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Japan's Occupation of Java in the Second World War

A Transnational History

Ethan Mark

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Japan's Occupation of Java in the Second World War

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Preface and Acknowledgments

History revels in irony, often saving its sharpest barbs for those most assured of its meaning. Such hubris manifests most profoundly precisely at moments of seismic social shift—moments of revolutionary upheaval in which history itself seems up for grabs. Now all is action, possibility, change; the pace of time itself seems to quicken. Altered relations of power, real and imagined, encourage the surfacing of accumulated ambitions and grievances, the reimagining and remapping of social boundaries, visions of transcendence. The contradictions of the old are confidently exposed to substantiate the fullness of the new. At their foundations, however, the structures of social power and knowledge and the orders they constitute are not so easily overcome; outflanked, they do not yield the field but rather reconsolidate and renegotiate it. The identity of the self-proclaimed missionaries of the new, how they define the relations of past and present, and the logic by which the “new order” allows them a social space, highlight not only the promise but also the limits of liberation.

This is a story of the wartime encounter in Java between two modern Asian societies, Japanese and Indonesian, embracing not one but two such moments of seismic social shift. Preceded by the shocks of Pearl Harbor and the fall of Singapore, the first such event came in the first nine days of March 1942: the overturning of Western imperial hegemony in the Netherlands Indies by a Japanese one. The second, even more instantaneous and unheralded, was Japan's defeat in August 1945—for most of Java's inhabitants, as much a bolt from the blue as the first. The experience of occupied Java between these two defining moments is reflected and refracted through the experiences of two sets of missionaries and their relations with one another: Japanese “men of culture” mobilized to conduct public relations for the occupying forces, and Indonesians who worked with them for their own purposes. Forged in a moment of overlapping struggle against a common “Western” enemy, their story illuminates an extraordinary, ambiguous, and ultimately tragic intersection between the waning forces of empire and the rising tide of nationhood—a distinctly “Asian” permutation of a global story of the Second World War era still largely obscured within the nationally-bounded histories integral to the postwar new order.

Researching, writing, and revising this study have led me on a journey of struggle and discovery across more than two decades and numerous national divides. Along the way I have accumulated a lengthy list of people and institutions to whom I owe debts of gratitude. I cannot imagine this project having gotten off the ground, let alone landing smoothly, without the support and advice of Carol Gluck. As teacher, mentor, scholar, and friend, her inspiration, insight, dedication, and enthusiasm have made an inestimable contribution to whatever I have so far achieved, and might achieve in the future. On the Indonesia side, special thanks go to William Frederick for his unsparing generosity with time, ideas, faith, and encouragement.

Preliminary research in Indonesia's National Archives and in Cornell University's excellent Southeast Asian collection was conducted with a grant from Columbia University's East Asian Institute, with support from John Bresnan. Benedict Anderson and Takashi Shiraishi also provided guidance during my early preparation. Subsequent intensive research in Japan was funded with a generous Fulbright / IIE Doctoral Dissertation Research fellowship. For his support in this period I am indebted to Waseda University's Gotō Ken'ichi. A number of Japanese veterans of the occupation gave freely of their time and memories and provided me with valuable, hard-to-obtain materials, including Izumi Shinjirō, Fusayama Takao, Morimoto Takeshi, and above all Nakajima Masachika. Research in Indonesia and the Netherlands was conducted with funding from a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship. Staff at the National Archives in Jakarta and at the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in Amsterdam were both exceedingly supportive and generous in availing me access to a wide range of source material. Graciously allowing me to interrupt their lives and work for personal interviews, Indonesian informants such as Sudarpo, Jusuf Ronodipuro, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Pak Tatang, and Ibu Saina made important contributions to the final outcome.

Writing was undertaken with fellowships from the Whiting Foundation and the NIOD, the staff of the latter also patiently providing me with office space and moral support for a time period much longer than my fellowship appointment. Here I must single out Remco Raben in particular for his steadfast encouragement, faith, and assistance as scholar, colleague, and friend. It was the NIOD once again, in equal share with the Isaac Alfred Ailion Foundation for Japanese Studies, that provided indispensable fellowship support to write this book. Complicated by unanticipated publishers' word limits, this project ended up taking several years longer than originally planned, and for this my apologies to all whom I have kept waiting. Thanks to editor Emma Goode and series editor Chris Gerteis at Bloomsbury for finally providing me an opportunity to surmount this hurdle. For scholarly inspiration as well as unstinting support and generosity in assisting in the shaping of the book, I am immeasurably indebted to Takashi Fujitani.

There is hardly room here to name them all, but the list of friends and colleagues who have helped me in various ways along this long road also includes Peter Keppy, Isao Yamazaki, Lewis Mayo, Christian Uhl, Els van Dongen, Torsten Weber, Scott O'Bryan, Keith Vincent, Franziska Seraphim, Louise Young, Katarzyna Cwiertka, Tom van de Berge, Yann Poncin, Paul Knoepfmacher, and David Schrayner. I am most grateful for the unlimited support, faith, and patience from my loving family: Gonda Dharmaperwira, her parents Reni and Mang, brothers and sisters on both sides, my father Robert. To our beloved children Yana and Ardjano—brightening the early days of this project as babies and now finally witnessing the appearance of this book as lights of my life in young adult form—I dedicate this study.

A note about orthography: before and during the Second World War, Indonesian was largely spelled according to a Dutch-influenced orthography that changed to an English-influenced one beginning after 1945, and officially since 1972. For example, what is now written with the letter "y" was written with the letter "j," what is now

written with the letter “u” was written as “oe,” and the like (this older Dutch spelling remains in effect in the case of certain family names). A term now spelled as “*gotong-royong*” (mutual cooperation), for example, was spelled before and during the war as “*gotong-rojong*.” In this manuscript I have kept to the original wartime spelling in the case of direct quotations as well as in the case of terms such as “*pemoeda*” which retain a specific period resonance. For other Indonesian terms I use the modern spelling.

And as no man knows the ubicity of his tumulus nor to what processes we shall thereby be ushered nor whether to Tophet or to Edenville, in the like way is all hidden when we would backward see from what region of remoteness the whatness of our whoness has fetched his whenceness.

— Joyce, *Ulysses*

Introduction: An Asian Intersection

Their young souls, which were ready to accept thoughts and aspirations whose appearance was good and beautiful, drifted for a time amidst astonishment at the slogans co-prosperity, Asia for the Asians, Hakkō Ichiu (All the World as One Household), and the like, which later turned out to be nothing more than beautiful balloons, each bigger and more brilliantly colored than the last, but their contents only air.

— H.B. Jassin, 1948¹

In March 1942, Japan captured the Netherlands East Indies and began a military occupation that lasted until August 1945. The circumstances of arrival and departure could not have presented a starker contrast. The Japanese capture of the Indies marked the culmination of a dazzling three-month string of unbroken victories over Western Allied forces previously seen as invincible. It brought an end to centuries of unbroken Western colonial domination, toppling the system of Western hegemony in Asia that Japanese and Indonesians alike blamed as the source of their modern troubles. It dramatically reversed the mood of Japanese crisis amplified by Japan's ongoing bloody, stalemated four-year war in China, and signaled, both for the triumphant Japanese and for the Indonesians who lined the roads to welcome them, a "new dawn" for Asia.²

Three and a half years later, their military forces elsewhere decimated and their homeland in ruins, the once proud Japanese were forced to accept a humiliating surrender and withdraw from Southeast Asia. They left behind them societies ravaged, exploited, and brutalized, their economies and social fabrics in tatters, with populations for the most part happier to see the Japanese leave than they had been to see them arrive—even if the Japanese departure only meant a renewed, violent confrontation with Western imperialism.

In retrospect, it was easy to disregard the depth and significance of the hopes that had accompanied the Japanese arrival, both among Japanese and Indonesians. Japanese promises of "Asian Liberation," the establishment of an "Asia for the Asians," and a "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" now seemed no more than historical phantoms, cruel fascist jokes whose cynicism, ruthlessness, and hypocrisy were matched only by their shallowness. In official, scholarly, and popular memory of the Indonesian experience of occupation, the Japanese hoisting of Japanese and Indonesian flags side by side during the 1942 invasion, followed in short order by the banning of the Indonesian flag and the strict forbidding of any talk of national independence "until

further notice,” became a notorious symbol of the flimsy, sham quality of Japanese wartime propaganda. In the end, Indonesia had received from Japan only a vague promise of future independence—and this only in September 1944, when the course of the war had turned decisively against Japan. In hindsight, those who had once called themselves Asia’s liberators appeared to have brought only a more exploitative, cynical, brutal version of the Western imperialism they claimed to oppose.

This bitter experience bore out an undeniable truth: for Japan’s leaders, Japan’s primary objective in occupying Indonesia, as elsewhere, had never been “Asian liberation” but rather the maximum exploitation of resources such as petroleum, foodstuffs, manpower, and territory to ensure the survival of the Japanese empire and its dominant position in Asia. For the mass of the Indonesian people who bore the direct brunt of these policies, early hopes of a better life were soon dashed amid shortages, inflation, discrimination, exploitation, and ultimately starvation, with casualty figures estimated in the area of three million in Java alone.³

Yet like all modern colonial and military occupations, the Japanese-Indonesian wartime interaction was shaped and to some extent enabled not only by the interaction between powerful victimizing leaders at the top and powerless victimized masses at the bottom, but by the experiences and agendas of men and women “in the middle,” both Japanese and Indonesian, who necessarily acted as social and cultural mediators between them. And whether thrust by circumstances or propelled by ambition into this strategic position, for many of these, the envisioned potential of this particular exchange extended far beyond the conventional. In occupied Java, a remarkable array of people from the middle ranks of both societies came forward to propagate Japan’s occupation as a shared, brotherly project to lead Asia to a bright modern future through a restoration of its indigenous culture and spirit. As in other colonial and military occupations, behind the façade of unity, their interests and agendas—not only as colonizer and colonized, but even amongst themselves—were hardly unified. As in other occupations, the power balance between them was asymmetrical. Yet to a degree reflecting the unprecedented, “world-historical” turn towards a post-Western and even postcolonial future that Japan’s sudden advent in Southeast Asia appeared to herald—along with the unprecedented opportunity for themselves and their nations that this appeared to represent—they seized upon this project with a remarkable zeal. Their experience highlights a transnational story of Japan’s wartime interaction with Asia yet to be told, with social and cultural implications much deeper, broader, more ambiguous, and longer-lasting than hitherto recognized.

Long conventionally understood as the reactionary “rampage” of a “not fully modern” society in the “semi-feudal” thrall of its leaders, Japan’s Asia-Pacific War has in recent times been increasingly revealed as a modern, mass affair, with revolutionary social and cultural consequences.⁴ In a “Total War” seen as both climax and radical solution to an interwar crisis at once domestic, regional, and global, Japan’s leaders sought to mobilize and hone the full productive capacities of the entire nation as never before—a Japanese inflection of a worldwide trend towards a qualitative as well as quantitative redefinition and intensification of the relations between state and society.⁵ Here, as elsewhere, the driving forces of Japan’s wartime social makeover were not just top-down but also bottom-up, with ambitious members of civil society as active

participants.⁶ Reflecting this dynamic, members of Japanese civil society were not only seduced by the propaganda of a “Greater Asia,” but also played a revolutionary, indispensable, and active part in crafting and propagating it.

This study reveals that, in wartime Indonesia at least, they were hardly alone. As exemplified by the prominent literary scholar H.B. Jassin whose 1948 quotation heads this introduction, while fearing Japanese power and motivated by their own agendas, many Indonesians found it all too easy to hitch themselves to the “beautiful balloons” of a Greater Asia—not only “to accept thoughts and aspirations whose appearance was good and beautiful,” but to actively participate in their production and reproduction. Against a backdrop of profound crisis in the Western-dominated global status quo, it was above all frustrated, ambitious members of Indonesian middle-class civil society like Jassin who perceived in the Japanese-sponsored promise of Asian rebirth an opportunity for themselves and their nation to rise from the oblivion to which the Western order had hitherto consigned them. As such, Greater Asia was the shared product of an ambivalent transnational intersection between Japanese imperialism and Asian anti-colonial nationalism.

Subsequently discredited and dismissed by Indonesians, Japanese, and commentators worldwide in light of a disastrous war and a postwar world dominated by nation-states and their neat-and-tidy narratives of heroes and villains, the wartime dream of a Greater Asia, and the cautionary transnational story of its proponents and victims, calls attention to a messier and more ambivalent history of the Second World War and its legacies.⁷ From a remote Asian location, it illuminates a chapter in a hidden story that is in fact central to the global history of the twentieth century: the passage from a world of empires to a world of nation-states, and the multi-valent, cross-border mix of confrontations, negotiations, alliances, and appropriations that accompanied and shaped it.⁸ It is a story with the global interwar crisis in the Western-dominated liberal capitalist order and the rise of anti-colonial nationalism as its double-catalysts—and the Second World War as its climax.

Situated at this most precarious of moments within the modern global history of imperialism, capitalism, and Western domination alike, the language of a “return to Asia” was the ambivalent shared vocabulary of an exchange that broke the colonial mold and pointed radically towards a postcolonial and postcapitalist future even as it also gestured towards the less-than-radical developmentalist neocolonialism of the Cold War to come—and expressed an ill-fated, romantic, and ultimately conservative Orientalist yearning to transcend time itself. As such, it spoke above all to the contradictory desires and frustrations of an ambitious, upwardly-mobile generation of middle-class would-be nation-builders, both Japanese and Indonesian, within an ambiguous wartime context of crisis and opportunity. The story of their wartime encounter highlights a troubling transnational space of receptivity, among Japanese imperialists and Asian nationalists alike, to an essentialized Asian identity as transcendent solution to the modern scourges of capitalism and imperialism as well as communism and other threatening social revolutionary forces from below—a receptivity whose story began long before the war’s promise brought them together, and continued long after its brutal reality drove them apart. As they confronted the new political and geostrategic constellations of the Cold War and beyond, “Asian

values” would subsequently go some way to bringing them back together again. As such their story reflects a wartime encounter whose valences and significance across time and space exceed the conventional political, chronological, narrative, and conceptual boundaries within which not only Japan's Asian occupations but indeed the Second World War as a whole has conventionally been conceived.

In practical terms, Japan's move southward against the combined might of the imperial West was an unprecedentedly bold gamble, and any hope of success demanded an unprecedented degree of sacrifice and commitment not only from Japanese, but from the peoples of the Asian territories “liberated” from Western control. Ideologically, Japan was meanwhile confronted with an Asia, and a world, in which not only Western domination but colonialism itself were being increasingly rejected and resisted. This reality was most rudely driven home by unexpectedly fierce Chinese resistance in the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), but it extended more generally across Asia and even to the Japanese themselves, many of whom identified with Asia's anti-colonial struggles so long as these did not directly challenge their own imperial privileges. Having dramatically raised the stakes of its war by taking on the overwhelming might of the West, imperial Japan could simply not afford another China debacle among its new Asian acquisitions. As a result, for both Japanese and local audiences alike, Japan's occupation of Indonesia and the rest of Southeast Asia had to be billed as something else, something revolutionary: an occupation to end all colonial occupations. Thus might the powerful, potentially destructive force of Southeast Asian nation-building aspirations be harnessed and co-opted into the struggle for Japan's imperial survival.

In the nearly four and a half years between the start of full-scale war in China in 1937 and the opening of hostilities against the Western powers in 1941, such appeals were honed and intensified in an increasingly desperate attempt to “pacify” the resistant Chinese, converting many Japanese to the cause, but meeting with little success among Chinese. Yet in seeking a justification for their radical move into Southeast Asia that might captivate not only Japanese but also Indonesians, the Japanese had a number of remarkable advantages in their favor that have since been largely downplayed or forgotten—advantages that cast the cultural experience of Japan's occupation of Indonesia in a distinctive light not only among Second World War-era occupations, but among modern colonial and military occupations more generally.

The most obvious of these advantages was a shared Western imperialist enemy, in the specific form of the Dutch, who had revealed themselves, in the face of rising Indonesian nationalism in the years before the war, as the most reactionary and intransigent of all of the Western colonizers in Asia. Whereas the Dutch had actively sought to suppress Indonesian nation-building aspirations—even shipping Indonesian nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta off to indefinite exile on a remote island from 1934 onwards—collaboration with and tutelage under the Japanese in such essential areas as administration, education, mass media, industry, and military training promised new avenues of practical opportunity. Although the Japanese leadership shared with the Dutch a fear of a unified Indonesia if mobilized *against* Japan, many also recognized its great potential in the shared, desperate battle against the unified

West, and sought in a rhetoric of unity and development a means of distancing Japan from the conventional colonial “divide and conquer” strategies of its enemies.

A second, little-remarked but highly significant point of potential intersection between the interests of Japanese and Indonesians (and other Southeast Asian colonized) was the positioning of China—and above all the powerful local overseas Chinese—as another “shared enemy.” Long resented by Indonesians for their economic domination and their position of privilege under the Dutch, the local ethnic Chinese community were also viewed with hostility by many Japanese, both as longstanding regional competitors and as an extension of the “illegitimate” resistance they faced in China proper. While their historical experiences of China and the Chinese differed, in their mental mappings of a transcendent new Asia, Japanese and Indonesians thus sought in one another a means of taming Chinese power.

A third point of distinctive Japanese-Indonesian intersection was the seductive power of Orientalism: the notion of an Asia whose peoples were essentially different from those of the West in terms of history, culture, and even biology. Orientalism was (and still is) an extremely potent vehicle of Euro-American global domination. Yet turned against Euro-America, it is also inherently a double-edged sword, a potentially shared source of Asian unity and anti-Western counter-attack. When set against an increasing array of negative phenomena associated with a Western origin in the interwar period, including the modern ills of capitalism, imperialism, and liberalism so starkly highlighted and amplified by the global Depression—as well as the communism so eagerly exported by the Soviet Union as a revolutionary solution to the class conflict and dehumanization they generated—Orientalism conjured the appealing apparition of an Asia “naturally” governed by essentially different historical, cultural, and even racial rules. A “rediscovery” and “return” to a shared “Asian” cultural and racial identity thus imagined, above all in combination with the selective adoption and adaptation of Western scientific and institutional modernity, promised a transcendent, revolutionary, yet socially harmonious way out of the crisis attributed to Western modernity. It was a recipe for modern nation-building the Japanese claimed to have uniquely mastered as Asia’s sole successful modernizers, a claim immensely strengthened in light of their unprecedented, swift, and decisive military victories over the combined forces of the hitherto “unbeatable” Western allies that began with Pearl Harbor. Orientalism and Western crisis thus combined to empower Japan to offer Indonesia indispensable leadership towards the powerful, seductive promise of a transcendent “Asian” alternative modernity.

In sociological terms, the most consistent support for such a “Greater Asian” renovation could be found among those occupying the social middle: representatives of each society’s middle classes, bourgeoisies, or what we can also call modernizing, nation-building sub-elites. In interwar Japan, members of this class felt a particular sense of frustration at the persistence of the “old order,” a domestic power structure perceived to be dominated at the top by a “semi-feudal” political and economic oligarchy from which they felt excluded. But they also felt threatened “from below” by the rise of an increasingly restless, politicized, and chaotic “mass society,” symbolized by activist workers and audacious modern women. A renovated, unified, virile nation-state, cleansed of the “Western” scourges of individual and class interest, efficiently

implementing and distributing the benefits of technological progress, regimented and mobilized for battle in the ruthless international struggles of the day, was the only way forward. As in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, such rhetoric gained currency against a backdrop of depression and the accompanying global crisis of “Anglo-American” liberal capitalism and heightened inter-imperial rivalry.

In occupied Indonesia, those most captivated by this missionary vision of a “new Asian order” were men occupying a domestic social position roughly corresponding to the most enthusiastic of their “Asianist” counterparts in Japan: ambitious, frustrated members of the Western-educated, “native” (*pribumi*) subelite or nascent middle class. Identified by scholar William Frederick as the new *priyayi* or “new nobility,” like many counterparts elsewhere in the colonial world, their accumulated capital was primarily social and educational rather than economic. Poised between Indonesia’s tiny feudal colonial upper nobility and its impoverished, uneducated agrarian masses, it was from among this class that Indonesia’s anti-colonial nationalist movement had emerged in the preceding decades.

In the period preceding the Second World War, Indonesian nationalists, along with counterparts in many parts of the colonial world, puzzled with increasing urgency over how to Westernize and modernize and yet avoid being a mere cultural copycat of the West. The Great Depression and the associated crisis of capitalism encouraged not only intensified opposition to Western imperialism, but also increased speculation over the weaknesses of Western modernity and the possibilities of its transcendence through a rediscovery and “revival” of local cultural traditions. For the nationalist class in particular, the notion of achieving an alternative non-Western, indigenous modernity seemed to offer a “third way” by which the power of the masses could be mobilized in a shared national battle against the illegitimate interests of the old colonial order, including the old native aristocracy, while promoting social harmony and avoiding a Western-style social revolution. In sum, the radical yet conservative promises of Japanese wartime Asianism found a particular resonance with preexisting Indonesian nationalist political and social concerns.

To illuminate this wartime social and cultural intersection and its ambiguous permutations, this study centers on the experience of Japanese and Indonesians who were at the center of the action as both producers and consumers of the ill-fated wartime dream of a “Greater Asia.” On the Japanese side, the focus is on members of the Java propaganda squad (*Jawa sendenhan*), a group of civilian specialists in the production of culture for mass consumption—writers, artists, filmmakers, musicians, and dramatists—along with military officers and administrators under whom they served and with whom they worked. It also includes a small but diverse group of prewar Japanese local residents who served as linguistic, cultural, and political interpreters and advisers to both.

Inspired by a cutting-edge Nazi-German model, the *bunkajin* (lit. “men of culture”) were mobilized, trained, and embedded with the invasion forces in a revolutionary bid to win local hearts and minds. In both social backgrounds and worldviews, they represented a diverse cross-section of Japan’s restless middle classes in a time of dizzying socio-economic and cultural change. Its membership included writers Takeda Rintarō and Asano Akira, both former leftists in their student days at the ultra-elite

Tokyo University in the 1920s whose political positions had since diverged profoundly in the face of rising fascism and war. Also involved were a diverse group of veterans of the propaganda front in China and Manchuria that included the liberal writer Abe Tomoji, the rightist writer Tomizawa Uio, and the colorful, pragmatically-minded military-civilian liaison Shimizu Hitoshi, each of whom—along with many others—embraced Indonesia as a space of opportunity to achieve the success that had eluded them, and their nation, in China. Although the army brass often viewed such men with suspicion as “Westernized” and politically unreliable, in an age of mass media and mass mobilization, their propaganda skills had become indispensable.

For their part the civilian draftees were wary of military attitudes and concerned for their lives and livelihoods. But no matter their diverse prior histories and political persuasions, with the fate of the empire in the balance, most embraced the opportunity not only to contribute to the new enterprise, but to help define it. In this, at least in the critical early months of the occupation, they had the distinctive good fortune of being under the command of two officers—squad commander Lieutenant Colonel Machida Keiji, and above him the commander of the occupying army itself, General Imamura Hitoshi—who were not only unusually committed to the “Greater Asian” mission, but also decidedly liberal in the degree of trust and maneuvering room they afforded these “men of culture” to pursue it on the ground.

On the Indonesian side, this study focuses on the experiences of a wide range of figures who in one way or another came in direct contact with these Japanese *bunkajin* and became involved in the Greater Asian mission, men (and a smaller number of women) who constituted a representative spectrum of the nation-building subelite. Sharing a high relative educational and social pedigree, they too were a diverse lot and often awkward bedfellows. They ranged from the young “native” students attending colleges in the capital of Batavia to the prominent nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta whom they so admired for their steadfast prewar refusal to cooperate with the Dutch. The students and their political heroes would be brought intimately together, but ultimately also driven to conflict—and to divergent visions of an independent Indonesia—by their experiences under the Japanese. Surveyed too is the remarkable wartime output of the outspoken prewar “non-cooperator,” romantic socialist journalist, poet, and playwright Sanusi Pané, who joined Sukarno and Hatta in opposing the Japanese before the war as “fascists,” only to become one of “Greater Asia’s” strongest wartime proponents. Among other experiences traced are those of the higher-status, conservative leaders of the *Parindra* nationalist party, Soekardjo Wirjopranoto and Winarno, rivals of Sukarno and Hatta who lacked their charisma and popular following but had avoided their harsh prewar fate by pursuing a more gradualist, compromising strategy with the Dutch. More quietly, they had also hedged their bets by nurturing ties with the Japanese. They would join Pané as propaganda coworkers at the wartime *Asia Raya* newspaper.

Given that the story of wartime Java as a transnational cultural experience has remained largely absent in postwar retellings, and in the traditional sorts of documentary evidence upon which these retellings are based—official policy documents, postwar memoirs, and interviews with prominent government and military officials, etc.—its excavation requires a critical combining of the narratives and data reflected in these

source materials with wartime sources such as editorials and essays in Japanese- and Indonesian-language newspapers, journals, books, and diaries. In the aim of further highlighting the transnational and transwar dimensions of the encounter obscured in conventional nation-centered narratives that begin in March 1942 and end in August 1945, I have adopted a narrative structure that weaves back and forth across the Japanese–Indonesian boundary line and places the experience in Java from 1942 to 1945 within an expanded geographical and chronological frame.

Chapter 1 introduces the Japanese context in the years preceding Japan's move southward in 1941, characterized by economic, political, and cultural crisis at home, in the expanding empire, and in the wider world—and explores the maturation of the ideology of Greater Asia within it. Chapter 2 sets the stage in the Netherlands Indies by taking up the story of Indonesian experiences of the prewar colonial status quo and its mounting social, political, and ideological pressures and tensions. This includes the rise of Indonesian nationalism and the “new *priyayi*” class that were its primary bearers, along with evolving attitudes towards the Dutch and their colonial regime, the ethnic Chinese, and Japan. Paying attention to ways in which the appeal of “Asia” to certain groups of Indonesians overlapped with those in the Japanese context—and to the web of overlapping sources that contributed to its formation—I profile the ways in which the two societies increasingly turned towards one another in the years leading up to 1942, even as the broader attentions of both remained fixed elsewhere, on the West and on other parts of Asia. Chapter 3 shifts back to the assembly of the small but heterogeneous Japanese group brought together to wage the ideological battle in Java under the auspices of the 16th Army's propaganda squad in late 1941.

Chapters 4 through 9 address the transnational experience of the wartime Japanese occupation of Java from March 1942 to August 1945, centered around those introduced in Chapters 1 through 3 and their interaction with the wider communities of occupier and occupied. Chapter 4 profiles the dramatic experience of the first direct encounters following the Japanese landings in March 1942, and the dreams and visions that accompanied them, first as described in Japanese accounts, and then in Indonesian sources. The first part of Chapter 5 explores early Japanese moves to “restore order” in occupied Java and the diverse agendas behind these, along with the Indonesian reception of these actions, which also varied according to class, status, and character.

While the manner of the Japanese restoration of order in the weeks after the Dutch surrender was a sobering experience for many Indonesians and, in its way, for Japan's Asian idealists as well, the sudden collapse of Western hegemony nevertheless resulted in a buoyant mood of speculation that seemed for a time to bridge the national divide. The second part of Chapter 5 profiles the ideas of Japanese Greater Asian missionaries in this moment of confidence. Chapter 6 depicts the fashion for the Japanese nation-building model and cultural “Asianization” among Java's indigenous elites, including the experiences of two semi-official Japanese–Indonesian projects aimed at securing Indonesian cooperation with Japan and its war effort. The first, the *Asia Raya* newspaper, was a relative success. The second, the “Three-A Movement,” was a dismal but revealing failure.

For Japanese authorities and for the Indonesian nation-building stratum, the return of Java's most prominent and outspoken nationalist Sukarno in July 1942 heralded a

new phase of Japanese-Indonesian cooperation and interaction. Chapter 7 revolves around Sukarno and his early interventions in the Greater Asian project. These included relationships he forged with Japanese representatives of the Greater Asian mission, his views of Greater Asia and its uses for Indonesia, and the experience of the “New Generation Residence Hall,” a Japanese-Indonesian project for the training of selected, ambitious young Indonesians to serve as the vanguard of the new Asian and national order.

Chapter 8 broadens out to the wider context of the first year of the occupation, surveying the colonial mentalities and structures of rule among the Japanese occupiers, Indonesian experiences of these mentalities and structures, and the reactions of Japan’s Greater Asian missionaries. There ensued a decline in the influence of the propaganda squad and its missionaries, many of whom departed Java by early 1943. Chapter 9 covers the Spring of 1943 through to the end of the Occupation in August 1945, a period of mounting socio-economic crisis, a steadily deteriorating war situation, heightened exploitation, and increasing Japanese-Indonesian alienation. Its final section explores the deflated but still defiant mood among veterans of Japan’s Greater Asian mission as the occupation drew to a close. In the Conclusion I assess the ambivalent implications of the wartime intersection and the transnational afterlives of “Greater Asia” in the postwar era.

To make a start on Japan’s Greater Asian enterprise and its transnational evolution in wartime Java, it is necessary to begin at an earlier place and time. On the Japanese side, this means exploring the predicament that pushed Japan on its radical course southward: the search for a way out of the interwar double crisis of capitalist and imperial modernity, and out of the bloody quagmire of the China War that it engendered.

Out of China

In the early hours of the morning of March 1, 1942, Asano Akira and several dozen fellow *bunkajin* (“men of culture”) colleagues, civilian members of the army’s new Java propaganda squad (*Jawa sendenhan*), followed the first wave of Japanese forces making a “landing before the enemy” at Banten, West Java.¹ Although the opposing Dutch colonial army was nowhere in sight, a chance encounter with Allied vessels fleeing the lost battle of the Java Sea resulted in a heavy exchange that sent their boat to the bottom. Plucked from the sea by Japanese troop transport vessels, the men of culture came ashore exhausted, soaking wet, and covered with oil. Morale, however, was high. For Asano and many others who waded triumphantly ashore that day, Japan had come to Java on nothing less than a holy mission of liberation: liberation of the Indonesian “natives” from their European colonial oppressors, and liberation of the Japanese from the stranglehold of Western encirclement and greed. Japan’s mission was unmistakable and clear, and the nation seemed truly as one in understanding and support.²

Over the preceding three months, almost all Western defenses in colonial Southeast Asia had crumbled in Japan’s military path. Singapore, the “impregnable” centerpoint of British imperial hegemony there, had surrendered just two weeks before, and local inhabitants across the region had turned out en masse to welcome Asia’s new leader and liberator. It seemed as if the forces of world history itself were on Japan’s side. The ease of the Java landings, too, surpassed the most optimistic of Japanese expectations: the Dutch fled before the force of Japan’s guns, casualties were minimal, and all but one of the members of the propaganda squad made it ashore.³ Surviving the brush with death made for powerful emotions of joy and relief. “In my whole life, there was never a morning where I felt more refreshed,” wrote Asano’s friend and colleague Tomizawa Uio.⁴ Yet as the “men of culture” marched along to their established meeting-point in their first exposure to the blistering Java sun, their legs grew heavy and they battled hunger, thirst, and fatigue. The quality of the “native” response, meanwhile, remained in doubt. The indigenous population were nowhere in sight, their homes abandoned.⁵

Although they made no direct mention of it in their subsequent writings, it is not hard to imagine that these first hours in Java evoked for Asano and Tomizawa memories of another “Asian front” they had visited some three and a half years earlier—the battlefields of northern China. As “special correspondents” (*tokuha’in*) of the “pen battalion” (*pen butai*) invited by the Japanese army to bolster domestic support for the Sino-Japanese War as it entered its second year in September and October 1938,

these two moderately prominent writers had largely failed to make contact with the local Chinese inhabitants, finding one village after another deserted in the wake of the fighting.⁶ “The China we visited,” Asano had written upon returning to Japan, “was, for the most part, a China without Chinese.” He referred repeatedly to a feeling of loneliness (*sabishii*).

Speaking upon his return in November 1938 at a roundtable discussion whose participants included several junior army officers, Asano recalled these ruined villages and lamented that there no longer seemed to be any connection between China’s glorious past and the “China of today.” While acknowledging a sense that “the walls around each village” seemed to “symbolize the peasants’ simple desire for peace,” he avoided the obvious link between Japanese aggression and the suffering of the Chinese peasantry through a feat of intellectual displacement, one that had become a standard reflex among Japanese state and civil-society spokesmen of the day. The problem was simple: China, like the rest of Asia, was not really suffering at the hands of the Japanese army—an army indeed characterized by its “purity,” “power,” and “noble efforts”—but from the schemes and ravages of Western imperialism. Because Asia was too weak to defend itself, the task had fallen to Japan, the only Asian nation capable of meeting the Western challenge.⁷

The challenges Japan faced in this mission, argued Asano, were really less military or political than spiritual: the Japanese public, including its intellectuals, seemed more absorbed with recently imposed domestic economic controls than with devoting themselves to winning the war. The “pure,” “selfless spirit” that had defined Japan’s nineteenth-century Meiji Restoration—a struggle completely different in its nature from Western political revolutions of class against class—had since been exchanged for “half-ways” and “compromises.” With a return to this spirit, the problem of China would surely vanish of its own accord.⁸ Current Sino-Japanese frictions were attributable to an exclusive Chinese exposure to Japan’s unrefined “lower culture” of restaurant and bar owners; in their stead, it was Japanese intellectuals who should take the lead in promoting a properly refined Japanese culture to the mainland. Japanese writers should write “pure” works of literature for a Chinese audience, and Japanese university students should serve mandatory stints in China to propagate Japan’s mission and foster mutual respect between Japanese and Chinese.⁹ In subsequent months, Asano and Tomizawa each occupied themselves with their own contributions to this new cultural campaign, Tomizawa producing a novel entitled *Tōyō* (“The East”), and Asano a treatise on and translation of the work of Meiji-era Japanese art and cultural philosopher Okakura Tenshin.¹⁰ Inspired by Tenshin’s famous proclamation “Asia is One,” each author portrayed the East and its cultural heritage as once great and unified, but now—as the outcome of centuries of increasing Western infiltration—in chaos and disarray, and in need of restoration under Japanese leadership.

Accompanying the article in which the above statements were published in December 1938 was an ominous editorial on the China situation by playwright and journalist Kamiizumi Hidenobu. Communism in China’s villages was like “air and water,” he wrote, and could not be beaten solely by military force. If it hoped to win in China, Japan must promote “a new ideology that is more easily assimilated than communism.”¹¹

In the context of the Sino-Japanese War, the sorts of ideas that civil-society spokesmen like Asano and Tomizawa offered upon their return from China—ideas that linked a project of domestic, social, and cultural renovation to missionary expansion in neighboring Asia—were now coming to represent a convincing solution for the problems of Japan and its empire. At least, that is, for many Japanese. They were joined in such thinking by a new, activist generation of government bureaucrats as well as military men, particularly those in the middle and junior officer ranks.

The crystallization of this recipe for a “Greater Asia” came about in an interwar context of economic, political, social, and cultural crisis that was at once domestic, regional, and global. Industrialization, rising living standards, an expanded political franchise, and access to a universal, merit-based educational system had encouraged hopes of progress towards a modern, prosperous, free, and equitable society—towards the fruits of the modern promise of the Meiji Restoration. In the interwar period, groups hitherto largely excluded from national social and political participation, including factory workers, farm laborers, and women, were among those most inspired by this promise, and increasingly assertive of their rights as fellow citizens.¹² But, as in other industrialized countries at this time, capitalist development and the move towards a “mass society” also brought unprecedented social dislocation, imbalances, and inequities. In Japan, this occurred with a tempo and an unevenness distinctive in its extremes. And, as elsewhere, these problems were heavily exacerbated by the global depression.¹³

For many, the process of unbridled modernization now seemed inevitably leading towards social fragmentation, anarchy, and dehumanization: a crisis of identity in a world dominated only by money and machines. Particularly among those from the middle class and up, growing social and political assertiveness “from below” heralded a dangerous splintering of the imagined simpler, more organic, and harmonious social order of the past. At the same time, particularly from the middle class down, there was a growing impatience with the perceived persistence of the outdated, “semi-feudal” socio-political trappings of the Meiji order—the still-lingering dominance of the “Satsuma-Chōshū clique” and its allies in senior military and political circles, and their intimate ties to “old money” in the form of the giant *zaibatsu* concerns.

The sense of crisis was compounded by intensified competition between the imperial powers in the wake of the Great Depression and a simmering unease towards rising anticolonialism in the empire—particularly in China. There was also wariness of the Soviet Union and its explicit aim of exporting communism. Nepotism and indecisiveness among Japan’s political elites were generally seen as compounding these problems rather than addressing them.

In line with global trends in the 1920s, many would-be reformers had been drawn to Marxism as a quintessentially modern, universal vehicle of domestic and international social analysis, critique, and reform. Its enthusiasts extended from urban factory workers in Japan’s fledgling labor movement to the elite, mainly middle-class graduates of the higher ranks of Japan’s modern, highly-competitive education system such as Asano Akira. But in the more heated post-1929 context, with its growing feeling of threat “from outside,” increasingly aggressive state and military campaigns to suppress and marginalize communism and its followers as “alien” and subversive of

the social order largely succeeded in placing Marxism beyond the political pale. These campaigns were pursued with the general concurrence of the mass media, business elites, and the mainstream political parties. In an ideological “return to Japan,” many now found a safer, socially-secure location from which Japan might be renovated and stabilized “from within,” rather than violently dismantled “from without.”

By now, however, Marxist social categories and critiques had become too compelling to be discarded altogether. Instead, a radical critique of modern life evolved that borrowed from Marxist categorizations and critiques of class society and the global capitalist/imperialist order, but—as in contemporary Italian fascism and, subsequently, German Nazism—rejected Marxist social revolutionary prescriptions.¹⁴ The problem of modernity was attributed to the fraying of the social fabric and a loss of traditional values—it was presented, in sum, as a problem of culture. With increasing stridency, it was not capitalism or imperialism per se, but rather Japan’s indiscriminate importation of “Western” liberal ideas and Western institutions such as laissez-faire capitalism and parliamentary democracy that were targeted.¹⁵ Japan’s experiment with Western liberalism and individualism, it was argued, had generated selfishness, greed, and decadence, and a corresponding departure from the morality and spirit of Japan’s “traditional” culture. This called for a restoration of older cultural norms and national social cohesion that modernization had undermined. Common rallying symbols were Japan’s emperor and its unbroken imperial line, pillars of Japan’s unique *kokutai*, or national polity, now increasingly referenced in the elaborate archaic terminology of the ancient literary works the *Kojiki* and the *Man’yōshū*.¹⁶ A second front in the discourse of traditional culture involved Japanese women, who were urged to abandon Westernized habits along with their wardrobes and “return” to their natural role as repositories of Eastern morality, familial devotion, and spousal subservience.¹⁷

Few, however, spoke in favor of a simple return to an idealized past. In the new Japan, egalitarian social values would triumph over the outdated inhumanities and injustices of both capitalism and “feudalism”: all would contribute their labors to the national cause, excessive “uneven distribution of wealth” would be corrected, and meritocracy vigorously enforced. “So long as economic profits, and especially unearned incomes, are enjoyed by one section of the nation alone,” proclaimed a 1934 pamphlet from the young officers in the press department of the Imperial War Ministry, “the majority of the people will be left in the utmost misery and distress.”¹⁸ The national interest *in toto* would set the public and private agenda, with the nation conceived as a single, unified, and classless social whole, as opposed to a place of confrontation between classes and their inexorably competing interests.¹⁹ This renovation would be mediated and ensured by thoroughgoing state intervention in the economic, political, and social realms, comparable to that of the fascist countries in Europe and—like them—partly inspired by Stalin’s USSR.²⁰ Thus would the common “national” interest be protected from partisan interests from above (feudal-plutocrat elites), from below (aggressive workers and peasants), from within (audacious modern women and Westernized intellectuals), and from without (communism and anti-colonial nationalism).

The social distribution of those most apt to perceive their position in terms of such a “squeeze”—and thus most receptive to a “solution” in the form of a radical

subjugation of such “selfish interests” to those of the nation—mapped the bounds of what might be called Japan’s radicalized interwar middle classes, broadly defined. They included members of both Japan’s “old” middle class—the relatively large proportion of Japanese in the category of small-to-medium-sized merchant, rural owner-cultivator, and those of former lower samurai background—as well as those of the smaller but rapidly expanding “new” middle classes in the educated white-collar and military professions, ambitious graduates of Japan’s modern, ostensibly meritocratic educational and military system. Between the two there was by now, in any event, a considerable overlap. The general middle-class character of this complex of ideas, however, did not preclude those of other classes from co-opting, subscribing to and contributing to their contents and spread. Indeed as with fascism in Europe, fear of more radical alternatives—particularly among (disaffected) members of established elites—facilitated their broader social diffusion.²¹ Down the social ladder, too, the appeal of a new order also extended to the growing number of those lacking the objective qualifications of “middle-classness” in terms of incomes or job security, but who made up for this in educational pedigree and/or ambition.²²

Beginning from around 1930, small groups of uncompromising junior army officers acted upon some of these ideas through a series of unsettling assassination attempts on elite political and economic figures. Backed by disgruntled members of the military inner circle, these actions culminated in a failed coup attempt in the name of a “Showa Restoration” in 1936. Impatience with the status quo was particularly rife among lower - and middle-ranking officers in the Kwantung Army, responsible for guarding the South Manchurian Railway and the substantial Japanese interests that had built up around it in preceding decades. These sentiments precipitated the army’s adventurous invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the subsequent establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo the following year.

Domestic developments in the wake of the Manchurian invasion meanwhile revealed that not only army officers but state officials, middle-class civil society, and indeed the mass of the population, too, were coming to look to Asia as a place where the contradictions of Japan’s modern development could be resolved.²³ A hostile international climate was a significant factor: in response to the depression, the Western powers grew increasingly protective of their domestic and colonial markets. In such areas as the Netherlands East Indies, these policies stood directly in the way of Japan’s attempts to export its way out of the depression. Within this context, colonial expansion in Asia was perceived as a means of securing resources and regions in which Japan’s own economic interests would be guaranteed preeminence.²⁴ For the military, the securing of China also represented the ultimate strategic barricade against the Soviets and communism, perceived as the most pressing threat to Japan.²⁵ Manchukuo was seen as a testing ground for a planned, controlled economy and corporatist state that might then be implemented within Japan.²⁶ It was also envisioned as a place of unlimited resources and advertised as a space for aspiring Japanese entrepreneurs to give free reign to their ambitions, free of the cliquism of cartels and insider politics that impeded them at home. Manchuria’s open spaces were furthermore portrayed as representing the ultimate solution for the pressing problem of Japanese rural depression and “overpopulation.”²⁷

In both ideological and physical spheres, the aggressive expansion of Japan's empire in the 1930s thus moved in dialectical tandem with domestic developments. Younger officers in the Kwantung Army led the domestic propaganda charge for social renovation both at home and in Manchuria. Their calls were met with enthusiasm at home, not only by fellow military men and activist bureaucrats but also by the mass media and an aggressive new group of venture capitalists. Journalistic glorification of Japan's soldiers and their exploits brought great returns for industries increasingly reaching a mass audience, as Japanese of all walks of life consumed such imperial fantasies with a passion.²⁸ After the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, state socio-economic control and intervention at home, which became known as the "New Order" (*Shin chitsujo*), greatly expanded. The war was initiated, again, by an army impatient with establishment resistance to its demands for military budget increases. Representatives of civil society, including Tomizawa Uio and Asano Akira, again played an important role in the social mobilization for war and domestic sacrifice. By serving as war correspondents in China, these writers and journalists could kill two birds with one stone, strengthening their patriotic credentials while tapping into a seemingly bottomless public appetite for war-related media.²⁹

Japan's modern imperial dialectic could not continue indefinitely on this internal plane alone, however. Where China and the rest of the world were concerned, Japan was treading a dangerous path. The military showdown with the Chinese nationalist and communist armies failed to yield the quick and decisive victory expected, and the risk of an eventual collision with the Soviet Union and the Western imperial powers loomed. Nor were the problems of expansion limited to the military realm. For in both the international and domestic political contexts of the 1930s, traditional ideological justifications for imperialism were coming under siege. The influence of the Marxist-Leninist critique of imperialism and the increasing rhetorical and political potency of anti-colonial nationalist movements in such places as India were, in effect, turning up the moral and political heat. So, too, was the anti-imperialist rhetoric emanating from such sources as the Soviet Union, labor movements, and progressives in the USA and Europe.

In 1931, Manchuria had been a relatively "easy target": It was of relatively minor importance internationally, capable of mounting little military opposition, and Japan could point to a decades-long history of activity and involvement there.³⁰ It was nevertheless a sign of the times—the growing appeal of anti-colonial nationalism, as well as rising tensions between the great powers—that Japan refrained from outright annexation, instead establishing the ostensibly "independent" new state of Manchukuo.³¹ Justifying military expansion into China proper—a vast country with a great cultural tradition of which Japan itself had long been a historical beneficiary—was a more complicated proposition. Its inhabitants revealed a growing political awareness and an increasingly strident nationalism, spurred on by Japanese military and economic aggression as well as nationalist and communist propaganda that attacked it. As Kamiizumi's trenchant 1938 essay revealed, the influence of rising nationalism and the appeal of Marxism's powerful critique of the evils of capitalism and imperialism in China demanded some sort of ideological response. All the more so after the widely acknowledged early wartime "successes" scored by the Chinese

nationalist enemy in the field of domestic and international propaganda. The nationalists, Army Information Bureau chief Mabuchi Itsuo grudgingly admitted in a 1940 text, were “winning in the propaganda war even as they are losing miserably on the battlefield.”³²

On the home front, too, it was increasingly recognized that victory in the total war that the conflict in China was becoming required more effective psychological mobilization of the entire Japanese population. Military and economic expansion into Manchuria and north China remained a relatively easy popular sell so long as they appeared to represent part of the solution to Japan’s modern socio-economic predicament. But full-scale war entailed sacrifices in the form of huge military budgets, rationing, and a shrinking of the domestic consumer economy. As Tomizawa and Asano observed upon their return to Japan in late 1938, these sacrifices were proving hard for many Japanese to swallow.

To turn the tide both at home and in Asia, Japan’s middle-class missionaries amplified their appeals to culture as both refuge and remedy in an increasingly trans-Asian packaging. Japan’s war in Asia, they argued, was a holy war (*seisen*) unlike any other, because both Japan and Japan’s relationship to Asia were unique.³³ As domestic Japan cleansed itself of the modern social ills and tensions associated with the excessive importation of Western culture and institutions, so the aim of its battle in Asia was to liberate its Asian brethren from the same scourges of Western imperialism and capitalism, reuniting and developing an Asia whose peoples and lands had long been divided and downtrodden.³⁴ The resultant New Asian Order would draw its strength and its principles from an “Asian” cultural essence at once restored and renovated, yielding a form of capitalism without the problems of (Western) capitalism, a form of empire without the problems of (Western) imperialism, and a form of the modern shorn of the problems of (Western) modernity.³⁵ As Asia’s only nation successful in escaping colonization and preserving its native identity while implementing technological modernization, Japan was the sole country qualified for this mission, the powerful “older brother” Asia required to lead it out of the Western-imposed darkness. Such appeals were further permeated by idealized notions of a gender-ordered world, both in the image of a robust, active, productive, masculine Japan striving to bring about progress in a passive, feminized “other” Asia, and also domestically, in the idea of a clear division of labor between productive, manly military activities abroad and female supportive and reproductive activities at home.

Neither the problems Japan faced in China nor the proposals and ambitions of men such as Asano, Tomizawa, and others were entirely new to depression-era Japan. Nor were they entirely limited to Japan alone. The discourse of an Asia unnaturally divided by Western colonialism and awaiting reunification had precedents from at least the turn of century in the Pan-Asianist rhetoric of domestic spokesmen such as Okakura Tenshin as well as his admired friend Rabindranath Tagore in India, and subsequently Sun Yat-sen in China. The same period had seen the appearance of a Japanese rhetoric of racial and cultural commonality with neighboring East Asians (*dōbun dōshū*, “same language, same race”), although—as Sun, Tagore, and indeed a host of Korean and Taiwanese as well as Chinese critics frequently observed—such rhetoric was generally contradicted in colonial policy and practice. For both Japanese and Asian patriarchal

elites, too, rhetoric and policies seeking a “return” to “traditional” morality and gender roles also had a history as long as that of Western-style modernization itself.³⁶

Three key aspects of “Greater Asia” were, however, specific to their interwar time and place: (1) the strident rejection of Western culture and institutions and embracing of an imagined Asian-Japanese alternate modernity; (2) the appropriation of a Marxist-Leninist-inspired critique of the unjust, inhumane workings of “Western” capitalism and imperialism; and (3) a belief that Japan’s world-historic, divine national mission as a nation was to lead and liberate Asia through a rejection of the latter and a “return” to the former. The result was a mingling of imperialist discourses with those of progressivist idealism, social corporatism, Marxism, and anti-colonial nationalism. In thus appropriating the cause of Asian colonial liberation against Western domination, and in expanding Japan’s mission of internal renovation to one of seeming global relevance, Greater Asianism promised a higher mission around which Japan’s troubled society—rich and poor, right and left, country and city—might yet rally. Essentially imperialist in its Japanese incarnation, in global-historical terms it can also be seen to have occupied a transitional and highly ambivalent position between imperialism and postcolonial nationalism.

Beyond Japan itself, such ambiguities endowed Japan’s Greater Asianism with a potential transnational appeal, most of all where it intersected with the worldviews of fellow Asians sharing similarly ambivalent perspectives on Western modernity and facing a number of similar challenges in their struggles to secure domestic hegemony and establish new nations free from the fetters of the past. I refer specifically to Asia’s modernizing nationalist bourgeoisies on their own “Meiji Mission.” Yet precisely to the degree that it sought to co-opt the progressive forces of anticolonial nationalism and promised a common solution to the problems of imperial modernity, Japanese Greater Asianism was a highly unstable and dangerous double-edged sword. To make liberating promises alone, without fulfilling them in practice, would be to invite a doubled Asian wrath upon the empire.

As the first practical test case, early signs from China were not encouraging. For while occupied China represented the wellspring as well as the main target of Japanese Greater Asianism, a combination of local factors severely inhibited local receptivity to Japanese claims as “Asia’s liberator,” let alone any legitimacy as “Asia’s leader.”³⁷ These included the shocking brutality of the war and continued Japanese racism and arrogance, both of which cast Japan’s increasingly brotherly propaganda in an increasingly ironic light. If this were not enough, there was also the accumulated weight of history in the form of a common perception of Japan and the Japanese as scheming, self-aggrandizing imperialists. China had by now been subject to a century of imperial exploitation and encroachment at the hands of the Great Powers, with Japan representing, in this sense, only the most recent arrival to the predatory feast. In this context, while Japanese spokesmen sought to distinguish “Western” imperialism as Asia’s shared enemy, many Chinese had come to see imperialism per se as China’s enemy, revealing correspondingly little receptivity to the essentialist East/West distinctions that underpinned “Japan’s Case.” Japanese attempts to portray themselves as Asia’s political and cultural center were further undermined by longstanding assumptions of Chinese cultural superiority over their geographically smaller, “peripheral” neighbor.

Such issues were painfully revealed in an anecdote retold in a Java propaganda squad newspaper editorial in 1942:

There is a story of the China pacification unit (*Shina senbuhun*).

They argued that Japan and China have the same script and are of the same race (*dōbun dōshu*), they are brothers, and they should proceed with hands joined.

Someone in the audience replied—Alright, but China is the older brother.

It is said the members of the pacification unit had no words to answer this for some time.³⁸

While realizing Greater Asia's imagined cross-border potential in China thus proved difficult, this did not, however, limit its appeal among Japanese. On the contrary, for many Japanese, unexpectedly tenacious Chinese resistance only seemed to strengthen this appeal. "As long as [the Chinese] do not make one shared border and one shared peace the goal," wrote Tomizawa Uio in an early 1939 essay,

Japan will sacrifice its last drop of blood. Whether this is good or bad is not an issue. Now there is no other choice. Yet even just one year ago, we had not awakened to this irresistible fate. At first there was not one among us who was not struck by a strange feeling of, why this? At first we did not imagine that China would mount such intense resistance ... If Japan does not achieve its aim, in sum, it will mean the complete downfall of the East.³⁹

Mass support for the war and its aims, meanwhile, seemed to grow only stronger with time, at least through 1939.⁴⁰ Not all of this support could be directly connected to concerns about the impending downfall of the East. Some of it could be attributed to a simple desire to win the war and defeat "once and for all" the intransigent "local warlord" Chiang Kai-shek and the "bandits" under his command. This desire was ceaselessly whipped up by the Japanese press, military, and politicians, who refused to acknowledge the much more threatening possibility that the Chinese resistance was in fact a people's resistance. Another reason for popular support for the war was the continued promise of tangible economic and social rewards for many Japanese.⁴¹

Where the Japanese intelligentsia were concerned, in any case, the morass of the China war only appears to have heightened the appeal of Greater East Asia as an ideological refuge, only increasing the seductiveness of the notion of achieving an empire so new, and yet so "old," that it would somehow transcend the problems that imperialism and capitalism posed for the present. The "taming" of China in this way would also represent an appealing, permanent resolution of historically longstanding Japanese anxieties vis-à-vis its neighbor—its great civilization, vast population, immense physical size, and proximity to Japan—which always threatened to overshadow Japan's own identity, and in particular any Japanese claim as Asia's ruler and leader.⁴²

As much as it seemed to draw the Japanese together in an ostensibly shared cause, however, the experience in China also revealed worrisome divisions both among Greater Asianist "true believers" themselves, and between these and the wider population. Such

concerns were reflected in a common tendency to blame the problem of the Chinese misunderstanding of Japan's "true aims" not only on the "obstinate," "hot-headed" Chinese themselves but also on the misbehavior of unenlightened Japanese in China—or, as Asano and Tomizawa had put it, too much Chinese exposure to Japan's colonial "low culture" of restaurant owners, adventurers, self-centered petty tradesmen, and the like. From journalistic offerings like those of Asano and Tomizawa to army propaganda to popular films such as the 1940 blockbuster *Shina no yoru* ("China Night"), a similar critique appeared. More privately, military and other observers extended this analysis to explain (away) the misbehavior and cruelty of Japanese rank-and-file soldiers in the field.⁴³

There was also substantial resistance to the "holy" aspect of the holy war in China from more respectable quarters, however. Voices of skepticism included civilian spokesmen such as the party politician Saitō Takao. In bold public statements that brought him official reprimands and dismissal from parliament—but also a substantial amount of public sympathy—Saitō offered a critique of Japan's actions in China from what might be described as a "right-realpolitik" or "classical imperialist" position. Saitō dismissed haughty claims of a "holy war" in China as empty rhetoric debilitating to Japan's true mission in Asia: the securing of Japanese colonial interests and the bringing of China to heel by whatever means necessary, including the heightened application of brute force.⁴⁴ While Saitō was publicly vilified for his blasphemy regarding Japan's holy Asian crusade, there remained many figures within the military, state, and economic establishment who privately shared a devotion to the pursuit and protection of the Japanese imperial-strategic interest relatively unrestrained by the fetters of missionary considerations. These included men such as General Tōjō Hideki and others associated with the "Control Faction" (*tōseiha*) dominant in the Army High Command after 1936.

At the same time, responses to the "China problem" in the years 1937 to 1941 also highlighted problematic divisions among the Greater Asian "true believers" themselves. These divisions essentially revolved around the extent of political, economic, social, and cultural autonomy to be allowed "brother Asians" in the new Asian order. With military backing and encouragement, it was the voices of men who might be classified as "right idealists" that reverberated most—among civilians, these included Asianist ideologues such as *literati* Asano and Tomizawa and a host of scholars turned military cheerleaders such as Kanokogi Kazunobu, a philosophy professor at both Tokyo and Kyoto imperial universities. Unstinting in their support of the army, the war, the *kokutai*, the absolute inviolability of the Emperor, and the hierarchically exalted position of Japan in the new Asia to come, they shared a tendency to equate Asia's rescue with the "awakening" of Asians to their identity as Japanese imperial subjects. Such standpoints were usually accompanied by support for unilateral policies of "Japanization."⁴⁵

Representing a substantial minority both in- and outside of the military, however, there were also Asianist figures who, while agreeing on the basic primacy of Japanese national interests and sharing a conviction in the inherent superiority of Japanese culture, sought solutions to the "China problem" in a more egalitarian approach that would acknowledge Chinese subjectivity to the degree Japanese interests would allow.

Ideally, the power of Chinese local and national identity and aspirations might thus be co-opted in a shared Asian struggle. Occupying what might be called this centrist, pragmatic-strategic area of the Asianist spectrum was the influential General Ishiwara Kanji, a planner of the “Manchurian incident” with an extensive following among junior officer ranks.⁴⁶

Reaffirming communism and the Soviet Union as Japan’s one true enemy, Ishiwara believed Japan should employ “moral suasion” rather than military force in China, while holding up Manchuria as a model of harmony and mutual prosperity. China, he argued, would go on fighting even if Chiang Kai-shek was defeated, and both Japan’s and China’s interests would be better served through an arrangement of mutual political and economic reliance based on autonomous choice rather than force.⁴⁷ On the assumption that propaganda could not be effective without a popular mass movement, Ishiwara proposed the establishment of an “East Asian League Movement” (*Tōa renmei undō*), open to all Chinese, in 1939. The premises of this movement were Chinese political independence, economic cooperation, and mutual defense, with “absolutely no interference in internal affairs” so long as they cooperated with the Japanese.⁴⁸

These views reflected those of Ishiwara’s chief theoretical advisor Miyazaki Masayoshi, author of *Outline of an East Asian League* (*Tōa renmei ron*, 1938), and they attracted at least limited Chinese interest. Most notable was disgruntled nationalist Wang Jing-wei, who agreed to head up a pro-Japanese regime in the occupied areas of central and southern China in 1940.⁴⁹ But Ishiwara’s ideas continued to face stiff opposition within military and intellectual circles for, among other things, neglecting “the position of Japan as the leader and the nucleus of Greater East Asia.” Removed from the general staff in Tokyo several months after the war began, he was more or less “exiled” to the position of vice-chief of staff of the Kwantung Army in North China,⁵⁰ and was eventually removed from active duty altogether in 1941.⁵¹

Further to the left of Ishiwara and his ilk, but still firmly within the ideological sphere of Greater Asia, were a number of men roughly classifiable in the category of “left-idealists.” These were mostly members of the civilian intelligentsia who perceived the establishment of a new Japanese-led Asian Order as a path to the realization of long-cherished social-revolutionary goals both abroad and at home. In their view, Japan’s position, culture, and history as a fellow Asian nation uniquely qualified it to pursue a progressive modern “world-historical” mission in Asia. This mission would be faithful to Marxism’s progressive goals of social justice, but its “Asianness” would at the same time enable it to avoid the inherently divisive and destructive path upon which “Western” Marxism insisted: social revolution based upon class struggle. Japan, in sum, was to be the agent of an Asian revolution without revolution. Because of their past political histories, their ambiguous stance vis-à-vis military power, and a general military mistrust of Westernized intellectuals, these men often stood on particularly shaky ground where the regime was concerned.

Advocates of this sort of world-historical role for Japan included a number of Japanese “Asia Hands” and (former) Marxists such as the China scholars Tachibana Shiraki and Ozaki Hotsumi. Each conducted research in Manchukuo and north China under military protection and sought, in their own ways, to co-opt the army

as an agent of revolutionary social change even as the army co-opted the results of their labors for its own purposes.⁵² Perhaps the most influential representative of this approach to Japan in Asia was Miki Kiyoshi, an outstanding graduate of Kyōto Imperial University invited in 1938 to head the Cultural Problems Research Group (*Bunka mondai kenkūkai*) of the Shōwa Research Association (*Shōwa kenkyūkai*), a private policy advisory thinktank established under the encouragement of subsequent prime minister Konoe Fumimaro.⁵³ In the Association's *Principles of Thought for a New Japan*, published in early 1939, Miki noted that the creation of regional economic blocs and spheres of political and cultural influence was the basic trend of the times. He argued that it was Japan's "world-historical mission" to enable the East to determine its own destiny, creating a "cooperative body" (*kyōdōtai*) in East Asia with a "new East Asian culture" based upon "cooperativism" (*kyōdōshugi*). Cooperativism was defined as an alternative to both liberalism and socialism in which the state's economic structure would be unified and "classes will cease being classes and become [incorporated into] an occupational order within a higher whole." Thus would the evils of capitalism and class struggle be eliminated. Japan's imperial policy within this framework was to be one of "liberating" China from Western imperialism, eschewing the narrow "racialism" of old and establishing a relationship of "mutual respect" between the two nations in which Chinese national aspirations were to be acknowledged. As the price of entry into this brotherly New East Asian Order, the Chinese for their part would be expected to transcend "simple nationalism."⁵⁴

Such ideological divisions among Japan's Greater Asian "true believers" were real and significant. So, too, were the fracture lines of social class, status, and ideology separating the missionaries from the more conventional among the wider Japanese population. Forged in the crucible of the China war, these divisions were now poised for export to the very different contexts of occupied Southeast Asia. Their subsequent ramifications are a central subject of this study. Yet from Miki at the "left" to Tomizawa at the "right," Greater Asia's Japanese subscribers shared an inclination to seek solutions to the problems of imperial/liberal-capitalist modernity in an essentialized "Asian" cultural and racial identity, one by definition different from that of the "West." Above all, they shared a refusal or inability to contemplate solutions to Japan's problems outside of an imperial framework. Rather, in their own ways, each sought to stretch and mold Japan's empire to fit the perceived demands of the times, in the process fashioning distinctive visions of a Japanese empire that might transcend imperialism. While the cumulative play of history and power prefigured their ideological reflexes, their thinking nevertheless remained a moving target, contingent upon and relational to the workings of history and power yet to come.

Where context was concerned, the years 1940 and 1941 represented hard times for Japanese generally and for Greater Asia's subscribers in particular. These were gloomy years of continued brutal warfare, unbroken Chinese resistance, economic hardship, and rising popular frustration with the failure of the New Order to address socio-economic problems at home.⁵⁵ Above all, Japan's experience in China continued to undermine the two great premises of Greater East Asianism, on which its moral appeal was predicated. Firstly, the notion that Japan was really at war not against brother Asians but against the West, and Western imperialism. And secondly that, as such,

Japan's war was Asia's war, and that right-thinking Asians (i.e. those not irreparably contaminated by Western thinking and habits) would welcome Japan's actions and accept Japan's leadership. In this context it comes as little surprise that many Japanese greeted Japan's declaration of war against the Western imperial powers on December 8, 1941, with a feeling of relief and "lightness" in contrast to the "heavy burden" felt previously.⁵⁶ At last, Japan's holy war to liberate Asia from the West was more than merely a metaphorical one.

Crisis, Japan, and “Asia” in Prewar Java

The crisis facing Japan and its empire in the interwar period was in many ways a local inflection of a global crisis in the Western-dominated imperial/liberal capitalist order. The same could be said of Japanese responses to this crisis: the rejection of the status quo in favor of a “return” to a harmonious social order combining the best of “old” and “new”; “classless” social corporatism; racial, cultural, and gender essentialism; military expansion; and a rejection of “Anglo-American” hegemony was in many ways reminiscent of the national socialist or fascist trends triumphant in Italy and Germany, but also present in many other places in the same period.¹ Yet Japan’s positioning as a racial and cultural “outsider” in the global imperial hierarchy, along with the particular exigencies of Japan’s Asian empire in this period, also fostered the ideological evolution of a distinctive “Asian” mission, holding out the promise of a transcendent, essentially non-Western alternative to the problems and legacies that Western imperial/liberal capitalist modernity had brought to the non-West.

Selling this message at home was one thing, but Japan’s experience in China underlined the fact that, shared “Asian” identity or not, imperialism and anti-colonial nationalism did not make easy bedfellows. In Northeast Asia at least, the assumption of an Asia gleefully awaiting “brotherly” liberation, enlightenment, and leadership at Japanese hands was mostly wishful thinking. But Indonesia was not China. Intimately familiar with the Western imperialism that Japanese spokesmen decried as the root of modernity’s evil, Indonesians stood at a much greater geographical, cultural, and historical remove from Japan and *its* imperialism than the peoples of Northeast Asia. As a result, Indonesians were much more primed to ponder the possibility of positive Japanese-sponsored change.

This was all the more the case by the end of the 1930s, a decade in which the East Indies colonial order experienced a crisis of legitimacy that was, as in Japan, at once a play on global themes of declining Western imperial/liberal capitalist hegemony and at the same time distinctive—and distinctively extreme—in its specifics. Yet potential Indonesian receptivity to the promise of Japan’s arrival was also more than just a product of reaction against the old order, or a naïve willingness to exchange one set of worn-out promises for another—it was also a product of an active Indonesian history. For if the interwar Japanese notion of a transcendent, curative “Asian” alternative modernity was distinctive among the imperial metropolises, it was hardly a unique paradigm in colonized, non-Western societies in the same period. Rather, its appearance and elaboration, in various local inflections, was in some ways endemic

to the challenge of non-Western nation-building in a Western-dominated global order—particularly in proportion to the degree to which this hegemony appeared to be both illegitimate and vulnerable. While Japan remained largely in the background in Indonesian thinking until the eve of the Pacific War, here as much as anywhere, “Asia” already had an indigenous history. Still, so long as Western global hegemony remained an incontrovertible fact, Indonesian attitudes towards “Asia”—and Japan as its harbinger—remained ambivalent.

“Not our war”: Alienation and the colonial order

In December 1941, just after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, Radio Tokyo began a stirring series of propaganda broadcasts enlisting Indonesians in Japan's mission to “liberate Asia.” After a recording of the Indonesian nationalist anthem *Indonesia Raya* (“Great Indonesia”) sung by a chorus of Indonesian students living in Japan, listeners were treated to fiery speeches by two energetic young Indonesian patriots: a Javanese named Yusuf Hasan and a Sumatran named Muhammad Djoeli.² Djoeli was an exchange student, Hasan a former one now associated with Japan's military secret service. In one such broadcast in March 1942 they proclaimed,

Brothers of the same race and fatherland!

It is now almost four months that we have continued to shout and give speeches before this microphone, in the aim that our people in general will better realize, be more aware of, and also work even harder for, the fatherland. Our national anthem *Indonesia Raya* can be heard every night from Tokyo ...

Tonight we expressly offer to the people of Indonesia a speech considered and weighed as deeply as possible, which we have expressly entitled, “The people's strength and power is an important tool for achieving Indonesian independence.”³

Johar Nur, a 21-year-old student at the Higher Agriculture School (*Sekolah Pertanian Tinggi*) in Batavia, was one of those listening eagerly to these broadcasts. As an Indonesian, Nur was one of the privileged few positioned to do so: most of Java's ninety thousand radios were owned by Dutch and ethnic Chinese.⁴ Nur was also among the very small number of Indonesians privileged enough to make it to the top of the East Indies educational ladder. Since around the turn of the century, providing access to elementary education to the “natives” in general, and higher education to a much smaller number of well-born among them, had been a hallmark of the Dutch “Ethical Policy”: a series of initiatives publicly billed as a means of repaying Holland's “Debt of Honor” to her colonial subjects by providing them “enlightenment” and “uplift.” More quietly, the Ethical Policy initiatives had represented a less-than-selfless attempt to legitimize continued Dutch rule, forestall unrest, and bind the “natives”—in particular the indigenous elite—more closely to the Netherlands and its culture.⁵

For the indigenous population, the Ethical Policy had left much to be desired. Of a total Indonesian population of roughly 68 million in 1937, only 93,000 were receiving

more than a rudimentary education, with less than 500 enrolled beyond secondary school.⁶ And even for those lucky enough to be among them, like Johar Nur, access to higher education had often brought a different sort of enlightenment than that intended by the Dutch: enlightenment to the hypocrisy of an arrogant, racist colonial regime that preached the appealing values of progress, freedom, democracy, and equality, and yet seemed blithely determined to ignore these ideals where the colonized were concerned. Disappointingly for the Dutch rulers—though hardly surprising, given the circumstances—it was from among this chosen few that the Indies' first generation of nationalists appeared in the 1910s and 1920s. Johar Nur was a member of the second generation, just coming of age as the war approached.

Along with a number of his student colleagues, Nur was inspired by the example of the uncompromising "non-cooperator" lineage of Indonesian nationalists who had refused to work for the Dutch regime, including movement founders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, exiled by the colonial authorities in the mid-1930s. Like Nur, the non-cooperators hailed from well-to-do families, many from the class of nobility (known in Java as the *priyayi*⁷) with special access to Dutch-sponsored employment in the native government service. In particular, however, many of them came from among the lower echelons of the *priyayi* class, a group that had particularly benefited from the Ethical Policy's expansion of educational opportunities. Upon graduation, they found that promised new opportunities in state employment were limited, and that their advancement to any level of real responsibility remained blocked, as ever, by discriminatory Dutch employment policies that favored the upper *priyayi* and, above them, the Dutch themselves. Facing a similar situation were a group of people not *priyayi* by birth, but hailing from economically successful families who could afford to send their children up through the educational ranks, and were able to do so from the period of the First World War onwards, when the secondary schools were opened to those of talent as well as birth.⁸ At least from the standpoint of the Indonesian masses, their educational pedigree gave them a social status almost indistinguishable from that of the hereditary *priyayi*.⁹ Exposure to the gap between promise and reality under Dutch rule made both groups particularly receptive to anti-colonial nationalist ideas. Taken together, these lower *priyayi* and privileged proto-*priyayi* constituted an educated, restless subelite that William Frederick has called the "new *priyayi*," or new nobility.¹⁰

Discontent with the colonial status quo was hardly the exclusive preserve of this "new nobility." By the 1930s, the sense of alienation from Dutch colonial rule extended up as well as down the social ladder. Historically, the Dutch had accorded members of the upper aristocracy local autonomy in a system of indirect rule. But as the colonial bureaucracy expanded through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they had come to represent little more than figureheads. This fostered among them an increasing openness to nationalist ideas—if not necessarily to the upstart nationalists themselves. Through the 1930s, a combination of hard economic times and self-centered Dutch policies provided increased momentum to the convergence of views among wide segments of the Indonesian elite—both the cooperators and non-cooperators, the old and new nobility—towards a rejection of the colonial status quo, while compounding the mood of dissatisfaction among the indigenous population as a whole. In an era in which both "cooperator" and "non-cooperator" nationalist

movements in places like the Philippines and India were gaining momentum and concessions, Dutch moves to suppress nationalist aspirations with a firmer hand than ever only amplified their alienation. Many non-cooperators including Sukarno and Hatta were jailed and exiled, and remained out of sight—if not out of mind—until the coming of the Japanese. As Dutch crackdowns on the “non-cooperators” gathered pace in the first half of the 1930s, it was the more conservative *Parindra* party that emerged as the Indies’ largest nationalist party and its leaders as nationalism’s most visible public spokesmen.¹¹ *Parindra*’s predominantly *priyayi* membership, many of whom were also government functionaries, supported a cooperative, gradualist, non-confrontational approach towards the Dutch rulers based on participation in the (purely consultative) “Popular Council” (*Volksraad*), social reform, and the achievement of shared economic prosperity. But with even the mildest of requests for increased autonomy meeting with stubborn and arrogant refusal, *Parindra*’s leaders too increasingly adopted a frustrated and strident tone.¹²

Johar Nur and his elite student colleagues were well attuned to these developments, and they could not help but snicker when Nazi occupation in the Netherlands and gathering war clouds in the Pacific prompted a mushrooming of belated Dutch interest in their “native brethren” in the form of calls for “mutual cooperation” to “defend our homeland.” Increasingly frenzied Dutch demands for “native” involvement in war preparations in the latter half of 1941, which included the forced mobilization of Indonesian youth like Nur for blackout patrols and the like and the establishment of a “native” militia, only placed further strains on already raw relations.¹³ The conservative Dutch interpretation of the Atlantic Charter, issued by the Allies in August 1941, only added fuel to the fire: Dutch spokesmen maintained that the Charter’s acknowledgment of the right of self-determination for all societies participating in the conflict did not extend to those within empires!¹⁴ In this context, the Dutch propaganda offensive against Japan as an uncivilized fascist aggressor could do little to dissuade Indonesians that the coming showdown between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies was, as Nur put it, “not our war.”¹⁵

Indonesian Muslim leaders—many of whom were also nationalists—had meanwhile reached similar conclusions. Islamic activism and opposition to Dutch rule had gained steam in the first decades of the twentieth century. Motivating factors included unprecedented local social and cultural intrusions associated with the implementation of the Ethical Policy, as well as Dutch favoritism towards Christianity and an increase in Christian missionary activity.¹⁶ An essay by prominent Islamic nationalist (and cousin of Sukarno) Anwar Tjokroaminoto in March 1942 summed up the prevailing mood among Muslim leaders as the Japanese arrived, also reflecting an intellectual connection and identification with the wider Muslim world.

To begin with, the English worked extremely hard to get all Muslims to despise the Axis powers. They even tried to scare Muslims, [warning that] if the Islamic countries join in the German alliance, they would suffer certain misfortune—they would be tightly shackled. But Muslims are not so easily swayed by this propaganda. After all, it is not the Axis countries, but the allied countries—who proclaim themselves heroes of “democracy”—that have oppressed us all these

hundreds of years. This is why the majority of Muslims, particularly in this country, have assumed a cool, calm attitude, or just remained silent.¹⁷

In the years prior to 1941, Indonesians devoted relatively little thought to Japan or the Japanese. Yet when they did, sentiments were rather distributed across the positive side of the spectrum, with idealistic young, educated "new nobility" intellectuals like Johar Nur very often at the enthusiastic extreme.¹⁸ While attending school, Nur was rooming in the home of family friend and fellow West Sumatran Muhammad Yaman, a writer, retired schoolteacher, and older brother of prominent nationalist intellectual Muhammad Yamin. Mr. Yaman had developed a friendly relationship with the Japanese owner of a *toko Jepang* (Japanese store), the "*Toko Fuyuda*" in Batavia's *Pasar Baru* (New Market). On each visit the shop owner had given him Japanese books as gifts, and his extensive collection had grown to include books on Japanese scientific and industrial development as well as Japanese language textbooks. Nur recalled in a 1983 interview:

Mr. Yaman and the whole family delighted in studying Japanese ... I studied it a bit as well. In his estimation, it was clear the Dutch were going to lose. The atmosphere in the house was, well, not pro-Dutch. We were sympathetic to the arrival of the Japanese. All the more so when we heard Japanese broadcasts on the radio in the evenings that encouraged the Indonesian people to revolt before Japan arrived ... and that the Japanese were coming not to colonize Indonesia, but to liberate (*memerdekakan*) the Indonesian people.¹⁹

The Japanese broadcasts promised liberation not only in a political sense. Indonesian expectations were also raised by preinvasion pledges to "flood Java with Japanese products."²⁰ While generally of lesser quality than their European equivalents, Japanese consumer goods were highly prized because of their greater affordability and value for money.²¹ Java and the rest of the Netherlands East Indies had already begun to experience a flood of Japanese products during the depression years of the 1930s, braked only by increasing Dutch trade restrictions. Largely excluded from a colonial economy dominated in its upper echelons by Europeans and in its middle echelons by ethnic Chinese, Indonesians at all social levels looked hopefully towards economic interaction with Japan as a possible means towards a more prosperous and equitable future. Many imagined a Japanese-sponsored prosperity characterized by wide availability of cheap Japanese products.²²

These dreams were inspired most often by prewar contacts with Japanese shopkeepers and the goods they sold. For, like Nur's uncle, the vast majority of Indonesians first experienced the Japanese not through their radio broadcasts or other media, but through their shops. In an April 1942 magazine essay, N. Sutan Iskandar—a leading literary figure and head of the Indies' only Indonesian-language publishing house, *Balai Poestaka*—asked himself why the common people of Java, or *kromo*, had welcomed the Japanese. Did they know the Japanese army "truly wanted to liberate them? But how could they?" he wondered. From Japanese propaganda broadcasts? "No," he continued, for there were no radios in the villages, and "who could afford one

anyway?" The answer lay elsewhere: the *kromo* knew the Japanese from the *toko Jepang*, the Japanese shops that had multiplied dramatically in "the last few years." Though the Dutch had been around for centuries, he wrote, the common people had never encountered a Dutch person so *tulus* (honest, sincere) towards them as these Japanese shopkeepers. He then related a conversation with a "coolie" (*kuli*) who had advised him not to bother about having protection ditches dug against the Japanese, suggesting his money would be better spent on the fruit he was selling since "the Japanese are fighting the Dutch, not us."

"I was a regular seller of fruit to a Japanese, and I have shopped at the *toko Jepang*. I noticed their character to be completely gracious and kind-hearted (*lemah-lemboet belaka*). Apparently ... almost the same as us. Only their skin is a bit more yellow than mine."

He glanced toward the skin of his arm, which was very dark, struck by the heat [of the sun] because it was not inside a shirt. "Maybe the Japanese are of the same ancestry as us, Master."

"Yes," Iskandar recalled replying "with increasing surprise," revealing prejudices common to his class. "Because a person you suppose is nothing, foul, stupid, naïve and dull-witted, is in fact sharp in his feelings and observations!"²³

Mass faith in Japan's potential as liberator from Dutch oppression was further revealed in the contemporary popular revival and reinterpretation of the predictions of the Javanese prince Joyoboyo, twelfth-century ruler of the Kediri region in East Java. Joyoboyo had predicted a long time of suffering, to be followed by the appearance of a *ratu adil*, or just ruler. At some point in the years leading up to the war, this prophecy was transformed into one in which "yellow-skinned" liberators from the north would bring an end to the era of suffering, i.e. the period of Dutch rule. After staying only for "the life of one corn plant," or approximately one year, the liberators would return to their homeland, leaving behind an Indonesia free of all foreign domination and suffering.

In the minds of many Indonesians, the image of the "gracious, kind-hearted" Japanese stood in stark contrast not only to that of the aloof, arrogant Dutch, but also to the greedy and selfish ethnic Chinese, whose shops competed with those of the Japanese. As the nationalist Sutan Sjahrir noted in a 1937 diary entry,

The Japanese have a great advantage over the whites, despite all propaganda that may be attempted to offset it; for the sympathy that most of the Indonesians cherish toward the Japanese is not due to propaganda. It is simply due to the fact that the Japanese habits and general manner have won the people's hearts. The Japanese are, for example, very polite, and their usual facial expression looks something like a smile ... Now Indonesians regard the Japanese as "fine people," "civilized," they say; and they regard the Chinese and the whites as *kasar* or coarse.²⁴

Beyond the cultural niceties, Japanese shopkeepers in the 1930s had won their way into Indonesian hearts by demonstrating a greater willingness than their ethnic Chinese counterparts to hire Indonesian workers, a policy particularly appreciated

in the high-unemployment years of the Great Depression.²⁵ But just as the roots of Indonesian openness to the Japanese could be traced to a longer history of subjugation and suffering under the Dutch, it also owed much to long-standing domestic class tensions, tensions that frequently assumed the form of racial hostility between ethnic *pribumi* (literally "sons of the land") and ethnic Chinese in particular. This hostility was aided by ethnic Chinese dominance of the most immediately visible sectors of the colonial economy, their colonial identification as an ethnic community historically entrusted with administrative duties such as tax collection, salt, and opium monopolies, and colonial policies dating back to the turn of the century that had codified race and status, setting the Chinese above the "natives." From this time, too, increasing identification with their overseas homeland and cultural difference from the mass of the local population in areas such as religion and eating habits—particularly among the more recent immigrants known as *totok* Chinese (as opposed to the locally assimilated *peranakan* Chinese), but easily extended as a stereotype to cover the Chinese "race" (*bangsa*²⁶) as a whole—also helped make them easy targets.²⁷

Indeed, the early twentieth-century rise of Indonesian racial consciousness, and of Indonesian nationalism, could be traced at least as much to resentment and envy of the ethnic Chinese and their economic dominance as to opposition to colonial or Dutch rule as such. The *Sarekat Islam* movement of the 1910s and 1920s began as a movement of native economic empowerment vis-à-vis the ethnic Chinese.²⁸ And as it matured, the Indonesian nationalist movement showed only muted and sporadic interest in bridging racial divides. In the mid-1930s, in a move reflective of continued ethnocentrism, both "cooperator" and "non-cooperator" nationalist leaders alike rejected an attempt by a small number of assimilated Chinese to join the nationalist movement. Mohammad Thamrin, leader of the "cooperator" *Parindra* party, couched what was fundamentally a racial argument in terms of culture: even if the *peranakan* saw Indonesia as their home, he argued, they were still interested in maintaining a separate, Chinese culture. Revealing the clear association of foreign ethnicity with economic oppression, even the more left-leaning Indonesian National Party (PNI) of Mohammad Hatta allowed non-"native" races to join only as "associate members."²⁹

Speaking on Radio Tokyo on March 22, 1942, nationalist Moehammad Djoeli thus reproduced a theme long dominant within Indonesian nationalism, and nurtured hopes that Japanese occupation might bring a reversal of economic fortunes.

For the time being, we must work hard together with the Japanese military government. The entire Indonesian race must realize that independence is not something simple. At present, our race remains in [a state of] division [perpetrated] by foreign races. Our industry remains in the hands of the Chinese. The people's economy must now be revived. All of the small enterprises must be allied and made one, so that they may grow big and bring benefit to us all ... Many of us only enjoy shopping in Chinese or Indian stores.³⁰ This can only be the act of a race that is not Indonesian, that is not aware of the meaning of national liberation.³¹

In an essay penned around the same time, although not mentioning the Chinese by name, Islamic nationalist leader Anwar Tjokroaminoto pointed ominously to fascist

anti-Semitic purges in Europe as a model for how the “Indonesian race” should reckon with “inhabitants” whose “jewish nature” predisposed them to the corruption of Indonesia’s culture and the exploitation of its people.

As Germany once faced the society of Jews, as a result of the Weimar Republic, so Indonesia too has a problem of jewishness. Meaning that there are more than a few among Indonesia’s inhabitants who truly possess a jewish nature, whose behavior is jewish behavior. Laws that do not prohibit prostitution, for example, are exploited to run houses of prostitution. As in the jewish period in Germany, [when] these sorts of people produced books of prostitutes, pictures of whores to destroy the spirits of German youth, so there are not a few in Indonesia who secretly or openly do these sorts of things, ruining the spirit and character of Indonesian youth. In the social environment, there are also not a few instances of “man eats man,” meaning one sucks the other dry, assuming many forms, such as usury, or pursued by others through other means. People’s poverty has been exploited in producing a system of credit (*systeem bon*), until the life of the average Indonesian is a life on credit, even though life on credit is more expensive than life on cash. This jewish-type of person does not fail to take maximum advantage of the peasants’ ignorance. For example, when the peasant buys something, the scales are weighted heavy, while the contents are reduced. If the peasant sells something, the scales are lightened, even as the contents are many.

“Just as the German race has risen up in the aim of shining forth all its [true] qualities,” concluded Tjokroaminoto, “so the new Indonesia, under Japanese leadership, deeply desires the same sort of change, the cleanest possible filtration (*saringan*).”³²

Generally hardened attitudes towards local ethnic Chinese were also reflected in a largely “cool, calm attitude” towards Japan’s increasingly bold 1930s adventures in Manchuria and China. These sentiments were revealed, for example, in a lengthy newspaper debate waged in 1936 between *Parindra*’s founder Soetomo and the leftist-nationalist Liem Koen Hian, along with public reactions to it.³³ Soetomo, who had recently returned from a visit to Japan, lauded Japan’s achievements as a modern Asian nation and as a model for Indonesia to emulate. Liem answered by criticizing Soetomo’s “touristic” attitude, arguing that he had completely failed to take notice of the relationship between Japan’s “mature state of capitalism” and its imperialist aggression. In response, several readers came to Soetomo’s (and Japan’s) defense, asserting, among other things, that Liem held a personal grudge “as a Chinese,” and that his attitude was not properly that of an Indonesian.³⁴

As the war in China intensified and stories of Japanese brutality there began to appear in the local media, some among the nationalist elite did begin to voice concern. In private notes on the Indonesian nationalist movement prepared sometime between 1939 and 1940, Kaneko Keizō, a journalist for the *Tōindo Nippō* (East Indies Daily), wrote that some Indonesian nationalists had asked him why it was that “Japan cannot cooperate in a more amiable fashion with China?” They continued: “Is such Japanese-Chinese cooperation not the essence of Pan-Asianism?”³⁵ Some drew attention to the infamous “Tanaka Memorial” of 1927, a captured (and likely faked) document

allegedly authored by the Japanese prime minister and widely publicized by Chinese nationalists, which purportedly alluded to longstanding Japanese ambitions of world hegemony. A handful of left-influenced nationalists such as Mohammad Hatta and leaders of the leftist *Gerindo* party including A.K. Gani, Amir Sjarifuddin, and Sanoesi Pané characterized the Sino-Japanese war as "a struggle between fascism and democracy." And in 1939, on the premise of anti-fascist solidarity, *Gerindo* became the only nationalist party to open its membership to *peranakan* Chinese.³⁶

Still, for the great majority of Indonesians, Japan's tangle with China, just as that with the Dutch, was "not our war." The Indonesian obsession with their own "China problem" blinded many to the full significance of Japan's actions towards its Asian neighbors. Analyzing the Sino-Japanese conflict a month after its outbreak in its August 1937 edition, *Parindra*'s party newspaper *Soeara Parindra* editorialized as follows:

Until now, China has been regarded as a semi-colony by the strong Western powers. Because of this, Japan (seemingly on behalf of the Asian peoples) declares to be liberating China from the Western powers. China is therefore now split between those who cooperate with Japan and those who resist. What we fear is the outbreak of a real war in the Far East due to interference in the Sino-Japanese war by the Western powers.³⁷

The inference: the Sino-Japanese conflict was not a "real war" at all. As Japan's own spokesmen were only too eager to maintain, Japan and China were not really enemies; Asia's true enemies, nefariously pulling the strings (if not the triggers) from behind the scenes, were the Western powers.

"Indonesia," "Asia," and Japan

Among the indigenous population of the Indies, shared enemies, positive first impressions, and a lack of shared history in comparison with places such as China and Korea thus combined to encourage an openness—and a corresponding granting of the benefit of the doubt—where Japan and its intentions towards Asia were concerned. But an array of shared practical and strategic concerns, in combination with what might be called historical naïveté, were only part of the sum of potential Indonesian interest and support for Japan and its aims. There was also a shared ideological space. Japan's modern search for a transcendent, non-Western form of modernity and nationhood against a backdrop of declining global Western imperial/liberal-capitalist hegemony can also be seen as an inflection of a common thematic throughout the non-West—a thematic as pronounced in the colonial Indies as anywhere. For the Indies, too, saw the rise of an ideology of a modern "return to Asia," a search for an indigenous cultural and racial heritage that might serve as "inner" antidote to the ills associated with modern nation-building along Western-style industrial capitalist lines—a protective filtering system against the desirable but perilous deluge of Western modernity. The flourishing of such an interest paralleled the rise of Indonesia's nation-building middle classes, beginning before the First World War but gaining ground in the crisis years of the interwar period.

In contrast to the Japanese middle classes, which mushroomed amidst increasingly diversified and expanding industrial capitalist development in the first decades of the twentieth century, the social position of Indonesia's nation-building new *priyayi* was that of a tiny, nascent indigenous bourgeoisie. The vast majority were employed, or sought employment, not in business, but in the colonial civil service.³⁸ They presided over an overwhelmingly agrarian, uneducated indigenous society whose political, social, and economic relations, molded to the interests of colonialism, retained a feudal aspect. This was a feudal order reconstructed for colonial ends, however, whose social legitimacy and stability had been grossly undermined by the forces of capitalism, an increasingly intrusive colonial state, and the liberal-democratic and Marxist ideologies emanating from the colonial metropolises and reverberating across the globe.

The new nobility were implicated within this semi-feudal order, and as proud members of the social and educational elite, they tended to reflect a measure of the social conservatism and arrogance of the old nobility—not to mention that of the Dutch themselves. Even young ones like Johar Nur felt it only natural that they should assume the role of popular enlightener and leader, with a responsibility to bring the backward, ignorant masses of the Indies forward into modernity. At the same time, the new nobility were ideally positioned to observe the contradictions of the colonial status quo. Their sense of alienation and insecurity under Western-sponsored colonialism and capitalism, in dialectic with local and global developments, radicalized them, putting them in some ways in ideological step with Japan's interwar middle classes. More than any other social grouping, it was the new nobility, seeking to build a new nation and to move forward into technological and industrial modernity while expelling the evils of Western capitalism and colonialism and its henchmen—and at the same time avoiding a radical overturning of the indigenous social order—who were drawn to the radical yet conservative call of Asianism.

The 1936 public exchanges between *Parindra's* founder Soetomo and Liem Koen Hian, touched upon above, began as an abstract debate on the nature of Japan. But they soon devolved into a discourse on race and culture, of “Chinese” versus “Indonesian.” One reader went so far as to suggest that the bluntness of Liem's critical remarks on Japan was inconsistent with the “gentleness of Indonesian morality” (*susila Indonesia*).³⁹ Such discourses of Indonesian-ness were in turn representative of a broad process of national identity formation among the upper strata of indigenous society underway at both conscious and subconscious levels in the first decades of the twentieth century. This process in one sense represented only the latest expression of an ongoing concern with native identity tracing back to the earliest years of Dutch domination, out of which highly elaborated discourses of native and foreign “Othering” had sprung. Of these older discourses, which were in turn patterned along older regional ethnic, cultural, and geopolitical lines, that of Java and Javanese-ness was the most prominent and elaborated.⁴⁰

While the roots of the colonial discourse of Java itself extended at least as far back as the eighteenth century, it was from around the turn of the twentieth century that some elite spokesmen first began to incorporate notions of Javanese or native culture into modern discourses of progress, enlightenment, and, ultimately, nation-building. They hailed from among the first generation of native beneficiaries of the Dutch ethical

policies, assimilating these appealing late nineteenth-century metropolitan ideals in public discourse and in the newly accessible schools. They accepted the contention that the inferior social position and backwardness of "the natives" vis-à-vis the Dutch owed in large part to their historical failure to adopt progressive Western ways, and adopted as their own the task of "native uplift." But confronted with the gap between these appealing universal Western ideals and the exclusivity and inequity of local colonial thinking and practice—expressed in local Dutch criticism of the Ethical Policy itself, for example, and legally confirmed in the turn-of-the-century adoption of unequal racial statutes—many among them felt an increasing sense of frustration and alienation.⁴¹

The late nineteenth century was also a period in which nationalism as ideology attained truly hegemonic proportions both in the metropolises, and—perhaps even more so—among the ruling elites in the colonies themselves. Within this context, the turn-of-the-century indigenous elite could hardly escape extensive exposure to national modes of thinking in the schools, in texts, and in public discourse. When these combined with a sense of insurmountable social difference and inequity, thoughts of nationhood were not far behind. In this same period, two further developments indelibly impressed upon them the association of national unity and identity with power and success: Japan's startling victory over Russia in 1905, and, closer to home, the explosion of Chinese nationalism among the local ethnic Chinese community, whose energies bore visible fruit in the attainment of higher social status. Equally startling was the accompanying realization that as globally dominant as the white man continued to be, the power and prestige associated with nationhood was not his exclusive prerogative alone.

As the search for a distinct, indigenous nationhood progressed, some cautiously began to consider long-elaborated notions of Javanese culture as pointing to a genuine alternative national identity, ready for reinterpretation and reconstruction. A discourse of Javanese culture as a useful component of modern nation-building began to take shape. In the hands of some enthusiasts, at times these discourses of Javanese culture—and those of Indonesian culture that superseded them after the mid-1920s—began to hint at the possibility of an alternative modernity that might combine the best of East and West. A rehabilitated Native Tradition, appropriately interpreted, and purged of acknowledged backward, feudal aspects, was presented as offering a source of inner strength that could guide the people over the great hurdles of modernization and nation-building. At the 1918 "Congress for Javanese Cultural Development" cosponsored by the elite native reformists of the *Budi Utomo* organization and a number of prominent Dutch Javanologists, for example, nobleman Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo presented Javanese culture as a spiritual guide which, in combination with European science and technology, represented not a stumbling block to native progress but an indispensable ingredient.⁴²

As the crisis of Western imperial/liberal capitalist hegemony deepened through the interwar period, these notions gained a wider following. Within this context, contemporary colonial scholarship on Indies society also became an unwitting weapon in the nationalist arsenal. In 1919 and again several years later, Dutch scholars of "oriental antiquity" published accounts of the prosperous Hindic-Buddhist

empires of Sriwijaya and Majapahit which had stretched across large expanses of the archipelago and beyond from the sixth through the thirteenth and the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries respectively, dominating the region.⁴³ Other interwar Dutch orientalist reproduced and elaborated a mythology of the native past whose qualities, they maintained, were still to some extent visible in the contemporary countryside. These included such respected experts as economist J.H. Boeke, traditional (*adat*) law specialist C. van Vollenhoven, and theosophist D. van Hinloopen Labberton. In studies such as Boeke's comparison of Indonesian and Dutch villages *Dorp en Desa* (1934), Indonesian rural life was presented as the primordial antithesis of everything modern, lacking—in addition to its perceived benefits of rationality, progress, and freedom—its problems of capitalism, individualism, and cold calculation.⁴⁴ Boeke's was a new orientalist storyline that reflected increasing anxieties about Western modernity and hegemony globally, anxieties fostered by the horrors of the First World War, and furthered by the social dislocations of the Great Depression.⁴⁵

In colonial rhetoric of the ancient Indies—as in English study of ancient India, contemporaneous Japanese scholarship of ancient China, and other colonial scholarship along similar lines—the contrast between past greatness and present disarray was most often employed as a discursive buttress for continued colonial rule.⁴⁶ But nationalist spokesmen such as Mohammad Hatta, Mohammad Yamin, and Sukarno wasted no time in co-opting these Western scholarly explorations into a presumably happier precolonial past—along with the orientalism that underpinned these views—into both a discourse of originary Indonesian identity, and a powerful argument for an end to colonial rule.⁴⁷ They asserted that centuries of Dutch domination had destroyed a once-thriving indigenous political, economic, and social system that had stretched across the archipelago. In material terms, colonial policies such as the export of profits overseas, the gearing of the economy for agricultural exports, the neglect of industrial development, and, in the political realm, the propping-up and corrupting of an outdated native aristocratic elite had succeeded in “freezing” Indonesia's natural progress towards a modern nation.

Perhaps even more importantly, they added, this process of freezing had an internal component as well. The effects of colonial rule had penetrated to the very core of the native psyche, making dormant the cultural ingredients that they imagined had in the past underpinned this “Indonesian” greatness: the values of social unity and harmony, an undaunted and enterprising spirit, willingness to sacrifice for a noble cause, martial prowess.⁴⁸ Values that they saw personified in the perennial hero of the *wayang* shadow puppet theater, the *kesatriya* warrior. As evidence, nationalist spokesmen, like the colonial scholars, were only too happy to cite local rural idioms such as “mutual cooperation” (*gotong-royong*) and ancient inscriptions unearthed by Dutch specialists suggesting that Indonesian kingdoms had represented a sort of harmonious family state, with the ruler as a great father.⁴⁹ The rhetoric, if not its reality, had survived into modern times in the language of the Javanese court. In this discourse, Dutch colonialism was said in essence to have suppressed all of the “original,” positive traits that once characterized the ancient, “Eastern” culture and society of the precolonial Indies, while stimulating everything in it that was negative, backward, and stiflingly “oriental.” To Hatta, the establishment of village-level

economic cooperatives represented a harmonization of the progressive modern values of socialism with a return to the original, non-capitalist, naturally humane and egalitarian values of the ancient Indonesian village.⁵⁰ Upon release from his first period of Dutch imprisonment in 1932, Sukarno offered a purportedly indigenous alternative to Western conceptions of the working class or proletariat in the form of the *marhaen* or *marhaenism*, named after an impoverished peasant with whom Sukarno claimed to have chatted. Sukarno saw *marhaen* as the symbol of an Indonesia composed of poor, struggling, but freeholding peasants who had been exploited by both the Dutch and the Javanese feudal leaders before them. The indigenous Indonesian common man or *marhaen*, rather than the rigidly defined proletariat of foreign orthodox Marxism, was to represent the basic social unit of the new, free, and ultimately classless Indonesia.⁵¹

In a series of exchanges on the past and future of Indonesian culture and education waged in the pages of several leading nationalist journals between August 1935 and April 1936, a range of intellectuals debated whether Indonesia's Eastern tradition was a boon or an impediment in the building of Indonesia's future.⁵² These debates were revealing of proactivity on the part of Indonesian nationalists with regard to the notion of the (re)construction of an alternative "Asian" modernity.

The 27-year-old writer Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, who initiated the debate, clung single-mindedly, and almost single-handedly, to the position that Indonesia's Eastern inheritance, represented by Hindic-Buddhist-mystical ideals such as "unity and harmony with nature" and the suppression of the ego, and the persistence of hierarchical and feudal notions of social order, were like a cultural straitjacket condemning Indonesians to a static, passive existence, forever left behind on the path of social progress being blazed by the dynamic West. In rebutting Alisjahbana, several conference participants and others, including *Parindra* founder Dr. Soetomo, noted that it was not only Asians like themselves who had recently perceived a profound spiritual and cultural crisis in the West—a crisis against which Nazism was one radical and not necessarily desirable solution. "We should not become intoxicated with traditional culture," wrote historian and Javanologist Dr. Poerbatjaraka, "nor however should we become intoxicated with Western-ness. Know them both, choose what is good from both, so that we may safely employ these in future times."⁵³ The German-educated North Sumatran journalist Adinegoro argued that individualism went hand in hand with egotism and materialism, whose aims were "in conflict with the social." Displacing complex issues of politics, economics, and history with essentialized notions of race, culture, and caste, he asserted that "if a race views things from a materialistic standpoint, it will plunge into a ravine of capitalism and imperialism, which increases the oppression towards those who are weak, and heightens the relation of caste versus caste in a society that must indeed have differences between these castes."⁵⁴ Dr. Soetomo further contended that Japan's modernizing experience represented proof that an Eastern nation need not follow the Western example in all things.

Japan was able to stand firm and erect, because Japanese people fought using European equipment, Western equipment, Western intellect, while they also felt the need to rekindle their own culture. This is the strength of the Japanese race

that one must imitate, and this imitation we can easily achieve, if we return again to schools that offer education, such as the *pesantren* and the *pondok* [two sorts of indigenous boarding schools] of the past.⁵⁵

Alisjahbana's opponents were not limited to those on the conservative side of the political spectrum. His views on Indonesian history—or rather, on its virtual irrelevance to the nation-building task at hand—were countered by would-be nation-builders of all political persuasions, Sukarno included, who insisted upon a connection with the ancient past as an essential ingredient in the formation of a modern Indonesian identity. Writer, poet, and historian Sanoesi Pané—one of the founding members of the left-oriented *Gerindo* party in 1937—produced a spirited reply to Alisjahbana in an essay in *Parindra's Soeara Oemoem* newspaper entitled “Indonesian Unity.” Reflecting his debt to Marxism, Pané chastised Alisjahbana for his failure to acknowledge the flow of history as a “dialectical progression” arising out of the interaction of, and tensions between, old *and* new. Further echoing Marx's teacher Hegel, Pané argued that

Mr. S.T.A. [Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana] states that in the era of Majapahit, of Diponegoro, of Teungku Umar, there was not yet any Indonesian-ness (*ke-Indonesiaan*). This idea is not correct according to our thinking. Indonesian-ness already existed at this time, Indonesian-ness in custom (*adat*), in art. Only the nation Indonesia had not yet arisen, Indonesians were not yet aware that they were one *volk* ... [Only] now it is being felt and shaped.⁵⁶

Pané thus postulated Indonesian-ness as an originary ancient cultural unity, arguing furthermore that this cultural heritage was indispensable in overcoming the modern problems Western colonization had brought to the East.⁵⁷ Western culture, he wrote, had “blossomed upon a basis of materialism, intellectualism, and individualism,” its “economy greatly expanding, giving birth to industry, trade, and modern imperialism.” But these Western cultural strengths had also possessed an Achilles' heel, most clearly expressed in the contradictory socio-economic realities of colonialism, and of the Great Depression. Western culture had excelled in producing material wealth, but had failed in creating a basis for true social justice.

After the Western region had fully developed these three weapons [materialism, intellectualism, and individualism], the reality is that a new basis needed to be formed, an organization that would ensure that justice in all layers of life would be effected in the cultural realm. The West was already capable of protecting itself, of saving its physical body. But it still made no effort to ensure the prosperity of every single person. It may be compared to a person looking for food. There is already enough to eat, but the distribution is unfair, so that you end up with those with plenty to eat, and those who go hungry. That is the situation in the West nowadays.

While Pané's exposure of the contradictions and inequities of life in the industrial capitalist West clearly owed much to leftist social critiques, his argument—like that of Adinegoro—remained fundamentally one of cultural essentialism. This was all the

more clear when Pané turned to the case of the East as he envisioned it, where an imagined gentler natural environment had historically encouraged an alternative way of life.

In the East, things were better: In Greater India (*India Raja*), people required little effort to protect themselves, to find a way to tame the power of nature, because nature here was not as fierce as in the West. It may be said that materialism, intellectualism, and individualism were hardly necessary. People were not forced to separate themselves from a nature that needed to be opposed. Man felt himself one with the world around him. True science did not appear. Technology hardly advanced. With the economy it was the same.⁵⁸

Pané acknowledged a problem here. The West, as represented by "Faust, Goethe's scientific expert," had "prioritized the material, at the expense of the spiritual." In contrast, the East, here likened to the perennial *wayang* hero Arjuna, had "placed all importance on the spiritual, while forgetting the material." An effective course (*haluan*) could only be steered by "uniting Faust with Ardjuna, fusing materialism, intellectualism, and individualism with spiritualism, sensitivity, and collectivism." Doing so did not mean that Indonesian culture need be changed, Pané concluded, only "expanded."

While arising from a colonial milieu, such views of history, of Asian-ness, of the West, and of the course that Indonesia needed to follow, overlapped extensively with the tenets of contemporaneous Japanese Greater East Asianism: the Hegelian construction of an Indonesia awaiting a realization and restoration of an ancient, unified Asian identity; the flirtation with a leftist social critique that devolved into an essential association of the crisis of modernity with Western racial and cultural shortcomings; the vision of a new Indonesia and a new Asia uniting the best aspects of East and West. The return to or retention of an imagined ancient indigenous or Asian cultural and racial essence as a sluice-gate against the deluge of Western modernity—whose unparalleled strengths in material progress, scientific rationalism, and intellectual enlightenment were acknowledged as worthy models for all humanity, but whose obsessions with the material, the rational, and the self had yielded the unwanted byproducts of social alienation, inequity, and chaos—this was a discourse that addressed shared problems, a discourse whose appeal transcended national boundaries, albeit in different inflections.

This convergence between Japanese and Indonesian discourses in the prewar period was attributable to more than a coincidence of problems and needs; there was also a commonality of sources, and, in some cases, direct exchanges. Indonesian nationalism, including its assertions about "East" and "West," was heavily indebted to the ideas of other anti-colonial nationalisms, particularly those expounded by Tagore and Gandhi in India.⁵⁹ Discourses of Eastern cultural unity and spiritual strength versus Western material might were shared and elaborated by Tagore and his turn-of-the-century Japanese orientalist acquaintance Okakura Tenshin, whose arguments were in turn rediscovered and mobilized by Japanese Greater Asianists in the 1930s and early 1940s. After 1911, Sun Yat-sen's calls for Pan-Asian unity

against Western colonialism were widely known and discussed among intellectuals throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Anti-colonialist movements in the Islamic Middle East intermingled longstanding rhetoric of Pan-Islamic alliance against religious foes with these more recent discourses of anti-colonial Pan-Asianism and of Eastern spiritual and cultural greatness. Particularly for an increasing number of more devout intellectuals who came in contact with Islamic colleagues abroad in the context of pilgrimage or study, this was another important avenue for the diffusion of discourses of Asian-ness.⁶⁰

Since Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, Indonesian intellectuals had meanwhile been intrigued and inspired by Japan's success as the one Asian nation that had achieved military strength and economic modernization while remaining independent from colonial control. In the 1930s, against a backdrop of rising dissatisfaction with the Dutch status quo, a growing Japanese economic presence, and increasingly outspoken Japanese interest in closer ties with their Asian brethren, Indonesian interest in Japan was on the rise. In this context, *Parindra's* founder Soetomo, who conducted the debate with Liem Koen Hian after visiting Japan in 1936, was one of a small but important succession of elite Indonesians who journeyed to Japan in this period to work, study, and establish business connections, to see for themselves the extent of Japanese success, and—more importantly—the lessons this success might hold for a future Indonesia. Often, however, this interest was mixed with ambivalence: was Japan's interest in Asia, as it claimed, really qualitatively different from that of Western imperialism? Was Japan's modernity anything more than an inferior copy of the Western original? In any event, was Japan culturally “close” enough to offer a nation-building recipe of relevance to “Indonesia”'s needs?

Mohammad Hatta was one of the first nationalist figures to visit Japan. Arriving in Kōbe for a brief tour in 1933, Hatta found himself in a somewhat unexpected limelight, confronted by curious journalists and welcomed by a clique of Japanese pan-Asianists who had recently formed into a group called the Asia Association (*Ajia kyōkai*), its membership consisted primarily of representatives of several conservative political parties and a handful of high-ranking military officers.⁶¹ Association president Shimonaka Yasaburō welcomed Hatta as the “Gandhi of Java,” while Ōsaka's leading *Asahi* newspaper maintained that “ever since the Manchurian Incident, Indonesia's natives” had been increasingly “yearning for Japan,” and that Hatta, “under the guise of industrial observation,” in fact “intends to tread the soil of Asia's leader (*meishu*) Japan” in the belief that the “study of Japan” was essential to his aim of “building the Indonesian economy through native efforts.”⁶²

At the time, the Asia Association's “Greater Asia” journal attributed to Hatta the following enthusiastic statement: “The League of Nations is a European affair—we must find life in Greater Asianism.” Hatta's acknowledged contempt for the League of Nations makes at least the first part of this statement seem more than fabricated whimsy: he had elsewhere branded the League as a “collection of imperialists.” The second, however, suggested some wishful thinking, conscious or otherwise, on the part of the Japanese translator. Again based upon his writings elsewhere, Hatta was much more at home with the Sun Yat-sen's term “pan-Asianism” than with the Japan-centered term “Greater Asianism” (*Dai Ajia-shugi*). Indeed, the intimate familiarity

with Europe and deep knowledge of contemporary social science that afforded Hatta this critical perspective on the League of Nations also made him an unlikely candidate for easy seduction by Japanese "Greater Asian" appeals. For Hatta, Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria had in any case hardly constituted a new incentive to "yearn for Japan." In an essay Hatta wrote before his departure, he had revealed himself to be skeptical of Japanese intentions towards "brother Asians," questioning whether there was any substantial difference between Western imperialism and Japan's activities in China and Korea. In recalling his 1933 tour of Japan in later memoirs, Hatta remembered feeling admiration for Japanese "diligence" and for what he regarded as a special ability to "first copy something, and then improve upon it," particularly with reference to Japan's textile industry. Yet Hatta saw a nation still playing catch-up to the West in its political, economic, and social development. Just after his return from Japan, he complained that "the [Japanese] people do not understand the policies of their own government." It was Japan's social "immaturity" as a late modernizer, Hatta maintained, that had left it prey to rising forces of militarism and fascism.⁶³

Hatta was not the first Indonesian observer to identify Japan as an imperialist power whose actions in the international realm differed substantially little from those of the West. Sukarno had warned in a 1928 essay that "in the near future, we will doubtless witness the unfolding of a desperate struggle for spoils and power in the Pacific between the imperialist giants America, Japan, and Britain." "The prospect of a Pacific War [was] always used by [Sukarno's] Indonesian National Party (P.N.I.) as something to excite people at mass meetings," Sukarno's colleague Gatot Mangkupradja later commented.⁶⁴ While Sukarno spoke highly of the cause of Asian unity and of Sun-Yat-sen's pan-Asianism as appealing weapons in the struggle against imperialism ("unity of fate," he noted, "cannot but inspire a unity of feeling"), his 1928 essay failed to include Japan in the list of potential Indonesian allies. Two years later, in the course of a famous speech at his first trial by the Dutch authorities—a speech that appeared in publication under the provocative, table-turning title "Indonesia Accuses"—Sukarno again included Japan among the "imperialist nations." He went on to identify Japanese claims as "standard-bearer for the oppressed peoples of Asia" as "false," no more than an "empty illusion" held by conservative Japanese nationalists.⁶⁵

Despite this skepticism, however, in the essay he wrote before his 1933 visit to Japan, Hatta left open the possibility of a Japanese realization of a true pan-Asianism as envisioned by Sun Yat-sen: i.e. as an alliance of equals. Japan's coming actions in Manchuria and China, he argued, would serve as a litmus test. In economic terms, meanwhile, Hatta envisioned great material possibilities in the establishment of direct trade linkages between Japanese firms and Indonesian entrepreneurs—entrepreneurs who included a number of his fellow West Sumatran associates—as a means of circumventing the Dutch and ethnic Chinese economic stranglehold in the Indies. Indeed—no doubt with the watchful eyes of the Dutch colonial authorities as an added incentive—Hatta publicly insisted that his visit to Japan was aimed purely at exploring these economic possibilities, rather than motivated by any political interest.⁶⁶

Some eight years later, in a two-part essay appearing in newspapers in Batavia and Bandung in late December 1941—just after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and with their move southwards imminent—Hatta indicated no change in his earlier

skepticism towards Japan. With “fascism at our doorstep,” he argued, the Indonesian people had to free themselves from their predominantly pro-Japanese sentiments and such “illogical fantasies” as the legend of Joyoboyo. “Imperialist Japan is the most serious threat to Indonesia and its aims. For those Indonesians who love their fatherland and believe in democracy,” he wrote, “there is no alternative but to oppose Japanese imperialism.”⁶⁷

Yet as Hatta noted with some dismay, his own cautious and skeptical early assessments of Japan had proven less than representative of elite Indonesians as a whole. In fact, as Hatta’s Leiden-educated associate Sutan Sjahrir noted in mid-1936, many elite Indonesians—particularly those whom he deemed the “middle class” (apparently meaning the new nobility)—seemed to have eyes only for the positive.

That our nationalists are so taken with Japan is not surprising, particularly given that grievances against white rule have continued to mount of late, and [Dutch] pressure [on them] feels heavier than ever—while Japan acts in such a charming and obliging fashion towards them and even grants autonomy to Korea! That there is a definite line and intent in all the efforts to win the sympathy of the eastern peoples remains all too obvious. Unless I am very much mistaken, they have reached the point that our lower-middle class, middle-class and civil servants look more and more toward Japan for their sons’ and daughters’ educations in addition to their cultural development. Recently it has even become fashionable to go to Japan for a holiday.⁶⁸

As Japanese military men, pan-Asianists, and firms were increasingly courting Indonesian men-of-influence, Indonesian men-of-influence were, for their own reasons, gravitating towards Japan. In 1933, the same year as Hatta’s visit, the Ishihara Industrial Company sponsored a “commercial and sightseeing tour” of Japan for a number of interested representatives, including the journalist and later newspaper publisher Parada Harahap, and Gatot Mangkupradja, son of a well-to-do lower *priyayi* doctor and a former executive of Sukarno’s now defunct PNI.⁶⁹ Harahap returned to write a fawning, exoticized travelogue aptly entitled, “Approaching the Rising Sun” (*Menoedjoe Matahari Terbit*, 1934). For Mangkupradja, who ran a pharmacy in Bandung, the principle aim of the trip was economic: “To establish relations with Japanese industrialists.” But once in Japan, he also managed to attend the *Asia Association*-sponsored “First Pan-Asiatic Congress” as an Indonesian representative. His reviews were favorable. “I got the impression that the Japanese were seriously determined to see that *Asia is for the Asians*,” Mangkupradja recalled, “and after my return to [Java] I immediately made contact with the Japanese running shops in Bandung, Jogja[karta], and Solo, and managing plantations in Garut and Cianjur.”

A year after Mangkupradja’s return from Japan, the lawyer Achmad Subardjo, who would go on to figure importantly—if somewhat quietly—in Indonesian politics, traveled to Japan for a more extended stay. Residing in Japan for almost a year between 1935 and 1936, Subardjo was, like Mangkupradja and Harahap, most positive in his reviews. Born into a family of the lower nobility in 1896, Subardjo had been a prime

beneficiary of the best that the "Ethical Policy" had to offer. But his success in the Dutch educational system only made reminders of his status as a second-class citizen all the more bitter. His early advances in his studies were in part motivated by a desire to prove a Dutch school principal wrong in his observations on "native" intellectual limitations. Later, as a teenager attending an elite Dutch high school in Batavia in the early 1910s, Subardjo, by then an avid reader of the Dutch-language press, was shocked by local criticisms of the Ethical Policy, including one letter to the editor arguing that "on the subject of native uplift, the natives can only be 'uplifted' as high as a scaffold." "The more I read the Dutch newspapers," he later recalled, "the more convinced I became of the truth of Rudyard Kipling's famous phrase, '*East is East and West is West, never the Twain shall meet ...*'" Subardjo was in attendance at the aforementioned Conference on Javanese Cultural Development in 1918, and here he experienced an epiphany: Knowledge of "Asian, especially Javanese culture," he later recalled, could represent a means of achieving "a balance with all of the Western education I had absorbed until now."⁷⁰

During a fifteen-year period of study at Leiden University in the Netherlands that ended in 1933, Subardjo participated eagerly in the fledgling Indonesian nationalist movement. Like his student colleague Mohammad Hatta, Subardjo was strongly drawn to the leftist critique of capitalism and imperialism that grew ever more influential in these years. But Subardjo, with stronger feelings of social and racial alienation vis-à-vis Westerners, also continued to be drawn to the discourse of cultural essentialism, of East and West, as an axis of identity. Japanese calls for a return to Asia, reverberating as Subardjo returned to Java in 1934, found in him a receptive ear. Under encouragement from Sudjono, a relative living in Tokyo, Subardjo arranged to visit Japan in September 1935. The funding for Subardjo's trip came from the Chinese-owned *Matahari* newspaper in Semarang, Central Java, in return for which Subardjo was to send regular dispatches on his experiences in Japan.

Subardjo later recalled being "awestruck" (*menakjubkan*) at his first sight of the "metropolitan city" of Tokyo,

not because of its size, but because it appeared as a mix of ancient and modern ... what really impressed me was that these modern buildings were not built by architects of the American or European race, but by Japanese people themselves. During our journey, I'd already been informed that the boat that carried us was not built in Europe or America, but by Japanese manufacturers. As [a member of] a people that had been colonized and oppressed, and which had an inferiority complex as a result, I couldn't believe that Asian races had the ability to match Western people in science and technology.⁷¹

Like Hatta and other previous Indonesian visitors, Subardjo soon found himself courted by Japanese pan-Asianists and military men, particularly those from the navy. He was also in Japan at a time in which critiques of Western modernity and the Western-tainted political status quo were reaching fever pitch. This was symbolized, for example, in the public furor and subsequent forced removal of legal scholar Minobe Tatsukichi from his position at Tokyo Imperial University for his interpretation of

the emperor as an “organ of the state.”⁷² Nationalist ideologues such as professors Fujisawa Chikao and Oguchi Tōyō cultivated contacts with Subardjo. In turn they provided him with the latest ideological packaging of modern Japan as a nation that had achieved technological modernization without sacrificing its ancient cultural essence.⁷³ Subardjo's views were also influenced by several encounters with the vast research library of the South Manchurian railroad company, introduced to him by a member of the Alliance for Japanese Culture (*Nihon bunka renmei*). Here, amidst a “large and great” collection of mainly Western studies pertaining to Japan and other parts of Asia including the Netherlands East Indies, he discovered the text of a public address delivered by Rabindranath Tagore during a visit to Japan in 1916. Subardjo was particularly impressed by Tagore's assertion that Japan was

in a situation both old and new at the same time. She inherits the ancient culture of the East, a culture that commands man to seek wealth and strength within one's own soul ... [and to] sacrifice one's self without regard to cost or profit, even to death, accepting uncounted social obligations ... You [Japan] are lucky not to have been fettered from outside, and because of this your responsibility is all the greater. Through your voice, Asia will answer to the problems of ... this modern age.⁷⁴

Tagore's exquisitely phrased First World War-era critiques of Western modernity and its meanings for Japan and Asia anticipated those of the 1930s and early 1940s, not surprisingly kindling the imaginations of Japanese and Indonesian intellectuals alike.

[I am] apprehensive of the change, which threatens Japanese civilisation, as something like a menace to one's own person. For the huge heterogeneity of the modern age, whose only common bond is usefulness, is nowhere so pitifully exposed against the dignity and hidden power of reticent beauty, as in Japan.⁷⁵

Against a Europe “ever ready for fight,” Tagore juxtaposed a Japan of “reverent adoration” which “does not boast of her mastery of nature,” but rather brings to it “her offerings of love.” This “opening of the heart to the soul of the world,” was “not the forced product of exotic culture,” but belonged “to all [Japan's] men and women of all conditions.”⁷⁶ Issues such as class conflict, imperialism, and political contingency were thus whisked away, replaced by an organic, harmonious family-state, and a purity and nobility of “purpose.”

Your duty towards your state has naturally assumed the character of filial duty, your nation becoming one family with your Emperor as head. Your national unity has not been evolved from the comradeship of arms for defensive and offensive purposes, or from partnership in raiding adventures, dividing among each member the danger and spoils of robbery. It is not an outcome of the necessity of organisation for some ulterior purpose, but it is an extension of the family and the obligations of the heart in a wide field of space and time.⁷⁷

In his 1916 addresses and afterward, Tagore also sounded alarm bells for Japan, and for Asia, regarding the dangers of an uncritical importation of Western nationalism and imperialism. Subardjo, however, remained most captivated by the evocation of a Japan essentially different from the West. In a dispatch to the *Matahari*, he informed the newspaper's elite Indonesian audience that

in Japan, although modern industry has been established, the traditions and customs of an agricultural country remain strong. In its religious, moral, and social traditions, we can see that everything is intimately concerned with the world of gods and devils. They really believe that these exist. The union of the gods and the people is the basis of Japan's oldest religion, Shinto.⁷⁸

In another report, he proclaimed that "Japanese culture contains more or less all of the basic elements of Eastern culture," and lauded Japan for being "the only country in Asia which is able to completely combine Western technical civilization with Eastern spiritual culture." He therefore urged fellow Indonesians to study in Japan, not only to master Western science and technology, but to "think about how to revive Indonesia's traditional spirit and ideas, deeply locked away in the people's hearts." In particular need of rediscovery by Indonesians, he maintained, were the wisdom and self-discipline that were the hallmarks of Japan's famed warrior code of *bushidō*.

Subardjo's hopes for this sort of Indonesian cultural renaissance as a result of contact with Japan were further encouraged by contemporary theories of common racial ancestry between the Japanese and the Malayan peoples, a connection in turn used to explain a host of purported cultural commonalities in such areas as language, architecture, and clothing.⁷⁹ When first introduced to such theories on the invitation of a certain Dr. Ichikawa from the Alliance for Japanese Culture, Subardjo recalled being somewhat skeptical, but surprising confirmation came from two Western sources. The first was a 1907 work by William Elliot Griffis encountered in the South Manchurian Railway Library.

The tie that resulted in the [ancient] Japanese political victory and the formation of the single *Jimmu* dynasty that has always ruled Japan, was in all likelihood the Malay race. This victory was almost the same as the victory of the Normans in England, whereby the victors were absorbed by those they defeated. This fusion in turn produced a strong race.⁸⁰

The second was the response Subardjo received from archeologist and former Leiden acquaintance Dr. Von Stein Callenfels to his question "Is it true that Japanese people have Malay blood?"

"Certainly!" he replied with assurance. "The Mikado himself has not forgotten his Malay ancestry, because every year, according to the customs of the Japanese Throne, he eats rice with his hands, not with chopsticks as is usually done." He

observed my doubting expression and said: "This is a real fact. In the science of Archeology, this is something that has already been confirmed."⁸¹

Subardjo's subsequent personal observations only added weight to the notion of a common cultural heritage.

When I compared traditional Japanese architecture, its houses on poles all along the seashore ... and all along the great rivers, and islands ... could I continue to doubt it? And not only this; also the variety of colors of the kimonos worn by Japanese women, which matched what one saw in the Sunda archipelago, particularly in the area of Priangan, West Java. And the Japanese songs that greatly resembled those of Sunda, all in a minor key—to Western ears, like a sad lament.⁸²

During Subardjo's stay in Tokyo a delegation of *Parindra* party leaders arrived on a study tour, and he took the "happy opportunity" to show them around. The group included party founder and chairman Dr. Soetomo, whose published fond impressions of Japan upon return were to precipitate the public debate with Liem Koen Hian shortly thereafter. With him was Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, who was to inherit the leadership of the party in 1941 upon the deaths of Dr. Soetomo (in 1938) and *Parindra's* subsequent chairman, Mohammad Thamrin (in 1941). It was Soekardjo who would lead *Parindra* into the period of Japanese occupation, and he and other *Parindra* members, as leading spokesmen for Japanese-Indonesian cooperation, would play a pivotal role in shaping public discourse in the critical first year of the occupation.

How important Subardjo's rave reviews of Japan in the *Matahari* were to the decision of *Parindra's* leaders to make the journey to Japan is unclear. Already in 1934, a year before Subardjo's departure for Japan, Soetomo had expressed an interest in Japan's educational system as a possible model for that of Indonesia, an interest deep enough to inspire the dispatch of a study mission from his Indonesian People's Party (*Partai Bangsa Indonesia*) to Japan late that same year.⁸³ In any event, the timing of the 1936 trip by *Parindra's* leadership just three months after the new party's founding suggested that Japan loomed large in its strategic thinking. Soetomo's lengthy two-month stay in Japan marked the beginning of a close association between *Parindra's* leadership and Japan, in terms both practical and ideological.

Soetomo's letters home during the trip described Japan and the Japanese in terms even more glowing than those of Subardjo. In his first dispatch, posted two days after arrival in Tokyo, he declared that he had felt right at home from the moment he stepped aboard the *Nagoya Maru*.

On this boat everything looked modest and unpretentious (*sederhana*). Although the *Nagoya Maru* was complete, it did not boast of its grandeur. This prompted in me an immediate feeling of pleasure, as if I was in my own home. The food, too, was simple, comprised that is of Japanese cuisine. If one wanted, however, one could order European food. But there was no reason for me to order anything else, because Japanese food too is oriented primarily around rice.⁸⁴

In a subsequent dispatch, Soetomo mobilized the simple observation of a shared diet and a shared cultural framework into a shattering broadside against Dutch- and Western-sponsored notions of racial and cultural superiority—and, by extension, against the premises of Western colonialism itself.

It appears too that the Japanese prefer eating rice, although they eat only a small amount of meat; on the contrary, they enjoy eating fish. All along we have always been served rice with roasted or salted fish. I have read [Western-authored] books, which attribute the lack of energy of the Indonesian race to the eating of too much ... rice. At that time I already did not believe this sort of explanation; now I believe all the more, that energy, great industriousness, and firmness of character are attributable to *nothing else* than the eating of great amounts of rice.⁸⁵

Soetomo was as quick as Subardjo to link such Japanese-Indonesian commonalities to a history shared long before the advent of the West in Asia:

Yesterday morning I visited a museum of ancient artifacts which demonstrated to me the cultural connection between the Japanese race and our own. Here I observed statues of the Buddha and other ancient relics, which said to me that in ancient times, our race was culturally related to the Japanese race. In the expressiveness of the painting, the Japanese come closer to the true reality (*keadaan senjatanja*) than we Indonesians in Java; and in this they are closer to those of us from Bali.⁸⁶

Overwhelmed by a Japanese hospitality to which he made constant reference, and convinced of the value of Japanese experience to Indonesian needs, Soetomo offered the following public wish to fellow party readers:

It may be that in later days, the flow of the children of Indonesia who journey to Japan will increase to the point that Japan becomes for Indonesians a "Second Mecca." I hope that this may be the case as it has been in the holy land, the land of our great and holy prophet Moehammad. Is it not so that among the Asian races who journey there, it is Indonesians who are the most numerous?! This is one proof that the adventurous spirit (*semangat pengembara*) of the Indonesian race truly remains great. May it be so.⁸⁷

Upon his return to Java, Soetomo held up Japan's experience of modernization and the Japanese spirit as models worthy of imitation by a future independent Indonesia. In his series of effusive articles written for *Soera Oemoem* that provoked Liem's criticisms, he also reproduced arguments of the ancient Japanese originating from the Malays, a reflection of his attendance at Dr. Ichikawa's lecture on this subject while in Subardjo's company (and, no doubt, Subardjo's own strong convictions on the subject).⁸⁸ At one point, amidst commentary on a *kabuki* play that had much impressed him while in Tokyo, Soetomo further proclaimed that "in spite of its modernization, Japan has not lost its indigenous artistic heritage," and added that "there is no great difference between Japan's traditional culture and ours."⁸⁹

In the five years that separated the visit of *Parindra*'s leaders to Japan and the beginning of the Pacific War—a period of steadily worsening relations between the Indies government and Japan, and between the Dutch rulers and Indonesian nationalists, including the moderate *Parindra*—the editors of *Soera Oemoem* continued to harp on the theme of a coming together of Indonesians and Japanese. Echoing Soetomo's 1936 observations, one *Soera Oemoem* editorial proclaimed that "Mecca used to be the Holy Land for Moslems, but Tokyo will in the future act as a magnet for our intellectuals."⁹⁰ *Parindra* party members were well-represented in a new trend of sending children to Japan for higher education, and when a position as instructor in Malay-Indonesian at Tokyo's School of Foreign Languages was advertised in 1938, a gamut of prominent Indonesian intellectual figures responded. Among them was Armijn Pané, Sanoesi Panés younger brother and a prolific writer and editor at Batavia's Malay-Indonesian publishing house *Balai Poestaka*. Others included journalist Parada Harahap and—despite his skeptical position in the 1936 debate on the value of Asian cultural heritage for Indonesian nation building—the renowned young author and linguist Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana. In the end, it was R. Sudjono, a relative of Subardjo, who was chosen. Sudjono, too, was a Leiden law graduate. He was also chairman of *Parindra*'s foreign policy board, and this political connection may have been the primary reason for his acceptance. Sudjono resided in Tokyo until 1942, when he would return to Java as advisor with the Japanese invasion forces, attached to the 16th Army's Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*).⁹¹

In the economic realm the flow of Japanese industrial and consumer commodities to the Indies followed a reverse trend in the late 1930s, flattening and even declining amidst both increasingly stringent Dutch measures designed to limit Japanese "dumping" and the new phenomenon of ethnic Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods, waged particularly between 1936 and 1938 in protest of Japan's increasingly aggressive stance in China proper. Yet for a handful of enterprising, well-connected Indonesian entrepreneurs at least, the new circumstances represented not an economic closing to Japan, but precisely the opposite. Among them, it was undoubtedly trader, importer, and cotton-spinner A.M. Dasaad who best navigated the late 1930s economic landscape. Associated with a group of entrepreneurs from the *Minangkabau* region of Sumatra⁹²—a group that included Mohammad Hatta as economic advisor—Dasaad shrewdly took advantage of the opportunity opened up by the local Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, and the ongoing high demand for them, to import them himself. From a founding capital of 89,000 guilders, by 1941, Dasaad's firm's annual turnover had reached between 8 and 10 million guilders, making him perhaps the leading Indonesian economic figure of Java at the time of the Japanese arrival, and certainly among the most encouraged by the new possibilities promised thereby.⁹³

Amidst these developments, Achmad Subardjo himself maintained a low public profile after his return to Java in 1936, no doubt spurred in part by fear of further arousing Dutch suspicions. But quietly, Subardjo continued to think and speak highly of Japan, and cultivated contacts with a small number of sympathetic local Japanese residents. These included the Bandung shopkeeper Nishijima Shigetada.⁹⁴ On the eve of the war in September 1941, in tandem with Nishijima, Subardjo lead a small

subversive group that sought to stimulate local support for arriving Japanese army units, to sabotage Dutch counter-measures, and stockpile food.⁹⁵

Subardjo's level of activism at this moment was highly exceptional, practically unique among Java's nationalists. But a wider group were involved in quiet contacts with local Japanese, particularly members of the *Parindra* party such as journalists Winarno Hendranoto and Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, along with Mohammad Thamrin, who had assumed the *Parindra* chairmanship upon the death of Dr. Soetomo in May 1938. In the extended absence of Sukarno and Hatta, Thamrin emerged as Indonesian nationalism's most prominent spokesmen. Known for his stirring, eloquent speeches to the Volksraad, where freedom of speech was guaranteed, Thamrin never shied from wielding the issue of Indonesian fondness for the Japanese as one of his rhetorical tools. In an address dated November 9, 1940, for example, Thamrin was most emphatic in his warning to the intransigent Dutch, making reference along the way to popular word plays on (1) *Djintan*, a Japanese mouthwash with the image of Meiji hero General Nogi on its label, and (2) the Dutch spelling of the name of Kobayashi, the chief Japanese trade representative in (recently failed) negotiations:

Some years ago I stated that Indonesians were quite capable of contributing to the thoughts and to the discussions which concern their country. They do so in spite of no schooling and in spite of still being considered dumb by Western people. I explained on that occasion that Indonesians had interpreted the word *Djintan* to mean "*Djenderal Jepang Ini Nanti Toelang Anak Negeri*": This Japanese general will soon help the sons of our land. At present there is a new play on words to illustrate this kind of Indonesian folk humour (*leloetjon rakjat*). "Kobajasi" has recently been interpreted by our people as follows: "*Kolonie orang belanda akan Jepang ambil seantero Indonesia*": The entire Dutch colony of Indonesia will be taken by Japan.⁹⁶

In the heated atmosphere of late 1940, remarks such as these, combined with contacts between Thamrin and some local Japanese, proved too much for the colonial authorities to swallow. When a search at the office of the nationalist newspaper *Pemandangan* revealed that Thamrin had shared a secret report on the "Economic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies" with Satō Nobuhide, then a civilian employee of Japan's Naval Ministry, Thamrin was placed under house arrest and heatedly interrogated.⁹⁷ Suffering from a chronic kidney ailment and fever, Thamrin died five days later on January 11, 1941, in effect a martyr to Japanese-Indonesian cooperation.

Thamrin's nieces later recalled a great private optimism about the Japanese in his last days. During walks after dinner, Thamrin would point to the palace of the governor-general and say, "Pretty soon the Japanese forces will land in Indonesia. Then we shall move over there."⁹⁸ Thamrin would not be on hand to witness the Japanese arrival, but when they did arrive just over a year later, his death would only strengthen *Parindra's* leaders' sense that their party was the rightful heir to the mantle of Indonesian leadership in any Japan-oriented future.

Yet despite such quiet exchanges and occasional pro-Japanese effusiveness in the Indonesian press in these years, the dramatic ideological reorientation of the Indonesian

elite towards Japan forecast in the *Soera Oemoem* newspaper—a reorientation greatly feared by contemporary Dutch observers—failed to entirely materialize. Elite Indonesian attitudes towards Japan remained generally positive, but to most, Japan still seemed far away, and still a second-rate power in comparison with the Western ones. At no more than thirty in any given prewar year, Indonesians studying in Japan remained vastly outnumbered by those still making the traditional elite educational pilgrimage to Europe. As William Frederick has observed, such low numbers in spite of the financial appeal of schooling costs less than one quarter those in the Netherlands were a clear reflection of an “awareness of important language and cultural barriers as well as the fact that, like it or not, the world still recognized European primacy.”⁹⁹

Within this context, the effusiveness of Subardjo and Soetomo on the subject of Japan—and above all on Japanese culture—remained exceptional. It is telling, for example, that the Japanese case remained mostly in the background in the nationalist cultural debates of 1935 and 1936. Spokesmen acknowledged that Japan had made a name for Asia, but remained ambiguous on the specific relevance of Japanese experience to their own, seeing in Japan merely a reflection of the West, or a “special case” that was neither entirely Eastern or Western.¹⁰⁰ Inclined to view Japan both as a Western copycat and a Western-style imperialist aggressor, the outspoken left-oriented “Asianist” Sanoesi Pané too was clearly hesitant to look to Japan as a model, looking instead to Indian experience and culture for inspiration and guidance.¹⁰¹ Pané shared with other scholars, both Dutch and Indonesian, a view of Indonesia’s cultural roots as essentially Hindic-Buddhist. For all its appeals, Japan and its experience still seemed further removed than that of India or the Islamic societies of the Middle East, both of which had clear historical and cultural links with the Indies, and both of which were in a similar situation of Western colonial domination.

More generally, until 1942 at least, the project of cultural nation-building itself remained sporadic and tentative in the colonial Indies. In a practical sense, this was a reflection of a nationalist agenda that put political and economic issues before cultural ones. But it was also a reflection of continued Western political and ideological hegemony. In the great shadow of Western power, considerations of “native tradition” and “Eastern”-ness as anything other than a handicap to modern nation-building and progress carried an aspect of bluster and wishful thinking; or worse, narrow-minded chauvinism.

Whatever their stance on such issues, furthermore, few seriously expected the Dutch to be leaving any time soon, in either the abstract or the concrete sense. In this context, the flirtation of *Parindra*’s leadership with Japan and the Japanese must be seen as just one of several options that these leaders wished to keep open for the future, and perhaps equally or even more so, as a bargaining chip against the Dutch. Until the eve of the war, a much greater share of *Parindra*’s attentions and energies continued to be lavished upon the Dutch rulers, with whom *Parindra*’s leaders always hoped to come to terms: to achieve, together with the Dutch, the same sort of gradual, cooperative progression towards national autonomy that cooperator nationalist colleagues appeared to be achieving in the Philippines, Burma, and in India.¹⁰² Amidst continued rifts and weakness in the nationalist ranks, meanwhile—including the failure to attract a consistent mass following—nationalist energies were mostly absorbed in concrete, day-to-day issues of political strategy. As one Indonesian commentator later explained

in an essay in the *Asia Raya* newspaper that appeared six months into the Japanese occupation,

There were those who resisted the West in terms of economics, and some who put the most emphasis in the field of politics, but only a small minority pursued the struggle in terms of clashing ideologies. Only one or two groups and one or two people opposed the West in the area of culture, and the struggle of these one or two groups did not get enough attention from the popular strata, because almost all the people's energy at this time was taken up with politics.¹⁰³

In the Indies as in many other places in the non-West—in particular among the nation-building bourgeoisie—the crisis conditions of the interwar era had opened a window onto a particular kind of "Asia." Up to now, constraints of power, place, and history had left the Japanese mostly isolated in viewing the attainment of this "Asia" as not only possible and urgent, but as a matter of life and death. But a new alignment—with new potentials—was just over the horizon.

Venturing South

In the summer of 1941, Japanese planning and organization for the invasion of Southeast Asia and the Pacific began in earnest, as worsening relations with the United States and the Netherlands East Indies and continued Axis victories in Europe made war for Southeast Asia's resources seem a concrete possibility. The expanding political and material aims of the conflict, the increasingly "total" social commitment that victory in modern warfare demanded, and the sense that Japan had allowed itself to be outwitted by the Chinese nationalists on the propaganda front led logically to the military devotion of increasing attention and energy towards the winning of "hearts and minds," both Japanese and Asian. Compelled to acknowledge the "cultural war" as too important to be left to the uncoordinated actions of the regular military's Broadcast and Pacification Units as they had been in China, the military now expanded the "hearts and minds" franchise, mobilizing a range of mainly civilian cultural expertise, including writers, filmmakers, intelligence experts, "Asia hands," and the like, for the move southwards.¹

The result was an entirely new construct called "military propaganda squads" (*gun senden butai*), one for each new area to be occupied, established between mid- and late 1941. The specific shape of the propaganda squads owed more than anything else to the example of the Nazi German *Propaganda Korps*, a new concept in propaganda strategy which had much impressed army general Yamashita Tomoyuki on a tour of Europe the previous year.² Like the *Propaganda Korps*, the propaganda squads involved the mobilization of a variety of civilians regarded as experts in the production of culture—novelists, poets, social commentators, journalists, painters, cameramen, photographers, wireless operators, musicians, printers, stenographers, etc.—whose responsibilities included "propaganda for and pacification of the inhabitants of the occupied areas and broadcasts to the home front," as well as "the exceedingly difficult matter of 'the enlightenment (*keimō*) of officers and men in the field.'"³

In both their diversity and relative coherence socially and ideologically, the Japanese "hearts and minds" experts mobilized to join the 16th Army for the journey to Java—many of whom were eventually assembled aboard a single boat called the "S.S. Sakura" (*Sakura maru*)—comprised a rough cross-section of Japan's middle- to upper-middle classes. Their mobilization represented a revolutionary intersection between state and society, driven by a convergence between the practical exigencies of modern war, crisis in the imperial order, the appeal of the fascist-social corporatist model, the radical potentials of new media techniques and technologies, and social change in a

context of maturing industrial capitalism. As such, the experience of the propaganda squads reflects the dynamics of Japan's broader social history in this period, heralding the arrival of Japan's middle-class intelligentsia as indispensable popular mediators of nation and empire in an age of mass society, mass media, and total war.

For the hearts and minds experts, mobilization for participation in Japan's world-historical showdown against the West in Asia presented both peril and promise: a confrontation with the overwhelming, fearsome, and sometimes arbitrary power of the military-imperial state, but also an unparalleled chance to assume an active and influential role in national and imperial affairs—to stand up and be counted in national eyes. Ideologically, the move southwards represented for many a unique opportunity to transcend the social constraints, contradictions, and fracture lines hitherto obtaining in the Japanese nation and its empire: an opportunity to create a new order where devotion to the national and imperial cause would be the only social denominator. Thus would they break through the unnatural and outdated hierarchies and boundaries dividing fellow Japanese—as well as Japanese and “brother Asians”—from one another. For the building of this transcendent Asian order, the vast “Southern Regions” groaning under Western colonial domination appeared to beckon as an ideal locale. Precisely in their very *unfamiliarity*, they offered a location for Japan and Asia alike to start afresh, to liberate one another from the shackles of Western modernity and the “misunderstandings” of the China War, to rediscover that ever-elusive sense of community and harmony lost in the headlong rush to the modern.

Underneath an impressive veneer of unity, commitment, and idealism, however, the ideological configuration of “hearts and minds” experts steaming southwards revealed variegated constructions of “Asian liberation” and positions vis-à-vis the Japanese state, “Asian brethren,” and one another. As much as they sought to leave them behind, the tensions and disunities of modern Japan and its empire were very much on board. And long before they together set foot on the sands of Java, problems and dynamics already in play in the context of the China War prefigured and circumscribed the limits of the liberation they might offer both to Japan and to the rest of Asia. These included the ambiguous and subordinate relationship of these men vis-à-vis the military and its imperial objectives, their ideological minority status as missionary “true believers,” serious divisions of status and worldview even among the “true believers” themselves, and characteristically colonial idealizations of social reality and its potentials.

From the beginning, the signals from within the Japanese imperial system were ambiguous and ambivalent, reflective on the one hand of the conservative inertia and provincialism of the Japanese military and bureaucracy, on the other of the revolutionary nature, challenge, and promise of the times. For the military, employing the services of these men of questionable national credentials to soften up both the Japanese and colonized Asian publics—a motley crew including “Westernized” men of culture and former Southeast Asia residents—was, on one level, merely a cynical arrangement of convenience. Many in the military had little respect for civilians or for civilian interference in what they regarded as their exclusive imperial preserve—the prosecution of the war, and the obtaining of resources to that end. As a civilian in army employ observed, those outside of the military were derogatively referred to as

“provincials” (*chihōjin*), “as if they were a different race of people from another world.”⁴ Java propaganda squad commander Machida later maintained that “those referred to as *bunkajin*, including writers and journalists, were even looked upon as heretics.”⁵ In this ambivalent context it was surely no accident that, whereas the civilian members of the Nazi German *Propaganda Korps* were given full training and status as professional soldiers, the civilian membership of Japan’s new propaganda units received only nominal military training and the non-military status of “military affiliates” (*gunzoku*), despite their wearing of uniforms and swords.⁶ *Gunzoku* referred to “non-military individuals who of their own volition were employed to work for the army or navy.”⁷ According to civilian broadcaster Hamano Kensaburō, sent to the Philippines, “even the lowest privates” saw themselves as “the emperor’s right hand,” while *gunzoku* ranked lower than an “army pigeon.”⁸

This problem was compounded by continued debates within the military leadership over the very need for a “propaganda war,” and an unwillingness to foot the bill for it in any case.⁹ But within as well as outside of the military, there were also those who felt that the new situation demanded a fresh approach, presenting not only new threats but also new possibilities to Japan and its mission. Many of those more frustrated with the course of events in Northeast Asia envisioned Southeast Asia as a “clean slate” of sorts, a chance to start afresh and do the imperial job in a more enlightened, harmonious, and productive way, informed by an awareness of the military-colonial mistakes of the past.¹⁰ What was more, to the extent they would genuinely welcome “liberation” from Western colonial rule and the opportunity to establish a new post-Western order, Southeast Asians—and their anti-colonial nationalist movements—promised potentially vital support in the “common struggle” against the powerful Western foe.

Still, many in the high command were instinctively suspicious of autonomous political movements of any kind, a feeling largely shared among Japan’s civilian administrative elite, including a small number of bureaucrats enlisted by the army to transfer their domestic and colonial ruling “expertise” from North- to Southeast Asia once these areas were secured. Closer to home in Korea and Taiwan, Japan’s colonial administrators had recently been implementing revolutionary, intensive programs of forced cultural “Japanization,” industrialization, and economic integration with a corresponding suppression of local political and cultural autonomy. This heavy-handed approach was part of a wartime strategy of mobilizing and integrating Korea and Taiwan within an autarkic greater Japan, employing these areas as forward military-industrial bases for the conquering and defense of China and Southeast Asia, mobilizing their much-needed manpower to these ends, and neutralizing the threat of anti-colonial nationalism. For Tokyo policymakers, Southeast Asia was to fulfill a different, in some ways more conventional, “peripheral” colonial function as supply base and defensive “outer ring,” involving a minimum of Japanese manpower and resources. Guidelines on the “Administration of Occupied Areas” issued by the General Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference in November 1941 characterized Japan’s primary goals in Southeast Asia as the “rapid acquisition of important defense resources” and the “securing of self-sustenance of operating military forces in the field.”¹¹

In this context, in contrast to the radical imperial interventionism of Korea and Taiwan, the conference adopted a more conventional colonial approach to ruling Southeast Asia that took a cue from the ostensibly “harmonious” Dutch and English systems of “indirect” colonial rule implemented in these same colonies—as well as the lessons of China. “Existing government structures are to be used to the utmost,” it advised, “and former government organizations and folk customs are to be respected.” The conference was muted on the subject of “Asian liberation,” ordering only that “the native inhabitants are to be guided so as to promote among them trust of the Japanese forces, and their independence movements are not to be stimulated prematurely.” At the same time, in South- as well as Northeast Asia, Tokyo strategists recognized that ultimate victory in the coming showdown with the West would require much more from Japan’s colonial subject populations than the passivity and tranquility idealized in peacetime colonial imaginations. In this war to end all wars, active participation, support, and sacrifice were to be the order of the day. As spelled out in the conference guidelines, the “heavy pressure due to the acquisition of defense resources and local self-support by the occupying forces are to be borne by the native inhabitants, and the pacification of the inhabitants is to be carried out in harmony with this purpose.”¹²

Given the burdens and expectations to be placed on Japan’s new subject populations, shortages of time and Japanese manpower, and the nature of Southeast Asia as a battlefield periphery, the winning of local “hearts and minds” to the common struggle was, in sum, a top priority. And while the liaison conference was decidedly counter-revolutionary in calling for essential continuity between Western and Japanese colonial regimes—meaning, in effect, the continued propping up of the old orders of collaborating “traditional” native elites, with the Japanese simply taking the place of the former Western overseers—its ambiguous wording regarding Southeast Asia’s nationalist movements also reflected at least an ambivalent recognition of their potential social power as “natural allies” in the shared anti-Western struggle and the promised building of a “new order” to come. In this context, there were those at various levels who—while varying in their actual knowledge of, or sympathy for, nationalist movements—agreed that the dynamic potential of Southeast Asia’s independence movements should be harnessed to the common cause so long as it represented no direct threat to Japanese interests; and, as a corollary, that Japan’s “hearts and minds” experts should be given the leeway to appeal to the interests of the common cause as they saw fit.

This was all the more the case in the run-up to and during the invasion, in which expectations of a hard fight seem to have left the command open to any means of ensuring native support, at least until the battle was won.¹³ This background would seem to help explain the deployment of stirring pro-independence symbolism and rhetoric aimed at Indonesians in the period of December 1941 to March 1942, such as the hoisting of Japanese and Indonesian flags side by side during the march through Java, and in continued Radio Tokyo broadcasts, even as the liaison conference guidelines insisted that nationalist movements not be stimulated “prematurely.”¹⁴ The text of a Radio Tokyo speech by Mohammad Hasan delivered on March 26, 1942—more than two weeks after the Dutch surrender in Java—provides a sense of the optimism of these broadcasts.

Do not allow the people to continue to fail to concern themselves with the benefits of independence. If this is not considered, then the loss that we shall suffer is certain: Independence will be postponed. I believe we must remember the speech of Prime Minister Tojo, in which he explained that regarding Indonesia, political policy will be pursued according to the conditions and customs of the Indonesian people, and according to the desires of the Indonesian people. Meaning: Japan is going to examine whether or not the people really desire independence.¹⁵

In fact, where the specifics of Japan's liberationist promises were concerned, the prime minister's speech to which Hasan referred could also be read to indicate a cynical *realpolitik* in Japanese policymaking, echoing the liaison conference's emphasis on continuity over change. For in this landmark speech, delivered on January 22, 1942, as the Malaya and Philippine campaigns progressed, Tojo had only spoken of independence with regard to Burma and the Philippines. Burma was gateway to the stronghold of India, whose nationalists the Japanese were eager to court. The British had already granted its nationalists a measure of local representation, and a contingent of Burmese nationalist leaders were now accompanying invading Japanese forces as the "Burma National Army." This situation appears to have encouraged at least nominal concessions to nationalist aspirations among Japan's leadership. Likewise, Filipino nationalists had already received a promise of future independence from the United States in 1937. Indonesia, which had never received such a promise from the Dutch, received no such promise from Tojo either.

Still, while Tojo and his cynical ilk might have seen the practice of propaganda in the occupied regions merely as a means to a military-strategic end—and numerous others among Japan's military and administrative elites might have shared a desire to avoid "stirring up the natives" altogether—the force about to land in Java also had its share of men committed to the notion that the legitimacy of Japan's historic mission in Asia rested precisely in the degree to which its praxis matched its propaganda claims. In broad terms, these men included General Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the 16th Army that was to occupy Java. They also included Lieutenant Colonel Machida Keiji, a highly-decorated career military man and veteran of China who was chosen to lead the Java propaganda squad. "As far as I knew," wrote Machida in 1967, "the military goal of the propaganda squad from the very beginning was to liberate the colonies and achieve the independence of Java."¹⁶ "Asia is One" and the "liberation of Asia," he added, were "not at all a matter of fooling. I felt in this a reason for living."¹⁷

Machida, who had no background in propaganda or in Southeast Asia, later said that he had no idea why he was chosen as leader of the Java propaganda squad, but the choice is likely explained by views he shared with Imamura and Imamura's key staff officer Colonel Takashima Tatsuhiko, also a childhood military schoolmate of Machida. While Machida's postwar claims of devotion to Indonesian independence should be taken with a grain of salt, all three of these men were Greater Asianists in a broadly liberal, "center-pragmatist" mold, believing in the war as one of Japanese and Asian liberation from the evils of Western oppression, and maintaining a paternalistic attitude towards Japan's Southeast Asian younger brethren, while eschewing the hard-handed tactics of China—so long, that is, as Japan remained firmly in the political

saddle, and its war aims remained uncompromised.¹⁸ “The liberation of Asia,” the achievement of Japan’s “military goals,” and “Asia is One” (with Japan at its center) were thus conceived of as mutually harmonious and reconcilable ends. In fact, Machida himself later admitted that the Japanese sponsoring of stridently pronationalist propaganda aimed at the Indies in this period was attributable as much as anything to a general Japanese underestimation of the extent of Indonesian political awareness.¹⁹ This telling admission points to the colonial understandings and sheer ignorance of Asian societies that underpinned—and gave false coherence to—domestic Japanese Greater Asianism.

Within the 16th Army’s new Java propaganda squad, ignorance of Southeast Asia was much more the rule than the exception.²⁰ Of a total membership of over two hundred (of whom approximately half were civilian and half military), even in the most optimistic estimate, the Java propaganda squad boasted only eight people with a knowledge of the local language.²¹ Compounding the lack of background, most of the unit’s membership was assembled only in December 1941, leaving very little time to learn. The majority of the members were chosen not for any special relationship to or knowledge of the Netherlands East Indies, but for their perceived skills as purveyors of cultural enlightenment. Past demonstrations of patriotism and devotion to the war effort also seem to have been a factor in the selection of some members, notably Asano Akira and Tomizawa Uio. More prominent than either of these—and apparently chosen more for this than for his relatively less impressive patriotic credentials—was the novelist Abe Tomoji. Aged thirty-eight in 1941, Tomoji, a professor of English literature at Tokyo’s Meiji University, had written some eight novels. One of these, “Winter Inn” (*Fuyu no yado*), profiled a conflict between Christian ideals and Japanese morals as revealed in the intimate portrait of a dysfunctional modern suburban Tokyo family, and had sold more than three hundred thousand copies. Another, set in Beijing, described another conflict equally in vogue in the 1930s, that of Chinese versus Japanese “ways of thinking.” While Abe has been described as a liberal thinker, and another of his prewar books approached “liberalism from both its good and bad sides,” he had never been involved with the political left to the degree that some of his colleagues, such as Asano, had been. Indeed, Abe told a friend in 1942, had it not been for resentments among literary colleagues at his anti-communist stance in his college days, he “might have been famous five years earlier.”²²

Still, questionable past left-wing associations—even when accompanied by a failure to declare a “change of direction” as Asano Akira had done—did not prevent the selection to the propaganda squad of such figures as the well-known liberal journalist and cultural commentator Ōya Sōichi, as well as the novelist Takeda Rintarō. Takeda had participated in the proletarian literature movement in the 1920s, and his 1929 novel *Bōryoku* (“Violence”) had been banned for its political content and anti-military standpoint. His early 1930s works, sketches of peripheral urban characters inspired by the seventeenth-century works of Ihara Saikaku, had been much less overtly political, but retained a pointed concern with social justice. In explicit opposition to the ultra-nationalistic, pro-military literary groupings *Bungei konwa kai* (the Arts Gathering Association) and the Japan Romanticists (*Nippon rōmanha*)—of which Asano Akira was a founding member—Takeda had founded the humanist *Jinmin bunkō* (“People’s

Library”) journal in early 1936.²³ After the war, Takeda was criticized for his turn away from Marxism and his failure to offer resistance to the government-imposed shutdown of the *Jinmin bunkō* in early 1939.²⁴ Yet while those such as Asano and Tomizawa accompanied the army to China and championed that war’s promise as an opportunity for Asian renewal, Takeda maintained a pregnant silence regarding the China war.

Upon his selection to the Java propaganda squad, Takeda reportedly told Machida, “now the *kenpeitai* and the *tokkō* (Special Higher Police, or ‘thought police’) won’t be visiting me anymore. That’s good.”²⁵ The selection of Takeda seems in fact to have represented a test of loyalty or even an exile, an impression further strengthened by the fact that while the *bunkajin* were officially summoned for a one-year term of service, Takeda ended up serving almost two years in Java, longer by far than any of his colleagues, including Colonel Machida himself. More generally, 16th Army chief of staff Okazaki Seisaburō later reconfirmed that the *bunkajin* “were drafted partly to make them understand what the war was all about.”²⁶

After reporting for duty, the *bunkajin* proved an unruly lot. Older than the low-ranking soldiers attempting to order them around, and used to preferential treatment, the *bunkajin* chafed at the tight physical and mental confines of army life during the month and a half of training and preparation conducted mainly in Taiwan. Though only nine years old at the time, Abe Yoshio later wrote that the insult his father experienced in being “put through the military training of a common soldier, when he should have been treated as an officer” was “burned into my memory.”²⁷ In response, the “multitude of fighting cocks,” as Tomizawa referred to them, refused to conform to the established schedule or routines.²⁸ Machida recalled the *bunkajin* tormenting the much younger officers in charge of them with biting wit—and, in the case of comedian Matsui Akikata, mercilessly accurate imitations of their screamed orders—until the officers begged to be transferred.²⁹ When the army put them to work unloading supplies from their boat in Taiwan, Ōya Sōichi composed a song praising the contribution of Taiwanese coolies to the war effort. Only after the war was it revealed to Machida that this song was in fact a veiled protest against the military’s treatment of the *bunkajin* themselves.³⁰

But the protests were good-natured and did not amount to any real “resistance.”³¹ In fact, the dominant mood among the members of the Java propaganda squad appears to have been one of excitement and anticipation, all the more so once their mission and their destination became clear. All supported the war effort and were inspired to some degree by the idea of the “liberation of Asia.” And Java, after all, was said to be a “paradise on earth.”³² For all their chafing at the military rules, the *bunkajin* awaiting dispatch to Java in early 1942 were an extremely motivated group. Their output of propaganda materials in preparation for the Java landing was prodigious. Reflecting their intended role as enlighteners of the men at arms, among their productions at this time was a poster with eighteen simple “do’s and don’t’s,” aimed at teaching Japanese troops about the “natives” and their customs in the Indies.³³ Composed by cartoonists Yokoyama Ryūichi and Ono Saseo, the poster, which included basic points such as “do not wear your shoes into the temples of the natives” and “looking at women bathing is a man’s shame,” was later dropped from the air to Japanese troops landing in Java.³⁴



Figure 3.1 Java propaganda squad members depart for a tour of battlefields and cultural historical sites in Java and Bali in mid-May 1942 with visiting painters Koiso Ryōhei and Yoshioka Kenji. Bottom row left to right: Yoshioka, Koiso, painter Minami Masayoshi, writer Abe Tomoji, comic storyteller Matsui Suisei, and cartoonist Ono Saseo. Source: *Unabara* newspaper, May 17, 1942, p. 2.

Besides the *bunkajin* and an assortment of military staff, the propaganda squad's membership also included two young civilian propagandists sharing the surname Shimizu: the field-hardened professional Shimizu Hitoshi, and the ivory tower ideologue Shimizu Nobuo. Each was aflame with passion for Japan and its mission in Asia, and each had his own distinct interpretation of what this mission was. The contrasts and points of agreement between their two approaches—Shimizu Nobuo self-righteous, iconoclastic, emperor-centered, and fixated on an idealized past and future, Shimizu Hitoshi flexible, practical, social, with two feet in the modern present—were in many ways representative of the “right-idealist” and “center-pragmatist” constructions of Japanese Greater Asianism respectively.

Shimizu Hitoshi, born of a self-described “country peasant family” in Yamagata prefecture, was a seasoned, pragmatic man of the field, who dreamed of a harmonious, Japan-centered Asian order based upon mutual recognition of shared practical interests and concerns.³⁵ At Chūō University in Tokyo he had run a newspaper that sought to “unite the ideas of the right and the left,” an undertaking that sometimes put him on the wrong side of the Thought Police. Upon graduation in 1937, Shimizu had served for three years as a unit chief (*hanchō*) in an army “pacification squad” (*senbuhan*) on the propaganda front lines in north China, attempting to win the hearts and minds of the local population to Japan’s side.³⁶

Shimizu was a great admirer and protégé of Army General Ishiwara Kanji, the planner of the “Manchurian incident” whose later opposition to the war in China itself led to his “exile” to the position of vice-chief of staff of the Kwantung Army in north China.³⁷ It was here that Shimizu Hitoshi came to work under him in January 1938.³⁸ Shimizu was greatly interested in the Chinese people’s movements, and believed as Ishiwara did that Japan’s priority lay in uniting Asia’s peoples for the coming ultimate showdown against the Soviets. Like Ishiwara, he also believed that this unity was not something that could be imposed from the top-down or by force, but must come “from the heart.” On the assumption that propaganda could not be effective without a popular mass movement, in consultation with Ishiwara, Shimizu attempted to establish an “East Asian League Movement” (*Tōa renmei undō*), open to all Chinese. The premises of this movement were Chinese political independence, economic cooperation, and mutual defense, with “absolutely no interference in internal affairs,” based on the idea that the people, who were “powerless,” needed to “cooperate and compromise with those who had the guns.”³⁹

Shimizu returned to Tokyo in 1940. There he grew friendly with Gotō Ryūnosuke, a classmate of then prime minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro and member of Konoe’s brain trust, the Shōwa Research Association (*Shōwa kenkyūkai*).⁴⁰ He subsequently became an organization bureau chief of Gotō’s *Taisei yokusankai* (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), peopled by young, activist bureaucrats from both right- and left-wing backgrounds.⁴¹ Here, among energetic, progressive young intellectuals such as Rōyama Masamichi, Ryū Shintarō, and Ozaki Hotsumi, he found common company in his support for an “East Asian League.”⁴² Tensions with imperial ideologues in the wider society, both military and civilian, remained however undiminished.⁴³

In April 1941, six months after its founding, the *Taisei yokusankai* itself was disbanded after police investigators accused it of being “red.”⁴⁴ Shimizu, however, continued to work with those who had left the movement, taking up a position in the Cabinet Information Bureau’s third division. He was working here when he was recruited to serve with the Java propaganda squad.⁴⁵

With his background in propaganda in China and his extensive experience of dealing with the military, Shimizu Hitoshi was chosen to act as a sort of liaison between the civilian *bunkajin* and the 16th Army in Java, where the population included an economically influential minority of Chinese descent. Knowing nothing of the Indies and happy with the position he had reached in the corridors of the Cabinet Information Bureau—an influential insider status only now becoming attainable for graduates of private universities like Shimizu—he was not eager to depart.⁴⁶ But he quickly focused his energies southward.

On board the *Sakura maru* in the days before the landing in Java, in keeping with his belief in the importance of establishing direct communication with the masses in the occupied areas, Shimizu made a determined if necessarily short-term effort to learn the Indonesian language.⁴⁷ He appears to have been more or less alone in this. While the other squad members passed the monotonous days at sea socializing, writing, and drinking, Shimizu holed himself away with a Indonesian language textbook published by the *Takushoku daigaku* (Colonial University) in Tokyo—one of many Japanese textbooks of the time in which the foreign language was written in *katakana* for easier usage by Japanese.⁴⁸ In Shimizu's case, as with many other Japanese, this practice would seem to have contributed to a propensity to badly mispronounce the language, a problem always more apparent to listeners than speakers, compounded by the fact that native listeners were rarely in a position to offer a critique.⁴⁹ Whatever he lacked in language expertise, however, Shimizu was ready to make up for in missionary enthusiasm.

Also lacking in any knowledge of Indonesia or its language—and likely too Japan-centered to study it—the *sendenhan*'s more cerebral, scholarly Shimizu Nobuo, subsequent editor of its Japanese-language newspaper in Java, had been active since the late 1930s as a theoretician of the “imperial way” (*kōdōha*) military faction.⁵⁰ Scholar Gotō Ken'ichi has referred to Shimizu Nobuo as “the brains behind the top brass of the 16th Army.” In the post-1937 context of stalemate in China and Japanese defeats in the secret war against the Soviets at Nomonhan, in the pages of the magazine *Sensō bunka* (“War Culture”), Shimizu helped to formulate *kōdō* ideology into a fully elaborated rationale for a military advance southward (*nanshin*), a noble call to arms which might also appeal to the people of Asia (and Southeast Asia in particular), complete with the latest scientific trimming culled from the fields of geography, linguistics, anthropology, and historiography.⁵¹ He was joined in this by colleague Kojima Toshihiko and the leader of their group, Nakakōji Akira. Their arguments, and their comfort with ancient imperial vocabulary, appear to have taken inspiration from the writings of Professor Kanokogi Kazunobu, a specialist in German philosophy and culture and active member of the “Greater Asia Association,” founded by a number of right-wing activists, academics, and political figures such as Konoe Fumimaro to bolster legitimacy for Japan's adventures in Manchuria and China in the early 1930s.⁵² While the gaze of Kanokogi and most of his contemporaries had been fixed upon the Asian continent, however, Shimizu and his colleagues—with increasing support from officers in the navy, many of whom had long viewed the southern regions (*nampō*) as a natural domain for Japanese expansion—sought to bring the South Pacific and Southeast Asian regions into the center of the Greater Asian program.

Like Kanokogi—and the *bunkajin* Asano Akira and Tomizawa Uio—Shimizu Nobuo offered a Japan-centered, politically and scientifically up-to-date reformulation of Okakura's “Asia is One” philosophy, a reformulation that included a strong dose of Hegelian idealism: Japan's expansion in Asia as world-historical necessity. Asia had been One, he maintained, before the West and local infighting broke it up. Thousands of years before the rise of the West, Asia was the birthplace of all culture. Amidst the Western onslaught, Japan was the only country that had managed to retain this originary Asian culture. But this was not all: in the self-serving historical formulation

of Shimizu and his colleagues, it was Japan (and not Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, or China) that had in fact always constituted the *center* of this unified Asian cultural sphere, which they called the sphere of *shumēru* culture, or, alternatively, *sumera* culture.⁵³ The word choice played upon the phonological similarity between the “Sumer” people of ancient Babylonia, the ancient Japanese appellation *sumera*, used in reference to the emperor (and popularized in the 1930s by Kanokogi), and the ancient verb *suberu*, to govern. Sometimes defined as limited to the Pacific region, at other times depicted as stretching from the Middle East to the Americas, this cultural sphere was always cartographically construed with Japan at its geographical center. Within the Pacific region, *sumera* culture was said to have been spread by ships borne by the *kokuchō* or Black Current, ocean currents “naturally” linking the Pacific’s geographically disparate areas together. Japan’s world-historical mission, then, was none other than to liberate Asia from Western oppression and restore Asia to its original cultural sphere.⁵⁴

To spread their philosophy, Nakakōji and his group had established the *Sumera gakujuku*, an “organization for social education” with Navy Admiral Matsuji Nobumasa at the helm, in 1940.⁵⁵ The *gakujuku* sponsored weeklong seminars that attracted a wide following, including a range of prominent civilian and military figures, admitting as many as forty thousand people to its premises over the course of its operation. Among the most enthusiastic of attendants were students from Tokyo’s Colonial University (*Takushoku daigaku*) and the University of Greater Eastern Culture (*Daitō bunka daigaku*). When war broke out in the Pacific, Shimizu Nobuo along with twenty-five students from the *Sumera gakujuku* were chosen to join the Java propaganda squad and thereby propagate the *Sumera juku*’s Greater Asianist philosophy through direct contact with their Asian brethren.⁵⁶ Shimizu Nobuo served for the first nine months of the occupation in the influential position of editor of Java’s only Japanese-language newspaper, *Unabara*.

Coming to the *Sendenhan* from a very different place were the handful of men who *did* know something about the Netherlands East Indies. Most of these Japanese had recently returned “home” in the context of ratcheting tensions between their “motherland” and the Dutch colonial rulers, and were now preparing to make a stirring return. Many had gained their knowledge of the languages and cultures of the East Indies through an existence “among the natives” as shopkeepers and the like, an existence that had, until the coming of war, situated them as “peripheral” figures socially, politically, and geographically vis-à-vis the Japanese empire. Reflecting the opportunities for social influence and mobility on offer to such cultural brokers in times of empire-building, their local knowledge now proved invaluable to the national enterprise, placing them in a position of enhanced influence vis-à-vis both Japan and Indonesia. For them as for no other Japanese, the invasion promised the fusing of the disparate causes of their ancestral homeland as well as their adopted one, with the potential reward a postcolonial renaissance both for Asia and for themselves.

For the Java propaganda squad, the most important of these Japanese cultural brokers was Ichiki Tatsuo (1906–49), subject of Gotō Ken’ichi’s classic 1977 monograph *A Grave Marker in the Burning Sea: The Wanderings and End of an Asianist*.⁵⁷ Ichiki was later described by Colonel Machida as “number one in the propaganda squad regarding the issue of Indonesian independence” and as the “knowledge and the hope

of the propaganda squad.”⁵⁸ As a young man in the late 1920s, Ichiki had left an obscure, impoverished existence on the island of Kyūshū to settle first in Sumatra and then in West Java. The overseas Japanese community in the colonial Indies into which Ichiki arrived was one deeply divided along lines of socio-economic class, with lifestyles varying accordingly. The elite, representing big business, finance, and the foreign service, lived, like their Dutch counterparts, in grand colonial residences in the best neighborhoods of Java’s major cities, and frequently failed to put down roots, spending only a few years in the Indies before returning to Japan. Theirs was a world apart from those like Ichiki who came to the Indies in search of a better life, often driven by bleak socio-economic circumstances, and made the Indies their new home. Ichiki belonged among the lower strata of this grouping that we might call the Japanese colonial petty bourgeoisie, which comprised the vast majority of local Japanese residents, a thriving community of several thousand working mostly in small trade, many as owners or employees of *toko Jepang* retail shops dealing in low-cost Japanese goods. Growing slowly from the first decade of the twentieth century, their numbers had swollen by several times during the domestic economic troubles and the export boom of the late 1920s and early 1930s.⁵⁹

In contrast to the small overseas Japanese elite, these men often lived where the indigenous population lived, often at a standard closer to that of their clientele—at least, that is, the better off among them. They not only dealt with Indonesians as daily clients, but also often hired them as employees. This situation encouraged among many of them a sympathy for Indonesians. Among them, Ichiki Tatsuo was exceptional in the extent to which he assimilated into Indonesian society, living in a Bandung *kampung* (“native” neighborhood), marrying a woman of the local Sundanese ethnic group, and devoting himself to Indonesian language study.

Through the 1920s, an official first-class status within the colonial racial hierarchy and a generally peaceful, prosperous existence had encouraged among the Japanese colonial petty bourgeoisie a much greater identification with and attachment to the Dutch colonial order—and to their place within it as proud local representatives of Japan as a fellow imperial power—than to the small but rising indigenous anti-colonial movement.⁶⁰ During the depression years of the 1930s, however, Japan’s share of total exports to the Indies quickly grew to eclipse that of the Netherlands itself, prompting Dutch cries of economic “dumping” and the adoption of a series of anti-Japanese tariffs and restrictions beginning in 1933, followed by increasingly bitter and inconclusive trade talks in 1935 and 1940. Worsening geopolitical relations culminated in the Dutch appropriation of Japanese-owned property in late 1941. In this context, the Dutch-Japanese relationship took on an increasingly hostile aspect, and local Japanese were often made to feel as second-class citizens.⁶¹ This sense of shared injustice encouraged identification and association with both the radical, patriotic ideologies now filtering in from Japan, and—among some Japanese at least—sympathy with the Indonesian nationalists and their cause. As in Japan itself, openness to the radical calls for the establishment of a new order at home and in Asia was more pronounced among the younger generation of local Japanese, in particular among more recent arrivals like Ichiki, whose attachment to the old colonial status quo was less deep-rooted, and whose ties to and identification with the homeland ran deep.⁶²

In the late 1930s, Ichiki was one of a group of Japanese activists involved in an attempt to counteract what they saw as anti-Japanese propaganda being spread among the local population both by the Dutch colonial authorities and media, and by the overseas Chinese, fueled by the outbreak of war in China and growing economic and political tensions between the Indies and Japan. In this context, Ichiki and his colleagues—including another young local journalist named Yoshizumi Tomegorō—also aimed to offer a positive spin on Japan's actions elsewhere in Asia, actions that several of the more left-oriented Indonesian nationalists were then also criticizing as imperialistic and fascistic. Their activities included contacts with Indonesian nationalists, letters and editorial submissions to local newspapers, and a 1938 attempt to establish a Indonesian-language newspaper in the aim of publicly pleading "Japan's case."⁶³

The newspaper plan was foiled by the Dutch authorities, who later, on the eve of the war, attempted to paint these activities as part of a decade-long, coordinated scheme of treasonous "Japanese burrowing" into their colony.⁶⁴ When the time came in 1940 and 1941, Ichiki and his colleagues were indeed readily mobilized for secret, military-sponsored Japanese intelligence-gathering activities. Still, they hardly conformed to allied propaganda images of the local Japanese resident as treacherous Tokyo spy in civilian disguise. The writings of Ichiki and other local young activists suggest that they were less the extensions of a nefarious Tokyo-based southward expansion scheme than self-starters, whose actions were motivated by patriotic sentiments as representatives of a homeland they perceived as increasingly misunderstood and isolated, combined with genuine sympathy for oppressed brother Asians.

Ichiki was an avowed supporter of Indonesian nationalism, and was seduced by the revolutionary, liberationist appeal of Greater East Asianism and Japanese prewar propaganda, not seeing—or refusing to see—a contradiction between Indonesian and Japanese national ends in this "world-historic" moment. In this he was like a number of other men who worked behind the scenes preparing the ground for Indonesia's "liberation" as war approached, including Ichiki's newspaper colleague Yoshizumi, the young Bandung shop employee Nishijima Shigetada, and the older shopkeeper Machida Taisaku—president of Bandung's Japanese Association—all three of whom had an unsettled history of involvement in left-wing politics in Japan before moving to Java's quieter pastures. Arrived at by way of intimate association and identification with the Indonesians and their struggle for liberation, however, theirs was an Asianism built upon two poles of loyalty—Japan and Indonesia—distinct from the Japan-centrism characteristic to Greater Asianists in Japan proper.

In the days prior to and after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the enthusiasm of these local Japanese for their particular brand of Asianism encouraged a small number of Indonesian nationalists to participate actively in laying the groundwork for Japan's arrival, including, as noted above, the lawyer Achmad Subardjo (a close friend of Nishijima) and Yusuf Hasan of Radio Tokyo fame (who made the journey to Tokyo shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War, undercover, in the company of Machida Taisaku). This enthusiasm also sometimes led to a "reverse-mobilization" of sorts where fellow Japanese were concerned, as in the case of Satō Nobuhide, a civilian staff member of Japan's Navy Ministry who was dispatched to Java in 1940 to gather intelligence while serving officially as chief of the Batavia office of the Tokyo Municipal

Economic Bureau. When his work brought him into contact with long-time residents Nishijima and Machida, he quickly came to share their passion about Indonesian liberation.

The local knowledge of these sorts of “Indonesian hands” was a rare and highly prized commodity, particularly in the propaganda and intelligence departments. But the 16th Army military establishment, including those in the Military Administration Department (*gunseibu*) in particular, was dubious of the political histories and ultimate loyalties of these expatriate Japanese. This department, to be charged with the day-to-day rule of territory once military operations were completed, contained a mix of military and civilian officials with administrative experience in Japan and elsewhere in the empire, along with several higher-status prewar Java residents as advisors. Reflecting its social makeup, its staff were generally of a more conservative, cautious, conventionally colonial bent than the men of the intelligence and propaganda units, whose tendency to “Greater Asianist” missionaryism represented a potential political flash point. Significantly, in the hierarchy of command that extended down from the military commander, the Military Administration Department was located in a line separate from the line connecting the commander to the propaganda and intelligence departments. In the early stages of the subsequent occupation of Java, this meant that the propaganda squad would be answerable only to Commander Imamura, and thus free of direct *Gunseibu* oversight—a situation that would have profound consequences for the dynamics of the early occupation. But a showdown between Japan’s Greater Asianist missionaries and a constellation of contending forces, from imperial ideologues to “control-faction” authoritarians to the *kenpeitai*, from the Tokyo high command to seasoned colonial bureaucrats and elite political advisors—all of whom had their own ideas about their mission in the Indies—was on the cards from the beginning.

Where the selection of “Indonesia hands” was concerned, the Military Administration Department’s cautious, conservative influence was in fact already in play even before the 16th Army departed Japan. Before the move southward, both Satō and Machida, who had both just returned to Japan, appeared on a department blacklist as unreliably “pro-Indonesian” and were excluded from the 16th Army’s subsequent activities in Java. Machida remained in Japan for the duration of the war, and Satō, Yoshizumi, and Nishijima eventually wound up in navy employ.⁶⁵ It is not clear precisely how Ichiki Tatsuo managed to remain in the 16th Army’s good graces, but one reason might have been his relative political naïveté, and another the association of some of Ichiki’s most active associates, including journalists Kaneko Keizo and Kubo Tatsuji, with the Tokyo-based Japanese right-wing activist and Pan-Asianist Iwata Ainosuke.⁶⁶

A similar “safe” label appears to have applied to the quiet, well-mannered former Indies resident Nakatani Yoshio, who joined Ichiki as a translator for the propaganda squad. Nakatani’s prewar journey to the Indies had been prompted by Ōtani Kozui (1876–1948), a former superintendent priest of the Honganji branch of the *shinshū* Buddhist sect in Tokyo, one of a handful of vocal exponents of Japanese expansion southward (*nanshin*) in the 1910s and 1920s.⁶⁷ Over a period of thirty years, Ōtani had taken a number of talented youngsters under his wing—focusing on those from

impoverished backgrounds such as Nakatani—and encouraged them to settle in the southern regions (*nampō*). After arriving in the Indies, the young Nakatani had established a successful five-and-dime shop in the East Javanese city of Malang. It was only in the last few years before the war, when the real possibility of a Japanese advance arose, that he had begun to take a more serious interest in things Indonesian. At this time, Nakatani began following Indonesian language classes at a nearby *Taman Siswa* school.⁶⁸ This also resulted in his direct exposure to local currents of Indonesian nationalism, to which he is said to have responded positively, although, in his usual manner, quietly.⁶⁹

As it headed southward, the S.S. *Sakura* was host to lively philosophical discussions among its restless, culturally talented passengers. The boat was well-stocked in both food and alcohol provisions, better in fact than most of its occupants were accustomed to in a Japan already suffering from rationing and shortages. The ironic contrast was, in a sense, a warm up for the high-living to be enjoyed in the “paradise” of Indonesia. “As a result,” recalled one passenger, “everyone grew all the more buoyant, full of energy. A sense of sadness, that if we were unlucky during the landing, we might end up as so much seaweed—there was nothing of the sort.”⁷⁰ Optimism was further stoked by news of the “world-historical” fall of Singapore that filtered in just as the fleet departed Taiwan.⁷¹

As the 16th Army convoy approached Java, the *bunkajin* steeled themselves for the battle ahead, fearful but excited to be taking part in a great showdown whose outcome all believed would determine the course of Japanese and even of world history. The enthusiasm of some *bunkajin* was such that during the battles with the Dutch in the landings in West Java at Banten and East Java near Surabaya, it proved impossible to restrain them from witnessing and cheering the fighting first hand—against orders—above deck. At Surabaya, the *bunkajin* were reputed to have “thrilled like children” as the Japanese fleet and the landing army got the better of the Dutch air force. Though the naval duel preceding the landing at Banten was more intense—“like hell,” according to Colonel Machida—even after the ship carrying the propaganda squad was torpedoed and began to sink, cameramen, soundmen, and news writers raced about recording the story for posterity. Composer Iida Nobuo meanwhile remained dutifully below deck on the sinking S.S. *Sakura*, composing a piece fittingly entitled “The Sound of Battle,” as previously ordered by Machida.⁷²

In a brief newspaper article written a month later, Iida recalled the jolt of this trial by fire in terms of a radical self-awakening to the great mission ahead.

As a composer, I wanted to experience the war as a musician, sensing the war through sound, and to record the war as I had thus experienced it. But in the end, regrettable as it is, I realized this was a useless scheme. With the first bullet, my consciousness as a tradesman vanished. Not only that—the opinion I had held up to then towards music, my attitude towards my own pieces—these vanished too ... Under the present circumstances, we can no longer continue calmly along the same old path. We must plot a new course, make a new departure. Our works must be born of a new consciousness ... The first bullet meant to me the beginning not of necessary death, but of necessary life.⁷³

In this total war that would determine the fate of the nation and the fate of Asia, there were, in sum, no more musicians, no more writers, indeed no more “private citizens” at all—only soldiers of various stripes, each, in his own way, mobilizing all his powers towards the final victory.

Within this ideological context, the sinking of the S.S. *Sakura* at Banten harbor represented a sort of military baptism for the *bunkajin*. As they struggled ashore in the tropical waters, for a moment, the soldiers, the *bunkajin*, even Commander Imamura himself were transformed into equally anonymous, oil-soaked warriors, united in selfless dedication to the national mission. In the peaceful life of Japanese-occupied Java, the minute, often painful distinctions that divided the diverse membership of the Japanese forces would soon return with a vengeance. But for these few hours at least, it was as if they had been literally washed away. At least one third of the propaganda materials prepared for Java went down with the torpedoed S.S. *Sakura* in Banten harbor, including Asano's beloved copy of Okakura's *Asia is One*.⁷⁴ But as its members would later proudly recall, the propaganda squad's spirits and enthusiasm were hardly dampened.⁷⁵

And so the 16th Army and the members of the Java propaganda squad made landfall west of Batavia, West Java, early on the morning of March 1, 1942. The pent-up energies of Japanese society—ideological as well as military—now began to explode across the Dutch East Indies.⁷⁶ For Japanese and Indonesians alike, it was a world turned upside down.

First Encounters

For both Japanese and Indonesians, Japan's arrival in the Indies represented a departure into uncharted terrain. Nothing under the sun is entirely new, and to a degree, a combination of mutual ignorance; colonial worldviews, orientalist stereotypes; barriers of power, culture, and language, and the drama of military invasion prefigured a mix of mutual attitudes and experiences common to many such transnational encounters. Romanticism, exoticism, alienation, arrogance, subservience, fear, missionary social interventionism—the usual suspects were there from the beginning. Yet in this particular encounter, the nature and intensity of the ambitions, and the mutuality of the embrace, pushed beyond the conventional. Powering this were the situation of shared enemies and a shared war against them, the crisis of Western imperial/liberal-capitalist hegemony, and mutual desires for social renovation and nation-state building that extended to the transcendence of “colonialism” itself. At the beginning at least, the very vastness of the mutual unknown was more a strength than a weakness, allowing room for all manner of ambitious imaginings, seductive visions of unfettered possibility. From the moment of first contact, the desire for a new order often found expression in the excited identification of shared, essentialized racial and cultural characteristics. These in turn were interpreted to signify a common, organic, pre-Western, precolonial past—a shared past that in turn pointed the way to a shared post-Western, “postcolonial” future. The mutual appeal was most pronounced among Japanese and Indonesians representing each society's rising social middle. For it was from this social and ideological vantage that the prospect of a new “Asian” order appeared to offer the greatest advantages over the old one.

A reunion of strangers

On the night of February 28, 1942, the Japanese 16th Army expeditionary forces landed at Banten, West Java, and at two other points on the north coast of Central and East Java. In the preceding days, the Japanese navy had inflicted a decisive defeat upon combined Allied naval forces in the battle of the Java Sea, smoothing the way for the landings. At Banten, the Japanese landing fleet happened to encounter two Allied warships in flight from the battle, and in the exchange of fire that followed, as noted above, the boat carrying most of the Java propaganda squad, and its materials, was sunk. It would be the heaviest fighting most Japanese, including the *bunkajin*, would experience in the entire Java campaign.

Of the landing, Tomizawa Uio later joked in a children's book, "I'd been immersed in oil when the boat sank, and my face and body were completely black—I looked just like an Indonesian."¹ Leaving the carrying of his heavy rucksack to the adjutants assigned to him, Tomizawa now had the privilege of turning his full attention to the scenery, and to his mission.

Slowly the day broke. As the sky grew light in the east ... I could hear the chirping of many small birds ... In the gradually brightening light, we could see green mountains, fields, and rice paddies, surrounded by thick woods. It had been so hot inside the boat, yet when we came ashore on Java it was so cool that our bodies felt cold. The morning breeze rustled the leaves of the trees, bearing their scent. Gorgeous flowers bloomed in the bushes ... Looking along the side of the river, there were beautiful rice paddies built just the same way as in Japan. ... What they said was no lie—Java was a paradise on earth. We stood transfixed ... I couldn't help but wonder if I had died and gone to heaven ... Bowing towards Japan, we swore that we, like gods, must assuredly do something great on this island.²

Exhausted and hungry, Tomizawa's contingent arrived at the rendezvous point, the village of what the Japanese transliterated as *Ragusaūran*,³ in mid-morning. Along the way, the *bunkajin* appointed the China propaganda veteran Shimizu Hitoshi along with journalist Ōya Sōichi as negotiators with the local inhabitants. But in *Ragusaūran* as earlier along the road, they were nowhere to be found, their "mud-walled homes" empty. Shimizu finally located a blind man left behind when the other villagers fled, and endeavored, in broken Indonesian, to convince him that it was safe, and ask for food.⁴ Unimpressed with Shimizu's linguistic skills, Ōya remarked, "what a pitiful last-minute strategy (*hidoi doro nawa da ne*)!"⁵ But soon the males of the village had returned, and there ensued the first encounter between the members of the propaganda squad and the inhabitants of West Java.

As Asano and his colleagues anxiously awaited a meal, some thirty "natives (*genjūmin*) wearing Turkish hats called *topis* and *sarongs* from their shoulders that recalled Buddhist robes," approached them in a procession, kneeling one after another and clasping the right hands of the Japanese into their own. "It was the first time we'd seen this sort of courtesy, but you could guess from the sincere and serious attitude that it was their way of conveying the highest honor," wrote Asano. Yet for the tired, oil-drenched, starving Japanese, "it was no small nuisance." The villagers were

in such earnest (*shinken*) that this could not be received casually. One had to maintain a reasonably appropriate posture ... the first four or five people were alright, but after 10 or 15, we started to be unsettled. And then your hand started to feel awkwardly warm after being touched by their hands one after another—it wasn't a very pleasant sensation. But we appreciated their sincerity. This was the first time we had contact with the natives, and for them it was also the first time they had met Japanese ... So they, the natives, no doubt came to meet the

first members of the Japanese army that they encountered, after deciding together to pay them the highest honor. That is, with the village headman and the village elders at the head of the line, they all came to greet us in full dress.⁶

The solemn atmosphere was then broken by the children, who “rushed toward us with curious looks.” The young women of the village were the last to return. “A shadow of relief came over the villagers,” noted Asano. “This was the way they gradually revealed their feelings of affection (*shin'ai*) for us.” After serving the Japanese a snack of boiled plantains, which “tasted like *yaki imo*” (roasted Japanese sweet potato), they prepared a lunch of chicken and rice.

Like many other Japanese observers, Asano depicted this first encounter with the “natives” as a pure and spontaneous event. The Banten area to the west of the capital was

the most isolated district of Java, without elementary schools or any sign of newspapers. Likely all were illiterate. So it may be that there was not one among them who knew what sort of nation Japan was. It goes without saying that they were too simple, these farming folks, to be clever enough to welcome us waving the Japanese flag. But their true feelings were cheerful.⁷

We have no record of this encounter from the perspective of these villagers, but likely they were shocked and frightened by the appearance and aroma of these strange men, who certainly did not look “just like an Indonesian.”⁸ Asano’s depiction of warmth between the two sides rings true, but in his reference to the simple villagers’ spontaneous feelings of affection, he made no allowance for the possibility of more practical motivations on their part. The account of cartoonist Yokoyama Ryūichi, who was on the scene earlier than Asano, suggested a slightly different interpretation. The first person Yokoyama encountered in *Ragusaūran* was “shaking with fear,” as if he was meeting with some sort of “devil.” “Perhaps he felt sympathy that I was covered in oil,” noted Yokoyama, “but he grasped my finger with shaking hands and touched his own forehead, then kowtowed.”⁹

That evening, Asano and his propaganda squad colleagues stayed overnight in the village, rooming in the homes of the local inhabitants. After removing his dirty uniform, Asano took in the beauty of the place, watching the squirrels flit up and down the palm trees and the sun setting over the nearby mountain peaks. As night fell, the Japanese were treated to dances performed at the square before the mosque, accompanied by “meager instruments” as “a singer sang Sundanese ballads.” “As I fell asleep on the straw mat on the dirt floor,” he wrote, “I could still hear the singing mixed with the robust voices of laughing soldiers from the square.”¹⁰

If Tomizawa and Asano had already been seduced by the natural beauty of the surroundings and the warmth of the welcome, for others the romance was taking longer to blossom. “The native house was, of course, just a roof, walls, and a dirt floor,” wrote novelist Kitahara Takeo. It was pitch dark inside, and after groping about for a place to lie down, he and cartoonist Ono Saseo had trouble sleeping, as squirrels—perhaps the same ones that Asano admired—flitted across the roof and occasionally across their

faces.¹¹ In a book meant for children, the 46-year-old poet Ōki Atsuo recalled that, along with his comrades, he lay on a straw mat “in a strange-smelling dirt-floored room entirely typical of the lands of the south,” and was later rudely awakened by a mosquito of the sort that carries the “frightening malaria virus.”¹² But Ōki’s reaction to local hospitality—including the surprisingly “pure-hearted” native refusal of all offers of payment—was no less enthusiastic than that of Asano.

In a radio broadcast home to Japan, novelist Ōe Kenji, who accompanied the 16th Army contingent that landed near Rembang, East Java, also described his first contact with Indonesians sympathetically. The Japanese were given coconuts to drink from, which, in their intense thirst, tasted “unbelievably delicious.” Revealing a complete lack of familiarity with the influence of Islam and its sexual morality in Java, Ōe noted with apparent disappointment,

the women wear their thick black hair in a bun. And—perhaps it was something the Dutch government had forced upon them in the name of public morals?—they all wear bras, with a *chemise*, and on top of that a thin garment, and in place of skirts, *sarongs* of various colors. On the island of Bali, which neighbors Java, the women are famous for not wearing anything on their upper bodies. Perhaps in the old days they were half-naked here too.

Ōe was nevertheless impressed with these women, who “carried any sort of item on their heads.” As a result, “not one of them,” even the elderly, had “stooped shoulders like the women in Japan.”¹³ Yet viewed from the truck, their bodies looked “frail,” likely from “inadequate nutrition.” Ōe linked this to “an extremely high rate of tuberculosis infection” and suggested this was “surely a problem that should be carefully considered in the coming Japanese administration.”¹⁴ Still, Japan’s move southward was about more than selfless benevolence: “To think that with each turn of our truck’s axles, the territory of the Japanese Empire is expanding,” Ōe proclaimed. “You can just imagine it!”¹⁵

Within hours of the landing, several of the central themes characterizing the Japanese response to Java were already on exhibit: the benevolent “white-man’s burden” notion of a duty to impart the benefits of technological modernity to the natives; the intoxication of imperial expansion; a sense of alienation—or, with a more positive spin, exoticism—towards the “primitive,” “simple” natives, sometimes mixed with a romantic feeling of closeness and warmth. Placed within the global context of the colonial experience, these responses are neither surprising nor unfamiliar.

But in the Japanese encounter with Indonesia and Indonesians, there were also, from the beginning, elements that transcended the conventional. Squad commander Machida’s feelings upon awaking for the first time in Java were not atypical.

Morning—. I awoke to the sound of a music box. What sounded like a music box was the chirping of countless sorts of birds. I was startled almost to the point of confusion. It wasn’t only my ears. My sense of smell was also in rapture. It was a distant, dizzying, yet definitely familiar sort of perfume. When I realized

that it was the smell of rice plants, my emotions reached a peak. It was the scent of the home that I had left as an infant, a scent that had accompanied Japanese people since time immemorial. This scent of rice plants, which evoked thoughts of eternity—surely the people of Java understood this as well. Oh, I could not think of this as a foreign country.¹⁶

Viewing “Java’s fine green mountains and fresh-looking trees, grasses, flowers, and rice paddies,” *bunkajin* Abe Tomoji wrote “my heart cried ‘a new Japan,’ not only in reference to the landscape, but also honoring the great, deep development of our race.”¹⁷ Later he would note that this exclamation was “more than simply exaggerated words prompted by the emotions of the landing ... When we Japanese gazed across the rice paddies, a sense of nostalgic longing (*natsukashii*) welled up.”¹⁸

Riding inland from the East Java coast, Ōe Kenji marveled that

Java’s scenery (*fūbutsu*) is exactly the same as that of Japan. If you exchange the palm trees for pine trees, it would be as if you had gone anywhere in the Japanese countryside ... the tools in the farmer’s barns all look just the same as the ones in Japan. The look of the houses closely resembles the style seen in the *haniwa* (clay figures) dug up from Japan’s ancient burial mounds (*kofun*) ... As in Japan, the walls are of unpainted mud, using bamboo woven together. Their beds are like the bamboo chairs used in the cool summer nights in Japan, made large.¹⁹

The *bunkajin* were hardly alone in these observations. Soldiers marching with Ōe, used to combat in China’s “vast plains, without one tree or one blade of grass,” were bewildered to be marching amidst the familiar, lush scenery of “home.” Citing the water-filled rice paddies, a journalist later reported that Japanese soldiers were finding the Bandung area “so much like Japan that it’s a problem,” in the sense that it made them doubly homesick.²⁰ The experience was not without its lighter side: when a soldier accompanying Ōe remarked, “even the frogs make the same noise as the ones back home,” another replied, “you wouldn’t expect them to speak Malay now, would you?”²¹

More remarkably still, Japanese observers were quick to perceive a closer racial connection with the people of Java than with those nearer to home. “A dark skinned Japanese,” Lt. Col. Machida later wrote,

certainly looked more like a native than a fair-skinned Indonesian. [Indonesian] women in particular generally had light-colored skin, and if you put one somewhere in Japan, no one would realize that she was of a different race. This physical similarity extended also to the Thais and Malays. They didn’t have flat faces like the Chinese or the Koreans, but had faces just like the Japanese. Japanese people were surprised at it, but the Javanese were exactly like the Japanese.²²

The former proletarian literature writer Takeda Rintarō, hitherto viewed with suspicion for a lack of outspoken devotion to the imperial cause, proved no less captivated by this sense of “coming home.”

I fell upon a strange notion:

"This is not an unfamiliar place. I've been here before. Of course I haven't ... but I certainly know this place."

It was a strange logic, but I followed it instinctively.

"Although I don't know it myself, the blood flowing in my body knows this island well." Without thinking, I said something to this effect to the soldiers next to me.

[They answered:] "You too? In fact, I was just somehow having the same feeling ..."

They say people often have this sort of sensation. It was a feeling I frequently had when in Japan. But this time, it was somehow deeper and more profound: A sense of freshly recalling something out of a vague, foggy, ancient memory.²³

In this construction, Java was not just a place resembling Japan, but a place already coursing in the Japanese blood, a sort of racial inheritance. "As we continued our advances," wrote Takeda,

as these natives who worship the sun joyously welcomed us as intimates, as I beheld their lives living under two-sided, pointed thatched-roofs with *chigi*



Figure 4.1 Ono Saseo's "Rice Planter Girls" illustrated a notion of shared Asian origins expressed by many Japanese. "As shown in this picture there is hardly any difference between the rice planter girls of Japan and Unabara," he wrote in an accompanying text. "They must have been the same since long ago." Source: *Unabara* newspaper, May 30, 1942, p. 1.

[Japanese ornamental crossed rafter ends on shrine gables] mounted upon four pillars that looked just like little country village [*shintō*] shrines, as I viewed the fertile rice paddies and traversed the plateau roads with many mountains resembling [Mt.] Fuji, over and over, we were able to confirm the validity of our [first] impression.²⁴

To these eager observers, Indonesia was taking shape as none other than the original Asia itself, frozen in time by Western oppression since the last encounter with Japan so many eons before, and patiently awaiting this historically pre-destined Asian reunion. While Japan had pushed forward, dynamic and active in the face of the Western threat, Indonesia appeared to have remained static and passive. Constructed thus, it was only natural that Japan had “returned” to lead it into the modern world. Conversely, for a Japan that had lost its way along the road to modernity and sought an answer in “Asia”—only to be confronted, in China, with an Asia that refused to conform to the script Japan had written for it—Indonesia appeared a heavenly-ordained destination.

For the Japanese, events of the subsequent days only increased the intensity of this experience by several orders of magnitude. For not only in the landing areas of East and West Java but throughout the Netherlands East Indies, the local population welcomed the arriving Japanese with an outpouring of emotion. On the morning of March 3, 1942, Asano Akira and his colleagues

found a truck with some room and climbed aboard ... the truck rode hard towards Serang, engulfed in surprising shouts of welcome from the natives, who had formed a human wall along the road. It was a truly astounding welcome. The emotion of this moment was one that my comrades and I will surely remember all our lives. Men and women, old people and children—every sort of person had lined up. Then they welcomed us with great shouts, raising both hands in the air. Among them was a woman who looked to be a *kakyō* [overseas Chinese] waiving a Japanese flag and shouting *banzai*, but we were much more grateful for the welcome of the Indonesian people, who, empty-handed, shouted incomprehensible words. The reason was, the faces of these simple (*sobokuna*) people of Sunda [West Java] looked so animated. An expression of joy overflowing. The dark clouds of Holland, which had oppressed them for more than 300 years, were now being blown away by the breath of the imperial army, and the sun poured down like rain. This was what is meant by bathing in the imperial graces (*kōka ni yoku suru*) ... We waved back at them from the truck. Though we drove on and on, the human wall of welcome was endless.²⁵

Here again, Asano depicted the welcome of the Japanese by the indigenous inhabitants as a spontaneous outpouring of emotion. This was highlighted in contrast with the local Chinese, whose political astuteness was shown to reflect a proportionate element of calculation and insincerity.

Ōe Kenji offered a similar account from East Java. As he rode along in an army truck, children rushed out, “every one of them sticking up his right thumb and

shouting something.” A comrade who was fluent in Malay explained they were shouting “*jumbōru*” (*jempol*, lit. “thumb”) and that this, and the thumbs-up sign, meant “number one,” or “top-class.”

In sum these were words and gestures of welcome, saying that the Japanese army was strongest of all. Not only children, but Indonesian men and women alike all stuck out their thumbs and shouted *jumbōru* ... it seemed as if when they saw us and saw that we have the same skin color and really resemble them, they became overjoyed, and welcomed us with the sense that it was just as if their relatives had come to rescue them.²⁶

The reception was virtually the same everywhere the Japanese went. The local inhabitants did their best to help the Japanese as they could, notably in refusing to carry out Dutch orders to destroy important war materials and facilities, strategic bridges and the like, and offering to guide the way. Sixteenth Army Commander Imamura recalled one such case on the second day after the landing, when the Japanese found their way blocked by trees knocked down in the road by the retreating Dutch, who had wired them with explosives:

In a strange development, natives (*genjūmin*) leapt from the rice paddies on both sides and headed for the road, holding primitive swords (*bantō*) in their hands. Whatever the appearance, it didn't look as if they intended to oppose the Japanese army. When they reached the road, they began to cut the branches of the Tamarinds with their swords. With hundreds of them working at it, within a fraction of an hour they had made it somewhat easier to pass ... In this way, with the help of the Indonesian race, we advanced three kilometers in some three hours. Then, another surprise—from that point on, not a single tree had been knocked down, even though they were all wired with explosives ... [The local inhabitants] brought coconuts and gave the sweaty soldiers a drink, treating them to bananas and papayas and saying something which I couldn't understand. In thanks, some of the soldiers took out cigarettes, bread, and chocolate from their pockets and gave it to them. With naïve (*mujakkina*), smiling faces, [the local inhabitants] repeatedly said “*tuan terimakasih*” [“thank you sir”].²⁷

Through a translator, Imamura then talked to an old man from the nearby village, who explained to him the meaning of the ubiquitous Indonesian thumbs-up sign (which was different from the “Japanese army is number one” interpretation of Ōe): “a good thing” or “we're happy you've come.” The man then told Imamura “for the first time” of the “centuries-old” Javanese prediction of Prince Joyoboyo, who had foretold the coming of a “race of our own sort from the north” to “restore freedom to Indonesia” (though more common Indonesian versions of the time referred not to a “race of the same sort” but to a “yellow-skinned race”).²⁸ “Might you be this race? Your language is different, but you look the same ...”

Imamura appeared unaware of the predictions of Joyoboyo at the time of the landing. Instead he offered a bit of ancient history of his own, reflecting a familiarity

with racial theories first articulated by Western scholars such as Griffis and Von Stein Callenfels, and now eagerly circulated by exponents of southward expansion including the propaganda squad's own Shimizu Nobuo: "Among the ancestors of us Japanese, there were people who came from this island to Japan by boat. You and we Japanese are brothers. We are fighting against Holland in order to restore your freedom." The man again gave the thumbs-up and thanked him. When Imamura asked why the rest of the trees had not been knocked down, the old man explained that the Dutch had wired the trees and asked the villagers to set them off. Satisfied after observing a certain number, they had left, leaving the rest of the job to the villagers. But as the roadblocks would be inconvenient for themselves as well as the Japanese, the villagers had opted not to continue the job.²⁹

Encountering similar roadblocks in East Java, Ôe Kenji was struck by the marked contrast between the easy advances against the Dutch colonial army and the horrors and frustrations of battling the Chinese resistance, a situation he had witnessed first hand.

I thought to myself, if this was the Chinese army, they wouldn't have simply retreated after knocking the trees down, but would have always poured down as intense as possible a cross-fire from within the surrounding woods, and obstinately (*shitsuyō ni*) mounted repeated nighttime assaults. The Dutch army did not. But then, this was for no other reason than that the Dutch were mostly officers, and since they'd retreated and abandoned their Indonesian subordinates, it was only natural that they had no fighting spirit left.³⁰

In marked contrast to the endless war of attrition in China, Japan's advances in Indonesia—like those, for that matter, in all of Southeast Asia in the first three months of the Pacific War—epitomized modern war as a romantic experience: dynamic, coordinated, lightening-quick advances, minimal casualties, and maximal results, all against the ultimate opponent: the arrogant White Man.³¹ Total Japanese casualties for the entire Java campaign were to number some 600 dead, 1,100 wounded.³² This was a far cry from the numbers coming out of China, and indeed from the slaughter of the Allied island-hopping campaigns in subsequent years that would come to symbolize the Pacific War. Bold innovations such as bicycle units and parachute divisions dropped behind enemy lines added further dash and color to the scene. This was truly something to write home about, and the propaganda squad's members did so with overwhelming enthusiasm. In the starring role was, as usual, the Japanese soldier-hero as common man: tireless, rugged, and unflinchingly brave, yet underneath it all humble, uncomplicated, and good-natured. The unity among Japan's soldiery, and the unity of the nation behind them—contrasted against the disarray and "save myself first" attitude among the allies—were repeatedly credited with Japan's successes.³³

Four days after the landing, as the Dutch retreated towards their mountain stronghold of Bandung some 140 kilometers to the east, the capital of Batavia (Jakarta) was declared an open city. The Japanese army was looking increasingly "unbeatable," while the Dutch—in a seeming confirmation of the contemporary Japanese stereotype

of decadent, weak-willed Westerners—showed “almost no will to fight.”³⁴ As the *bunkajin* described it, Japanese troop morale, motivation, and discipline could not have been at a higher level. In the occupation of Singapore just a few weeks earlier, however, Japanese soldiers had been involved in widespread looting, rape, theft, and murder. Fearing a repeat performance, Imamura barracked his troops outside of the Batavia city limits and allowed only the propaganda squad and members of the Military Government Section to enter the city.³⁵

For those who did enter Batavia, contact with the local population only further reaffirmed the happy contrast with China. “On the morning of the seventh of March, when the main force of the propaganda squad entered Batavia,” observed Asano, “there was such a throng one could not move one’s body. The people of Indonesia, men and women, old and young, happily welcomed us, shouting something or other.”³⁶ Shimizu addressed the assembled crowd in Indonesian to thunderous applause, as the power of emotion seemed to defeat the language barrier. Fellow squad members applauded Shimizu as a “miraculous genius,” although the surprised translator Nakamura Genkichi observed that “eloquence and language study are two different things.”³⁷ Shimizu himself was overwhelmed by the warmth of the Indonesian response—particularly in comparison with his previous experience. “We had great success in the beginning, it was very pure, and I really adored this race, I became very fond of them,” Shimizu later recalled, while also adding the following revealing qualification:

I don’t know if I could call it respect, but I could not help but feel affection for them. This was again different from [my experience] in China ... They were much closer to us than in China, where we had said they were the same race and the same ancestry, but in reality that sort of relationship never materialized.³⁸

Writing for the local Japanese newspaper audience, Wada Tomokazu, a soldier stationed in a village west of Batavia, was also excited to find in Indonesia—and particularly its “unspoiled” rural folk—an “Asia” that had eluded Japan closer to home. In their apparent willingness to open their lives to “great political changes,” he asserted, Indonesians were “different from the Chinese,” who had learned through history to avoid change. The encounter encouraged in Wada a sense of Indonesia as a place of limitless possibility. “Japan may now subscribe to any dream,” he concluded. “Because history is on Japan’s side. For a soldier, there is no greater happiness than to witness Japan’s mobilization of all its talents to take the giant step towards this construction.”³⁹

Not all Japanese were equally inspired by the Indonesian welcome. After initial euphoria, Ōe Kenji was shocked to discover that the Indonesian masses seemed to be interpreting the arrival of the Japanese as a green light for the seizure of “enemy property.” As his truck approached the town of Cepu, East Java, Ōe noticed a crowd of people bustling along the roadside “like ants before a storm.” “Looking more closely,” he realized that they had “invaded the stores and homes of the Dutch, Chinese, and others who had fled before the attacking Japanese army.”

First they carried away food, but then it became furniture, and then the fixed items, and in the end it didn't matter if it had anything at all to do with essentials; they shouldered [the items] themselves, or by twos, or by fours. In the instinctive excitement of looting, they made countless trips to this faraway town, and, unperturbed by the sun's heat, brought [the items] back home ... In the small town [of Cepu], even as our unit passed by, they did not show any particular expression of remorse, but kept right on breaking into one overseas Chinese (*kakyō*) shop after another. And even as they carried loads larger than themselves, they still managed to raise their thumbs skillfully and call out to us, "*jumbōru!*" It was just as if they were saying, "thanks to you fellows, we are free from care—look how much we can carry home!" I thought to myself, this is something! This was truly awkward. What if it were to spread across the whole of Java?⁴⁰

Ōe and his comrades were witnessing the phenomenon of *perampokan*, the popular looting of shops, residences, and offices, most of them owned by the Dutch and overseas Chinese. Though it did not occur in all areas—the East Java city of Surabaya, for example, appears to have been largely unaffected—the *perampokan* reached dramatic proportions across Java and Sumatra at this time, a mass free-for-all amidst the political vacuum in the wake of Dutch retreats.⁴¹ Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Kisō, behind enemy lines in Banten, West Java, the first day after the Japanese landing, recalled the following similar scene.

In front of the station peasants, vagabonds and the like had beaten down the gates of a Chinese shop and were in the middle of looting it. I pointed my gun in the air and fired menacingly, but their countenance had changed at this once-in-a-lifetime chance. It was even as if they were thinking, "the Japanese Army has no reason to impede what we're doing." They showed no sign of concern. There was no way of controlling them, and I gave up.⁴²

Confronting the *perampokan*, Ōe Kenji was forced to acknowledge the frightening possibility that the Javanese masses, partly as a result of Japanese propaganda, might be welcoming the Japanese for reasons quite different from those which he had first imagined.

In fact, because we never believed that the natives would undertake such appalling looting behavior, we'd prepared posters and flyers with texts calling for them to abandon the Dutch, that they were the same color and the same race as Japanese, overflowing with the meaning that we must be close [with one another]; but if we distributed these, it would only encourage more looting. In truth, the instant that I witnessed this scene, it was as if the romantic thoughts of Indonesians which I'd been allowing myself were beaten out of my head ... My hair stood on end, and even in the heat, I felt a chill go down my spine ... They were welcoming us not at all for the reason we thought, but because they understood that we would simply allow them to steal.

Liberation had its limits, and firm Japanese control and the sanctity of private property had to be secured. "If we did not take more a strict approach, it would bring about a ridiculous situation," concluded Ōe. "We had to propagandize immediately that where the enemy Dutch or Chinese of an enemy character (*tekisei kakyō*) were concerned, the Japanese army would positively not tolerate the theft of private property."⁴³

The next morning, irritated after spending a night in a luxurious but barren Dutch home whose furniture, food, and even fixtures had been picked clean by looters, Ōe and his comrades struck out to convince the local inhabitants that the goods they had stolen must be returned.

The Malay-language experts Takeuchi, Shimazu, and Etō [prewar residents of the East Indies] brought together the villagers of the immediate area, and began their persuasion.⁴⁴ We also went and had a look at the villages, but—was it something maddening, or laughable?—their little houses were filled with the goods they had stolen. Some of the items didn't fit, and were stacked up outside. Nevertheless, imitating the Dutch [manner of] decoration, they'd set up a bed, line up four radios next to it, hang up three electric clocks, and have a relaxed smoke amidst it all. It seemed as though they did not consider thieving behavior to be bad. In response to our questioning, they all responded calmly that "these are Dutch and Chinese people's things," talking as if the Japanese army had even urged them on.

When the Japanese spokesmen told the villagers that the stealing of enemy property was not allowed and ordered them to return it, the villagers

straightaway began to return all of the stolen goods to their original places. They seemed to see it as perfectly natural that if they returned the things they had taken, everything would be square. It was not so much that they were scheming to sell the goods, or to use them themselves; it was more that, in their primitive instincts, they were intoxicated by the sheer satisfaction of possession. No matter how much one spoke to them of social order, or of conscientious reflection bearing morality in mind, as far as these truly shallow (*kihakuna*) people were concerned, there was no point. Drenched in sweat, they began to make the round trip to return things. But once we left, like ants, they would most likely carry the things right back to their homes.⁴⁵

The nonchalance of Java's masses indicated a faith in Japan's coming as heralding a socio-economic reordering that would logically include the redistribution of the ill-gotten possessions of shared Dutch and Chinese enemies. Confronting this inconvenient, subjective "native behavior," however, Ōe's fleeting "romantic thoughts of Indonesians" were whisked away to reveal the reverse side of colonialism's Janus Face: the natives as "primitive," "instinctive," conscience-less, selfish.

Other Japanese seemed to have been harboring these sorts of assumptions all along. Writing for a local Japanese audience three days after the victory, a cynical observer characterized "Our Mission" as follows:

The Indonesians have welcomed us. But they appear to be at a loss when it comes to expressing hostility to the Dutch. Under 300 years of Dutch oppression, they have been made stupid (*gumai*), made insensitive (*mukankaku*). If the Indonesians think that just because the Japanese have arrived, they can eat without working for it, they've got another thing coming. We must first rescue the Indonesians from their habit of idleness (*taida*). We must teach them labor, effort, patience, dedication. If they know how much trouble and suffering the Japanese have undergone in reaching today's level of national power and international status, they will realize that it is not such an easy thing being our brothers ... Up to now they've been idle coolies of the Dutch. Beginning now we must make of them diligent workers for Japan and Asia.⁴⁶

"Idle coolies": perhaps no two words so vividly encompass the competing strands of the Japanese wartime construction of the Indonesian masses, and the mix of colonial arrogance and anti-colonial sympathies that lay behind it.

At the top, Commander Imamura remained among the more sympathetic, if no less colonial. At a news conference held shortly after the Dutch surrender, he summarized Japan's aims towards the "obedient natives."

As you can see from the way all of us have been received, the natives are clearly yearning for the Japanese. Our greatest aim must be to shower the imperial authority upon these obedient natives who have truly met us with voices of welcome ... I believe the fact that such obedient natives have completely spurned the Dutch is a result of the Dutch policy of exploitation. So through the spirit of the imperial way, showering the imperial authority upon them, we must make the welfare of the natives central in our thinking. It would be a mistake to make them the object of exploitation of the entire Japanese nation—I believe we must strive for their happiness at the same time. Simple exploitation will not do. Petroleum is, however, a single exception.⁴⁷

The emotional power of the seemingly whole-hearted commitment of Japan's public spokesmen to a brotherly rebuilding of Asia—albeit in their own image—would make a strong impression upon the Indonesians exposed to it, particularly in the early days of the occupation. Like the Japanese, Indonesians were also excited at the prospects opened up by the Japanese arrival. But seduced by the imagined simplicity and warm welcome, the ease of victory over the Dutch, and the profound confirmation of themselves and their strivings which they believed this to represent, it was easy for the Japanese to overlook the conditional nature of this welcome, and the subjective, multiple local agendas that lay behind it.

"The East Indies have fallen from Dutch control after 300 years. The great mission of the imperial army is to make thoroughly clear to the inhabitants the meaning of this great historical reality," proclaimed *Sekidōhō*, the new Japanese-language newspaper published by the propaganda squad, on March 9—the date of the Dutch surrender.⁴⁸ While they were very much interested in what the Japanese had to say, however, Indonesians also had their own ideas about what it all meant.

Turned tables

Early on the morning of March 6, 1942,⁴⁹ the 21-year-old student Johar Nur ventured out of his Batavia neighborhood to witness the arrival of the Japanese. His excitement at this prospect had been building during months of listening to Radio Tokyo broadcasts. Nur's bicycle flew the red-and-white Indonesian flag. As he headed for the office of the Dutch Resident, he observed a number of striking phenomena, each signaling this as a moment of profound shift in social fortunes, and the dawning of a new era.

I saw former Dutch K.N.I.L.,⁵⁰ of the same race as myself, on the run, wearing white shirts, undershirts—they'd tossed off their blue trousers and shirts ... Then I passed by a housing complex for Dutch nationals near the [train] station. There was a woman crying and kissing her young child. You could say I wasn't too affected by this. Then I headed for Salemba Road ... I stopped near the Senen post office, because from here I could see ... people were already boisterous, ordinary people, they'd looted a bicycle shop ... empty.⁵¹

For the Indonesian masses, the heady days surrounding the Dutch departure and Japanese arrival saw preliminary fears of wartime horror gradually replaced by a sort of chaotic festival atmosphere, typified by the kind of enthusiasm that so unsettled Ōe Kenji in East Java. A Indonesian newspaper reporter described the mood in Batavia on March 6 as "like the day of *Lebaran* [marking the end of the annual month of fasting], the only difference being that the people who fill the streets are not wearing nice clothes, but the excitement in their hearts is no less than any *Lebaran* anywhere." The reporter noted several bicycles and *becaks* [pedicabs] flying the Japanese flag, and was himself greeted with happy shouts of "*banzai!*" At one point a Indonesian youth yelled to him, "Hey, look at this—isn't it a nice typewriter?" When asked where he had got it, he replied, "with a happy laugh, 'I stole it over *there!*'" The reporter then encountered what he described as a "shocking, sad sight": groups of three or four people hurrying by carrying heavy bags, yards of fabric, chairs and tables, "all sorts of things." Asked from where, they enthusiastically replied, "we broke in!"⁵²

Where the masses encountered resistance in the looting spree, the festival atmosphere often turned to one of vindictiveness and brutality, a reflection of long-nourished class and racial animosities.⁵³ A reporter who ventured east from Batavia to survey events there after the Dutch retreat returned with the grisly account of a Chinese shopowner in the suburb of Bekasi who waged a shoot-out with would-be marauders. Reaching a state of desperation as the stream of assailants continued unabated, the shopkeeper was reported to have turned the gun on the six members of his family, poured kerosene over his shop, set it alight, and finally shot himself.⁵⁴ Wealthy fellow Indonesians, too, were hardly immune to the wrath of the masses. The same newspaper article related an account of a hated Indonesian landowner who "attempted to escape but was caught by the inhabitants. He was then tortured, strung up in a wet-rice field and left in the sun for three days, while his possessions were damaged and looted."⁵⁵

As another reflection of the newly changed social circumstances, “almost everyone” in Batavia’s streets on the day of the Japanese arrival was sporting a *pitji*, a rimless type of velvet hat worn by male Muslims. These became an instant fashion, for the wearers “a sign that they were really and truly sons of Indonesia,” and thus presumably distinguishing them from the Dutch and their cohorts, enemies of the Japanese.⁵⁶ In the week of the invasion, the *Pemandangan* newspaper noted in its humor column that except for rice, the items in the highest demand in Batavia were now *pitji* and *tukang sunat*, or practitioners of circumcision. Circumcision was perceived as the most definitive—and speedy—way of confirming one’s identity as a Muslim, and thus as a true Asian. Self-redefinition as Asian had suddenly become an urgent task, particularly among many in Java’s social upper crust, who had hitherto been closely associated with the Dutch rulers and their culture, many having had little more than ceremonial experience with Islam. The writer noted with some irony that he had located his own *pitji* in the cellar, faded from lack of use.⁵⁷

Sometime around nine in the morning, Johar Nur and his cousin reached Batavia’s central square, just in time to witness the arrival of the first Japanese soldier to the scene.⁵⁸

He smelled incredibly rancid, on account of apparently not bathing for several days ... It was the first time I’d seen a Japanese soldier, and his battle dress. There were plants on his head [helmet], his rifle was long, [but] he himself was short ... It was really quite a contrast, this sturdy man with big feet ... I was impressed to see them. Because they, who were so small, had been able to defeat the Dutch, whose bodies were so big ... since I was small I’d been what you could call terrorized, as I was educated in Dutch schools with Dutch teachers. You must understand that already from a young age, children were made to fear [them], this was planted in our souls ... the fear that we were not capable. This one fact that flared up within my heart was huge: Little people can defeat [them].⁵⁹

It became immediately apparent, however, that where the Japanese army was concerned, the whole might be more impressive than the sum of its parts. Looking famished, another Japanese soldier approached a nearby vegetable-seller pushing his cart. He wordlessly pointed at a red pepper that “indeed looked like something delicious to eat” and showed some Japanese money. “Then without asking anything, he proceeded to eat it, and the [unexpected] spiciness made him grimace. In my heart,” Nur recalled, “my reaction was—remember, I’d only just turned 21—apparently these people are stupid ... brave in war, fierce fighters, but stupid.”⁶⁰ It was the sort of scene that was repeated throughout the archipelago in the days following the landing, making Japanese the butt of many local jokes—at the time, mostly good-natured ones.⁶¹

Where cultural friction in the first moments of the Japanese arrival was limited to such incidents, Japanese soldiers were given high marks for their discipline, particularly in comparison to the notoriously brutish Australian soldiers who had been on hand to assist the Dutch.⁶² Less amusing were first encounters with certain soldiers who apparently “didn’t care about idealism” and went about “stealing things and hitting people right and left.”⁶³ In the East Javanese town of Blora, on the day after the first

Japanese soldiers had passed through, the future prizewinning author and political dissident Pramoedya Ananta Toer witnessed the raping of local women, beaten “until their faces were black and blue.”⁶⁴ In the Central Javanese city of Surakarta, Jusuf Ronodipuro, a young employee of General Motors, was given a receipt by Japanese soldiers who requisitioned his car, but later experienced having his watch wordlessly taken off him by another, fearsome-looking soldier. As Ronodipuro noted, “the Japanese [explained] afterwards [of such soldiers], ‘Oh, they are not Japanese. They are Koreans, or Taiwanese.’”⁶⁵ Pramoedya also heard this explanation after he arrived in Jakarta a few months later.⁶⁶ At least one Japanese eyewitness, however, later confirmed that the appropriation of bicycles at least was a common practice among “regular Japanese soldiers” both during and after the Java campaign.⁶⁷

Encounters with these sorts of soldiers sometimes turned Indonesian positive opinions of the Japanese around in a hurry, though in the early days, many among the elite at least were willing to give the Japanese liberators the benefit of the doubt and accept the proffered explanation that these Koreans or Taiwanese were merely “bad apples” in a generally well-behaved lot. In any case, these incidents do not appear to have transpired in Batavia. For his part, Johar Nur noted that his first impression of the Japanese as “stupid” was “not repeated later on,” as he was “very impressed” by the “older, neatly-dressed Japanese, apparently the soldiers’ superior,” who appeared later in the morning to take the Dutch Resident into custody before a cheering crowd.⁶⁸ In Nur’s eyes, the Dutch aura only suffered further in the exchange.

as it so happened I saw governor Tjarda, guarded by several Japanese soldiers, and he was carrying his own suitcase ... He was waiting for the train, apparently at that time they wanted to ship him off to Manchuria. So he was really reduced as a human being.⁶⁹

In the days after the Dutch surrender on March 9, Johar Nur was forbidden to venture out of his immediate neighborhood, for fear he might get caught up in the middle of the chaotic violence of the *perampokan*. He did manage nevertheless to witness the propaganda squad’s hoisting of painted propaganda balloons in the central Gambir square before the governor’s palace, now the residence of Japanese commander Imamura.⁷⁰ The irony of the Japanese commander’s choosing of the luxurious colonial seat of power as his own residence was not lost on Imamura himself.

I personally desired to live and work in a simple residence. This was because, thanks to 300 years of exploitation of the Indonesian natives, everywhere in Java, the public and private facilities of the Dutch as well as the residences of the overseas Chinese had become truly extravagant, and it was feared that if we did not pay careful attention on this point, it might be a mistake damaging to Japan’s [aims of] frugality. But I had no choice but to bow to the demand of the Military Administration Department that I should reside in the governor’s residence for the sake of [ensuring] the authority of rule over the 50,000,000 people of Java.⁷¹

Imamura's decision was the first in a long series of Japanese choices favoring practicality over ideals, choices that revealed Japan's inexorable wartime priorities. If anything, Imamura was exceptional in his hesitation, for many Japanese officers and civilians, including the members of the propaganda squad, were quick to occupy the many luxurious colonial residences that had been home to the Dutch ruling elite. Without any apparent irony, Tomizawa Uio was soon telling assembled Indonesian journalists that "you must sacrifice, so that in later days your descendants can live happily in houses of stone, beautiful houses, which were up to now inhabited only by the Dutch."⁷² For the time being, however, the best of these would be inhabited by the Japanese.

Still, in these heady early days of victory and revelry, most Indonesian onlookers appeared more interested in the two balloons hoisted before the palace—one carrying the Japanese flag and the other the Indonesian—than in the ironies of Imamura's choice of residence. The propaganda squad's new *Sekidōhō* poster bulletin reported that "crowds of Indonesians, young and old" gathered to gaze at the balloons, on which were inscribed the texts *Asia banzai* and, according to Johar Nur, *One Color, One Race (Satu Warna Satu Bangsa)*.⁷³ Nur noted that the most positive reaction to the balloons came from younger Indonesians, particularly "those with education."⁷⁴

Politically active, anti-Dutch students such as Johar Nur and his nationalist colleague Chaerul Saleh were indeed among Japan's most staunch supporters at the time they arrived.⁷⁵ For them, "Japan was a symbol of the power of us people of the East, who could bravely oppose and subjugate all the imperialists."⁷⁶ On the day the Japanese entered Batavia, Saleh led fellow members of the Federation of Indonesian Students (PPPI) to the city limits and welcomed the Japanese, bearing the Indonesian flag. Founded by Saleh in 1937, the PPPI was the most nationalistic and politically radical of the prewar student associations.⁷⁷ Upon hearing of Saleh's plans, fellow students at the elite Batavia Medical College and members of the officially neutral Association of Indonesian Students (USI) gathered hurriedly together in their clubhouse to debate whether they, too, should turn out to welcome the Japanese.⁷⁸ Most of the students were in favor, though a small minority, including two named Sudarpo and Sudjatmoko, questioned whether Japan had really come to liberate Indonesia.⁷⁹ Echoing the warnings of exiled nationalist leader Muhammad Hatta, of whom he was a follower, Sudarpo cautioned his fellows not to forget that the Japanese were "fascists" and that the war was really one of "fascism versus democracy."⁸⁰ But even Sudarpo later admitted that, whatever skepticism he might have entertained towards Japanese motives, the extent of Japan's military victories over the arrogant West was such as to inspire an inescapable sense of admiration, along with pride as a fellow Asian.⁸¹

For their part, members of the propaganda squad had already been impressed with the earnestness and enthusiasm of Indonesian youth. Their first experience of this kind came two days before the entry into Batavia, in the town of Serang. Here Shimizu Hitoshi and Asano Akira were accosted by a spirited young man who desired nothing other than to accompany and assist the Japanese forces as they took the city from the Dutch. Asano described his appearance as that of "just a boy," but was surprised to hear through Shimizu that he already had experience working for a nationalist newspaper and had even been imprisoned by officers of the Dutch Political Intelligence Service, the PID (*Politiek Inlichtingen Dienst*). Shimizu and his colleagues had no choice but to

refuse the young man's pleadings for the time being, but they did not forget him, and he later came to room with Shimizu in Batavia, landing a job as clerk in the broadcasting section.⁸²

The young man was D.N. Aidit, a 19-year-old Sumatra-born member of the left-leaning *Gerindo* party with a degree from an "intermediate-level commercial school."⁸³ After the war, Aidit would rise to head the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), but distinguishing him here were his youthful energy, idealism, and openness to the Japanese. Early encounters such as these encouraged the assumption among many Japanese that the youth of Indonesia were Japan's natural allies. As in Japan, youth were prized as the hope of the future, their spirits as yet untainted by the "compromises" and "selfishness" of Western-style modernity. This assumption lay behind Shimizu and company's subsequent courting of eager, ambitious young Indonesians such as Johar Nur and Chaerul Saleh as the vanguard of the new order. Sudjatmoko, who was less hostile to the Dutch and not as politically active as Saleh, Nur, and others at the time, said of his predominantly pro-Japanese colleagues in a 1989 interview, "I was surprised to see that it was the people who were the most radically anti-Dutch ... how easily they became slaves of the Japanese."⁸⁴ Yet this statement itself also points to the fact—often missed by Japan's missionaries as well—that it was first and foremost the implications of Japan's "subjugation of the imperialist" Dutch, rather than anything intrinsic to the Japanese as such, that fired the imaginations of these overtly pro-Japanese youth.

With some sort of Japanese-sponsored independence apparently on the way, Indonesia's older nationalists were no less eager to court Japanese favor and secure for themselves a place of prominence in the new order. The revolutionary zeal of Japanese propaganda and its propagandists prompted Indonesia's nationalist elite to expect a reversal of fortunes, not only in the disappearance of the Dutch themselves but also in terms of a domestic social reordering in which the pro-Dutch "native" administrators (the *pangreh praja*, lit. "rulers of the realm") and the "foreign" ethnic groups holding special economic and social privileges under the Dutch system—in particular the ethnic Chinese—would be replaced by Japan's presumed natural allies, that is, the nationalists themselves. Known as the most dedicated opponents of the Dutch, the non-cooperators hoped to be the first in line. And amidst the wild mix of rumor, confusion, and fact that accompanied the Japanese arrival, it looked for a time like all of this might shortly come to pass.

As the Japanese advanced to victory at Bandung, from his privileged vantage in the home of the older brother of nationalist Mohammad Yamin, Johar Nur was able to witness Yamin's comings and goings as he took part in hurried negotiations to assemble what the non-cooperator nationalists of Sukarno's *Partai Nasional Indonesia* lineage hoped would be the first governing cabinet of an independent Indonesia. Yamin himself appeared as the domestic affairs minister, with the absent Sukarno and Hatta listed as propaganda minister and economic ministers respectively. In Sukarno's absence, the list, completed on the day of the Dutch surrender, was presented to the Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*) by the Islamic nationalist leader Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso, himself named as transportation minister.⁸⁵

In Central Java, meanwhile, acting quickly in the political vacuum in the wake of the Dutch departure, nationalists of Hatta's elite non-cooperator lineage set up "Indonesian

Peoples' Corps" (Barisan Rakyat Indonesia, or BRI) branches across the region in the aim of assuming the tasks of local governance, thereby presenting the Japanese with a ready-made Indonesian regime as *fait accompli*.⁸⁶ Unfurling the Indonesian flag, they aimed to restore public order and establish legitimacy by suppressing the *perampokan* and calling on Indonesian civil administrators to continue working—no longer for the Dutch, but now for the BRI. The arriving Japanese allowed things to continue for a time, and their initial efforts met with great success. "As it turned out everyone wanted to join ... the cooperator [nationalists] and the masses," noted Sarli, one of the five top BRI leaders. "Everyone did as we said: Don't loot, and [like that] there was no more looting." Local civil servants and administrators, now without their Dutch benefactors and "without anywhere else to turn," also answered the call of the BRI. Even Indonesian members of the Dutch Political Intelligence Service, who in years before had twice arrested Sarli for political activities, now came to beg his forgiveness in tears, believing his side had won.⁸⁷

Out of a variety of personal motives, many educated Indonesians meanwhile offered their services to the arriving Japanese as guides, interpreters, and experts on the local culture, with some luck establishing relationships that could ensure a continued or improved status in the new order. Raden Soendoro Budhyarto Martoatmodjo was a member of another hastily established local administrative organ, the "Public Interest Committee" (Comite Kepenlingan Oemsem, or CKO) in Jember, East Java. The 43-year-old, Leiden-educated lawyer had been active among the first generation of Indonesian nationalists.⁸⁸ As Japanese forces approached, rumors spread that Japanese officers, who had "gone months without contact with women," were gathering together Javanese women—including members of the elite *priyayi* class—for their "comfort," perhaps in the Central Javanese city of Bojonegoro.⁸⁹ Hearing this, Martoatmodjo rushed by car to Jember's central square just in time to meet the first Japanese troops. He approached a Japanese officer poring over a map of the city and asked in English if he could be of assistance. The officer had trouble with English, though with "much difficulty," he managed to indicate that he needed a place to barrack his troops and that he was considering the neighboring mosque. "No!" exclaimed Martoatmodjo, who explained as best he could that the housing of troops in a mosque would "invite a clash with the people." Instead he suggested they use the Dutch school building in front of the mosque.

Martoatmodjo was then asked to help find a place to house Japanese officers, and he led them to the home of the Dutch Assistant Resident. When they arrived there, the Dutchman stared at Martoatmodjo with "a look that could kill ... as if I were a member of Japan's fifth column. Yet my goal," he later insisted, "was to make sure the Japanese officers didn't molest our wives!" Shortly thereafter Martoatmodjo invited the Japanese officers and soldiers to attend a dinner hosted by the CKO, to which he and his colleagues made sure to invite their wives.

My aim was that if the officers understood the way of life of us Indonesians—that wives are on the same level as their husbands—they wouldn't molest [them]. For the Japanese, you know, women were considered second class ... If they wanted to bother Dutch women or Indo (Eurasian) women [who often had Dutch status], I

didn't care, this was none of our business ... my goal was that they didn't molest *priyayi* women. For their soldiers, indeed they asked through the Regent ... and they were arranged, assembled from all over the Jember Regency, I didn't care. These were true comfort women—I don't want to say prostitutes, for comfort. This was for the subordinates. For the officers, if they molested Dutch women, it wasn't my business.

Thus did Martoatmodjo work to gain the favor and protection of the Japanese leadership, an interest for which women of Indonesia's working class, along with those of European and Eurasian descent, proved expendable. In this he was joined by many officials and other local notables across the archipelago, including Sukarno, who were plied with similar Japanese requests.⁹⁰ Shortly hereafter, Martoadmodjo was appointed to head the local government goods distribution apparatus, the *Haikyū kumiai*.⁹¹ His later career under the Japanese included appointment to *Chūō Sangi'in* (the Central Advisory Council in Jakarta, established in 1943) and, in 1944, the assistant governorship of Besuki province. At war's end, the new nationalist government promoted him to provincial governor.⁹²

In a similar fashion, Abdoellah bin Salim Alatas, a wealthy trader of Arab descent and the sole Arab appointee to the Volksraad before the war, quickly ingratiated himself with the Java propaganda squad. When the Japanese requisitioned his car near Batavia, Alatas asked to be allowed to assist as they saw fit. Satisfied that he "understood Japan's aims extremely well," Tomizawa Uio and translator Nakatani Yoshio took Alatas along as a guide on the road to Bandung.⁹³ "The Arabs were second only to the Chinese in shrewdness, and Indonesians didn't much like them," Colonel Machida wrote years later, "but Tomizawa, who needed a guide at that instant, was grateful" to have such an apparently "self-possessed" and "capable" man at his side.⁹⁴ Tomizawa himself later observed,

I spoke with this Arab during this time, and found him to be a man of refinement, well aware of the state of the world, with the cultivation of a regular gentleman in the cultural realm as well. He wasn't an Indonesian, but he was the same type of person as an Indonesian, and after speaking with him about this and that, I could for the first time make some estimate of the thoughts and feelings of the highly-cultivated intelligentsia in this land.⁹⁵

Alatas further impressed by self-assuredly translating the first official proclamation of the Japanese commander from Indonesian into Dutch, despite warnings that the slightest error could mean execution for treason.⁹⁶ Upon their arrival in Bandung, the threesome took charge of the local radio station, and each read their respective texts over the airwaves.⁹⁷

Although deeming Alatas a former "gentleman of high position" now reduced to a member of "a pitiable race with no place to call home," Tomizawa remained convinced that his "cooperation was not based on any selfish motive." A close relationship soon developed among the three men. When they located a temporary residence in Bandung in which there were only two beds, Nakatani sacrificed his to the older Alatas

and chose to sleep in a reclining chair instead, although this represented a “decline in the authority of the Japanese army.”⁹⁸ Alatas’ devotion would eventually be rewarded with the position of business manager at the propaganda squad-sponsored *Asia Raya* newspaper, despite intense early opposition he faced as a non-Indonesian from *Asia Raya*’s director Soekardjo Wirjopranoto.⁹⁹

Among the Indonesian elite, it was predominantly members of Soekardjo’s *Parindra* who came to dominate Java’s propaganda apparatus in the first months of the Japanese occupation. *Parindra*’s leaders had frequently been the object of criticism from the non-cooperators for their willingness to compromise with the Dutch and their “feudal” mentality, but *Parindra* was also the Indies’ largest legal nationalist party, and, as we have seen, it was *Parindra*’s leadership—symbolized most poignantly by the martyred Thamrin—that had invested the most energy in developing prewar ties with the Japanese.¹⁰⁰ Given this background, and the presence of the Leiden-educated lawyer and former chair of *Parindra*’s Board of Foreign Relations Sudjono among the Japanese landing forces, it is not surprising that *Parindra* saw itself as the legitimate heir to the mantle of leadership under the Japanese.¹⁰¹ Indeed, a delegation of *Parindra* party members was even reportedly on hand to welcome and guide the arriving Japanese forces when they landed at Banten, West Java.¹⁰² But it was the non-cooperator nationalists who first seized the initiative with the Japanese military leadership.

On March 8, the day after he had arrived in Batavia, Colonel Nakayama Yasuto—head of the General Affairs Division of the Military Administration Department—sent out an invitation to prominent nationalists in the city to meet with him.¹⁰³ The next day Abikoensno Tjokrosoejoso and two associates appeared at his office.¹⁰⁴ The *Parindra* party newspaper *Berita Oemoem* described the exchange between them as follows:

Colonel Nakayama put to them a question: The Japanese army is in control of the entire nation of Indonesia—it is no longer in the hands of the Dutch. Now how will it be, are the gentlemen of Indonesian ready to assume control of this country and to arrange it according to what is best and most suited to the nature and characteristics of its people?

“We are ready!” answered the Indonesians, and they elaborated upon their ability [to do so] with several points. This was accepted by Colonel Nakayama.

“How about the Dutch personnel, do you need their help?”

The Indonesian side replied: “We do not need it!”

Colonel Nakayama then advised that Indonesians remain peaceful and assist in [encouraging] the advancement and tranquility of the inhabitants, until agreement is achieved. Japan does not want to stand on its own (*Nippon tidak maoe hidoep sendiri*).

If a Japanese gets f50-, then Indonesians, too, shall get f50-. This is the metaphor for all matters, in living as brothers!

Colonel Nakayama went on to explain that Japan is prepared to give its blood for 20 years in helping to defend this country.

In light of the above statements of the leader of the Japanese army, it appears that Indonesians are now indeed being given a good opportunity to reveal their true value.

The author of the essay, apparently the newspaper's editor Winarno Hendranoto, went on to acknowledge that the Japanese in fact had the power to do whatever they liked, but that it would be "glorious" if they should grant independence to Indonesians, "who up to now have never had such a chance." In a clear reference to the privileged position of the ethnic Chinese, he added, "we've never had the opportunity to occupy even the level or position of number two."¹⁰⁵

Another source, based on an interview with Col. Nakayama himself in 1964, described the same meeting in slightly different terms:

After a cordial reception, Nakayama proceeded to discuss some of the existing problems. At one point during the conversation, he broached the subject of Indonesian participation and possible changes that might be made in the government. At this juncture, Abikoesno somehow proposed that one change should be the formation of an Indonesian national government. The colonel, who felt that Abikoesno had misunderstood his intent, was embarrassed and reportedly ignored the proposal.¹⁰⁶

Abikoesno was undaunted. The next morning, having secured the backing of eight Indonesian political and religious organizations for his formal blueprint for the new Indonesian state, Abikoesno submitted it to Nakayama. The centerpiece of the plan was the list of suggested names for a ruling "government cabinet."¹⁰⁷ For several days there was no response from the Japanese authorities, and press rumors circulated that the Japanese had appointed Abikoesno as an advisor or even as Indonesia's first prime minister.¹⁰⁸

Parindra observed these moves with "mouths agape."¹⁰⁹ In *Berita Oemoem*, Winarno quickly responded. It would be wrong, he argued, to select the new Indonesian government based on the advice of only one or two people. He suggested a list of ministerial candidates of his own, a list that retained the names of Sukarno, Hatta, and Yamin, and substituted a number of *Parindra* candidates for others. Notably absent was the name Abikoesno.¹¹⁰

By March 13, it began to appear that Abikoesno had not in fact been the recipient of any Japanese appointment. The Delft-educated engineer Soerachman Tjokroadisurjo, also present at the meeting in question with Col. Nakayama, revealed that nothing of the sort had been discussed. On the next day, the propaganda squad press service released an announcement denying reports that "some leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement in Jakarta have been appointed as advisors to the Japanese Commander or as liaisons."¹¹¹ *Parindra's* leadership was clearly delighted and relieved at the news. In *Berita Oemoem*, Abikoesno was ridiculed for his audacity in "appointing himself" advisor, cabinet-former, or even prime minister.¹¹² In the more neutral *Pemandangan*, an editorial complained sharply about opportunistic Indonesians trying to take advantage of the confusion of the moment for self-advancement. The writer predicted that once things settled down, these people would not have much hope of being allowed to take part in the new government—which was precisely why, he argued, they were trying so hard to advance themselves now.¹¹³ In *Berita Oemoem's* humor column, *Parindra's* Winarno made light of the whole situation, under his assumed name of "Cloboth,"¹¹⁴ offering an alternative reading of the Joyoboyo prophecy:

In the last few days I have been one of the people almost unable to eat or sleep, as I continue to struggle to think up the arrangement of the new government, if Japan allows me set up my own government ... Yes, these are truly crazy times. At least according to old Joyoboyo, who already predicted the present situation. That is: When the yellow-skinned race come to take control here, many people will wander aimlessly, out of their minds. Only those with a strong faith will avoid joining the insane.¹¹⁵

Now it was *Parindra*'s turn to take the initiative, and the opportunity came quickly—almost too quickly—in the form of the propaganda squad's Hitoshi Shimizu. For his part, Shimizu sought to establish a “people's movement” akin to the “East Asian League” in China, a “spontaneous” movement of native solidarity with Japan that would rely as much as possible on indigenous initiative.¹¹⁶ To this end he sought to cultivate positive relationships with select locals who would act as messengers to the masses.¹¹⁷ In a 1950s interview, Shimizu admitted that his idea for the new movement remained vague at first. But he was confident that by revealing the emotion and truth of his convictions and displaying Japan's avowedly superior culture to Indonesia's masses—culture here defined in the form of modern media technology—he would gain better results than he had in China.

I felt I had to stand on the front lines—in my China experience too, in sum, I knew that you couldn't tell lies to the masses, and that it was very good just to let your own feelings show fully. Another thing was that at that time, in terms of the Japanese-Indonesian relationship, however you saw it, Japan's culture was [on a] higher [level]. Therefore—unlike in China—I thought with cultural things, film, radio, or photographs, if you brought the appeal of culture to them, the masses would follow you.¹¹⁸

Shimizu was impatient to inaugurate his movement and capitalize on the favorable climate of Indonesian support in the wake of Japan's great victory. With more prominent nationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta as well as *Parindra*'s current head man Soekardjo Wirjopranoto absent from Batavia in the early days after the surrender, it was *Parindra* in the form of a certain Mr. Samsuudin that took the first initiative in establishing links with Shimizu. Samsuudin, thirty-three, was holder of a prestigious law degree from Leiden University, and had also served as vice-mayor of the important Batavia suburb of Bogor.¹¹⁹ Visiting Shimizu at his new office in the propaganda squad's temporary quarters in the luxurious *Hotel Des Indes*, he explained that he had been a close associate and Volksraad deputy of the late Mohammad Thamrin, assuming Thamrin's seat upon his death.¹²⁰

Further in Samsuudin's favor was his prewar association with the propaganda squad's Ichiki Tatsuo. “And then, though only vaguely,” Shimizu later recalled, “I knew the name Thamrin. I knew he was from the pro-Japanese group, so I thought, he'll do. Let's get on with it.”¹²¹ Samsuudin was made chairman of the new movement. Sjahboedin Latief, one of the original participants in Sukarno's 1927 PPPI and a board member of the Bandung branch of the *Sarekat Islam* party who accompanied Samsuudin that day,

was named as general secretary. Just eight days after the Dutch surrender, the “Three-A Movement” was underway.

A week later, the slogans of the “Three-A movement” began to filter into the public domain. They appeared in a set of three, one for each “A.” Although few observers at the time were aware of it, there was a slight divergence between the Indonesian- and Japanese-language versions of the third and last of the three slogans.

<u>Japanese Version</u>	<u>Indonesian Version</u>
A <i>Asia no shidōsha Nippon</i> Leader of Asia, Japan	A <i>Pemimpin Asia Nippon</i> Leader of Asia, Japan
A <i>Asia no hikari Nippon</i> Light of Asia, Japan	A <i>Tjahaja Asia Nippon</i> Light of Asia, Japan
A <i>Asia no botai Nippon</i> Mother of Asia, Japan	A <i>Pelindoeng Asia Nippon</i> Protector of Asia, Japan ¹²²

The slogans appeared a tribute to Japanese self-absorption, and in subsequent hindsight, they and the movement they represented came in for ridicule from Indonesian, Japanese, and Western commentators alike.¹²³ Yet as Shimizu recalled it, the primary initiative came from the Indonesian side. After some discussion, Samsedin and his assistant Sjahbuddin “went steadily ahead with the project on their own ... They printed and typed things,” Shimizu later said. “Besides, I didn’t really understand Indonesian, so I was more or less in the role of looking on as they charged ahead. Only if we thought I should give a speech, I gave a speech.” He explained:

I had [experience with] the *Tōa renmei*, and wanted to carry out an Asia movement, but as far as the actual [slogans] “*Tjahaja Asia Nippon*,” “*Perlindoengan* [sic] *Asia Nippon*,” and “*Pemimpin Asia Nippon*,” the one who came up with that was an Indonesian ... it came via Samsedin or someone like that ... they made their proposals quite strongly. They wanted to conduct a movement to support Japan, while at the same time conducting a popular movement as Indonesians ... They came up with [the slogans] with the idea that it would be unwise to incur the disfavor of the Japanese army ... it was not that these [terms] were used because we had come up with “*shidōsha*” or “*botai*” or some such beforehand.¹²⁴

Nishijima: You say you continued to want to conduct an Asian movement ... Does that mean that ultimately, your thinking was to conduct a spiritual movement to purge the Western-European spirit, and [replace it with] a new Asian spirit?

Shimizu: Yes. That was our one-and-only aim. However, Samsedin wanted to flatter Japan. Master Samsedin or one of the others [said], “This is how we should do it.” I never had any experience with the Dutch education system, but these people were very good at flattery. So they came up with it. “*Pelindoeng*,” “*Pemimpin*,” “*Tjahaya*” et cetera, all of that was created by Indonesians.¹²⁵

As Shimizu indicated, *Parindra*’s membership had trodden such a path before, playing within the established rules of the Dutch administration and slowly exacting

political advantage while carefully avoiding direct confrontation. In its slogans and its pandering to Japan, the Three-A could thus be seen not only as a Japanese movement to pacify Indonesians, but also as an Indonesian movement to pacify the Japanese.

In a similar mood of optimism and ambition, Samsuudin's *Parindra* colleagues in East Java were equally active. On March 8, *Parindra*'s Surabaya branch prepared a letter to the local Japanese Army Commander, pledging *Parindra*'s loyalty to, and willingness to cooperate with the aims of, Dai Nippon.

1. *Parindra* agrees with the aim of Japan in bringing about a new prosperity in Asia, especially for the advancement and glory of the people and land of Indonesia.
2. *Parindra* is prepared to assist Japan with all its energy and thinking in order to realize the above aim.

Written by S. Rooslan Wongsokoesoemo, whose early career had included a number of years of work as a clerk and translator at several Japanese trading companies in Surabaya, the letter was cosigned by *Parindra* vice-chairman Soedirman and three other local party leaders.¹²⁶ First attempts to deliver this letter personally to the Japanese commander failed, but in the meantime, a Japanese officer from the military government, S. Watanabe, sought *Parindra*'s help in printing press releases and otherwise transmitting information to the masses; Wongsokoesoemo, with his past experience with the Japanese, was chosen to work temporarily as a liaison to the military government. The arrangement, according to a 1943 *Parindra* report, "greatly smoothed relations between *Parindra*'s leadership and Nippon." Wongsokoesoemo was put to work "preparing and/or receiving all reports regarding matters of government and difficulties suffered by the people," and compiling these to produce "a conclusive perspective" which would allow the Japanese to know "what was really contained in the inner self of the people."¹²⁷

On March 16, Wongsokoesoemo and his colleagues were finally given the chance to submit their letter to Moriya Shuichirō, in charge of internal affairs with the 48th Division that was assigned temporary administrative jurisdiction over East Java.¹²⁸ Moriya told them that "the new government desires the solid unity of the people in opposing the allies" and was concerned with "a variety of matters, for example the composition of the regional government, the police, etc. With regard to this, all of us were ready to submit our views and plans," wrote *Parindra*'s Soedirman, "and thus the first meeting with the commander was filled with hopes great and meaningful." Moriya was already showing signs of myopia, however, when it came to Indonesians and their abilities. Amidst disappointing and saddening reports of *perampokan* in many areas, "he also made the remark, that the people of Indonesia are *only capable* of asking for work or stealing."¹²⁹

A second meeting two days later nevertheless raised expectations further, as Moriya "requested a list of names of intellectuals among us (*intellekt kita*) to later replace the Dutch officials, who according to him needed to be 'swept aside' (*disapoe*). Reflecting *Parindra*'s haughty attitude towards its nationalist rivals, a 1943 memo from the Surabaya leadership later recalled that the party had thus,

in the blink of an eye, been recognized as the one and only representative of the people, whose membership at this time stood at 23,178—not including the many requests we received for new membership after March 8th [1942] ... Who was it that became workers for Japan, and carried out important functions? ... Among the parties, it was only we who had attained such a position.¹³⁰

While *Parindra* was thus eager to make the most of its “pro-Japanese” reputation and get the jump on the non-cooperators in the process, the leadership of the 16th Army’s powerful, conservative Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*) in fact showed more early interest in Mohammad Hatta, a non-cooperator with an unusually pronounced “anti-Japanese” reputation. Hatta had at times outspokenly portrayed Japan as a greater threat to Indonesia than the Netherlands. In doing so, he had ignored warnings from colleagues such as fellow Leiden-educated nationalist Sutan Sjahrir, who while agreeing with Hatta on Japan’s “fascist” nature and the need to divest the Indonesian people of their overwhelmingly pro-Japanese leanings, feared the obvious risks involved in such a public display if the Japan should take the Indies.¹³¹ In the closing passage of his December 1941 *Pemandangan* essay attacking “Japanese fascism” as Indonesia’s “greatest enemy,” Hatta had almost asked for such a fate: “It is better to drown with one’s ideals,” he had written, “than live like a corpse. That is the meaning of struggle.”¹³²

Thus on March 19, when the Japanese military first discovered him and fellow political exile Sutan Sjahrir where the Dutch had abandoned them in Sukabumi, West Java, Hatta expected rough treatment.¹³³ But whatever the Japanese authorities might have known of his history, Hatta’s prominence apparently won the day. He was summoned to Batavia by the 16th Army’s third-highest ranking officer, Deputy Chief of Staff General Harada Yoshikazu, also concurrent chief of the Military Administration Department.¹³⁴ Once in Batavia, reflecting the administration’s awareness both of Hatta’s stature and of his potential usefulness, Hatta was housed in the luxurious Hotel des Indes and provided with a roomy De Soto automobile. Advice on Hatta’s importance may have come from Miyoshi Shunkichirō, former consul at Batavia, translator and political advisor to the Military Administration Department, who had worked at the Japanese consulate in Batavia before the war. In any event, the two men soon became well-acquainted. In his 1960s memoirs, Miyoshi offered the following estimation of Hatta.

Not only had Hatta, along with Sukarno, been a warrior for the Indonesian nationalist movement for many years, he was also a scholar and a pure, fervent Muslim. Moreover, he was a man full of courage, in whom the intelligentsia of all factions—not to mention the general population—held great confidence. He was just the man to serve as a cooperative leader.¹³⁵

Summoned to his first meeting with General Harada, Hatta was asked if he was ready to “cooperate with the Military Government.” He later recalled answering with a question of his own: “Does Japan intend to colonize Indonesia?” This Harada vigorously denied, offering “his word as a soldier.” Hatta then recalled telling Harada

that he was “prepared to cooperate with the Japanese military government, but not as a government official. I would be prepared to be an adviser who is free to give advice to the military government,” he wrote, although upon this he placed a further condition: “I would not work under a Japanese superior, preferring my advice to be given on my own responsibility.” Hatta then suggested the establishment of an office for this purpose, whose staff he would appoint himself. The request was granted, soon beginning life as the “General Advisory Office” (*Kantor Penasehat Oemoem*), under the umbrella of the Military Administration Department.¹³⁶ For his services, Hatta received the highest permitted salary for a public official, 500 guilders per month.¹³⁷ Miyoshi, the office’s “Liaison Management Official,” later described the functions of the office, or what he called the “Hatta Organ” (*Hatta kikan*), as follows:

Alongside making contacts with Indonesian leaders from all circles, offering enlightened guidance on military government policy, and issuing research reports containing information and documentation relating to such things as politics, economics, and general customs, the organ also functioned as an intermediary, publicizing military policy and intentions to the general public, while at the same time transmitting the voices of the population upwards.¹³⁸

Hatta was soon joined there by former Leiden classmate and fellow nationalist “non-cooperator” Achmad Subardjo, whose prewar assessment of Japan had been as positive as Hatta’s was negative.

These two prominent “non-cooperator” nationalists thus began an early, quiet relationship with the powerful Military Government Department without having actually sought it. In contrast, Hatta’s socialist colleague Sutan Sjahrir, no less skeptical of the Japanese than Hatta but less outspoken on the subject, was paid little attention. Sjahrir responded by retiring quietly to Bandung and maintaining a low public profile; later in the occupation, his nationalist stature and distance from the regime would help to win him influence among nationalist youth disenchanted with the Japanese order. At this early juncture, however, Sjahrir’s sort of skepticism vis-à-vis the possibilities of the new order were a rare commodity—indeed, no more so than among the relatively radical young followers of the non-cooperators, including Johar Nur.

In the confused but hopeful days following the Japanese arrival in Batavia, Nur and four of his friends set about “investigating who among the Japanese was making contact with Indonesians” in Batavia. They aimed to establish a local administration that would “keep an eye on the situation”—including the continuing *perampokan*—and function as a “contact body between the coming Japanese government and the people.”¹³⁹ Until the war, Abdullah Hasan, Chairul Basri, and Muhammad Kamal had been completing their studies at the high school level, while H. Sofyan had been studying to be a notary public. At the ripe age of twenty-one, Nur was the oldest of the lot.¹⁴⁰

When Nur and his colleagues sought him out at the Hotel des Indes, Hitoshi Shimizu seemed delighted to have been approached by what he was “already looking for,” Nur later recalled: Members of the “generation of youth with great aspirations.”¹⁴¹ Shimizu proceeded to set up Nur and his colleagues in the posh former offices of an English insurance company on the west side of Batavia’s central Gambir square.

In the blink of an eye, their “Social Committee” (*Badan Masyarakat*) was a reality. Sofyan, having the most “extensive experience of contact with the people,” was chosen as “chairman.” Chairul Basri and Abdulah Hasan were put in charge of establishing and maintaining contacts with the Japanese military government. Hasan’s status as nephew of Yusuf Hasan (of Radio Tokyo fame) and his family connection with the late Thamrin of the *Parindra* party, recalled Nur, all represented “many signs that he would be able to make contacts with the Japanese.”¹⁴² Nur and Kamal meanwhile, were assigned to establish contacts with Indonesian society, which Nur first interpreted to mean “workers, in the alleyways and homes.” The public response was immediate, and “the workload was unbelievable. [For us], there was no difference between day and night.”¹⁴³ It was a heady experience. According to Nur, the *Badan* occupied an extraordinary position between the Japanese and Indonesian communities. “The longer [we worked],” recalled Nur, “the more our contacts grew.” Barely out of their teens, Nur and his colleagues

were [among] the first to set up contacts between Japan and Indonesia, and the first to be consulted between Japanese and Indonesian leaders. Between Indonesian women and the Japanese. Between Indonesian students and the Japanese. Between Indonesian youth in general and the Japanese. Between Indonesian traders and the Japanese. And between leaders of the workers, the white-collar workers, and the merchants and the Japanese.¹⁴⁴

Nur’s Social Committee did not retain its autonomy for long, however, but was soon brought under the umbrella of the quickly expanding “Three-A Movement.”¹⁴⁵

Winarno’s newspaper reference to Joyoboyo’s prediction of widespread popular insanity taking hold in the wake of the arrival of the yellow-skinned race was only half-facetious. For both Japanese and Indonesians, the psychological effects of the events of the first days of March 1942 were dizzying. Under Japanese pressure, the only Asian order, indeed the only global order any of the participants had ever known—an order predicated upon Western military, political, economic, technological, and cultural hegemony—had collapsed like a house of cards. It was as if the constraints of history and power that had weighed so heavily on the shoulders of Indonesians and Japanese alike had been “swept aside.” In the realm of the imagination at least, Asia had turned a corner, and before it lay a horizon of unlimited possibility. Few military occupations have begun with such promise. But few have also promised so much. Given the continued existence of competing agendas, political interests, and overriding priorities on both sides, promise would inevitably have to turn into compromise. It was here that the newness of the new order would be put to the test.

Restoring Orders

For Japanese and Indonesians alike, the Dutch departure and the Japanese arrival inspired a burst of energy and activity. This was further fed by Japanese propaganda. Japanese of all stripes basked in the welcome and an unheralded sense of missionary purpose, while inspired Indonesians sought to make good on what seemed an unprecedented horizon of opportunity. For members of the nationalist subelite, this meant a scramble for acceptance as leaders of the nation-to-be; for the long-suffering working class, this largely meant filling empty pockets. Native colonial administrators and other vested interests within the old order, including the ethnic Chinese in particular, meanwhile found themselves precariously positioned between Japanese suspicions and propaganda and the resentments and ambitions of the local population.

So long as the fighting continued, the stirring of revolutionary energies and resultant “disorder” were effectively in Japan’s strategic interest. Once the fighting ended, however—at least so far as Tokyo was concerned—Japan’s official priorities shifted to the more sober concerns of consolidating control and restoring order in the aim of “rapid acquisition of important defense resources” and the “securing of self-sustenance of operating military forces in the field.” To this end, beyond the dismissal of the Euro-American colonial rulers themselves, Tokyo had mandated a policy of continuity. “Existing government structures” were to be “used to the utmost, former government organizations and folk customs respected,” and “independence movements not stimulated prematurely.” Straightforward as these plans appeared from Tokyo’s perspective, however, they harbored not one but two great—indeed revolutionary—contradictions.

The first of these was practical: the conflict between the requirements of the “acquisition of important defense resources” and “the securing of self-sustenance,” and the fact that the Indies’ existing political, social, and economic structures were those of a colonial export economy. A net importer of basic necessities such as cotton and rice, and a producer primarily of raw materials for export to the industrial metropolises such as sugar and rubber, the Indies were thus neither self-sustaining nor geared towards the production of “defense resources,” but rather heavily dependent on overseas markets—markets now rendered largely inaccessible by Japan’s own actions. In the face of these new and dramatically altered economic demands and constraints, little continuity was possible.

The second contradiction was political and ideological. While the removal of Southeast Asia’s Euro-American colonial rulers was in itself revolutionary, utilizing

“existing government structures” also meant in effect co-opting and governing through the very colonial, feudal, and capitalist structures and interests against which Japan claimed to be fighting. Indonesia’s national independence movement had sought legitimacy not only in the overthrow of the Western rulers, but in the promise of social change that would transcend colonialism and its inequitable legacies. Japan, in promising a transcendence of the old order and co-opting of the symbols and rhetoric of Indonesian nationalism before and during the invasion, could not avoid “stimulating” Indonesians “prematurely.” This was more than an accidental oversight, however, but was prefigured by place and time. For the nature of this war, and this transnational encounter, was determined not only by the exigencies of war and the whims of Tokyo elites, but by their intersection with the social-revolutionary energies astir in the societies of both colonizer and colonized. It would subsequently be shaped by the resultant struggles and negotiations on both sides to mobilize, contain, and manipulate these energies.

The conflict between revolutionary desires for change and the conservative priorities of the Japanese leadership, along with the constraints of wartime, were a recipe for disappointment and disillusionment on both sides. The asymmetric structure of power meant that the greater share of this disappointment and disillusionment would inevitably be experienced by the colonized. The socially weakest and most exposed among the colonized—Java’s huge working class—could be expected to suffer these contradictions most sharply and immediately. If war and its demands meant greater hardship, however, the fact of war against a shared enemy encouraged a greater patience, stoicism, and inclination toward social unity than that obtaining in many colonial contexts. What was more, History seemed to be on Japan’s side, and for both Japanese and Indonesians, Japan’s unheralded power manufactured its own legitimacy. For the Japanese and Indonesian nation-building men in the middle, moreover, the contradictions of continuity and change were not so readily apparent. For their social position and interests naturally inclined them to seek both revolutionary social change and the essential maintenance of social order, and they shared a conviction that the means to balancing these two agendas lay in a judicious rediscovery and operationalization of Asia’s essential difference from the West. For the moment at least, the appeals of a transcendent Asian future more than counterbalanced the limitations of the present.

The limits of liberation

On March 10, 1942, one day after the formal Dutch surrender near Bandung, General Imamura and twelve top staff members of the 16th Army deliberated on the shape of Japan’s administration in Java. Imamura’s memoirs later revealed a discussion of a much less inspiring nature than the nationalists might have hoped. The issue at hand: should the Japanese be moderate or repressive?

Many of the junior members of Imamura’s staff favored making Indonesians “aware of the authority of Japan and the Japanese army through a policy of repression (*dan’atsu seisaku*),” which might gradually be shifted to a “moderate policy (*kanwa seisaku*) once

we have seen results.” But Colonel Nakayama, chief of the General Affairs Section of the Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*) who had served as a military attaché in Java on the eve of the war, favored a more paternalistic approach, arguing that

The aim of the military government—as hinted in the “Principles of the Execution of the Administration in the Occupied Areas” issued from the center to each army as it entered the field—must be to effect the people’s willing submission through impartial virtue and authority, to restore the damage done to military resources, and to cultivate and requisition [these resources] in the easiest and speediest fashion. Strategy Section Chief Colonel Takashima, Deputy Chief of Staff Harada and Chief of Staff Okazaki indicated their agreement with this thesis.¹

Nakayama’s views were inspired by his prewar assessment of Java’s population. The Dutch, wrote Nakayama in mid-1941, had been “successful” in “making good use of native customs,” keeping the natives ignorant and in awe of the Dutch, and employing the Chinese as middlemen. As a result, “the natives are almost nonchalant about politics. They do not care who the ruler is ... All they want is a peaceful and easy-going daily life. They are not much concerned with any direction the world situation moves in.”² These were not the stubborn, resistant masses of China, and there was thus no need for repression. General Imamura concurred:

although *hakkō ichiu* is a doctrine of brotherhood among those of one and the same family, it is apparently being interpreted as some sort of policy of aggression. As the sole possessor of military power, the military can always employ repression if the need arises. Therefore, as much as is possible, it is decided that the military administration will be carried out according to a policy of moderation.³

The term *hakkō ichiu* used by Imamura, literally meaning “eight directions, one house,” had first appeared in the ancient *Nihon shoki*, attributed to the legendary emperor Jimmu.⁴ The slogan was first officially employed in the Konoe cabinet’s statement of the “Basis of National Policy” in July 1940, which described Japan’s mission as “encouraging the achievement of world peace based upon the great spirit of national founding that unites the eight directions under one house.”⁵ Interpreters almost always equated the “roof” in *hakkō ichiu* with “house” (*ie*), a term whose meaning encompasses both that of a physical “house” and the people who inhabit it, a family. *Hakkō ichiu* could thus be read to represent at once both a geo-political mission of empire-building, and a moral mission of achieving brotherhood among one family. Imamura’s construction of *hakkō ichiu*—and that of many Japanese and Indonesian commentators—emphasized the moral, familial aspect. But like the term *hakkō ichiu* itself, Imamura’s line did not escape these contradictory impulses within Japan’s mission. Rather it encompassed them both.

Imamura’s statements provide a snapshot of both the divisions and the common ground within the 16th Army leadership with regard to Japanese policy vis-à-vis Indonesians at the outset of the occupation. The common limits of vision were reflected in the lumping of the local population into one undifferentiated mass,

which then became the object of repression or moderation. Second, underlying the genuine divide over the need for harshness (the young officers) versus the advantages of moderation—be it for practical (Nakayama) or moral reasons (Imamura)—was an overriding common interest in the maintenance of order, an order defined in terms of Japanese domination and control. For all involved, the military and colonial aim of achieving local submission to the Japanese remained paramount—whether through brute force, Dutch-style social manipulation, or as the natural, spontaneous result of brotherly love.

In a sense, there was nothing remarkable in this priority on order, as these were army officers and this was, after all, wartime. Clearly too there were important distinctions among the men present. Around the time of this meeting, Colonel Nakayama and his staff appear to have been primarily responsible for a momentous internal decision to ban the Indonesian independence movement and its symbols. This was in keeping with Tokyo's orders that "independence movements are not to be stimulated prematurely," but the propaganda squad's Hitoshi Shimizu later insisted that Commander Imamura and others such as himself did not privately support it.⁶ Still, despite the apparent contrast between the myopic, colonial views of Nakayama and the idealism of Greater Asianists like Imamura and Shimizu Hitoshi, Shimizu himself later described Nakayama as having a "deep understanding of Indonesia," and Imamura, too, described Nakayama as having "my complete confidence," a fact reflected in his entrustment with the "particulars of the military administration."⁷ The respect, and the shared concern with "order," reflected Japanese Greater East Asianism as an anti-imperialist ideology that was at the same time laden with colonial assumptions and emphatically centered on Japanese interests.

The awkward task of publicly legitimating the limits of the new order now fell to those who had until now been most active in stirring hopes of liberation: the propaganda squad. When a Bandung newspaper printed the text of the nationalist anthem *Indonesia Raya* one week after the surrender—a song still being broadcast by Radio Tokyo at the time, even as the 16th Army was attempting to have nationalist broadcasts removed from the air⁸—it fell to Tomizawa Uio to explain to assembled Indonesian journalists why this was no longer permissible. In postwar retrospect, squad leader Machida later complained of general discouragement among the propaganda squad membership at having to perform this seeming about-face. But publicly at least, spokesmen such as Tomizawa tackled the task with gusto, immediately seizing the offensive. The parading of nationalist symbols was portrayed as a self-centered affront to the brotherly spirit of the new Asian order. This was to become a standard Japanese refrain.

The point is, you fellows cannot afford fall short in your understanding. "Indonesia Raya" is a song that you fellows sang when you were under the oppression of the Dutch government, and couldn't bear it. Isn't it, as it were, a [form of] resistance against the stingy (*ketchina*) Dutch government? How shameful! In this age of great change, I do not know why anyone would want to publicize such an outmoded song. I don't know why you fellows can't at least remake the song, so that it doesn't say "Indonesia Raya," but rather something like "Asia Raya" or "Pacific Raya." ... If instead you publicize this kind of thing just to soothe yourselves, it's a shame,

but even I—who expected quite a lot from you—have no choice but to throw in the towel.

The assembled journalists “all had troubled expressions on their faces,” noted Tomizawa, “but it seemed as if they acknowledged what I had said.”⁹ On or about the same day, *Parindra*’s party organ *Berita Oemoem* was placed under a regime of prepublication censorship.¹⁰ While Indonesian journalists had been long accustomed to the Dutch system of postpublication censorship, this was a new and potentially more repressive state of affairs.¹¹

Tomizawa’s pronouncements heralded the larger trend in Japanese policy towards the restoration of order. On March 20, 1942, the Japanese military government issued two ominous decrees.

For the time being, discussions, movements, suggestions or propaganda of any sort regarding the regulations and composition of the state are not permitted.

If an official flag must be displayed before an office or houses on holidays, only the Japanese flag must be used.¹²

At some point shortly after the issuance of these decrees, the playing of *Indonesia Raya* was banned.

Apparently aware of the chilling effect these decrees might have upon Japanese-Indonesian relations, an accompanying newspaper commentary attempted to soften the blow by interpreting the decrees in a paternalistic light, and maintaining a brotherly image of Japanese accessibility.

As the Japanese government has already stated, we have no intention of enslaving the people of Indonesia as the Dutch did. Again and again we say that our aim is to enlighten and restore once again the people’s prosperity. Are there still suspicions towards Japan? ... In order that there does not arise a sense of misunderstanding, we clarify here, that the decree regarding the banning of discussions, suggestions and propaganda regarding the composition of the state, is only temporary, and not permanent. And only in order to maintain tranquility before anything happens. If you wish to propose something to the military government, or to ask our advice regarding this issue, we are always ready to happily provide as full an explanation as possible.¹³

In the days preceding this announcement, the 16th Army had already proven extremely active, indeed ruthless, in countering perceived threats to public tranquility. On March 8, one day before the Dutch surrender, the 16th Army issued a decree on “Social Safety” (*Keamanan Masyarakat*), which, while ostensibly aimed at enemy activities, allowed sweeping powers of arbitrary repression against all manner of groups and individuals. In one section of the order, “gathering, associating, propagandizing for the enemy, and the publishing of printed or illustrated matter” was forbidden. Another proclaimed that all those in possession of firearms were to hand them in immediately or face stiff penalties. A third announced a general curfew from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.¹⁴

For the mass of the local population hoping for immediate changes in the social order, two other parts of the order had chilling ramifications. Part Six called on “all officials of the old Government and all the people immediately [to] begin carrying out their duties as before.” Part Five was addressed specifically to the alleged perpetrators of the *perampokan*.

It is strongly forbidden to **take, steal, or seize** items when there is no owner or guard present.

Whoever perpetrates this sort of theft will receive the harshest punishment.

Whoever has obtained or seized the property or currency of another person must return it to its former owner. If it is returned, the crime will be forgiven.

Military Government¹⁵

When this order was published in local newspapers the next day, the following clarification appeared in fine print below it: “The meaning of ‘the harshest punishment’ includes the penalty of death.”¹⁶

In his first conversation with members of the Indonesian press on the same day, Colonel Nakayama proclaimed that the Japanese “considered Indonesia to be the younger brother of Japan, so it is only proper that we love one another.” But he expressed anger about the *perampokan*, saying that the perpetrators would be punished because “as our parents have taught us, one must be prepared to punish those we love very much, to make them better.”¹⁷ It was precisely the sort of rhetoric already employed in China and Korea, where Japanese violence was often billed as *ai no muchi*, “the whip of love”—not the ruthless oppression of an outside invader, but a dose of discipline in the Confucian sense, that of parents or elder brothers punishing a wayward, naughty child.¹⁸

Java’s masses had interpreted the power vacuum and the Japanese arrival as a golden opportunity to turn the socio-economic tables on presumably shared enemies. For reasons never completely clarified, the first wave of Japanese troops added momentum to the *perampokan* by forcing open barricaded shops and storehouses in their path. Three days after the Dutch surrender, *Berita Oemoem*’s editor offered a less-than-satisfying explanation for this from Colonel Nakayama: “Japanese soldiers forced open shops that were closed, but not with the intention that people steal and loot. It was only to open them, and if there was no one there, to leave them as they were, open—they are not to be looted.”¹⁹ A range of possible explanations for Japanese actions included making the goods inside available for Japanese troops as needed, but it is difficult to imagine that the issuers of such an order did not realize the message it would carry to the local population. In Batavia at least, there were accounts of the Japanese having actually forced bystanders to break into boarded-up shops for them.²⁰

Now an extended, island-wide crackdown on suspected looters began, led by the *kenpeitai*, but assisted by the old native colonial police. If they were lucky, suspected looters were merely punished with beatings. Some had their hands cut off at the wrists, while others were summarily executed, or bound hand and foot and left out in the sun to die, with signs hung around their necks with such texts as, “as an example (*boeat*

tjontoh)!”²¹ In Batavia, the severed head of a “particularly bad looter” was put on display in a public square.²²

Records of the popular response to these events are only indirect and anecdotal, but they suggest a sense of shock and betrayal. Already reeling from the extreme, immediate response of the police and the *kenpeitai*, Java’s masses also discovered to their chagrin that the crackdowns represented a perfect opportunity for native officials to reassert their influence. Beginning with the *perampokan* crackdowns, local reports that made their way to Achmad Subardjo’s desk as Research Section chief in Mohammad Hatta’s advisory office in the Military Administration Department comprised an endless stream of complaints against abuses committed by local officials and police, including arbitrary searches and punishment, self-enrichment, and systematic corruption. The complaints were not directed against the *kenpeitai* themselves, but rather against Indonesian officials and police who were taking advantage of their position to “cheat and do harm to the *rakyat* and to the great government of Dai Nippon.”²³ Direct criticism of the *kenpeitai* could of course be dangerous, but the tone of these early reports also suggested that despite initial setbacks, the faith of Java’s masses in the Japanese had yet to be completely shaken.²⁴

If the *perampokan* crackdowns came as a shock to the masses, the elite proved more generally sympathetic to Japanese aims. Where the nationalists had established local administrative committees, stopping the *perampokan* and maintaining order in the name of the Japanese was a way of confirming their own legitimacy. One local report in West Java noted the formation of a temporary alliance between “Chinese and wealthy indigenous families” who had “united to entertain and cheer the Japanese Army, and plead with the Army to suppress the turbulence.”²⁵ The nationalist elite, most of them from these sorts of families, were frightened and embarrassed by the *perampokan*. *Parindra* leader Soekardjo Wirjopranoto accused the people involved of having directed their excitement and newfound boldness to the “wrong address, the wrong place ... But at any rate,” he wrote, “their recent excesses have brought their own reward. The Japanese army has immediately punished a number of people. Some were shot to death, etcetera. It is hoped that after these episodes, tranquility will return as before.”²⁶ Reporting on the public display of victims of Japanese punishment, a journalist for *Pandji Poestaka* magazine commented, “This is the way that theft and other illicit acts will be wiped out nowadays. We hope it serves as a reminder.”²⁷

Elite acceptance of the often brutal Japanese treatment of transgressors was also encouraged by the appearance of Japanese impartiality: the *kenpeitai* could be just as hard on fellow Japanese who misbehaved. Soldiers involved in the raping of local women in the town of Blora, East Java, during the invasion were summarily executed “the next day.”²⁸ Jusuf Ronodipuro observed,

They took measures. The *kenpeitai* especially. The military police ... they didn’t care, even [if the perpetrators] were officers, colonels, their own people. At that time, safety was guaranteed, security. You need not lock your door. Because—*so!* [body language for cutting off a limb] if you were caught. ... Pickpockets, their fingers—*chop!* Jakarta was *safe*. Drunken soldiers, interfering in things, coming

into people's houses, *well!*—there was no discrimination. My first impression of the *kenpeitai* was on the positive side Even if you disagreed, Jakarta was safe.²⁹

To a degree, elite nationalists shared with the masses the shock regarding the Japanese confirmation of native officials and police to their posts. But here too, many revealed an understanding of the Japanese argument that they were indispensable to keeping order. In a preview of a pattern repeated in 1945 and afterward, Indonesia's established nationalists placed their priority not on social revolution but on unity and the maintenance of social order in a time of national crisis.³⁰ In this interest, native officials were asked not to abandon their positions, but rather their outmoded "feudal" loyalties—to work no longer for the colonizer or for their own circle, but for the nation. The fundamental overlap between state officials and nationalists in economic class, social status, worldview, and education made this rhetoric plausible and appealing. "Although there are many who do not agree with this way of doing things, the population must respect the position of the Domestic Administration and the Police as a part of the Japanese Government," wrote *Parindra* leader Soekardjo Wirjopranoto. "Only I do hope that [they] will change their attitude toward the people." Batavia's *Pandji Poestaka* magazine argued that native officials, who "ought to be the leaders of the people," had functioned "up to now" rather as "tools of the Dutch." Yet, he added, "we are sure that the native officials did not in fact approve of this work of theirs, and that in their hearts they held different aspirations ... In the era of the new Asia," he concluded, they "should realize that they have to be the fathers and protectors of the people, not to act as before."³¹

For their part, native officials remained wary of the changes the new order would bring, but were eager to seize upon opportunities it offered to maintain or expand their influence. Wielding a nation-building rhetoric in which they too had grown proficient in the last decade before the war, many were now quick to assert their credentials as national leaders, and as Japan's natural allies. The Japanese confirmation to their former positions was thus welcomed as a promising sign of Japanese faith in Indonesian capabilities. Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo, author of an ill-fated 1936 petition for Indonesian self-government within a Dutch commonwealth that carried his name, reflected this optimism.

People of Indonesia (*Rakyat Indonesia*)! The expression "*Indonesia Merdeka*" (Free Indonesia) is no longer a [mere] slogan. *Indonesia Merdeka* has now appeared before us. For three hundred years we have been considered a race that is not yet ripe, not yet adult [enough] to walk on our own. The people of Japan have removed us from the Dutch *selendang gendongan* [lit. a shawl slung over the shoulder, often used to carry babies and small children], saying: "Brother, let's go, it's time for you to walk on your own!"³²

From the point of view of nation-building, native colonial officials like Soetardjo, the mood of general optimism in the early months of the occupation was strengthened by a number of early cases in which the Japanese chose not only to retain Indonesian officials, but to promote them to positions vacated by the departing Dutch that were

higher than any they had known in the past. Among the most prominent of these was the appointment of the Leiden-educated former schoolteacher and Batavia city alderman Dachlan Abdullah to the post of Batavia mayor just a few days after the surrender. Beneath him, for example, Mas Soetan Doko, former criminal research section chief, now replaced the Dutch chief of police.³³ On April 16, the city of Sukabumi, too, received an Indonesian mayor. The emperor's birthday of April 29 saw a host of further promotions, including a number in West Java to the position of Resident, the third-highest colonial administrative rank, and formerly an exclusively Dutch domain.³⁴

While billed as the first step on the promised road to Indonesia's "Asianization," the appointment of a mix of native civil servants and Japanese military men to posts vacated by the Dutch was also, from the Japanese strategic perspective, the only practical option. Prewar Dutch administrators in Java had numbered some 15,000 in all, yet 16th Army forces had been accompanied by only 50 high-ranking and 150 low-ranking Japanese administrators.³⁵ This low number partly reflected Tokyo's pragmatic mandate of working through existing political structures to the extent possible, but it also derived from the fact that military planners had expected Dutch resistance in Java to last for several months, rather than several days.

At least to the extent that they identified the fate of Indonesian colonial officialdom with that of themselves and their nation, Indonesians were heartened by these developments. This was most pronounced among the elite. More heartening still—in this case particularly to the nation-building new *priyayi* subelite—was the favoring of the Indonesian language, perhaps the most important of symbolic changes introduced by the Japanese. While no Java-wide order to the effect appears to have been issued, use of the Dutch and English languages was strongly discouraged, with both Japanese and "Malay" assuming the place of "official" languages.³⁶ All the old *volks-* and *desa-* (village) schools were officially rechristened *Sekolah Pertama* ("First School"), while all former *vervolgsscholen* ("continuing [elementary-level] schools") were renamed *Sekolah Rakyat* ("People's School"). Whereas the Dutch had allowed only regional languages in these schools, the new regime specified the use of "only the Malay language and/or regional languages."³⁷ And even while Japanese administrators, like the Dutch before them, usually referred to the "Malay" rather than the "Indonesian" language, newspaper articles freely used the latter term. On the emperor's birthday of April 29, General Imamura further proclaimed that "the names of lands and cities throughout the island of Java that remind us of the period of the late Dutch regime are to be exchanged with names that accord with the wishes of the people." Singapore, with its suspect majority ethnic Chinese population, was just now being forced to accept a new Japanese name—*Shōnantō*—but Java would be different. Batavia was to become Jakarta as the nationalists desired, although, revealingly, the change would not take effect until after another seven months of hemming and hawing within the Japanese command.³⁸

In an equally significant development—at least to the small elite who witnessed it—Java's radio listeners were soon being treated to vast quantities of music from across Java and even other parts of the archipelago. In a diary entry dated late July 1942, Dutch radio employee Leo Jansen complained,

You hear nothing other than the endless whine and wail of Indonesian sounds. It begins early in the morning and alternates between crying, praying in monotone *gamelan*, *kerontjong*-imitations of jazz or Sundanese love songs, [all of] which know no end. In-between are announcements, speeches, official reports, news, everything in Malay, with voices that sound just as aggressive as ours probably used to in their ears.³⁹

While the program schedule also included some Japanese-language programming and some foreign (Japanese, mainly German Western, and even Arab) music, the preponderance of local music suggested a profoundly new state of affairs, and indeed must have gone a long way towards reinforcing the existence of a thing called Indonesia in many imaginations. Even as Java was cut off from the rest of the Indies, and even as Japanese officials were now referring much more often to Java than to Indonesia, this variety of cultural radio programming strongly suggested an imagined Indonesia extending all the way from the Sumatran societies of Aceh and Minangkabau in the west at least as far as Dili in East Timor in the east, just as its nationalist sponsors envisioned. Here at least were some undeniably revolutionary developments, encouraged by the Japanese as the Dutch never had. Lying behind this turn of events was the fact that the propaganda squad—in sole charge of radio operations through late 1942—had chosen, out of the usual mix of practical and idealistic considerations, to employ over one hundred Indonesians in central and regional positions.⁴⁰

To expand the listening audience, from midsummer onwards, the propaganda squad constructed boxes containing radios with loudspeakers mounted atop poles in forty selected locations around Batavia, as well as in other major Javanese cities, for people “without access to radios.” As a result, members of Java’s urban working class were also able to “tune in.”⁴¹ A mid-July *Unabara* report described the following scene surrounding the first appearance of this “singing tree” in Semarang:

Since the loudspeaker was not visible, there was a great surprise that “the tree sings songs.” As rumor traveled, more and more people gathered, and now it has become one of the well-known sights (*meisho*) of Semarang ... The crowds look up to the Southern Cross and listen to the broadcasts in rapture (*kiki horeteiru*). The other day, an old woman kneeled upon the grass lawn and was worshipping the signing tree. She seemed to believe it was a tree of the gods. The soldier in charge of the loudspeaker said with a slightly anxious look, “maybe the medicine is working too well.”

While this Japanese-authored description might be taken with some skepticism, in mid-August, 1942, *Parindra* member and newspaper editor Winarno did not hesitate to describe these radio towers as another proof of Japanese largesse where Indonesians were concerned. Indeed, Winarno wrote, “us” nationalists had in fact been asking the Dutch for just this sort of public radio installation “for a long time,” with no effect. Now the Japanese had done it “without us even asking.” Indonesia’s “masses” (*rakjat*), he wrote, could now enjoy listening to radio, hitherto an exclusive luxury reserved for the well-to-do. And what was more, doing so no longer obliged them to “make the fat cats at Philips and Erres in Holland rich.”⁴²

Of great symbolic value, too, was the new regime's attempt to present itself as one with Java's majority religion, Islam. Muslims in Batavia were treated to Japanese public pledges that

what Japan aims for and means for is no different from that aspired to by the great Prophet Muhammad. Like Muhammad, who pronounced that all Muslims were brothers and advocated world peace, so Dai Nippon believes and advocates the same.⁴³

The author of these words, Muhammad Said Wakkaas, was one of several Japanese Muslims who arrived with the 16th Army to encourage Muslim participation in the war effort, and who, in their mere presence, seemed to many observers to embody a brotherly contrast with the aloof Dutch.

Several other varieties of Japanese policy and practice in the wake of the surrender, however, provoked a near-universal negative response. One of these was the temporary retention of certain Dutch officials, another decision prompted partly by ideology—Commander Imamura's "moderate" inclinations⁴⁴—but dictated mostly by practicality. Dutch males were generally rounded up and placed in newly established prison camps, but Imamura decreed that those in positions useful to the military regime be allowed to remain in public life for the time being, so long as they took an oath of obedience to Japan. Indonesians were extremely impatient with these measures.⁴⁵ The views of many among the 16th Army's junior staff officers as well as observers from Tokyo coincided with those of Indonesians, and their complaints to Tokyo of Imamura's "lenience" put the commander under close scrutiny.⁴⁶ For the duration of his tenure, however, Imamura held firm, to the dismay both of these officers and the many Indonesians awaiting their turn.

More unpopular still was the appearance of a mix of general Japanese soldierly ignorance, self-absorption, and brutality in daily life on Java's streets. Pedestrians encountering Japanese soldiers or passing before sentry posts at Japanese offices and residences were expected to show respect by bowing and removing their headgear. Those riding bicycles were expected to dismount and do the same. Offenders were summarily scolded, slapped, or kicked. Very often there was no prior warning or explanation. Indonesia's ethnic Chinese later referred to the Japanese occupation period as "the period of people struck by moving hands."⁴⁷

While bowing and showing deference to higher-ups was not a foreign notion to the local population—indeed, the Dutch had made much of these rules of respect-paying (*hormat*)⁴⁸—the severity, suddenness, and unpredictability of this verbal and physical abuse came as a shock that could leave scars long after the physical wounds had healed. Japanese cultural ignorance only made matters worse. The notion of the head as sacred and not to be touched, for example, was virtually universal among Indonesians, yet it was the head that angry Japanese often struck first. Japanese sentries frequently took offense at the failure of "natives" to remove their headgear when passing, unaware that for Muslims, it was precisely the *wearing* of headgear such as a *pitji* or a turban that was considered a sign of respect towards others.⁴⁹

Commenting on the problem in a mid-May newspaper editorial, *Parindra's* Winarno noted that while he understood that in Japan it was “normal, even a sign of closeness” to touch another’s head, Indonesians found having their heads touched or rubbed offensive, even if there were no bad intentions behind it. Let alone being struck in the head. “The emotional pain (*sakit hati*) that arises as a result certainly lasts a very long time, and is difficult to treat.” The fear instilled through such experiences, he warned, was having a paralyzing effect: “Among Indonesians, it seems that when people are going to do something nowadays, they are already extremely careful, in fact so careful, that they sometimes no longer dare to do anything at all.”⁵⁰

Still more directly discouraging to the nationalist elite in particular was the early appearance of a tendency for the *kenpeitai* to catch them in its widening net of order maintenance. Above all when the focus of local campaigns to restore order waged by native officials, police, and *kenpeitai* began to shift from the looting masses to potential competing elite contenders for power such as nationalist and Muslim leaders. The problem was particularly endemic in parts of East and Central Java, far from the relatively better-informed Japanese circles at the center.

Japanese military staff and *kenpeitai* had little or no knowledge of local conditions. Worse, many of them had been recently transferred from the hostile, unpredictable environment of occupied China, and retained from that experience a heightened level of suspicion and ruthlessness. Satō Genji, a young *kenpeitai* officer who came to Surabaya in April 1942 after serving six months in Manchuria, later pointed out that his training had not even been oriented towards China or Manchuria, let alone Indonesia. He had studied Russian, the language of the expected enemy, “but then the war started in a completely different place: the Pacific, and the South Pacific.” Shortly after his arrival in Surabaya, Satō received information of a communist plot. Thousands of Indonesian suspects were arrested, only to find that it “had been a big mistake,” and that the confessions obtained from some of the suspects were the product of *kenpeitai* beatings.⁵¹

To make matters worse, it quickly became apparent that even more sympathetic or knowledgeable Japanese could do little to blunt the reach of the *kenpeitai*. The notorious power of the *kenpeitai* within the Japanese military establishment was reflected in the right to punish a non-*kenpeitai* officer up to *three ranks higher* for any alleged breach of the military code, something to give even top army officers reason for pause.⁵² Ironically, the *kenpeitai* were also forced to rely heavily upon the records and native operatives of the former Dutch colonial intelligence service, the Political Intelligence Service (*Politieke Inlichtingendienst* or PID). This added to the *kenpeitai* tendency to see the nationalists and other political outsiders in the Dutch colonial system—such as Islamic leaders—in a dangerous light. The *kenpeitai* mistaking of a contingent of in-house security guards for a guerilla movement, for example, led to the early, shocking arrest of prominent Islamic leader Kiyai Hasjim Asjari of the conservative *Nahdatul Ulama* organization—hardly an anti-Japanese radical—along with his students at the Tebu Ireng Koranic boarding school (*pesantren*) in Jombang, East Java. Only after they had spent more than half a year in a Surabaya prison was the “mistake” finally cleared up.⁵³

In Java's eastern provinces, even members of *Parindra*—who considered themselves Japan's most loyal supporters, and its chosen representatives—soon found that they were not immune to arbitrary Japanese suspicion. On April 6, 1942, the managers and several members of the party branches in the cities of Malang and Lawang, along with the leadership of a *Parindra*-sponsored peace-keeping committee in Bangil, East Java, were arrested by the *kenpeitai* on the vague accusation of having been involved in the freeing of members of the Dutch colonial militia (*Koningklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger* or KNIL). Suggestive of the formation of an anti-Japanese guerilla movement, it was the sort of accusation tailor-made to incite a swift *kenpeitai* response. *Parindra* commentators later blamed jealous Dutch officials, still present at this time, for the purportedly trumped-up charge.⁵⁴

A day after these arrests, the Japanese officer with whom *Parindra* had been working, S. Watanabe, stormed into *Parindra*'s Surabaya office and accused *Parindra* of being "communist-oriented." A person identified as a *Parindra* member had been arrested for circulating a pamphlet containing "provocations against the Japanese government" which included an assertion that "only Soviet Russia could free the people from the shackles of Western imperialism." Watanabe gave *Parindra*'s leadership until 4:00 p.m. the same day to refute the accusation, or face arrest. In response, *Parindra*'s quick-thinking Roeslan deflected Japanese suspicions upon an (unnamed) political enemy in Malang who, in the days before the invasion, had attacked *Parindra* for being "fascist" and "pro-Japanese" in the pages of its newspaper, the daily *Express*. Still, *Parindra*'s early efforts to have its Malang, Lawang, and Bangil colleagues freed proved fruitless. Neither Watanabe nor the 48th Division's internal affairs director Moriya could influence the *kenpeitai*, particularly the *kenpeitai* within another military jurisdiction.⁵⁵ Their release did not come for more than four months.⁵⁶

A similar fate befell Sarli and his Indonesian People's Corps (BRI) in Central Java. Again, the problem stemmed as much from competition among local groups, and the attempts of these groups to manipulate Japanese suspicions and ignorance, as it did from Japanese suspicions and ignorance. Billing themselves as representative of both Indonesian and Japanese interests, the BRI had succeeded in placing four of its members in the office of the local Japanese commander. Included in the reports these nationalists submitted to the Japanese authorities were many accusations of continued anti-Japanese and pro-Dutch practices among their local competitors for influence, native officials and the ethnic Chinese. These reports were commonly passed along to the *kenpeitai*. The groups fingered therein, meanwhile, launched their own public relations campaigns, frequently portraying the nationalists as dangerous anti-Japanese radicals.⁵⁷ In a June 1942 memo, a nationalist observer in Cianjur, West Java, wryly commented that native officials were

very good at redefining their credentials in such a way as to appear very pro-Nippon, while on the surface of it, the members of the nationalist movement (*pergerakan*) and the fifth column who were already assisting the Japanese even before the capitulation now appear as anti-Nippon. [The nationalists] are losing their influence and in truth the situation is indeed unchanged from before the war and since the war up to now.⁵⁸

The smear campaigns to which the author referred were reminiscent of muckraking reports on nationalist activities submitted in earlier times to the Dutch authorities by officials and their allies with the police and the PID. The irony of the situation was lost on the ignorant *kenpeitai*, however, who responded as best they knew—swiftly and brutally.

On April 26, 1942, the Japanese military arrested Sarli and his BRI colleagues. A subsequent nationalist report blamed not the Japanese but the “CBO” (*Chinese Burger Organisatie*, Chinese Citizen’s Organization) for the arrests, describing the CBO as “anti-Japanese and anti-Indonesian.” The Chinese had incited the Japanese arrests, it said, with the “aim of blocking the Indonesian race,” and out of rancor over the BRI’s reporting to the Japanese alleged Chinese concealing of weapons.⁵⁹

Sarli recalled being imprisoned in the “residence of the Japanese commander,” but the description of his experience there smacks strongly of the *kenpeitai*. Sarli had been imprisoned before under the Dutch, but the conditions were now different.

If the Dutch held you, you weren’t tortured ... They didn’t do anything. But in the Japanese time, they made you stand in your room a whole day and a whole night. If you couldn’t do this anymore, then they’d scratch you with a pencil until you confessed, it hurt like hell ... I wasn’t told what I had done wrong ... If they’d ask you something, you’d start to talk, and then they’d hit you, smack! That’s the way the Japanese were. I didn’t understand their language ... and they didn’t understand what I said ... It was worse for [BRI chief Dr.] Soejoedi ... even though he was already 45 or 50 years old ... they cut his neck with a samurai sword.

After several months, appeals from nationalist colleagues to Subardjo in Batavia finally had an effect. Sarli and his colleagues were released in September or October of 1942. In February of the following year, however, Sarli and many local nationalist colleagues were again arrested and jailed as part of a *kenpeitai* sweep of suspected anti-Japanese activists.⁶⁰ The local pattern of mudslinging among native officials, Indonesian nationalists, and ethnic Chinese—each portraying the other and their activities as anti-Japanese—became a feature of the wartime landscape, as did the often arbitrary and merciless Japanese response.⁶¹ To those on the wrong end of these exchanges, Asian brotherhood seemed a long way off indeed.

The behavior of the *kenpeitai* revealed the inconsistency and ad-hoc nature of Japanese policy and practice on the ground. Part of this had to do with poor planning and intelligence, and part of it with the fragmented nature of the Japanese command structure. But in a deeper sense, Japanese inconsistent treatment of both native officials and ethnic Chinese was also prefigured by the contradiction between the ideology of the Greater East Asia War as one of liberation from past forms of colonial oppression, and the practical necessity of working *with* and *through* these very same groups in order to achieve Japan’s strategic priorities.

On the personal level, there was no shortage of Japanese anti-Chinese sentiments of their own, fostered via upbringing and education, propaganda, and experiences of the China War. From the start of the occupation, Java’s ethnic Chinese were frequently called to task for the threefold historical crimes of supporting Japan’s enemies on the

mainland, close alliance with the Dutch, and greedy capitalist oppression of the natives. In a May 1942 newspaper travelogue, former proletarian literature writer Takeda Rintarō observed that even Java's smallest-scale *kakyō* (overseas Chinese) retailers had their own Indonesian servants who did all the heavy, dirty labor while the *kakyō* took it easy. An accompanying cartoon by Yokoyama Ryūichi depicted the Chinese owner of a portable food stand relaxing alongside his busy Indonesian assistant. "It would be insensitive," Takeda wrote, "to even ask how much he is paid."⁶² The more venomous observations of Sergeant-Major Yatayama of the Batavia Overseas Broadcasting Service reflected views common among Japanese soldiery. Complaining that a Chinese market vendor charged him double the official price for a pack of cigarettes, Yatayama declared he would "like to kill all Chinese, because they are lazy bloodsuckers."⁶³ Publicly, too, Japanese spokesmen such as Shimizu Nobuo often depicted the *kakyō* as personifying all that was wrong with the modern Western-infected (capitalist, greedy, selfish, decadent) Asia on the one hand, and with the old (passive, obsequious, lazy, feudal) Asia on the other.⁶⁴

Yet just as in calmer moments the Japanese knew that brutal repression represented no real solution to the China Problem on the mainland, those who knew anything about the Indies also knew that Chinese capital and social networks remained essential to the smooth running of the economy, and the maximization of output for the war effort. In a debate with Count Kodama Yukio, one of three political advisors dispatched from Tokyo in mid-April who urged a more repressive policy towards the Dutch and Chinese, General Imamura replied with pure pragmatics.

The *kakyō* on this island might have participated mightily in boycotts of Japanese goods, but Java's industry has been operated entirely by the Dutch and the *kakyō*. If we suppress them in a vengeful fashion, if we lock them up the way we have in other battle theaters, beginning with oil, no resources will be developed, and it will become impossible to exploit the war supplies produced here for the entire Japanese military.⁶⁵

General Affairs Division chief Colonel Nakayama too revealed at least a minimal capacity to see Java's Chinese community with different eyes, noting in a mid-1941 essay that Java's *kakyō* did not support the enemy Chiang regime as intensively as those in other parts of Southeast Asia.⁶⁶ At the same time, Japanese doubts as to the possibility of real "character change" where the "Chinese race" were concerned were never far from view, nor was the big stick that Japan wielded behind its rhetoric of mutual harmony.

Japan has unfortunately been in a state of war with China for a number of years, and continues to fight against the administration of one part of China. Our battle is not with the people of China—this is clear enough from the new Chinese Republic being built under Wang Ching Wei. It cannot be hidden that in the past many *kakyō* in Java supported Chiang Kai-shek. This is very unfortunate. Still, we can let that pass as something that happened under the old anti-Japanese Dutch regime ... Now a great action is occurring in Asia, and we find ourselves at a crucial moment, a moment where we must decide whether will we build Asia for

the Asians or continue to live in the fetters of the Anglo-Saxons. What will the one million *kakyō* of Java choose? For those who sincerely cooperate with the Japanese forces, it goes without saying that we will guarantee your lives and livelihoods.

Japan was ready to forgive past sins, and to work with those *kakyō* truly dedicated to Asia's cause. But, continued Nakayama in this March 19, 1942 speech, those who showed less than full, whole-hearted cooperation could expect little mercy, neither from the Japanese nor from the local Indonesian population, whose resentments had been all too clearly revealed in the looting.

For those who are outwardly obedient, but inwardly entertain other aims—a typical strategy of the Chinese race—Japan will not hesitate to crush you. Remember that Java is a small island. The issue here is sincerity. This will not be revealed in superficial words or writings, but in deeds of earnest cooperation ... On the occasion of the Dutch surrender, a certain portion of the native race (*dominzoku*) went on a looting spree with the Chinese as a target. This is truly regrettable and we sympathize with those who suffered as a result. As you know, our forces have suppressed these offenders with the severe punishment of death by firing squad. However, you must reflect calmly on the reasons why the native race carried out these acts of violence mainly against the *kakyō* ... In order to achieve true harmony between all races, there must first be heartfelt understanding. This can only be achieved through mutual sacrifice. Up to now the *kakyō* have not considered the sacrifice of the natives, but we urge you to reflect that something that happened once can happen a second and a third time.⁶⁷

Nakayama thus attributed past tensions both between Chinese and Japanese, and between Chinese and natives, to the Chinese failure to acknowledge, and live up to, their true identity as Asians. As with most Greater East Asianist constructions, the issue was defined in moral and cultural rather than in political or economic terms. The implication was that the achievement of this internal revolution of Asianization and brotherly mutual understanding would render revolutionary external changes—along political, social, or economic lines—unnecessary.

Asianist ideologue Shimizu Nobuo offered a similar argument in a mid-May newspaper editorial. Under the title “Natives, Be Thee Imperial Subjects,” the editorial was written in Japanese, but ostensibly addressed to local inhabitants. “You natives,” he wrote, should know that you have Japanese blood sleeping in your veins—or at least this was the case, he added, with “the good ones among you.” Shimizu here emphasized that his “you” referred to both natives and *kakyō*. This blood, he continued, “seeks its original home (*furusato*),” and “it is the duty of all good natives” to awaken to this and become “people of *sumera* (*sumera mitami*).”⁶⁸ Doing so would mean participating in the building of a “paradise for Asians” and of a “new Asian culture” that would “overcome modern Anglo-American culture and its contradictions,” free from of all forms of exploitation.⁶⁹

Pushed and pulled between Greater Asian idealism, racism, and military-colonial *realpolitik*—but inevitably dominated by the latter—Japanese measures

taken to deal with the Chinese problem remained piecemeal, more symbolic than systematic, an awkward combination of hard and soft. At the command level, Imamura's views prevailed, and systematic repression of the sort undertaken in Singapore was eschewed in favor of more gentle forms of public urging and coercion. At the same time, *kenpeitai* crackdowns on selected ethnic Chinese individuals or groups began to occur in periodic cycles, with the first wave coming several days before the emperor's birthday celebrations of April 29, 1942. Some were isolated and based on specific local circumstances and accusations (such as those in the Sarli case above), others directed from the center. Reasons given for these crackdowns usually fell into two categories: alleged "pro-Chungking," "pro-Allied" or "anti-Japanese" posturing or deeds, and/or acts of "economic treason" in the form of hoarding, speculation, and blackmarketeering.⁷⁰ Within weeks of the Dutch surrender, all Chinese and others not of Malay ethnic origin were also ordered to appear for registration as aliens. Here they were required to swear an oath of loyalty to Japan and to pay an expensive registration fee.⁷¹ Chinese protests of being charged double—having earlier been subject to similar fees and registration by the Dutch authorities—were ignored. This symbolic gesture at once represented continuity with the racial division of the past and at the same time, in the new context, hinted at a reversed racial reordering more favorable to Indonesians. Seemingly confirming this symbolism, a group of some eighty Indonesian students were employed to process the alien registrants.⁷²

To combat the economic opportunism associated with Chinese merchants, prices of all goods and services were declared fixed at their prewar level (those of January 1, 1942), and strict rules against hoarding were issued in early March 1942.⁷³ Indonesian economic initiatives—for many a newfound necessity in the wake of layoffs and closures—were encouraged, at least in principle. In early April, for example, Indonesian entrepreneurs who had organized their own food shop (*warung*, old spelling *waroeng*) cooperatives into an organization known as the "Indonesian-race Waroeng Alliance" (*Perserikatan Waroeng Bangsa Indonesia*, or *Perwabi*) to compete in a realm previously monopolized by Chinese merchants, were granted access to various products for public sale.⁷⁴ The "historic" opening of a new *Perwabi* office in Batavia on June 6, attended by Military Administration Department advisors Soedjono and Mohammad Hatta, along with the Three-A movement's Hitoshi Shimizu and Samsuodin, was accompanied by an enthusiastic speech from a Japanese official in the Batavia city government named Mr. Kotani.⁷⁵

Perwabi is the right of the race and is like an heirloom that should be treasured. When Japan arrived here, the shortcomings of the Indonesian race in the economic field were very visible—it could be said to be altogether dead. But this is not because of the passivity (*lembekan*) of the Indonesian people. This race is on just as high [a level] as the other races of Asia. Only, for 300 years they have been lulled and put soundly to sleep. If we look briefly, we can see how great the economic power of Indonesia was during the *Sriwidjaja* and *Modjopahit* eras. Now released from their shackles, utilizing their economic power, the Indonesians are free to head toward the Island of Prosperity.⁷⁶

Amidst rumors that the Japanese authorities were to grant it distribution rights to salt and petroleum, *Perwabi's* membership had by this time swelled from an initial 400 to approximately 1,600.⁷⁷

The realm of the economy, however, was also another in which positive symbolism and haphazard state intervention represented little in the way of concrete improvement. In the immediate aftermath of the *perampokan*, some of Java's have-nots did indeed find themselves living the high life. A commentator in Batavia in early April 1942 observed that

When looters do their job, people there use the word "*nggedor*" [break in], because the recent looters have usually gotten in to steal things from stores by breaking in the door. Now a person all dressed-up or who smokes a cigar no longer has any value, because it is said those are *gedor*-brand clothes or *gedor*-brand cigars.⁷⁸

But the flooding of the market with stolen goods was a short-lived phenomenon, and the instant prosperity merely a phantom. Behind it lay an economy in disarray. With the economic infrastructure disrupted by the fighting, the *perampokan*, and the change of power, severe shortages of rice and other staple goods plagued Java's economy. What was worse, this scarcity—along with uncertainty and fear among Java's mainly Chinese retailers and distributors, fear hardly reduced by the carrot-and-stick approach of Japanese spokesmen—encouraged black marketing, hoarding, speculation, and price inflation.⁷⁹ Since the outbreak of the war in December, access to Java's foreign markets in Europe and the USA had been cut off, with the result that consumer goods and critical raw materials such as cotton had stopped flowing in, and the many products of Java's export-oriented economy had stopped flowing out. Joblessness, already a major problem in the depression years of the 1930s and early 1940s, only worsened. A Japanese newspaper report in July 1942, acknowledged that the shutdown of Java's export enterprises alone, for example, had meant unemployment for "one million several hundred thousand" workers.⁸⁰ Many of Java's new rural unemployed turned up in cities, only to find more of the same. "In normal times," noted an Indonesian radio spokesman in early April 1942, prosperity had come from cities and factories, from companies making such export products as rubber, tea, coffee, and sugar. But now that these had shut down, Indonesian youth in the cities were "out of work and out of money."⁸¹ For those already on the economic fringes, speedy solutions were needed—speedy solutions the Japanese did not have. In late April, an Indonesian radio spokesman could only offer the following slogans for the masses. For the unemployed in the cities: "Go back to your village!"; for the unemployed in the countryside: "Don't go to the city!"⁸² A week later, in a concrete measure to reduce the numbers of unemployed in Batavia, desperate city officials offered free one-way train tickets to all those willing to return to their rural villages.⁸³

Within several weeks after the fighting, the worst of the food shortages in the urban areas were reported to be over. Reports from the provinces also painted an improving picture. But the black market continued to thrive, its operators taking advantage of the gross discrepancy between Japanese-decreed prewar price levels and the real relation of supply and demand. A quintal of rice bought for 14 guilders in the Batavia suburb

of Tjikampek in late April 1942, for example, sold for 25 guilders in Batavia. Although *kenpeitai* efforts to arrest suspected black marketeers received wide press coverage, the economic forces driving them were inexorable, and the black market continued to expand, with the established economy declining in equal proportion.⁸⁴ The Japanese-sponsored introduction of a rationing system for household essentials, in which Indonesian- and Chinese-run *warung* served as distribution points, went some way to ameliorating these dislocations, but proved hardly immune to these same economic forces.⁸⁵

In material terms, the outlook for the Indonesian elite was little more encouraging. School and office closures, along with the shutting of banks and other financial institutions meant that many among the Indonesian economic and social elite also found themselves going without. For those lucky enough to remain employed, a decree dated April 1 ordered wage cuts for all office workers making more than 100 guilders per month ranging between 5 percent and 30 percent or more.⁸⁶ For students, some thirteen thousand public elementary schools reopened on the emperor's birthday of April 29, but private institutions and those above the elementary level took longer to open, and did so on a piecemeal basis.⁸⁷ Those on government pensions particularly felt the pinch, as did students whose room, board, and tuition had been paid by relatives from afar. The outlook for students like Johar Nur, whose family lived outside of Java, was particularly bleak, given that Java, under a separate administration, was for all intents and purposes cut off from the other islands of the archipelago for the duration of the war.

In a book of recollections written in 1944, *bunkajin* Abe Tomoji cited the following words attributed to the eighteenth-century Javanese prince "Kertasura": "On both shoulders, we bear a heavy load—on the right shoulder, the Dutch, [and] on the left shoulder, the Chinese' ... Until yesterday," added Abe, "all Java's cities and towns reflected the truth of this depiction."⁸⁸ If the early changes introduced by the Japanese were of significant symbolic value, however, the combination of Japanese moral pronouncements, decrees, and occasional arbitrary acts of suppression only partly soothed the frustrations of the many Indonesians who had optimistically interpreted co-prosperity to mean the immediate transfer of former Dutch and Chinese prosperity and power into their own hands. Add to this the crackdowns on the *perampokan*, the quick return of the old local ruling apparata, and unexpected public beatings, and some began to long for a return to the normal times (*djaman normal*) of prewar Dutch rule. The speedy banning of public discussion of Indonesia's future political status, not to mention of the anthem and flag—at least "for the time being"—were all grounds for potential concern, particularly for the small, educated and politically-minded Indonesian elite most concerned with such matters. Nothing seemed settled or sure—except the Japanese concern with enforcing "public order."

The situation placed not only the nationalists who had welcomed the Japanese, but also the Japanese Greater Asianists of the propaganda squad and elsewhere in an awkward position. Particularly the reversal on the independence issue. After the war, members of the Indonesian elite almost always remembered this proclamation, little more than a week after the Dutch surrender, as the moment that the balloon burst, that the Japanese revealed themselves in their true imperialist colors. From here

on out, they recalled, Indonesians and Japanese parted ways, pursuing cooperation on the surface, but for entirely opposing ends: On one side, the progressive ends of Indonesian nationalism; on the other, the cynical *Realpolitik* of Japanese imperialism. For his part, Colonel Machida and a number of his propaganda unit underlings, who strongly maintained that they were always committed to the cause of Indonesian independence, remembered these days as a time of betrayal by a *kenpeitai* that made no distinctions between enemy China and friendly Java, and a military—and above all a Tokyo High Command—that continued to equivocate where independence was concerned, sabotaging a Japanese-Indonesian relationship that had begun with such promise.⁸⁹ Yet, looking forward from 1942 into a still uncertain future—and dazzled by the light of Japan's stunning victory and the unprecedented collapse of the Western order—Japanese Greater Asianists and new *priyayi* nation-builders alike in fact proved distinctly capable of gazing beyond the shadows cast by the lowering of the flags, and the deployment of the *kenpeitai*, towards the opening of a great window of Asian opportunity.

Unabara: Riding Asia's tide

The new line offered by Tomizawa Uio to Indonesian journalists in mid-March 1942 revealed to educated Indonesians for the first time an updated image of Greater East Asia sanitized of “selfish,” “petty” national aspirations. These aspirations were now deemed merely a dependent, resistant action relevant only to an historical stage now past, that of Western imperialism. It was now time for Asians to leave their differences and boundaries behind, to band together as one united race under Japan's leadership. The storyline was not entirely new to Tomizawa and other Japanese spokesmen, having been mobilized in a simple form against Chinese nationalism as well.⁹⁰ The military triumph over the Western colonialists and the Indonesian reception of the Japanese, however, provided an intoxicating sense of self-assurance, and a great new impetus towards its elaboration.

In the warmth of this new Indonesian context, Japan's spokesmen shared a profound sense of relief, confidence, optimism, and unity. The experience of Indonesia seemed to erase the contradictions of modern Japanese imperial identity so acutely revealed in the ongoing confrontation with China, enabling, in hindsight, a confident reappraisal of its implications. In July 1942, recalling the painful anecdote of a pacification unit (*senbuan*) that had once found itself at a loss for words when confronted with the proposition that “China is the older brother,” Shimizu Nobuo, editor of the propaganda squad's *Unabara* newspaper, was only too eager to provide them with a retrospective answer.

How wonderful if they had been able to reply immediately.

It is a problem of history—when you are properly aware of Japan's history, the answer is extremely simple.

Japan has always been leader of the Asia-Pacific sphere from ancient times—if you know this history, that is enough.

Japan has always been constructing China—if you know this history, that is enough.

We are now seeing this truth with our own eyes in the Greater East Asia War.

We must be aware that this truth before our eyes has been continuously repeated in China since ancient times.

What is true in China is, again, true in the southern regions. Japanese people, take great pride!⁹¹

Among the membership of the propaganda squad, such fantasies were broadly shared. Shared, too, was a tendency to anchor these in references to “shared” ancient history and esoteric, ancient imperial vocabulary. Yet such shared qualities, and the fact that all were compelled to hew the official line, also masked continued, significant differences in interpretations of Greater East Asia, not only between Japan’s Greater Asian missionaries and more conventional imperialists but among the Asianists themselves.

These differences produced differences in narrative emphasis. While reference to a shared pre-Western heritage was universal, those to Greater Asia’s right such as Shimizu Nobuo were more inclined to center their gaze backwards, deep into an imagined hoary past. While (Western) capitalism and imperialism were common targets, those to the right more often trained their sites on (anti-colonial) nationalism as well. While all harped upon racial, cultural, and historical commonalities as a means of naturalizing Japanese-Indonesian ties, those to the right were quicker to see these in an overtly hierarchical, Japan-centered framework, thus to emphasize not only a shared Asianness but also—as typified in another passage from Shimizu Nobuo—the *Japaneseness* of Indonesians, and Japan as Asia’s eternal political and cultural center.

After landing on Java, what everyone has noticed is that among the native race here, there are a number who look just like Japanese. You’ve encountered them many times. No matter how much you look at them, theirs could not be anything other than a Japanese face. This is only natural, however. In ancient times, this place was within the sphere of governance of *sumera mikuni*, a region of great culture with Japan at its center.⁹²

These differences were real and significant, with correspondingly varied ramifications for the Japanese-Indonesian encounter. Postwar claims of discomfort at the Japanese about-face on the national question and imperial self-centeredness from those closer to Greater Asia’s more liberal, pragmatic political center such as propaganda squad Commander Lt. Col. Machida, Shimizu Hitoshi, and 16th Army Commander Imamura Hitoshi, along with a minority further to the left who even dared to express these concerns in wartime,⁹³ were more than just window dressing. Yet to the extent that all Japanese Asianists subscribed *both* to the illegitimacy of conventional (“Western”) imperialism and to an imperial worldview of their own, all faced a common dilemma: how to define Japan’s difference, its means to imperial transcendence? Advertising revolutionary change yet lacking in concrete, revolutionary structural alternatives to Western imperial modernity, Japan’s spokesmen for Asia shared a compulsion to define this transcendence in terms of blood, morality, history,

and destiny—of race and culture. Centuries of global Orientalist discourse, decades of exclusivist Japanese national rhetoric, and the unique achievements of Japan's modern development—confirmed in the miracle of Japan's sweeping military victories over the Western Other—offered a wealth of ammunition for such constructions of difference.

On April 3, 1942, in keeping with its Greater East Asianist concerns, the propaganda squad changed the name of its Japanese-language newspaper from the neutral-sounding *Sekidōhō* ("Equatorial Post") to *Unabara*, an ancient Japanese term meaning "Great Ocean."⁹⁴ Reflecting his approval of the change, General Imamura was personally invited to pen the *kana* making up the paper's title. In its first edition, Shimizu Nobuo, the new paper's editor, explained the rationale for the change. He wrote of an ancient, self-sufficient civilization of peaceful, prosperous, sun-worshipping Asian lands extending from the Middle East to Central and South America, with Japan at its center. He contended that the ancients had referred to Japan as Asia's *nakatsukuni* or "middle kingdom" (thus implying that this appellation had later been usurped by China). Many of these lands, he added, had "become Buddhist" by following the world-historical example of Japanese prince Shōtoku Taishi (574–622). Now the *sumera miikusa* (an ancient term for the emperor's army) had returned to spread the "concrete expression of *hakkō ichiu*" across the *Unabara* to all the corners of Asia.⁹⁵

Shimizu Nobuo's brand of Greater East Asianism, with its constant references to the archaic past, its Japan-centrism, and its employment of obscure imperial terminology, fits with the standard image of official Japanese wartime rhetoric. The idea of Asian liberation, if it appeared at all, seemed secondary to Shimizu's ultimate concern, the legitimation of Japan's new imperium. Even the direction of Buddhism's ancient historical flow was open to inversion if it served Shimizu's rhetorical purposes.

In Shimizu's writing, ancient terms such as *hakkō ichiu*, *unabara*, and *sumera miikusa* took center stage. But he was hardly alone in using them. When modern words failed to sufficiently describe essential qualities of Japaneseness, or to impart a fully Japanese quality to Japan's expansion—as they often did—this sort of terminology filled the gaps, serving as a textual embodiment of Japanese tradition, of history itself. Behind its archaic form lay nothing in particular. Yet the very impenetrability of this terminology, along with its sacred association with the imperial house, functioned as a powerful label of legitimacy, at least to a Japanese audience. At the same time, its lack of content made it convenient to almost any interpretation of Japan's new order.

Commander of the propaganda squad Machida Keiji was taken with Shimizu's historical arguments and regularly deployed *sumera*-rhetoric in his occupation-period writings. "The world-historic development that Japan is carrying out on the continent and in the southern regions (*nampō*)," he wrote in an introductory essay in *Unabara*, "is not the first time Japan has done so, but is a revival of the building of a shining culture in the self-sufficient sphere of the emperor of Sumera in ancient times."⁹⁶ Yet in Machida's polemics, ancient history took a back seat to radical, contemporary themes of imperial exploitation and future liberation, the war painted in the radical shades of revolution. Indeed, terms like exploitation and contradictions appeared so frequently in Machida's texts that, if one did not look too closely, one might confuse them with the propaganda of Asian anti-colonial nationalism, or even that of Japan's supposed archenemies, the communists.

“Against the ruinous contradictions of modern European culture, built upon the theft of the lands of Asia’s colored races as colonies and the exploitation of those races,” wrote Machida, “this Greater East Asian War is a war to save mankind from ruin and to build a new world order.” Having “perpetrated their cruelties in order to conquer the world,” the Anglo-Americans now “portrayed war as barbaric” and “imperialistic” in order to stop those, such as the Japanese, “who would wage a war in order to break apart the contradiction-filled status quo.” Japan had “never waged a war for personal gain,” and the materialistic characterization of this as a war between “‘have-not countries’ and ‘have-countries’” in Western parlance was also wide of the mark. Rather, this war, along with the Manchurian and China “Incidents,” was only the most recent in a long line of selfless Japanese attempts “to stop European attacks on Asia.” “There are battles that must be fought,” Machida proclaimed: “there is the battle to save humanity.” But how exactly would Japan fulfill this mission?

For the sake of the revival of the Asia-Pacific sphere with Japan at its center, Asia’s colonies are liberated, Asia’s colored races are freed from Anglo-American exploitation, and they truly achieve their place. Thus begins the revival of the Asia-Pacific sphere, and thus does *Hakkō ichiu* attain concrete expression; herein lies the holiness of our fight. Through the liberation of Asia, this European modern culture built upon the exploitation of Asia is of necessity reformed, and a new world order is built. As a paradise is built for Asians, true world peace will be achieved ... and precisely through this struggle, the China Incident can be resolved for the first time ... The development of the New World Order depends on this Greater East Asia War.

Not only was Machida convinced that the age of imperialism was past—he firmly believed in the justness of its passing. Only through the ending of imperialist exploitation and a restoration of Asia’s peoples to their place could Japan’s battle be a holy war. For the relatively liberal, practical Machida, the holiness of Japan’s war was thus not an *ipso facto* result of association with the ancient imperial house or something inherent in Japaneseness. As also vividly illustrated in “The Power of Insecticide” (Figure 5.1)—one of many eye-catching cartoons by Ono Saseo that adorned Unabara’s front page in its first weeks of publication—Japan’s cause was expressed rather in the modern, revolutionary vocabulary of the liberation of Asia from imperialist shackles.

Yet Machida’s imperialism was “European” imperialism, something Japan, as an Asian nation and an Asian race, was by definition incapable of. Alongside this circular reasoning, which he shared with Shimizu Nobuo, but which to him does not seem to have been satisfying enough in itself, Machida also offered the argument that Japan was not a have-not country in the European sense, with the implication that since Japan was already wealthy and developed, why would it pursue imperialism? Or perhaps: Japan’s society existed in a state of natural harmony, experiencing none of the internal contradictions that drove European expansionism. In the end Machida’s argument of Japanese difference, like those of other Japanese Greater East Asianists, fell back upon the quality of Japan’s moral character: Japan and the Japanese were by nature unselfish and pure. Japan was therefore incapable of imperialism.




Figure 5.1 In a cartoon by Ono Saseo entitled “The Power of Insecticide” (*satchūzai no iryoku*), “Japan” sprays Roosevelt and Churchill, depicted as engorged mosquitos. Grateful Indonesians look on and proclaim, “now that we no longer have our blood sucked by these sorts of insects, we can really sleep peacefully.” Source: *Unabara* newspaper, April 2, 1942, p. 1.

A third line of Greater Asianist attack on the global imperial status quo appeared in the writings of Col. Murakami Takaaki. On the staff of the 16th Army high command and publicly listed as head of the Army Broadcast Unit (*Gun hōdōhan*), Murakami was also in charge of 16th Army special intelligence operations at the outset of the occupation. His discourse on “the aim of the Greater East Asian War,” published in *Unabara* at this time, is of special interest not only for its originality but also because of Murakami’s combined influence in both propaganda and intelligence.⁹⁷ Murakami’s Japan-centrism and attacks on fellow countrymen who sought to join forces with resistant Asian nationalism revealed a politics firmly to Greater Asia’s right. In places his argumentation was vague, inconsistent, even absurd. Yet his creativity, and the revolutionary perspective on the Western imperial order afforded by his time and place, combined to produce an incisive and intriguing critique of the global status quo, opening another window onto the radical potentials of the ideological edifice of Japanese Greater Asia.

“In the past,” wrote Murakami,

in order to achieve world hegemony, England divided the world into small pieces that could not function self-sufficiently. Then it bequeathed to them its constitution and parliament, had them assume an independent form as a “modern state” (“*kindai kokka*”), and perpetrated the notion that this was the one and only progressive form a nation could take. Then in order to ensure that these [nations] could not stand on their own, and in order to bind these [nations] together, [England] developed and implemented the structure of finance capitalism, to the point where it achieved complete control over the whole world. This plan extended to the islands of the South Pacific.⁹⁸

In a rhetorical move with poststructural echoes, Murakami then carried his imaginative deconstruction of the practices of English imperialism beyond politics and into the realms of race and culture.

To *divide* [the people of the world] *into small races* (*kominzoku*) and have them construct “modern” small nations (“*kindaiteki*” *kokokka*): this was one of the schemes they implemented.

This intention is clear, for example, in the name “Indonesia.” The regular use of the term “Indonesia” is something that happened in the last 20 years; there are various theories regarding its linguistic roots. It is said that “nesia” comes from the Greek “nensu” meaning “many islands.” The point is, Indonesia is used as a classification of the local inhabitants together with Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia etc. In this aim, modern anthropology has necessarily been mobilized to ally itself with the movement for the acquisition of colonies.

Murakami then took aim at his real concern: resistant Asian nationalism, and the threat it posed to Japan’s rightful hegemony over Asia.

And so we reach the present, in which the movement for a popular front (*jinmin zensen*) has reached maturity. Anthropology reveals this as a rising development that will necessarily bring the independence of the races, the establishment of “modern nations”; these are then to form a “league,” “on an equal footing.” Here we have another scheme. It has even appeared in the form of a popular front that reveals an inclination to camouflage its movement for racial independence within our nation’s great ideal, the divine spirit of *hakkō ichiu*, and attempts to form a democratic-type “Greater East Asian League.”

Murakami had now moved from Indonesia to China. General Ishiwaru Kanji’s “Greater East Asian League” (*Dai tōa renmei*) concept, which Murakami here depicted as a sellout to Western imperialism, proposed allowing the Chinese nationalists relative internal autonomy in exchange for military alliance with Japan against their mutual enemy, the communists (both Chinese and Russian). In collaboration with Indonesian nationalists, the Propaganda Department’s own Greater East Asian League veteran

Shimizu Hitoshi was just now seeking to establish a local version of the league in the form of the Three-A Movement.⁹⁹ Ominously, in Murakami's thinking, this sort of compromise could not be countenanced, either with Chinese or Indonesians. Indeed, even the construct of "Indonesia" itself might have to be discarded.

Thus it is clear from the above that the term "Indonesia" refers to this Anglo-American-type division of the races, and because it evokes the so-called league-type formation, the situation is such that I feel it may be necessary in the future to conduct a careful examination into whether or not this term should be allowed to continue to exist.

In sum, modern nationalism itself, whether metropolitan or colonial, was nothing more than an elaborate scheme of Britain and its capitalism. Only larger bodies could really be "self-sufficient"—implicitly, empires, though Murakami shied from the term with reference to Japan. Ancient precedent dictated that Japan should serve as center of Asia's larger body.

In the past, this land was a part of an Asia-Pacific cultural sphere that prospered with Japan at its center ... and it is precisely these Pacific Islands that appear in Japanese myth as the "nation of *Unabara*" ... it is clear that our nation's sphere of authority extended from the continent—of course—far out to the southern sea islands.¹⁰⁰

Since then, time and Western colonialism had conspired to erase memory of this shared past, leaving only the name of East Java's "Mt. Semeru" as a reminder—an uncanny reference to the ancient imperial realm of Sumera, or so it seemed.

Along the way to Semeru mountain, Murakami had thus assembled an impressive if somewhat garbled critique of the Western world system and its ideological domination, in a manner reminiscent of Marx, Lenin, Gramsci, even in some ways anticipating the postwar poststructuralists. The English bid to control the world had been sustained through the achievement not only of military and financial hegemony but also ideological hegemony, i.e. the construction of a discourse that portrayed the ordering of the world on its terms as natural, logical, even progressive. Whereas Marx and Lenin made this sort of case with regard to free trade ideology and parliamentary democracy under capitalism and imperialism, Murakami extended this scheme to Western racial constructions and concepts of the nation-state, implicating the field of anthropology as complicit in this larger scheme. In Murakami's description of the Anglo-American pursuit of *divide et impera*, there were also echoes of the resistant Asian nationalist critique of the nefarious domestic schemes of colonial rulers that had animated calls for strength in Pan-Asian unity from Sun Yat-sen and others. But like Tomizawa, Murakami carried the anti-colonial argument one step further than the Asian nationalists—from the national to the regional level—arguing that the "small nation" itself should be abandoned as a Western-tainted construct. With the exception of the originary Japanese one, *all* Asian nationalisms were thus delegitimized.

The worldview animating Japan's wartime empire in Java was further highlighted in the elaborately scientific Asianist formulations of Bekki Atsuhiko, a civilian geographer attached to the propaganda squad. Bekki published a series of articles in *Unabara* in mid-1942, adding an air of "scientific" legitimacy to the ongoing "world-historical" mission touted in the same pages by Machida and company. He also lectured widely to both Japanese and Indonesian audiences. A graduate of the ultra-elite Kyoto Imperial University, Bekki was a specialist in Geopolitics (*chiseigaku*), a methodology developed by the German military scholar Karl Haushofer shortly after the First World War, and eagerly appropriated thereafter by the Nazi regime. Geopolitics involved analyses of the interplay of geographical factors and the expansion of political and military power, with a view to how a given area should be treated and ruled by a given power in the context of a global period of "long-term warfare."¹⁰¹ Bekki's start in this area came in the late 1930s, when the Tokyo High Command's chief of military history Col. Takashima Tatsuhiko—a committed Greater Asianist who subsequently served on General Imamura's staff—asked Bekki to produce a geopolitical work on the Netherlands East Indies. This he duly published in mid-1941. Arriving in Java shortly after the Dutch surrender, Bekki quickly seized the premises, the extensive holdings, and even some of the Dutch staff of the former Imperial Netherlands East Indies Natural Sciences Association in Batavia, changing its name to the "Center for Southern Areas Cultural Research" (*Nampō bunka kenkyūshitsu*).¹⁰²

Bekki's *Unabara* newspaper series presented an elaborately formulated Greater Asianist *longue durée* history with relation to the Indonesian archipelago, mobilizing ostensibly objective geographical, historical, and cultural data into a discourse depicting Japan and "this archipelago" (here Bekki never mentioned Indonesia) as naturally, uniquely, and inseparably intertwined in past, present, and future—a "scientific" discourse that could thus ideally both strengthen the notion of Japanese-Indonesian brotherhood, and justify a permanent Japanese role and presence here. Both Japan and "the land of *Unabara*," Bekki wrote, were relatively young volcanic islands rising from the Pacific ocean floor, both born at the same time, and both sharing a tendency for earthquakes.¹⁰³ Land formation in the Indies was thus "just like that of Japan," Bekki continued, and very different from both the "old water and rock land forms" of the Asian continent as well as those of continental Europe, which were made "only by water."¹⁰⁴ Nowhere else but in these two places did one find a "string of islands lying in between the continent and the sea, linking the two." In their natural features too, he added, both Japan and "this archipelago" shared great similarities.

Having established these scientific commonalities, Bekki moved effortlessly from the solid foundations of geography to the more slippery terrain of culture. In light of these physical resemblances in the natural environment, contended Bekki, it was not surprising that there was a "great similarity in the cultures that appeared on these islands." The fact that the two areas had ended up with "different governing systems" in recent times, he pointedly concluded, was a result of the "unnatural," disparate "pattern of rule" established in the early modern period by the Western imperialists: in this case by the Netherlands.¹⁰⁵ In a follow-up installment, Bekki attempted to reinforce this argument by producing a list of cultural signs presumably indicative of a common

Japanese and local ancestry such as words and place names in the two languages that resembled one another. He also traced the history of Japanese cultural interaction with “this archipelago” in both ancient and early modern times, a history “revealed even in Dutch museums.” Dutch culture here was like a “cover” that should be “removed,” allowing it to return to its “true, original shape.”¹⁰⁶

For Bekki, it was not only Dutch culture that needed to be removed in order to reveal Indonesia’s original, Japan-like shape. Colonel Machida also later credited Bekki for being “out ahead” in asserting that Islam, a “relatively new historical development” in Indonesia, was “not the basis of the [Indonesian] heart.” As paraphrased by Machida, Bekki maintained that this “basis” lay rather in the “traditional animism” of Indonesia’s “ancient culture,” and that “their particular way of thinking, the secrets of their spiritual makeup, and the peculiarities of their traditional village culture, all of these emanated from this.” Up until then, Machida maintained,

Dutch scholars had left a great deal of areas untouched, saying that these were areas of *Eastern mysticism* and therefore “out of our realm of comprehension.” But because Japanese were of the same ancestry and the same essence, they could—in Bekki’s words—easily understand.¹⁰⁷

In fact, Bekki’s work and premises were based largely on colonial sources, and the Japanese were indeed only the latest in the lineage of Dutch, native elite, and Indonesian nationalists, scholars, and others who had sought to coconstruct a de-Islamicized, orientalist history of the Indies, each with their own motives and inflections, but sharing an interest in containing the political power of local Islam. A Leiden-educated Indonesian expert on Islamic law working as a high-ranking advisor to the Military Administration’s Religious Affairs Department complained to a friend in October 1942 that Japanese religious policymakers “hoped to find a starting point in animism, which a clumsy Indonesian advisor had presented as the nucleus of Indonesian culture,” and “continue to [try to] pry this loose.”¹⁰⁸ Japanese Asianist enthusiasm on this score was indeed unbounded. Not surprisingly, Machida and others later acknowledged Bekki to be of great influence not only in the Propaganda Department but among the wider Japanese occupier community.¹⁰⁹

Given the appeal of these sorts of racial and cultural linkages between Japan and Indonesia to those already seeking to define a transcendent imperial Japan—and the mutually reinforcing, overdetermined amount of “evidence” for these linkages, both “common-sense” and scholarly—it is perhaps not surprising that these constructs were ubiquitous to wartime Japanese Greater Asian discourse across the political spectrum. The following text came not from the pen of a brazen imperialist like Shimizu Nobuo or Murakami Takaaki, but rather from the novelist Abe Tomoji. Abe had avoided the left-wing politics popular among fellow writers in the 1920s and early 1930s, but did not commit to the regime either, and was seen among students of modern Japanese literature after the war as a critical, liberal figure. In a private context, Abe was indeed bold enough to confide misgivings about the regime’s treatment of Dutch in Java to the Dutch diarist L.F. Jansen.¹¹⁰ Yet in his introductory contribution to *Unabara*, Abe too proclaimed,

We have arrived at a moment of the building of a new world, possessed of unlimited possibilities for development. Although my comrades are only now being struck by this great self-discovery, this mission given to our race has been clear from the beginning, from the time of the very beginning of history.¹¹¹

Abe thus contributed to the hegemony of the notion of a restorative world-historical destiny for the Japanese race. Yet in contrast to his more uniformly optimistic colleagues, Abe followed this proclamation with a startling warning: “Those who would see this racial advancement in Machiavellian terms will surely be cursed.” His distinctive concerns for the excessive potentials of Japanese power only became clearer in the body of his essay.

White civilization, Abe noted, had possessed the power to conquer Asia, “enslaving all the people” of Asia and “laying all their lands bare” at great profit to itself. Western imperialism had covered Asia like a “dark cloud ... but at the last moment,” he wrote, “the people of one imperial island at the eastern edge resisted it ... Had Japan not been there,” Asia would have remained “forever in darkness.” Yet it was more than Japan that had defeated the West. In the end, “righteousness always prevails over brute strength,” and so the West had been infected with the poison of its own history of greed and avarice. In the manner of a Christian missionary, Abe warned of the corrupting power of the material riches of the Orient. The history of imperialism revealed that, in order to fulfill their racial destiny, the Japanese must transcend the wordly temptations that had brought down their enemies.

It is clear that before us lie many obstacles. For example, we have passed the equator and here before us lies the world’s treasure chest, Indonesia. It is a land with unlimited possibilities. But if we treat it as an object of greed, this will become a poison that infests our own body. Objects must only be used as a tool for the attainment of spiritual ideals.

“Japan’s mission,” Abe wrote, “must not be one of revenge, but rather of making the world anew.” The West’s defeat had not come because of a shortage of materials, but because of a loss of spirit. But Asia’s flaw was that it had ignored the material altogether, opening it to Western domination. Japan’s answer must be to show Asia how to master the material without being mastered by it, “not to reject objects, but how to include them. We must make them aware of the power to use objects more effectively. And we must show them that the spirit that constitutes the source of this power lies dormant precisely within the traditions of Asian civilization.”

Real, lasting peace in the world, Abe concluded, could only be achieved through the rejection of immoral imperialist *Realpolitik* and the realization of a higher aim: in this lay Japan’s calling. Yet at the very close of this two-part essay—where Abe clearly recognized the need for a climax involving a more precise definition of Japan’s mission—he found himself at an unusual loss for words.

What we must do at this time is of course quite clear. In sum, our hearts must be the embodiment of the heart of the great emperor, who thinks [only] of world

peace and tranquility ... We therefore cease playing with words, and with the pride of a great nation and the reflection of a great nation, amidst the flood of all things Machiavellian, we must resolutely reveal the fruit of a righteous people.

Western power had been vanquished, Western hypocrisy exposed, and before Japan lay a seeming blank slate of “unlimited possibilities.” For a stinging critique of the West, of imperialism, of capitalism, of modernity itself, there were words aplenty, words that lit a fire in the hearts of writer and reader alike. In Japan and in the rest of Asia, this was a critique whose time had come. At the same time, Abe and his colleagues knew that each stirring word of critique of the Western imperial status quo, each exposure of its injustices, brought with it a heavy responsibility to produce something different. The solution had to be found “within the traditions of Asian civilization.” Yet if the encounter with Indonesia had immeasurably strengthened the conviction among Japan’s spokesmen that the Asian civilization they envisaged really existed, it was proving no less difficult to identify it. In their rhetoric, Asia was present only as a negative: not capitalistic, not individualistic, not exploitative, not *Western*. Even for the skilled man of letters Abe, the contradiction of Japan’s own imperial position vis-à-vis Asia could not be verbally overcome. In the end, when the possibilities of “playing with words” were exhausted, sacred texts of the ancient imperial house beckoned as a convenient rhetorical shelter. This proved just as true for the Westernized liberal novelist Abe and the liberation-oriented Colonel Machida as for the conservative ideologues Shimizu Nobuo and Murakami Takaaki.

Still, this was no time for pessimism. If Japan’s spokesman did not agree precisely upon the shape of Japan’s mission, could not provide a concrete blueprint for “postwar” Asia, and could not rhetorically overcome the fundamental parallels between Japan and the imperial powers it opposed, Japanese power nevertheless spoke for itself. Against a West in seeming military, moral, and social disarray, there was no denying the results of Japan’s modernization, the superiority of Japan’s military, and the extent of Japanese dedication to their nation and its mission. There was no denying that Japan was the only non-white nation to have achieved such a triumph against the formidable—hitherto seemingly invincible—power of the West. Furthermore, opposition to Western imperialism was not the only quality that Japan shared with its Asian neighbors, and with Indonesia in particular. If Japan’s spokesmen tended to get more than a little carried away in constructing a Japan-centered, shared Asian history and identity, Japan was nonetheless at this moment at the center of the Asian bulwark against the West, and there was no denying the existence of certain geographical, racial, and cultural commonalities that could be construed to represent a shared Asian identity and heritage. All of this was reason for optimism. “We have never experienced such a feeling of closeness as we do to this island and this people. It is no accident that Sumeru mountain towers here. The idea of the new Asia should first bear fruit here,” trumpeted *bunkajin* Asano Akira in the conclusion of his own contribution to the first issue of *Unabara*.¹¹²

Whatever their differences, Japanese intellectuals in Java at this historical moment were united in the intoxication of victory over the invincible white enemy, and also from the stirring Indonesian reception. Viewed in retrospect, the power and the

apparent infinite possibility had gone to their heads, making the real and the absurd to some extent indistinguishable. Focusing upon this aspect, histories dealing with this period have conventionally dismissed wartime Greater East Asianism as little more than elaborate, irrational fantasy, fatally flawed with regard to any potential appeal for non-Japanese Asians.

Yet if its more blatantly Japan-centered formulations indeed failed to draw great Indonesian interest, the broader discourse of Greater Asia nevertheless contained much with which Indonesia's nationalist intellectuals felt right at home. While carefully adhering to the constraints placed upon them, Indonesian propagandists and politicians proved as adept as their Japanese counterparts at manipulating the common imagery of *Asia Raya* to reflect their own concerns. While many Indonesian intellectuals were disappointed at Japan's failure to grant immediate independence, the intoxicating effects of Japan's power and success did not play out in Japanese thinking alone. The effects of power are not restricted by national boundaries. However they might have felt about the Japanese personally and however their publicly positive reception of the Japanese reflected elements of calculation and flattery, members of Indonesia's elite were clearly seduced by Japanese power, and this in turn inspired new imaginings of themselves, of their nation, and of the world.

Greater Asia Indonesian-Style

The Japanese occupation period saw respected Indonesian spokesmen from across the political landscape appear as strong proponents not only of cooperation with Japan's war effort, but also of a Japan-led "Asianization" of Indonesia. If it was not difficult to identify an aspect of calculated self-serving or self-saving in the enthusiasm, there was also more to it than this. For as long as anyone could remember, Western domination had defined the order of things. Now, with stunning suddenness, the future had arrived, with "Indonesia" still in a nebulous form. In ways not just political but also social, economic, and cultural, the Indonesian nation had yet to materialize. In this context, the mysterious but powerful new outsiders seemed to have much to offer, and much of value to teach.

What did Japan have that Indonesia did not? How had Japan succeeded where Indonesia had failed? As a fellow Asian nation, what could Japan teach Indonesians that the Dutch could not? The solution to the problems of Western modernity that Japan seemed to offer to Indonesia's nation-builders—not only rhetorically, but now in the concrete *praxis* of a world-historically successful military campaign against the West—was one of culture. Or rather, the successful combination of a restored ancient Asian cultural power on the inside with the powerful scientific and material trappings of Western modernity on the outside.

In an early April 1942 essay entitled, "Welcoming the Blossoming of Greater Asian Culture," dramatist and filmmaker Andjar Asmara likened Western culture in Asia to a Western apple that acquires a bitter taste after being grafted into an inappropriate, Eastern environment. "We Indonesians have not been unaware of our culture, the culture of the East," he wrote, but the pursuit of it had been blocked by both "physical and spiritual impediments." The physical handicap was poverty, but the spiritual one was "even more keenly felt ... because it is very difficult to fight against a spirit that is already stupefied as a result of the sort of grafting referred to above ... Yet now we live in a different era," Asmara proclaimed. "If my guess is correct, our culture will blossom in a fertile field under Japanese leadership."¹ Citing a Japanese officer who told a local audience, "Indonesians must do away with the habit of bowing and putting themselves down," and replace this attitude with "the bravery of one in the right, of one who defends a pure principle ... like that of the Japanese Army," H.B. Jassin, editor of the the formerly Dutch-sponsored arts and culture magazine *Pandji Poestaka*, heartily concurred: "The times demand a new spirit ... We have absorbed everything Western and denigrated everything Eastern, everything that was originally ours. The Japanese

are great because they could absorb the new while retaining what was theirs. We must replant our bravery, and bring back our belief in ourselves.”²

The appeal of Japan and the Japanese model to Indonesian nation-builders was the product of an intersection of interests along lines of class and identity. Like their interwar counterparts in other places including Japan and the West, Indonesian social elites rejected the social alienation and dehumanization of the Western liberal capitalist order, yet they feared the radical alternatives proposed from within Western modernity itself—in particular Marxist-Leninist-style social revolution. At the same time, the values of the European enlightenment, of progress, scientific rationalism, and meritocracy had attained virtual global hegemony. In relative proportion to the depth of the perceived crisis of capitalist modernity, these contradictory desires drove Indonesia's nation-builders towards the notion of a resocialization based on old and new: socio-economic renovation via the granting of increased powers to the state as classless, rational, and just social organizer, and cultural restoration via a return to imagined traditional “Eastern” morals and values which “Western” capitalism had eroded.

In the colonial Indies as elsewhere, it was members of the modernizing nation-building subelite or bourgeoisie, standard-bearers of the values of the enlightenment, who felt themselves most profoundly caught between these competing impulses for revolutionary change and anti-revolutionary self-preservation. It was also members of this class—primed for success according to Western-defined rules, yet denied this success in practice—who were most active in asserting the existence of an indigenous identity outside of the Western scale of measure. To them, Japan and its modernity seemed to offer a refreshing, alternative referent that would allow them to escape the identity trap that Western modernity had set for them, in which their own modern identities could never be other than a Western derivative. These two interwoven agendas—one of class, the other of identity—drew Indonesia's nation-building subelite to embrace the notion of an alternative Asian modernity, rooted in the “re”-discovery of an originary Asian culture, as representing the elusive “third way” they had long been seeking, both towards modern nationhood, and toward the “re”-fashioning of the complete selves they believed the West and its modernity had systematically robbed them. On both counts, the ideology of Japanese wartime imperialism, in the form of the Greater Asian crusade, offered to Indonesian nation-builders points of connection that distinguished it in fundamental ways from Western imperialism. The salience of these connections was in turn immeasurably strengthened and deepened by the irresistible power with which Japan made its dramatic entry, sweeping aside Western dominance and its associated institutions and assumptions like a house of cards.

Jassin thus expressed the hopes of many in envisioning an Asian order in which “the races of the East will stand and be led by the hand, not as ‘colonized’ races, but as races that are brothers, ready to help one another with the guidance of the Japanese race.”³ Yet Japan's overwhelming power was also a double-edged sword; it was overwhelmingly intimidating, assuring that the political relationship remained essentially colonial even as both sides insisted that it was something else. Tomizawa Uio's severe chastisement of Indonesian journalists for the publication of their national anthem only a week

after the Dutch surrender was a vivid display of these power relations, all the more unsettling as it came from the mouth of one of the most enthusiastic of Japan's Asianist missionaries. In his essay "Welcoming the Blossoming of Greater Asian Culture," the dramatist Anjar Asmara was unusually forthright, and prescient, in closing on a more cautionary note.

Because we are aware of the greatness and nobility of the aspiration for Greater Asia, we proclaim: Let us begin first with local culture. This is the first step. Teach each race to be true to its own culture, and after this, their eyes must then be turned to the races around them, who share the same color and the same fate. We mustn't forget that in our own house, there is still much to be fixed ... Since in the future all of our houses will represent one great neighborhood (Greater Asia), then there is certainly one leader who will fix the boundaries of the housing (*garis peromahan*) and its materials, so that it represents an orderly, beautiful, and strong neighborhood.⁴ But on the contrary, the way of arranging the furniture, the chairs, and the tables, must be left to the desires of each [household], because having the interior of each household arranged the way each one desires does no harm to the security or the harmony of the neighborhood. ... In short, it is our hope and our conviction, that our culture will be shaped first among ourselves, so that we might at a future date seek a way of steering it towards the culture of *Asia Raya*—so long as it is not in conflict with the fundamentals of [our] race.⁵

Whether given voice or not, such Indonesian concerns about the Japanese were nearly always a part of the package. Yet a tracing of Indonesian voices and aspirations from the outset of the occupation through its early months reveals that the power relations involved in this cultural encounter cannot be understood in the simple form of a unilateral imposition of "Japanization" or "Asianization." As Indonesians sought in Japan a model and a means to move towards a successful "Asian" nationhood, consent and appropriation mixed with domination and resistance in fascinating and revealing ways.

The Japan fashion

Contemplation of Japan and its modern experience as a potential referent along the path from Western colonization to Asian nationhood were hardly new to Java when the Japanese arrived in force. Yet before the war, serious consideration of these notions had been constrained by Western imperial preeminence, and the accompanying perception of Japan as a second-class, even primitive Western copycat. Now the global tables had turned. Now it was the West that seemed far away, and Japan "close."

Before, our spirits were bound up by the Western world. All of our actions, all of our trains of thought, all of our spirits revolved within the Western environment, while we viewed East Asia as the *Far East*. Even though it is this East that is closest

to us, that is occupied by people of the same ancestry and the same blood as ourselves. We call this area the Far East because Westerners call it that, because for them it is indeed a far away area, very far away. So far away that they do not understand the spirit aflame within the hearts of Asian people. Perhaps they never knew of it, or perhaps they refused to act upon this spirit, even though they were aware of it.

In this introduction to the first postsurrender edition of *Pandji Poestaka* magazine in April 1942, coeditors Armijn Pané and H.B. Jassin further proclaimed,

The boundaries that the Westerners used to maintain no longer prevent us from joining hands with our brothers from all Asia. Our desire to worship the Western world must be now be reoriented towards worshipping the spirit of culture, the prosperity, and the dimensions of Greater Asia (*Asia Raya*) in everything. Advancing our Indonesian-ness (*peri ke-Indonesiaan kita*) so that we may present it before the world of Greater Asia—this is our noble responsibility.⁶

After the propaganda squad's near-universal shutdown of local journals within a week of the Dutch surrender, Batavia's Indonesian-language arts and literature magazine *Pandji Poestaka* was the only journal allowed to reappear and continue publication under its prewar name. The nationalist daily newspaper *Pemandangan* was even more exceptional in being the only journal allowed to publish continuously from the end of the Dutch period through the first months of Japanese rule without a shutdown, perhaps because of its avowed nonalignment with any particular political party. The two together provide a window onto the excited, edgy atmosphere among Indonesia's nationalist class in the earliest days of occupation, a time in which Japan came into sharp focus for the first time as Indonesia's prime nation-building referent—with, as yet, relatively little coordinated prompting from the Japanese side. *Pemandangan's* run was to end less than three months into the occupation, while the less ostensibly political *Pandji Poestaka* would continue to its end. But in terms of circulation and influence, both were soon to be overshadowed by the Propaganda Department's new Indonesian-language *Asia Raya* newspaper, which debuted some seven weeks into the occupation. Staffed mostly by Indonesians, *Asia Raya* has often been remembered as a mouthpiece for a unilaterally Japanese agenda, but the Indonesian texts of *Pemandangan*, *Pandji Poestaka*, and *Asia Raya* alike, and the enthusiasm that radiated from them, reveal common ground as well as contestation: a project for Indonesia's "Asianization" that was a nationalist project as well as a Japanese one.

Already, on the day of the Dutch surrender, an editorial in the *Pemandangan* newspaper concluded, "the power of Japan or Nippon is one proof, as clear as can be, of how great the results can be if the desire and spirit of the people can be unified towards one objective. It is hoped this will be an example for us all."⁷ In a letter to the newspaper's editor two weeks later, A. Rachman Djauhari maintained that "many [Indonesians] are still unaware of themselves," wasting their time "boasting of rank and lineage." In contrast, he attributed Japan's modern success to an innate social cohesion seemingly immune to class struggle.

Look at the Japanese, our older brothers, a Far Eastern race that up to now could never be influenced by the customs or etiquette of other races. This is what must become a great example and model for us. We must be aware that the reason for this is none other than the strength of their unity. They work together without concern for level or degree, the rich and the poor mix together as one and the same. But we are not like that here. The rich are happy and the poor are miserable. The rich don't want to mix with the poor, and the poor are afraid to approach the rich, out of fear of rejection.⁸

Japan's resounding victory over a materially and militarily superior West led a host of Indonesian observers to attribute its success to such essential cultural and racial qualities. Given the longstanding hegemony of this sort of essentialism in interpretation of Japan in East and West alike, along with its particular intensity in both Japanese and Allied wartime propaganda, these observations were overdetermined. Typical was one *Pemandangan* contributor who observed that, while Western soldiers were well-equipped and self-assured, the Japanese were "simple and plain." Yet precisely here lay the root of their strength, allowing them to better withstand the strains of battle.⁹ This simplicity (*kesederhanaan*) was not Japan's only trump card. Japan's spiritual power, "completely alien to those who have only seen things through a Western lens," had also been forgotten or underestimated. The Japanese believed that nothing could stop the realization of the Emperor's will. The lesson was "there is no need for us to be discouraged because we lack wealth etc., as long as we are ready to give birth to a people's spirit that shines brightly."¹⁰

Such observations were of course more than simple academic abstractions; they highlighted Japan as a model for how Indonesia might release itself from the shackles of the past. *Pandji Poestaka* coeditor Jassin expressed optimism that Indonesia could rehabilitate itself through a rediscovery of its own version of the Japanese spirit of *bushidō*, something after all not really foreign to Indonesians. Following the late nineteenth-to early twentieth-century Japanese cultural spokesman and student of *bushidō* Nitobe Inazō, along with his British admirer Alfred Stead—whom Jassin cited—Jassin defined the essential aspect of *bushidō* as the ability to selectively incorporate influences from outside while remaining unshaken in one's native cultural essence. *Bushidō* also comprised such notions as keeping one's body healthy "not for self-centered reasons, but as a precious inheritance from our parents, and so that it can be of use to our parents and teachers"; "resisting and controlling desires ... a part of *bushidō* as it is of Islam"; "the actions of a man are to assist the powerless and direct his mercy and pity towards women and children"; and "a warrior or soldier is not seen as one who kills ... but one who fights for peace, justice, and progress." *Bushidō*, Jassin argued, "had its equivalent in the 'warrior spirit' (*semangat kesjateria*) of our race"; all that was needed was a reawakening to this original quality of Asian-ness, of Indonesian-ness, which Indonesia had lost in its all-too intimate encounter with the West.¹¹

Stimulated by the viewing of a Japanese propaganda film and a reading of Negishi Yoshitarō's 1939 *Japanese Spirit and Culture*, *Pemandangan* coeditor Asmara Hadi too argued that Japan's traditions were not really alien to Indonesia, only that Indonesia

had failed to retain them in full vigor—both mental and physical.¹² The 27-year-old Hadi was an energetic nationalist who had undergone cadre training with Sukarno before his exile in 1934, and later married Sukarno's daughter.

In our homeland too, the understanding of *bushido* is not alien. Only we do not call it *bushido*, but *Satria*.¹³ Open our classical literature such as the Mahabharata and the Ramayana and you will discover a shining *Satria* spirit ... Under the old regime this pure spirit could not arise except in the hearts of a minority of the sons of Indonesia. But now Dutch power has collapsed. Now we have a chance to revive this spirit. We must imitate Japan. We must cultivate not only the minds, but also the bodies of our youth.¹⁴

The founding of the Indonesian Sport Federation (*Ikatan Sport Indonesia*) within weeks of the Japanese arrival reflected this shared association and appeal of national power with the honing of vigorous, disciplined youthful bodies, sanctified with reference to an imagined ancient martial ethos. At a speech marking the Sport Foundation's founding in Batavia in mid-April 1942, the elite administrator Soetardjo joined in comparing "the spirit of *bushido* and the way of the *satria*," agreeing that the essential difference was "that while the word *bushido* is still used and education in its meaning is fully on offer in Japan, our people have come to ignore the essence of the way of the *satria*."¹⁵ Like the *bushidō* warriors, wrote Soetardjo, Indonesians in olden days were taught to have sympathy for the "weak and the small, to restrain their desires, to put aside their personal interests and fight for purity, truth, and justice ... and to be loyal and respectful to their parents, teachers, and king." Soetardjo further asserted that even Japan's fabled "*hara kiri*" (ritual suicide) had an ancient domestic counterpart: "In Javanese it is called '*soedoek seliro*', which is carried out when a person falls into a situation of indignity and low character."¹⁶ "And yet," Soetardjo lamented, "how much is left of this high ethic of our race?"

More than before, and more and more as time passes, people value physical pleasure more than spiritual righteousness. Materialism has spread mightily amongst the populace ... Live in pleasure, eat well, wear nice clothes, attain a high rank so that others will respect you, *et cetera*—these are aspirations that color the thoughts of many people every day. They no longer concern themselves with the bad situation of the homeland, or with the miserable conditions of the masses.

Thus discovering an Indonesia already "naturally" primed for a more productive relationship with the Japanese than ever possible under the Dutch, many commentators focused on Japan's modern education system as a practical means for making the most of Indonesia's natural but as-yet unrealized Asian potential. Soetardjo concluded his critical speech on the "weak condition" of Indonesians by urging the development of a method of education that contained "some elements from the modern education of the West, but mostly the ways of teaching of our own people from olden times, with a conception in line with Japanese education methods." In a contemporary *Pandji Poestaka* essay, branch chairman of the *Parindra* party Soepardjo drew on the Dutch

translation of Nohara Komakichi's 1935 *Japan As It Is* to describe and praise attributes of Japan's education system. With 99 percent of Japanese children attending school, "paying the same amount of money," and "wearing the same, simple uniforms," he observed, "over time there arises a feeling of sameness (*perasaan jang sama*)."¹⁷ Japanese girls were taught sewing, crocheting, and other women's work, while women were taught "to be moral, to be a loyal wife to one's husband, and to be the first servant of the nation."¹⁷ Soepardjo described with equal enthusiasm the Japanese practice of having students clean their own classrooms and organize teaching materials, which eliminated student arrogance and disrespect for menial labor. In closing, Soepardjo offered the following appraisal:

Everything is geared towards one aim: That the sons and daughters of Nippon will be of use to the islands and their race (*noesa dan bangsa*). This is very different from the education and teaching in our country during the rule of the Dutch.¹⁸

Soepardjo's use of the term *noesa dan bangsa* for Japan—an emotive nationalist phrasing usually reserved for Indonesia alone—further accentuated the sense of Japan as a fitting model for Indonesian nationhood.

Nationalist women, too, were quick to turn in a Japanese direction. Borrowing from an unnamed source, Noersinah Soepardo depicted Japanese woman as a model harmonization of the modern and the traditional, perfect housekeepers and mothers yet also advanced in such fields as medicine and education; loyal, obedient, and always aware of their Eastern identity, yet with backbone and spirit the equal of their "advanced" Western counterparts. Soepardo did not fail to note that 60 percent of Japan's manual laborers were female. But she assured *Pandji Poestaka* readers that these laborers' bosses were not Western-style capitalist oppressors, but rather like fathers to their female employees, always looking after them and seeking to improve them.¹⁹

In a speech published later that summer, Mrs. Sudjono, wife of the Indonesian advisor to the military administration and former Tokyo resident of the same name, based a similarly positive assessment on first-hand observation. Japanese culture might appear simple, she said, but it could not at all be described as primitive. Rather, it represented a perfect harmonization of the modern and the ancient, exposure to which produced "a noble feeling in harmony with the spirit in our souls."²⁰ Sudjono elsewhere recalled that, before traveling to Japan, she had heard that Japanese women had a low social position, and that to her it had seemed that way at first. But these assumptions were the product of "Western people who had influenced our ways of life and thinking, and also brought Western thinking to our women." Over the course of her residence in Japan, she had realized that "the women of the land of the Rising Sun have many more rights than their sisters elsewhere in Asia, with more freedoms in many things even than Western women." Though their status in public appeared low, they were in fact "only one step behind their husbands," in charge of shopping and looking after the family. Japanese women did not work in offices, except in low-level positions such as typists, but did pursue higher education in literature, housekeeping, medicine, teaching, "and other fields appropriate for women." Japanese women "also have qualities difficult to understand for those of us who have never known a willingness to pure service and

sacrifice,” she continued. “But I want to remind you women that we Indonesians too have a lofty women’s tradition little different from that of Japan. Only we have been over-influenced by Western ways,” taught to assume that

if our education is not the same as that of men and if we are not equal to them in all things, we will not enjoy the same rights as men and will not live happily. Because of this improper attitude, there are not a few eligible husbands without a wife, and home life is brought to ruin.

“These are the results of women thinking only of themselves,” she concluded, rather than devoting themselves—like the Japanese—to the greater national good.²¹

Among Indonesian youth, early positive inclinations towards the Japanese were if anything still more pronounced. “New era, new mankind!” proclaimed the charter of



Figure 6.1 In a cartoon by Ono Saseo appearing on the front page of the Java propaganda squad’s *Sekidōhō* (*Equatorial Post*) newspaper—forerunner of *Unabara*—an Indonesian woman gives a bump to a Dutch one while proclaiming, “you can stop acting so haughty, from now on I’m the most modern girl!” Source: *Sekidōhō* newspaper, March 29, 1942, p. 1.

the new “Representative Body of Indonesian students,” formed as a unity of the Batavia university student organizations PPPI and USI in early April. “The colonial world has vanished from Indonesian soil,” the text continued. “In the preceding era we knew many student associations in this land, as was indeed the intention of the old policy of ‘divide and conquer.’ This is perhaps the reason that so many students were confused by the changing of the times.” Thus was it necessary to “leave old attitudes behind” and find a new way to defend student interests. With schools remaining closed for the time being, students were not to sit on their hands, but to pursue “material and spiritual advancement” through, among other things, taking advantage of their free time to “study a number of aspects of *Dai Nippon*,” including the language and the makeup of Japanese society, with the help of Japanese experts.²² Sudjatmoko, a wartime Batavia medical student, later recalled his surprise at the uncritical embrace of the “new” Japanese order among the majority of his fellow students, even as the Japanese were enforcing social controls and bans on political activity stricter than those of the Dutch.

It was strange, to me strange indeed that my acquaintances—not truly close ones, but ones I knew—that it was so easy for them to say, “oh now it’s the new era (*zaman baroe*) ... the rules of the game have changed,” and so on. They just adjusted themselves to the [new] situation, without determining what it was they wanted.²³

In the honeymoon context that accompanied Japan’s arrival, even the most blatant early examples of Japanization could be accepted positively. When on April 1, 1942, the authorities ordered that the local time be adjusted one and a half hours forward to that of Tokyo—ostensibly for the purposes of military coordination, although a more symbolically Japan-centered decree would be hard to imagine—*Pemandangan’s* Anwar Tjokroaminoto even managed to see this in a positive, nation-building light.

Because many Indonesians have been “left stupid” from before, now there are many who are disoriented (*klabakan*) as soon as the time is advanced one and a half hours. With this change of time, I am in fact glad. Not glad because of the time change itself, but glad because the turning of the time is forcing many Indonesians to turn their heads. Then they seek a reason: Why is it different in Tokyo from Djakarta? The *hadjis* then recall that in Mecca it was also different from in Java.²⁴ They don’t understand why there’s a difference. And now, because there is an order that Java time be made the same as Tokyo time, they try to comprehend. The meaning of all this is that people add a bit to their knowledge.²⁵

In the streets, crew cuts were quickly becoming the rage in Batavia and elsewhere, particularly among children. “Lift the hat of a pedicab driver and find a crew cut underneath,” proclaimed an early May *Unabara* article, which also cited a local barber who assured his many young crew-cut customers that “this is how the Japanese get so smart.” The barber added that his customers liked the short hair because they no longer needed to use a comb, although they did sometimes complain that their daily bath (*mandi*) now felt freezing. He concluded with a statement of gratitude for his many

Japanese customers, profits from whom he viewed as a “heavenly blessing.”²⁶ One Indonesian source later recalled that teenaged males wore their crew cuts “proudly, as if they too were among the young men who had ‘won the war’ against the Dutch. Their young, innocent hearts were proud to imitate the *heитай-san*—the Japanese soldier.”²⁷ In an *Asia Raya* essay appearing in August 1942, an anonymous Indonesian observer confirmed that Indonesian youth were becoming “military-minded,” with a sympathy and awe for Japanese soldiers unlike anything seen in Dutch times—not surprising, he noted, considering how impressively these soldiers had defeated the Dutch, and given that their warm attitude towards the local children was “almost like day and night” in comparison with the aloof Dutch soldiers. When one walked through Batavia’s neighborhoods, he wrote, one saw children “marching with sticks or toy guns,” and singing Japanese military songs. The “spirit of military-mindedness” among the children should be nurtured, the observer concluded, in order to instill in them the virtues of “discipline and firm obedience to rules.”²⁸

In a photo collage appearing in *Unabara* in early April 1942 under the heading “The Japan Fashion” (Figure 6.2), Japanese readers were treated to propaganda images of Indonesians in various settings eagerly pursuing the introduction of things Japanese into their lives: a woman wearing a *kimono*, described as “the most yearned-for item among Indonesia’s beautiful women”; performers of traditional drama (*wayang orang*) who were said to be seeking to incorporate *kabuki* forms into their productions; *gamelon* performers said to want to “let the masses hear Japanese music played on their instruments”; modern drama actors seeking to perform plays in the Japanese language; and an unnamed upper-class woman studying Japanese. The final photograph showed a bustling Batavia market, with umbrellas prominently on sale. The Japanese journalist here described being “tapped on the shoulder by an Indonesian who had once been in Japan,” who exclaimed: “Sir, do those umbrellas not resemble Japanese silk ones?”²⁹

In the countryside, too, propaganda squad members Takeda Rintarō and Yokoyama Ryūichi reported a great popular turnout to each of fifty outdoor screenings of Japanese propaganda films such as “The Spirit of the Army,” “The Japanese Navy,” “The Young People of Japan,” and “Industrial Japan.” The propaganda entourage, which toured Java and Bali for two months between April and June 1942, included Indonesian song, dance, and theater performers as well. “Indonesians,” they reported upon return, “were apparently strongly moved by viewing the bravery of the Japanese army and the power of Japanese industry firsthand.”³⁰

Whatever was moving it, the Japan fashion among Indonesians appeared real enough, particularly among the elite, and above all where the Japanese language was concerned. Hastily-prepared introductory texts in Japanese for Indonesian and Dutch speakers sold like hotcakes, and advertisements for Japanese instruction—whatever the credentials—began to multiply in the newspapers.³¹ In mid-April 1942, a member of the propaganda squad complained of no less than four different, unapproved Japanese-Indonesian daily conversation booklets circulating around the port area of Batavia alone, all with gross shortcomings in his view (one of these, published by “a Chinese using an Indonesian name,” was banned for the cultural slight of dividing Japanese into two grammatical categories: “original Japanese readings” described as “incomplete,” and “Chinese readings” classified as “complete”!³²).



Figure 6.2 A photo collage for the Japanese readership of the *Unabara* newspaper entitled “The Japan Fashion” (*Nippon ryūkō*) highlights various permutations of a supposed new craze for things Japanese among Indonesians. Source: *Unabara* newspaper, April 9, 1942, p. 2.

Getting in on the action even before the Japanese victory was assured, nationalist man of letters Sanusi Pané pursued a study entitled “The Japanese Language and the Austronesian Language Family,” the first installment of which was published in *Pemandangan* just three days after the Dutch surrender. A month later this appeared as an introduction to Pané’s 48-page booklet entitled *A Guide to the Japanese Language*. Pané’s “Guide” was regularly advertised in *Pemandangan*, accompanied by the assertion that it was “Different From the Rest”—a pitch necessitated by the stiff competition it now faced from many others of its sort.³³

In his research, despite the apparent lack of previous personal familiarity with the Japanese language, Pané made an attempt to reveal Japanese not as an Altaic language as maintained by Western linguists, but rather as an Austronesian language—the language family in which linguists had placed Malay and other local languages including Javanese, Sundanese, and Betawi. Pané’s assertion was based on a detailed analysis of similarities between words in old Japanese and in older forms of these languages. In his introduction, he remarked that there had only been one study on the subject hitherto that he knew of, by Dutch orientalist scholar Dirk van Hinloopen-Labberton, who was said to have conducted his research while in Tokyo.³⁴ Further research along these lines by Western scholars had been inhibited, Pané maintained, by a fear that it would only reveal further links between Japanese and local languages. Drawing upon examples of both word roots and grammatical similarities taken from Dutch research as well as his own, Pané concluded that Japanese retained the “spirit and linguistic shape” of an Austronesian language, but that it had also absorbed aspects of Chinese and other nearby languages, making it “that much further from the foundations of the Austronesian language family.”³⁵ Despite marked similarities, he warned readers not to assume that Japanese would be easy for them to learn—even for a Malay speaker from Sumatra, he noted, just learning Javanese was no easy task.

For the moment, Pané’s countrymen were undeterred. In an April essay entitled “Expanding the Japanese Language,” noting “how widespread the desire” among his countrymen was to learn Japanese, *Pemandangan* contributor Bafagih exclaimed, “how good it would be if five or ten people could set up [Japanese] classes in each and every neighborhood or place, who could teach those who do not yet understand, leading their brothers in [keeping with] our spirit of mutual cooperation (*semangat kita gotong-rojong*).” As a further fringe benefit, the author pointed to the “great deepening of our knowledge of our [own] Indonesian language” which he maintained would surely accompany the mass study of Japanese.³⁶

Mid-April 1942 also saw the opening of the “Chihaya” elementary school in Batavia under propaganda squad auspices. The *Chihaya gakkō* was partly inspired by the example of a touring school of the same name established by a special detachment of squad members on temporary duty in Sumatra, but its driving force was “several [squad] members with an understanding and passion for education, beginning with [school principal] Shimizu Nobuo,” Greater East Asian ideologue and editor of *Unabara*.³⁷ “Chihaya” was the name of a rowboat of legendary speed familiar to Japanese schoolchildren, but the term was also said to have been chosen for its proximity to the Indonesian term *Cahaya*, meaning “light” or “brilliance.”³⁸ The choice not to use the Indonesian term itself was typical of Shimizu’s brand of Japan-centric

Asianism.³⁹ The *Chihaya gakkō* was meant to offer education not according to the “early modern scientific, positivistic method, in sum the dismembered method,” of the Dutch, “limited to classification and analysis,” but rather “a boardinghouse (*juku*) type of discipline, based upon a coordinated method of education, which brings a delight to students’ lives and fosters the genius of world-building,” squad Leader Machida later recalled. But “at its basis was, of course, the spread of the Japanese language.”⁴⁰

In its first weeks of operation, the *Chihaya gakkō* received so many applications from prospective students that it began turning them away—and this despite the fact that the school’s opening roughly coincided with the general reopening of public elementary schools Java-wide. By mid-May, it was reported that the school was too full and needed to move from its setting in a former Dutch elementary school to larger quarters.⁴¹ Once in the classroom, the eagerness of parents to get their children into the *Chihaya gakkō* appears to have been matched by the enthusiasm of the children themselves. In a May 14 interview in *Unabara*, Japanese observer Nakamura Hiro commented:

Among my friends, and also among the Japanese active at this school, there are a number who were also previously active in such places as China, Manchuria, and Mongolia. According to them, the students in those areas—perhaps you could call them “continental”—they somehow lacked something, they didn’t have enough appreciation (*kanjusei*). I was worried it would be the same here, but in point of fact these students have almost the identical learning ability and memory of students in Tokyo. In things like *katakana* they are even better than the students in Tokyo. Of course, the previous Dutch-type education system made them loose in many respects, but this looseness has not made them hostile to following rules as one might expect. On the contrary, they are eager to adhere to our strict rules of their own volition. I am glad of that. Of course, I expect much of these people of *Unabara* in the future.⁴²

If we accept the statements attributed to a 26-year-old teacher at the school named “Sutani” in a mid-May 1942 interview for *Unabara*, the good feelings were mutual. “In contrast to the Dutch, who looked down on us natives as lesser people,” she was quoted as saying, the Japanese “treat us as fellow human beings.” After years of grappling with the “difficult Dutch language,” she continued, “Japanese is not so difficult for us,” its a-i-u-e-o pronunciation simple in comparison to the Dutch a-b-c. Apparently referring to the Japanese staff, Sutani expressed appreciation that “the Japanese have also learned to speak our language quite a bit. Although,” she qualified with candid understatement, “at this point it seems there is a little trouble with pronunciation.”⁴³

In early June, when the opening of three more Japanese language schools in Batavia was announced, the number of applicants reached several hundred above the one thousand mark in just one day. This was more than double the expected number, and forced a suspension of further enrollment. The two Japanese instructors assigned to each school had their hands full.⁴⁴ In the central Javanese city of Semarang, too, applicants for the first Japanese language school, which opened on July 10, numbered over twelve hundred in just the first day.⁴⁵ Returning from a tour of the countryside in

the vicinity of Batavia in early June, Shimizu Hitoshi reported being brought to tears by the “fever for studying the Japanese language” he had witnessed there.⁴⁶

Japanese and Indonesians alike were identifying an enthusiasm, warmth, and closeness in the mutual interaction that was lacking, both in Japan’s Asian experience, and in previous Indonesian-Dutch interactions. Such identifications often wandered beyond talk of cultural connections alone and into the realm of race and biology. “Regardless of political questions, the relationship between Japan and Indonesia indeed strikes more of a chord and is more in tune with the feelings of the people [than that with the Dutch],” noted a *Pemandangan* commentator just three days after the Dutch surrender.

Because the extent of the difference between Japan and Indonesia is not as great nor as deep as that between Holland and Indonesia. In their facial appearance and their skin color, in the simplicity of their lives and all their common customs and traditions, the children of Indonesia feel closer to and more similar to the Japanese race than to the races of Europe.⁴⁷

On this subject, even upper *priyayi* administrator Hoesein Djajadiningrat, steeped in Dutch culture and the perks of the old system, informed his Dutch acquaintance Leo Jansen in early June 1942, that “what appealed to him in the Japanese” was their “reduced distance, their smaller size (*gestalte*) and darker skin. The Dutch superiority complex is after all mostly a question of size and skin color. The Japanese is by nature trustworthy for the Indonesian,” he concluded, “[although] unfortunately also brutish (*hardhandig*).”⁴⁸

Djajadiningrat’s administrator colleague Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo, author of the ill-fated petition for home rule in 1936, had his own distinctive interpretation of the racial connection. Three hundred years of Dutch rule had made Indonesians “weak in mind and body,” and

our weak condition allowed other races who were more clever, stronger, and more spirited (*lebih bersemangat*) to dominate us. This was also the case with the other races of Asia, with one exception: God who commands Nature placed a drop of Malay blood in a part of Asia now known as Japan. It was apparently already God’s wish that this drop of Malay blood would in later days become a catalyst (*lantaran*) for the awakening of the Asian races. According to the wishes of Nature this drop of blood blossomed into a mature people, mature enough to avoid being dominated by others. Now the time has apparently come, that God has chosen that the Japanese should awaken the other peoples of Asia.⁴⁹

In Soetardjo’s reasoning, Japan’s coming thus represented none other than the reuniting of a common Malay bloodline—a distant branch family returning to reinvigorate the degenerated main line!

It was of course easy to read something opportunistic and self-serving in the seeming sudden Indonesian fashion for all things Japanese—to the point that even Indonesian observers sometimes felt compelled to publicly distinguish the fake from

the real thing. In mid-May, *Asia Raya* editor Winarno Hendranoto criticized the “professional copycats” (*tukang tiroe*) among his own people.⁵⁰ In Dutch times, they had tried to dress and act Dutch; when the Dutch left, they had quickly tried to “return to their own kind.” “Recently,” Winarno continued,

I’ve seen some members of my race apparently doing their best to be considered Japanese ... Where before most of them only wore loose-fitting pants or a checkered *sarong*, they are now wearing green or khaki short pants ... Where before their hair was long, now their heads are shaved clean so that their scalps shine like young coconuts. But unfortunately, they’ve only changed their pants and the outside of their heads. The insides of their heads are still empty or nearly so.⁵¹

It might be simple to imitate the appearance of “our brothers the Japanese,” Winarno noted, but “I don’t think it’s so easy to change one’s heart, spirit and daring into something like theirs.” He concluded that it was better that one continue to “dress and look like an Indonesian, so long as one’s heart, spirit and desire is to cooperate with our older brothers the Japanese.” Achieving the real thing, in other words, meant not forsaking one’s Indonesia identity for a Japanese one, but rather blending their best qualities into an optimal Asian original.

Local audiences who packed Jakarta’s Prinsen Park theater in June 1942 to view the first Indonesian stage performance produced under propaganda squad auspices experienced a similarly incongruous display of Indonesian Japanization. Here it came as a result not of Indonesian monkeying, however, but rather of heavy-handed Japanese puppeteering. The play was produced by the squad’s new Theater Direction Center (*Engeki shidōsho*), established in Batavia shortly after the Dutch surrender under the leadership of “that renowned child of [the Tokyo Theater District] Asakusa,” Takeda Rintarō. The center, whose staff included scriptwriter Yasuda Kiyōō, composer Iida Nobuo, and several other *bunkajin*, enlisted promising Indonesian actors, scriptwriters, and songwriters to produce propaganda plays for Indonesian popular consumption. Once tested on a local audience, their productions were to be sent on tour throughout Java. While the center’s later productions were mostly Indonesian-authored, the center’s first play was based on a script hastily written by the lesser-known Sakuma Masaru, which was directly translated into Indonesian and performed by the cast of the “famous Indonesian theater troupe the Malacca Opera.”⁵² Sakuma, whose obscurity was reflected in his original assignment not to the propaganda squad but to the regular army forces, was apparently called upon because first-choice literati Takeda and Yasuda were engaged with the squad’s Java-Bali public relations tour, and were thus absent during the center’s first two months of operation.

The play, first entitled “A Pro-Japanese” (*Seorang pro-Nippon*) but later changed to the more neutral-sounding “Child of Asia,” was first performed in Batavia in late June 1942, and appeared for a second run there in late August. In October, it subsequently took to the road as planned.⁵³ The story was set in Java on the eve of the Japanese invasion, and revolved around an Indonesian family composed of an ardently pro-Japanese man, his son and daughter, and his ardently pro-Dutch younger brother, employed as a Dutch spy. At the start of the play, the pro-Japanese protagonist is

imprisoned after his pro-Dutch brother reports his sympathies to the Dutch. Angered by her father's incarceration, the protagonist's daughter refuses to marry the man her pro-Dutch uncle had previously proposed. In order to patch things up, her uncle attempts to get her father released from prison, but too late—upset by his brother's collusion with the Dutch, he has meanwhile committed suicide. He leaves behind a letter which his heartbroken children read aloud as neighborhood residents look on. It refers to a package he has left behind, to be opened when the Japanese forces arrive. This turns out to contain a Japanese flag. The performance ended with the local people crying “*banzai!*” three times, and then ceremoniously unfurling the flag “in the sunlight.”⁵⁴

Propaganda squad commander Machida Keiji later described the play, and the Indonesian reception, in the most glowing of terms.

The script was by Sakuma Masaru, with direction by the film journalist Abdullah Arifin. Its contents described the joyous welcome of divine liberation, and the sense of mission in building a new nation. Thus did Java's masses greet the play with hearty applause ... After the curtain came down, audiences would cheer and toss their hats into the air, blow whistles, and rush the stage, and the play became an instant speaking platform. Mingling amongst them, standing like two temple guardians at the center of the stage, and shouting “long live the newly arisen races,” were our own Tomizawa Uio and Takeda Rintarō.⁵⁵

Indonesians, however, were more ambivalent in their reviews. After the first showing in late June, one anonymous newspaper reviewer wrote that the play had succeeded in demonstrating the evil (*kandasnja*) of Dutch policy, which unnaturally “divided Asian races that are clearly one race and one ancestry” from one another. The performances had been filled to standing-room only. Still, the writer cautiously conceded, the acting could have been better.⁵⁶

After seeing the play during its second run in late August, the dramatist and critic Andjar Asmara was characteristically more forthright. The audience had indeed clapped in a “happy spirit,” and with its “fiery language,” he wrote, “this sort of play is truly appropriate to the desires of the era.” He nevertheless complained that

a script containing propaganda is not yet a success if it is only the words that receive applause, if the performance is not supported by good acting and direction, to that point where the intentions being propagandized are truly absorbed into the hearts of the audience.

From his subsequent commentary, it was clear that the blame for the play's failure as propaganda did not lie with the unskilled Indonesian execution alone.

As it is, the performance is [simply] a public gathering, not a play or a work of art. Particularly when, in parts where people are supposed to be moved, for example when the old father gets out of prison and then dies. ... the audience

doesn't join in the emotion, but rather rolls with laughter. Why this father has to kill himself does not make sense to us. Because he is afraid of being tortured by the Dutch government ...? If this is so, he does not reveal the blood of a *satria* ready to sacrifice for his children. The close of the story does not achieve the sort of weighty climax that could be expected to stay in the memory of the viewers, so that the propaganda might be more effective. When a script that contains propaganda is assembled, it must be reinforced by a storyline and drama that are good and solid, and executed through acting and direction that is orderly—only then is it meaningful propaganda. What one wants to propagandize should not be blatantly visible, but should be slipped with subtlety (*dengan haloes*) into a story that is strong ... Plays represent a very broad area for giving instruction to the masses (*rakjat djelata*), but this task brings with it the heaviest of responsibilities for the writer, the director, and the actors.⁵⁷

Experiences such as these revealed that the business of creating propaganda for Indonesian consumption—including the suggestion of parallels and lessons to be learned from Japanese experience—was generally best left in the hands of Indonesia's native interpreters. Asmara's response, along with those from the Indonesian-language journals allowed to continue publishing after the Japanese takeover, confirmed that there was no shortage of capable and enthusiastic native spokesmen ready to go to battle for the shared Asian mission. If the Theater Direction Center's first production thus failed spectacularly to take advantage of this potentiality, a concurrent Japanese-Indonesian project involving a more genuine harnessing of Indonesian initiative—the *Asia Raya* newspaper—was to prove a much more fruitful experiment.

Asia Raya

First published on the emperor's birthday of April 29, 1942—some seven weeks after the Dutch surrender—the *Asia Raya* newspaper was the Indonesian-language flagship of the Java propaganda squad. Throughout its life, which was to extend over the entire course of the occupation period—long after the squad itself had ceased to exist—the Japanese assuredly retained the editorial and censorial upper hand. Yet at least in the early going, for a variety of reasons—Indonesian initiative, shared interests, the language barrier, and the missionary character of its Japanese staff—*Asia Raya* was much more than “Japanese propaganda.” Navigating a grey zone between Japanese imperial and Indonesian national agendas, the strikingly confident message of its spokesmen was one not of rejection of the aims of Indonesian nationalism in favor of collaboration with Japanese schemes for a Greater Asia, but rather of a conviction of the possibility—indeed the necessity—of unifying these two aims.

Cautiously exploiting the limited autonomy of their position while at the same time mindful of the various constraints, hemmed within the confines of Japanese imperial dictates yet also convinced of the merits of working with Japan, Indonesian journalists at *Asia Raya* navigated a delicate and ambiguous path. They portrayed Japanese-Indonesian association as natural, and qualitatively different from that of colonizer

and colonized. Sacrifice was portrayed as not only a necessity of wartime but good for the honing of national spirit and stamina. In return, however, Indonesia's spokesmen also consistently invoked the great expectations Japan had raised in promising to deliver where the Dutch had failed: to lead Indonesia towards modern development, to respect and treat Indonesians as equal family members, and to show results in a relatively short time, at least as far as wartime circumstances would allow.

Support, accommodation, negotiation, and contestation thus intermingled in a delicate balancing act. Their distinctive and varied mixes in the output of each spokesman reflected political and personal differences of politics, religion, age, family status, geographical and ethnic background. And nowhere were its complex and varied contours and outcomes more vividly revealed than in treatments of the pregnant subject of "Indonesia" itself. Few Indonesian spokesmen were inclined to go so far as Tomizawa Uio in arguing that prewar Indonesian nationalism required outright replacement with a more "broadminded" and up-to-date Greater Asianism. Yet in a fluid wartime context in which the very shape of "Indonesia" seemed to hang in the balance—and in which the mantle of its "postwar" leadership also appeared up for grabs—Indonesian spokesmen frequently placed Indonesian nationalism under an "Asian" lens illuminated by Japanese power and success. In revealing ways, this included explorations of "broader," alternative constructions of Indonesia within a new Japan-led Asia, constructions in which prewar nationalism as practiced and conceived in a Dutch colonial context was often represented as "narrow" and outdated, inappropriate to the new Asian context.

According to a 1943 text from the *Sendenhan's* Tomizawa Uio, the very idea for *Asia Raya* was itself a local one, proposed by Tomizawa's new acquaintance S.A. Alatas as the two returned from Bandung to Jakarta (still officially Batavia) some three weeks after the Dutch surrender.

There was much work waiting for us in Jakarta. But first we needed a goal. I asked [Alatas]: Of the all the work we've done so far, just give me your offhand opinion, what would you say was the most important? He replied: Newspapers. To produce a newspaper with our own hands—and there are some fine Indonesians, to dig up and assemble these men of character, and make a new newspaper—isn't that the thing to do? "Up until now, there has never been a proper Indonesian newspaper ... I would by all means like to make a great newspaper that carries forward your aim of 'Greater Asia' (*Asia Raya*) ... And if we need capital, let's start collecting some," said [Alatas]. I was in fact thinking of making a movie, but I answered, "alright, let's do it." To this he added, "and if we do make such a newspaper, I'd like to call it '*Asia Raya*.'"⁵⁸

In a postwar interview, Tomizawa's former propaganda squad colleague Shimizu Hitoshi added,

We didn't control the newspapers et cetera very strictly ... All of the funding [for *Asia Raya*] was from the people, and the staff was all Indonesian. And we left the name and the contents entirely to Indonesians. Only with things like opinion on

the World War did we have the Broadcasting Section (*Hōdōka*) compose it. For the rest, we let the Indonesians do it all. That's why the period after when we first went there was the freest and most active.⁵⁹

Of course, there was to be censorship. "This was the job of the propaganda squad, something we had to do, and the military was of the opinion that there should be a fair amount of control," Shimizu added.⁶⁰ But within these confines, Shimizu insisted that *Asia Raya* was primarily an Indonesian show.

The picture painted by *Asia Raya* coeditor Tomizawa in his 1943 reminiscences, however, was closer to a situation of colonial tutelage than outright autonomy. *Asia Raya*, he wrote, was meant to represent a model of Japanese-Indonesian cooperation for other joint Japanese-Indonesian enterprises that were "sure to commence from now on not just in newspaper companies but in all areas. Of course," he added, "it is sure that Japanese will be at the center, but there is no undertaking from which Indonesians are banned as such. Thus our newspaper must be the first to appoint Indonesians to places of duty." This could not be done indiscriminately, however. "Because we are placing a certain authority in employees' hands," Tomizawa warned, "we must be very careful."⁶¹

The propaganda squad's sponsorship of *Asia Raya* was to some degree fortuitous: in the first moments after the Japanese arrival in Batavia, squad staffers had seized the state-of-the-art facilities of the leading Dutch newspaper the *Java Bode*, complete with high-quality paper and ink stocks. The more conservative Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*) and its civilian advisor Taniguchi Gorō, a former local newspaperman, had plans of their own for the *Java Bode*. Had they arrived on the scene first, *Asia Raya*'s history might have been very different. Shimizu later recalled,

the army couldn't get its hands on [the newspaper], and several times we got complaints from the *Gunseibu* that "the propaganda squad is doing an impudent thing." Still, since [our job] was propaganda, we thought it only natural to get involved with newspapers.⁶²

A month after the Dutch surrender, Tomizawa met with a group of Indonesian journalists assembled for the *Asia Raya* undertaking. In later reminiscences, he spoke highly of these journalists' familiarity with Japan, and their understanding of the need for Japanese-Indonesian unity. But he also insisted on an awareness of the great sacrifices Japan expected of Indonesians, and a readiness to remain unflinchingly dedicated to Japan and its war aims even in the face of great domestic suffering. The future Tomizawa painted was not bright, and in the end quite prophetic.

You may all be hoping for Japanese commodities, but for the next two or three years it will be absolutely impossible to provide you with them. Furthermore, the various important resources that were formerly in Dutch possession will all be taken away so far as they are necessary for the prosecution of the war. Whether the sum of products taken away will be many times greater than the amount which the Dutch authorities squeezed from you, I can't say for sure. This is certainly not

exploitation, but in the end it will be, at the very least, on that order. From here on out, you will no doubt experience a great poverty in your material lives ... One might dress it up in [fancy] words, but in sum, in your living conditions, depending on the case, a great age of poverty will befall you, the likes of which has not been seen here in 100 years ... To put it another way, all of you will be in the position of encouraging this mutual sacrifice.⁶³

Several weeks later, in a stinging critique of public dissatisfaction in his daily humor column that also mapped out the common ground between Japanese and nationalist aims, Winarno reflected upon the sacrifices Tomizawa described. If it is “the common people (*wong cilik*) who complain” because their “rice bowls are empty,” he wrote, “I can understand.” But pampered, overly Westernized members of the elite who complained because they could no longer ride in their cars, or hail taxis, or because the perfume on sale at *toko de Zon* or *Eropa* was old and losing its scent, he continued, “ought to be considered disturbers of the peace.”⁶⁴ Winarno noted that he himself still endured many things that were unpleasant. Yet when he stopped to consider

the Japanese people who also sit in the editorial or permanent writing staff of *Asia Raya* like U[io] Tomizawa, Asano [Akira] and others—who used to earn thousands in Japan but now earn just a few hundred, who used to live there safely, just pondering and writing books in a quiet atmosphere, but who now must join in the headaches, who once even braved the ocean waves in Bantam Bay, forced to swim to stay alive after the boat that carried them had sunk—then my feeling of dissatisfaction disappears, and it would be fitting to say I am grateful.⁶⁵

Measured by previous Indies circulation standards, *Asia Raya* was an immediate success, with circulation figures topping twenty-three thousand within the first few weeks.⁶⁶ In comparison with the millions of newspapers daily sold in Japan, Europe, or the United States at the time, *Asia Raya*’s circulation numbers remained minuscule. But viewed in light of a popular literacy rate well below 10 percent, and compared to past newspaper circulation levels in Java (*Pemandangan*, 7,000; the Dutch-language *Java Bode*, the largest, 15,000⁶⁷), these were considerable numbers. A month after the newspaper’s launch, *Asia Raya*’s Japanese and Indonesian staffers joined together in Batavia’s posh Hotel des Indes to commemorate a success that was “without precedent in Indonesian history.” According to the Indonesian staffer who described the festivities the next day, celebratory after-work gatherings of this sort were getting to be a regular event, as were hangovers from the drinks consumed.⁶⁸ Here, Japanese social custom seemed to be getting the better of the Islamic prohibition on alcohol consumption.⁶⁹

In the daily running of *Asia Raya*, as with their other projects, the *bunkajin* were largely left to their own devices. As propaganda squad commander Machida later recalled, “having long felt an inner resistance towards ideas that had lost currency or rule by force, I had apparently fallen upon a simple philosophy towards these civilian men in military employ. That was, it’s fine as long as you do it purely and innocently.” The unflinching dedication that he observed among his men in their very first, difficult

days in Java, he wrote elsewhere, had convinced him to follow a hands-off policy (*hōnin shugi*).⁷⁰ In turn, *Asia Raya*'s *bunkajin* staff appear to have given the Indonesian staff a relatively free editorial hand. Whatever the brotherly ideals suggested in Hitoshi Shimizu's assertion that "we let the Indonesians do it all," one clear reason for this autonomy was a practical one: the ever-present language barrier. An important related factor was that at *Asia Raya*, as in many other squad-sponsored projects, this barrier was normally bridged via two Japanese former local residents, each of whom revealed an unquestioned respect for Indonesia and Indonesians, and both of whom were in turn widely respected among Indonesians: Ichiki Tatsuo and Nakatani Yoshio.

For Indonesians who did not already know him from his prewar activities, Ichiki had confirmed his pro-Indonesian credentials at a founding ceremony for the propaganda squad sponsored "Greater East Asian Culture Association" eighteen days after the Dutch surrender through a stirring debut performance of the song "Long Live Indonesia," with text by Ichiki and music by Iida Nobuo—apparently in defiance of the official ban on such themes issued earlier that same week.⁷¹ The ban had shaken Ichiki as much as anyone, and his enthusiasm for his work, including at *Asia Raya*, suffered for it.⁷² In contrast Nakatani, who had developed a close working relationship with Tomizawa Uio, was constantly on hand. As the prominent Indonesian journalist Rosihan Anwar later put it, not only did Nakatani work extensively at *Asia Raya*, but he also "translated all the speeches, statements of the Commander and Department of the Commander of the Military Administration (*gunseikanbu*)—he was the man." Anwar, hired at *Asia Raya* in early 1943 at the age of twenty, assisted Nakatani with his translations and later roomed in a pavilion in Nakatani's spacious house. In a 1994 interview he offered the following positive appraisal:

It was required of me to check [Nakatani's] Indonesian, which was good enough. And with this man, I could get along ... well, because he was a soft-spoken Japanese, he was a mild-mannered gentleman, he didn't slap people—he was too short, too small. Although he [like the other *bunkajin*] had [military] boots and so forth. (laughs)⁷³

As Anwar recalled it, there was little in the way of deep political or philosophical exchange. Rather, it was Nakatani's gentle, refined (*halus*) manner—in contrast to that of many other Japanese he encountered—that won Anwar and many fellow Indonesians over.

Although we were personal friends, it never came to the point where he disclosed his philosophical reflections, and on my part also I didn't feel the need to bare myself. So I can't remember, except I thought he was rather, *tidak berarti* (meaningless) chit-chats, small talk. I never discussed with him, I wouldn't dare to discuss with him about what is your aim in coming here, and now this martial philosophy, of course not, I didn't touch that. And he didn't want to talk about that either. This is the unique thing about him, no, he restrained himself, other Japanese [would talk about] spirit (*seishin*) or the "spirit of the Greater East Asia War," no, he refrained from that. A fine-mannered Japanese.

Relations between *Asia Raya*'s Indonesian staff and the Japanese censor, however, appear to have been less cordial. New regulations put into effect around the time *Asia Raya* first appeared extended censorship to all forms of public writing and expression, which were to be submitted to the propaganda squad's "broadcast squad" (*hōdōhan*), as in Japan at the time, on a prepublication basis. The announcement of the new rules included a warning that anyone who bypassed this strict censorial regime could expect the most severe consequences.⁷⁴ On the other hand, here too the mitigating factor of the language barrier, the broadcast squad's resulting employment of a mostly Indonesian censorial staff to carry out the task, and the volume of material to be checked, resulted in an inconsistent and porous regime where censorship was concerned. As suggested by former broadcast squad employee Ms. Lasmidjah Hardi in a later interview, squad staffers were sometimes quite sympathetic to Indonesian nationalism. Hardi, who had been an active participant in the *Partindo* nationalist party of Sukarno and others before the war and who was twenty-six years old in 1942, later described the following conversation with a certain nationalist named Wonohito, who asked Hardi to join the Broadcast Squad and suggested some incentives for doing so, both for herself and for the movement:

"Do you want to work in the Censoring Branch (*Kōdōhan* [*sic*])?" "What gets censored?" I asked. "Well, various things. Newspapers, this, that. The Japanese, you know, they just pretend to know [what's going on]. We censor everything, well, at random. Also to earn money, to know what is going on, and to sit in the administration," he said. So I joined up. But I didn't like it, because the Japanese were like this: They had the speeches and writings of their own friends censored. Including [those of] Mr. Winarno.⁷⁵

While the censorship was thus performed "at random," with little direct Japanese oversight, and by people often sympathetic to Indonesian concerns, Winarno indeed still felt constrained by it. In a discussion of his attendance at a banquet hosted by the Broadcast Section (*hōdōka*, formerly the *hōdōhan*) in one of his daily humor columns in late 1942, Winarno boldly stated that the *hōdōka*, while generous with food and drink, "has turned out to be stingy" with what it allowed in print, "prone to binding the hands of myself and my colleagues." He immediately continued that this was "only proper because we are still in a situation of war, and fingers and tongues may not probe or waggle just as they please."⁷⁶ Even with this qualifier attached, Winarno's comments were striking. Equally striking and revealing, however, was the fact that these comments passed the censors and made it into the pages of *Asia Raya* at all!

As reflected in Lasmidjah Hardi's reference to Winarno as one of the Japanese's "own friends," the choice of Indonesian staff at *Asia Raya*'s senior levels revealed a preference for cautious men with a longer history of pro-Japanese affiliations and contacts, in particular members of the elite, conservative *Parindra* party. *Parindra*'s chairman, Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, was chosen as its director, and Winarno, the editor of *Parindra*'s former party newspaper *Berita Oemoem*, for the delicate job of political affairs editor. Importantly for *Asia Raya*'s legitimacy and appeal, however, these men were joined by those representing other segments of the nationalist movement as

well, including Islamists and the historically more radical “non-cooperators.” Most prominent among the latter was Sanusi Pané, who served as the paper’s first culture columnist. Strikingly highlighting the potential ideological appeals of “Greater Asia” right across not only the Japanese but also the Indonesian political spectrum, it was the multitalented Pané, poet, playwright, journalist, scholar, and cofounder of the left-wing *Gerindo* nationalist party, who took the early lead in forcefully connecting Japan and Indonesia in past, present, and future—and in promoting Indonesia’s cultural Asianization.

Over the two-month period in which he served as *Asia Raya*’s first culture columnist, Pané elaborated almost daily upon the themes of Eastern and Western distance, and of Indonesian and Japanese proximity. Appealing to the realms of race, culture, and aesthetics to identify transcendent resolutions to contemporary social and political ailments, Pané’s essays traced out wide expanses of common ground in Japanese and Indonesian Asianism, thus reinforcing and building upon many of the themes and issues his nationalist colleagues had already raised in the pages of *Berita Oemoem*, *Pemandangan*, and *Pandji Poestaka* in the first weeks of the occupation.

Analyzed on a conventional right-left political scale, Pané’s emergence in this role appears incongruous, opening him to accusations of cynical collaboration. In the prewar period, in contrast to those of the more conservative *Parindra*, *Gerindo*’s leaders had in fact maintained little contact with Japan or the Japanese, and had on occasion been outspokenly critical of Japanese “fascist aggression” and imperialism in China. This along with consistently critical, class-conscious interpretations of Indonesian society and the nationalist movement clearly located Pané to the political Left of the prewar nationalist spectrum. His investment in Marxism was serious. Yet a closer look reveals that Pané’s Marxism had always remained subordinated to an Asianist exceptionalism: long before the Japanese arrival, he had consistently interpreted class struggle, capitalism, and imperialism and the modern conflicts and social ills they engendered as essentially Western imports, alien and out of place in an Asia that needed to rediscover itself. In his spirited 1935 exchanges with Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, profiled in Chapter 2, it was Pané who had insisted not only that a successful modern Indonesia could not be built without reference to ancient local traditions, but that the modern (re-)birth of the Indonesian nation was itself preordained within these same resilient traditions.

As these exchanges revealed, Pané interpreted “Indonesia’s” traditions as essentially Hindu-Buddhist, locating Indonesia within a “Greater Indian” cultural sphere. As noted previously, this sort of interpretation—and particularly its corresponding rejection of a significant, more recent Islamic contribution to Indonesia’s cultural essence—had a lengthy scholarly lineage and a broad political appeal in the Indies, embracing such awkward bedfellows as nineteenth-century Dutch and native colonial administrators and scholars, as well as twentieth-century secular nationalists such as Sukarno. Through 1941, Pané’s Asian gaze had remained fixed on India, while his few references to Japan characterized it as little more than an effective copycat of the West—including its imperialist encroachment upon China! But amidst the vastly changed circumstances of March 1942, Pané’s longstanding investment in “Asia” appeared to trump any hesitation regarding a reorientation towards Japan.

Ring in this readjustment in his contribution to the first issue of *Asia Raya* entitled "The Culture of Greater Asia," Pané proposed a virtual grocery list of cultural traditions supposedly shared by Japanese and Indonesians.⁷⁷ Both honored their ancestors. Both built monuments to dead kings—a phenomenon also found in the West, he admitted, but "without the sense of religion as in the East." Both shared a Buddhist tradition. Japan's warrior code of *bushidō* could be compared to the Bhagavad-Gita and the stories of Sri Krishna. While Westerners considered themselves apart from nature, employing science as a weapon to "make Nature their servant" and to "add to their pleasure and their wealth," he wrote, Japanese, Indonesians, and other Easterners aspired to "become one with Nature." Westerners, he argued, were the prisoners of a materialism and greed that had possessed their spirit, their society, and their economy. Now the West was falling into a chasm of confusion (*kekaloetan*) and death (*kebinasaan*); worse, it sought to take the rest of the world down with it. Crisis followed upon crisis, *malaise* upon *malaise*, but the West had been unable to solve these problems because it had neglected to "change the basis of its culture."

Here Pané took up a question of perennial delicacy when it came to the constructing of an "Indonesian" national identity, all the more so now, with the (non-Muslim) Japanese rulers claiming a shared Asian history and culture. What of Islam, and the alternative global and Asian order that it suggested? In keeping with his prewar position, Pané played down this potential source of subversion. True, he noted, Islam had "left its mark" (*memberi tjeoraknja*) upon Indonesian culture, while in contrast "there are few Muslims in Japan and China." But this, he suggested, was but a ripple on the surface: "In its basis," he continued, "Indonesian culture is not different from those of Japan, China, or India."

In *Asia Raya*'s critical early first weeks that followed, Pané provided readers with a host of sophisticated arguments for a "return to Asia" that reflected, in his particular case, an ideological identification and evolution long predating Japan's arrival. In one of many such striking essays, Pané creatively conjured and mobilized a trans-Asian cultural heritage to take aim at what he called "The Mistake of Vulgar Marxism," symptomatic of a Western civilization on cultural and spiritual empty. Lambasting those who would "believe only in material life and material conditions," whose story of history was "merely that of changing means of production," who sought only to achieve "equality in all things," and whose realm of thinking "allows no room for the great beauty of nature," Pané accused Marxists of missing what really mattered most.

They fail to sense the miraculous in the beauty of the poems of Kalidjasa (India) and Li Tai Po (China), the *manyōshū* poets (Japan), or Pushkin (Russia). They approach society ... like a warehouse of machines. Mankind cannot attain an identical level, an identical ability, an identical character. What can be imagined and aimed for is to accord as good a place as possible to every person, according to his temperament, his character, and his ability.

The incisive weapons and analyses of Marxism had had their place in the Western-dominated colonial world, Pané asserted, but their continued unrestrained application now represented a hindrance to building of an improved, post-colonial Asian order.

It is imaginable that in times past the hearts of many Indonesians were drawn to Marxism (vulgar Marxism), as a [form of] resistance against an arbitrary colonial regime, but they must now be aware that the times have changed. We no longer face a colonial order ... What is important is to release one's self from the old thinking like that contained within (vulgar) Marxism ... because this sort of thinking is at odds with the soul of the East, which cannot forget the spiritual (*kerohanian*).⁷⁸

The answer to Indonesia's many remaining social problems, wrote Pané, was to be one of national unity rather than personal or class antagonism: "Indonesians who had a good position in the old order—good in a limited sense," he noted, "because in fact in the colonial order no one had it good—must find a way to put a greater priority upon the aspirations, aims, and interests of the whole rather than upon [those of] themselves alone." In so doing, he argued here and elsewhere, they would discard the divisive social legacies imported and imparted to Indonesia by an egoistic and materialistic West.⁷⁹ With the help of the Japanese, wrote Pané, things would now be different: "The new era will place culture in the center of society, and radiate it into all branches of life."

Noteworthy in the above essay too, however, was Pané's consistent attachment of the parenthetical distinction "vulgar" to the Marxism he criticized, indicating a bold refusal to surrender Marxism and its social relevance to Asian experience *in toto*, even at the possible risk of provoking the military censors. Perhaps out of concern for this risk, no elaboration was provided. But the qualification alone was enough to suggest that a *conditional and selective* appropriation of Marxist theories and principles, judiciously tempered with an ample dose of Eastern spirituality and culture, might yet have its place in a new, postcolonial and post-capitalist Asian order. For Pané as for many others to Greater Asia's political left, "Asia's" cultural essence thus represented more than simply a buffer against the modern ailments of revolution, materialism, and "nihilism." It also promised an alternative, organic route to social justice and progress against the modern enemies that Marx had so effectively and appealingly highlighted: the dreaded "imports" of capitalism and imperialism, along with the corrupt, decayed local "feudal remnants" with which they cohabited.

The particular depth of Pané's faith in an "Asian" solution was most profoundly reflected in a remarkable essay entitled "One Ancestry, One Race," written two months after the Japanese arrival.⁸⁰ Here, in the name of Greater Asia, Pané went so far as to suggest even the possible sacrifice of the sacred concept of Indonesia itself. Was "Indonesia," he argued, not itself in fact a foreign inheritance, a product of Western colonialism, in contrast to a natural, preexisting Asia? Echoing conservative Japanese spokesmen, Pané even appeared to embrace the ancient Japanese imperial terminology of *sumera mikuni* ("the imperial realm") and *sumera mitami* ("imperial subjects").

If we do not believe that the Indonesian race can enter *Sumera Mikuni* and become *Sumera Mitami*, then we are denying the true story and the true situation. For thirty years we have aspired to a unified Indonesia, to a great Indonesia (*Indonesia Raya*), such that it is understandable that there are Indonesians who are startled to hear of *Sumera Mikuni* and *Sumera Mitami*. But when we think deeply, we must

admit that what we considered our homeland for the last thirty years, and what we call Indonesia, is only a coincidence, merely the area corresponding to that under Dutch control.

It may be assumed that if the [Malay] Peninsula, the Philippines, Madagascar, and New Zealand too were included within the realm of Dutch control, we would view these areas too as a part of our homeland! In truth the original inhabitants of the [Malay] Peninsula, Madagascar, and New Zealand are [indeed] of the same ancestry and the same race as us. The Malay language of the Peninsula, the Malagasi language and the Maori language belong to the same family as the Indonesian language. It is easy for us, too, to feel as one race with the Japanese—suppose that Japan and Indonesia had both been under the rule of, for example, the English. Under these circumstances, we would have [already] been aspiring to *Sumera Mikuni* from before. It is thus clear that our denial of the possibility of being the same race as the Japanese and becoming *Sumera Mitami* is in essence completely hollow (*kosong belaka*), based only upon an unnatural situation, that is, upon Dutch hegemony.

For any who might have remained in the dark about what Pané was driving at, his subsequent conclusion left little room for second-guessing.

The desire for *Sumera Mikuni* and *Sumera Mitami* is based not upon facts of coincidence, but upon facts that are visible and real. The fact that we share the same ancestry with the Japanese race is not something merely temporary like Dutch rule. The wall that for so long kept us apart from Japan has now collapsed, and in this era the unification of the region of the Pacific Ocean—our ocean—is no longer simply a dream. Is it still appropriate that we nurture the old ideals, that we aim for Great Indonesia (*Indonesia Raya*), when we can now aim for ideals more in harmony with the desires of nature, more pure, that is to unify the *Sumera Mitami* once again and to purge foreign power from our homeland, from the Pacific Ocean? We understand that it is difficult for the inhabitants of Indonesia, who have for so long struggled to free themselves from imperialism, to immediately return to these proper ideals, to suddenly expand their aims. But the principles of *Sumera Mikuni* and *Sumera Mitami* must begin to be realized in Indonesian society, must become a guideline for us in all fields.

As reflected most vividly in “One Ancestry, One Race,” Pané revealed an exceptional early willingness to put into play the very racial, cultural, geographical, and political borders that defined “Indonesia” itself. In so doing, Pané stepped closer to Japan than most of his fellow nationalists were willing to go. Pané’s propensity for such statements later prompted the Dutch radio service employee Leo Jansen to brand him “one of the biggest [boot-]lickers.”⁸¹ Yet also exceptional in Pané’s case was his longer-term obsession with “Asia.” As such, his new embrace of Japan as Asia’s vehicle can be seen more as a modulation than a fundamental shift in his nation-building agenda—a change in means rather than ends, prompted by the unprecedented shift in the regional and global balance of power heralded by Japan’s irresistible arrival.

By the same token, Pané's public role as the most outspoken Indonesian proponent of a "natural" Japanese-Indonesian racial and cultural unity was not to last long. After just two months at *Asia Raya*, Pané returned to more quiet duties at the *Balai Poestaka* publishing house. In October he would take over leadership of the Center for Indonesian Arts (*Pusat Kesenian Indonesia*), while turning his attention to the writing of what would eventually become *Sejarah Indonesia*, a standard four-volume history of Indonesia—a history from which Japan was, remarkably enough, virtually absent.⁸²

In the meantime, as revealed in the pages of the new *Asia Raya* and elsewhere, Pané was hardly alone in adjusting his older views to fit a dizzying new set of circumstances. The dazzling display of Japanese power against the forces of the enemy West, and the accompanying notion of the arrival of a new Asian political, cultural, and racial order that would inevitably be Japan-centered, exerted its pull on a much wider spectrum of nationalist imaginations. In their own ways, nationalists of other political and cultural stripes joined in redefining "Indonesia" in light of Japan.

As noted above, such positions were not limited to the pages of *Asia Raya*. In an editorial that appeared on the front page of *Asia Raya*'s chief newspaper competitor *Pemandangan* on May 19—just six days after Pané's remarkable "One Ancestry, One Race"—editor-in-chief Anwar Tjokroaminoto offered an argument similar to that of Pané in a number of respects. Under the title "Broader Still" (*Lebih Loeas Lagi*), in language reminiscent both of Pané and such Japanese spokesmen as Tomizawa Uio, Shimizu Nobuo, and intelligence chief Murakami Takaaki, Tjokroaminoto criticized the ostensible outdatedness and narrowness of the prewar nationalist obsession with Indonesia itself, and called upon readers to open their eyes, and their allegiances, to the wider Asian world. But the Islamic nationalist Tjokroaminoto mobilized a different sort of rhetoric to reach his end, bringing a strong dose of Islam, and notions of *pan-Islam* in particular, into the equation. If Tjokroaminoto, like Pané, clearly accepted the non-Muslim Japanese as brothers and as leaders in the common struggle, his vision of a Greater Asia nevertheless diverged markedly. In contrast to Pané's Japan-centered *Soemera mikuni*, Tjokroaminoto's return to Greater Asia represented a return to the imagined ancient, unified precolonial realm of *Greater Islam*. If for him, like Pané, the Japanese advent had been enough to cast doubt upon the viability of prewar national conceptions, Tjokroaminoto's sturdy allegiance to Islam remained unshaken. In comparison to the claims of Islam, both Indonesian and Japanese interests remained secondary.

Thanks to the Japanese victory, Tjokroaminoto wrote, Indonesians now realized that "their homeland (*tanah airnja*) is in fact not narrow (*sempit*), but rather broad, covering all of Asia (*melipoeti seloeroeh Asia*).⁸³ Examination of the Muslim annals (*tarich*) since the spread of Islam confirmed that Indonesians had previously held close relations with people in Thailand, and earlier with people in India. But subsequent Western dominance in Asia had resulted in the "fracturing of this broad homeland, with each colonized group forming into a small homeland of their own (*bertanah-airkan sendiri-sendiri jang ketjil2*), also not independent." We now realize, he wrote, that "Asia is One."

If previously the [nationalist] movement was only limited to Indonesian-ness (*ke-Indonesiaan*), now it is broader, covering all the races of Asia as one race. This is certainly the case with the Islamic movement, because the opportunity is now open to make connections with our brothers across Asia, to the point that it is even possible to imagine one union of Asian Muslims, who number more than 400 million.⁸³

Within this general theme of expanding perspectives from the nation to Asia as a whole, in a front page editorial appearing the very next day (May 20, 1942), *Asia Raya* political editor Winarno offered a third perspective, one which, while acknowledging Japanese leadership, remained in many ways faithful to the traditional egalitarian ideals of prewar pan-Asianism. "The Indonesian nationalist movement began with aspirations beautiful and noble, that is to attain for the homeland a place great and prominent," he wrote. "But like all new shapes or constructions, it is certain that the Indonesian nationalist movement was born as an action because of the existence of a reaction, a resistance, a hindrance," in the form of Dutch opposition to these Indonesian aspirations.

Dutch power has now been obliterated from Indonesia. Many things that the Indonesian nationalist movement desired and aspired to can be accomplished now that Japanese power has brought about the collapse of Dutch power ... with Japanese assistance and leadership, what the Indonesian race aspires to regarding the greatness and nobility of the race, the nationality, and the nation of Indonesia in particular—and that of all the races of Asia generally—will be achieved.⁸⁴

Here, however, lay the catch: to reach this goal required the discarding of the old model of nationalist politics, and the harnessing and harmonization of these former powers of nationalist opposition towards unity with the new leaders in working towards a shared, Asian agenda. In a neat rhetorical turn, Winarno argued that this change in perspective was nothing less than the logical product of a natural, evolutionary process of broadening and expansion in outlook among Indonesia's sponsors, a process whose first phase had involved the unification of narrow (*sempit*) competing provincial agendas into a single, shared national agenda in the 1920s and 1930s, and whose decisive culminating event had come in the fusion of the Java-centric *Boedi Oetomo* with Dr. Soetomo's *Partai Bangsa Indonesia* to form the *Parindra* party in 1935. Here, wrote Winarno, it was left to the brilliant Dr. Soetomo, already at this time with his eye upon Japan, to foresee the next step in the logic of Indonesia's construction.

At this time, [Soetomo] already described a concept greater still. That is, not simply the unity of the Indonesian race, but also the unity of the Asian races! It was as if even beforehand, he could already see the present situation, that is, a time in which not only the slogans "Indonesia for the Indonesians" and *Indonesia Raya* are loudly proclaimed, but also Asia for the Asians, and Greater Asia, Noble Asia.

Those who now refused to get in step with the times, to abandon exclusive concern with the Indonesian nation alone and join this new Asian movement, continued Winarno, were like the narrow-minded (*berpendirian sempit*) activists of the old days who had refused to heed the nationalist call and had continued to dwell in old concepts of “Java for the Javanese et cetera ... The times always revolve. And the situation must change,” he concluded.

Careful attention to these and other nationalist statements at the time reveals that, while a close Japanese-Indonesian *relationship* might have been cast as natural, with the possible exception of Sanoesi Pané, Japanese *leadership* itself was not generally treated as some sort of natural or unchanging given, but was framed within several important qualifiers. First, Indonesian spokesmen emphasized Japan’s role not as Asia’s or Indonesia’s leader *as such*, but rather as the logical leader of Asia’s *development process*, a process that would occupy a finite amount of time, and would involve incremental transfers of authority and responsibility as warranted over the course of that time: not Japan as “Asia’s eternal leader,” as Shimizu Nobuo put it, but Japan as provider of nation-building *tutelage*. As Winarno put it in an *Asia Raya* editorial some two weeks after the paper’s launch,

At the moment Japan is carrying out its responsibilities with the sword and the rifle. Harshness and cruelty are necessary. But this is like the harshness and cruelty of a healer (*tabib*), who must cut the patient and shed his blood, in order to achieve the recovery of this person and to restore his health and dignity in the end ... So that a situation that appears very chaotic and full of violence, which brings forth many changes in many areas in the society and life of this country, is in fact only like the sickness and suffering of a mother, who ends up with happiness and a feeling of nobility once her baby is born. These are the “*barensweën*,” the pains of delivery, of Mother Indonesia, who is going to give birth to a new society ... we are sure that all the current difficulties and conditions that are out of the ordinary will only continue for a certain amount of time. If now there are many unemployed people, at a later time they will all certainly make a living once more. In fact things will be better than before.⁸⁵

In a fiery, remarkably confident rebuttal to a readers’ letter critical of the *Asia Raya*’s Indonesian staff published a day later, Winarno boldly asserted that there was nothing inherently or innately superior about Japan, and to suggest that the Japanese were any less fallible than their fellow Asians would be an insult to the brotherly unity both sides were striving for. “Why not criticize the Japanese too? Afraid? Or an inferiority complex? The time for that is past.”⁸⁶ Rather, Japan was simply further along in its national development than the rest of Asia, and was also better in touch with Asia’s common past. Japan thus logically had something to share, the *experience* of an older brother that Asians had no choice but to respect, and to learn from. On this note, in a May 28 front-page piece written ostensibly in praise of the Japanese education system, Winarno included a passage so bold that its appearance raises some question of the thoroughness—or the sentiments—of *Asia Raya*’s censors.

We are sure that our own religious teachings, as well as the great educational inheritance of our forefathers, are indeed enough to provide a basis for life, for life-goals, [and] that they are equally good, or perhaps better, than the teachings of the forefathers, or of religion, in Japan. But because of the influence of the West, because of Western-style education, it may be said that our life-goals, our religious teachings, and the teachings of our forefathers have fallen into chaos and confusion, and have been diluted.⁸⁷

Replacing Sanoesi Pané as *Asia Raya*'s regular cultural commentator from June 1942 onwards, Asmara Hadi—former *Taman Siswa* school teacher, *Pemandangan* journalist, and son-in-law of Sukarno—offered many similar arguments about the appropriateness of Indonesian tradition as Indonesia's ultimate model, while making only occasional or passing reference to Japan. In a mid-June piece entitled "The New Man"—also the title of a 1940 novel by Sanoesi Pané—Asmara, like many older Indonesian nationalists before him, offered an image not of Japan, but rather of the idealized Indonesian village, as repository of the ancient Eastern values now in need of rediscovery. "If you visit the countryside," he wrote,

you will witness the spirit of brotherhood that was the basis of Eastern society in eras past. Individual interests are unknown. What there is, are only the interests of the village society. All problems are also discussed together. If someone wants to build a house, thousands of hands are ready to assist. If someone experiences disaster, thousands of hearts join in sympathy. One helps another—mutual cooperation (*gotong-rojong*).⁸⁸

The Western spirit of individualism, Asmara wrote, had shackled the soul of this original Asian culture. As a result, the *gotong-royong* of today was "in many ways fettered," reduced to a shadow of its former self, "just a shape, not a soul." At the same time rejecting an indiscriminate return to the past, he acknowledged that even in its original form, *gotong-royong* was not perfect, making one's "fate and life dependent one's family," and thus "reducing one's own ability to act." Still, he concluded, the ultimate hindrance to the "progress of the East" was not the old *gotong-royong*, but Western imperialism. Indonesia's ultimate aim was to harmonize the values of *gotong-royong* with a modern respect for individuality, while rejecting Western individualism.

We shall not cast out *gotong-royong* as an ugly garment in exchange for individualism as our attitude towards life. Our mission is now to renew the shape of brotherhood that is the soul of the *gotong-royong* of the village, and encourage the individuality (*individualiteit*) in the life of each person.

In another essay published around the same time, Asmara Hadi proposed Japan's success in modernization not as proof of an essential Japanese superiority to other Asian countries, but of the capacity for all Asian nations to succeed in national development if not shackled by Western imperialism. Despite Western claims to the contrary, he continued, "dynamism is not the monopoly of the West, the East also moves

dynamically. There is in fact nothing in the world that is static in nature, everything changes, progresses, and grows.” The essential difference between East and West was rather a spiritual one: “Western dynamism is restless, while Eastern dynamism is calm,” he wrote. Revealing Sanoesi Pané’s influence—specifically that of *The New Man*—Asmara argued that while Westerners, unsure of themselves, were “always searching and working hard ... as in the character of Faust,” Easterners, in contrast, were sure of themselves, aware that “change is only on the surface, while the essence (*dasar*) is unchanging.” So too with the culture of Greater Asia, whose motif (*tjorak*) or its shape (*bentoek*) might change, but never its essence. In a conclusion every bit as radical as that of Winarno above—including its deployment of the Indonesian nationalist slogan *merdeka*—Asmara Hadi proclaimed:

If in the past four centuries Eastern society has seemed it is no longer alive, this is the fault of Western imperialism, which shackled (*merantai*) the spirit of progress. Proof that Eastern countries can develop their life if they are not shackled, as long as they are free (*merdeka*), stands erect before us: Japan.⁸⁹

Consciously or not, the daily language of *Asia Raya*’s writers thus played a role in reinforcing the notion of the legitimacy of Indonesia and Indonesians as equal players in an Asian partnership. Critically important to this was the ceaseless use of the words “Indonesia” and “Indonesians” themselves. Thus did the existence of Indonesia itself appear as an unchanging given, even as its future political shape was not directly addressed. That these terms remained acceptable to the propaganda squad and its censors despite the banning of the more explicitly political Indonesian flag and anthem appears to have been attributable, at least in part, to the efforts of Ichiki Tatsuo. In a local journal article for a Japanese audience published in late 1944, Ichiki wrote,

After the imperial army had conquered Java, there were people around who argued that the words “Indonesian [language]” (*Indoneshia-go*) and “Indonesian race” (*Indonesia minzoku*) should be eradicated. I always disagreed, and I complained to my boss [presumably Colonel Machida] ... that these sorts of opinions were no more than shallow, myopic nonsense.

In pressing what was for him a deeply emotional issue, Ichiki was careful to mobilize a powerful practical argument.

In order for Japanese to penetrate completely, it is necessary that we aim for the maintenance of the Indonesian language as its platform. Moreover, it is precisely the Indonesian language, which now advances in Java, that must serve as the future standard language not only in the former territories of the East Indies, but also within the broader Indonesian sphere identified both in geography and anthropology.⁹⁰

As important as the use of the term Indonesia itself was *Asia Raya*’s regular discursive equation of Indonesia and Indonesians with Japan and the Japanese, achieved in

part simply by speaking of them both in the same breath. In his introductory essay entitled “The West Retreats, The East Advances,” for example, Soekardjo wrote that the publication of *Asia Raya* represented a symbol of the “co-operative efforts of Japan and Indonesia.”⁹¹ In a mid-July essay entitled “Japan and Indonesia: A Twosome,” he referred to Japan as “The northern boundary of Asia” and Indonesia as “the southern boundary of Asia.”⁹² Statements such as these might have seemed uncontroversial enough, but in subtle ways, their repetition helped to buttress the legitimacy of Indonesian nationhood in the eyes of *Asia Raya*’s readership.

The conjuring and reinforcement of the notion of a preexisting Indonesia as a nation comparable to Japan was further enhanced by the inclusion of a sizeable Indonesia heading in *Asia Raya*’s news pages, appearing daily from day one. The news briefs under this heading came mostly from around Java, but also included stories from the rest of the archipelago when available. While the construction of Indonesia had been underway in the nationalist press for some time, this was the first time that an official, government-approved publication had presented it in these terms, not to mention in the Indonesian language itself.

Many Japanese spokesmen also continued to use the term Indonesia, particularly in *Asia Raya*.⁹³ While Ichiki’s arguments and sympathy with the notion of Indonesia among some Japanese no doubt played some part in this, of perhaps equal importance was simply the Japanese failure—conscious or otherwise—to come up with a suitably Japan-centered alternative term for the archipelago as a whole to replace the now defunct term “Netherlands East Indies” (*Ran’in tōindō*), either in Japanese or Malay. This failure may be attributed in part to the division of jurisdiction over the former East Indies between the 25th Army in Sumatra and Malaya, the 16th Army in Java and Madura, and the navy in the remaining northern and eastern islands of the former East Indies. This situation encouraged the various Japanese administrations to speak de facto mostly of specific islands (*Jawa*, *Sumatera*, etc.) rather than to speak of the entire former Dutch administrative territory, thus in a sense—ironically, and for the most part no doubt unintentionally—abandoning discussion of the archipelago as a whole to the proponents of Indonesia as a whole. When 16th-Army official proclamations did treat the archipelago in its entirety, even in ostensibly anti-nationalistic decrees—and even as the Japanese-language version referred in one place to the “occupied areas” (*senryōchi*) or in another to the “East Indies” (*tōindō*)—the Indonesian version of the same proclamations still used the term Indonesia.⁹⁴

Alongside the emphasis upon a Japanese-led development process and upon Japanese-Indonesian equality, a third condition that Indonesian journalists attached to the legitimacy of Japanese leadership was that its results where Indonesians were concerned must surpass those of the old Dutch regime, and do so in relatively short order. After all, they noted, the Dutch too had technical know-how and experience in nation-building, and had over time promised much to Indonesia. But, as Sanoesi Pané observed in his opening essay on “The Culture of Greater Asia,” and continued to argue almost daily in his *Asia Raya* culture column thereafter, theirs was a progress and a modernity with no heart, no soul. The Dutch, like other Western colonizers, had remained cynical, hypocritical, arrogant, aloof, ultimately consumed by their great Western egos and by the Western obsession with the financial bottom line. Despite

talk of ethical rule, they had employed their power and advancement not towards Indonesian betterment, but rather towards their own enrichment at Indonesian expense. Under them, Indonesians had grown to want only independence. As Winarno observed in his introductory submission to *Asia Raya* on April 29, entitled "Towards *Asia Raya*,"

For 300 years were the Dutch Kings in power in this land. For 300 years the flag of Holland waved in this country, without ever attracting or weaving together all Indonesian hearts in a sense of love, as one group, sharing a fate and a responsibility with the kings and people of Holland. This is doubtless for no other reason than that this flag was never planted in the field of Indonesian feelings in a way that was healthy and fertile. The behavior of the Dutch government did not provide the people with the conviction that the Dutch government would truly provide honor and prosperity to Holland and Indonesia alike. Because of this, until the end of Dutch rule here, most of the people remained cold towards the [Dutch] king and flag.⁹⁵

While Holland had thus failed Indonesia politically and economically, the essential ingredient of the Dutch failure, implied Winarno, was not so much a material or political but *cultural*. The success of Japan's venture hinged upon the Japanese *thinking* and *behaving* in a fundamentally different way towards Indonesians, expressing a sense of trust and solidarity of which the Dutch had spoken, but never realized. The suggestion was that the presence of foreign leaders on Indonesian soil could serve Indonesia's nation-building interests. What mattered above all else, however, was the quality of the relationship, whose essence could not be *colonial*, but must rather truly resemble that of an (idealized) family. The Dutch had been hypocrites; the Japanese, as fellow Asian older brothers, had to be different. "Hopefully not 300 years," wrote Winarno on April 29, 1942, "but 300 days will be enough for the protection and mercy of the Japanese Emperor to instill a genuine sense of love and happiness among the Indonesian people."⁹⁶

While the relationship was described in essentially cultural terms, however, even as family relations cannot be divested from politics, so the Indonesian journalists did not shy from associating the development of mutual *trust* with the essentially political issue of *entrustment*. In a mid-June editorial, Winarno's unmistakable subject was the Japanese entrustment of military power to Indonesians, as yet still forthcoming.

The desire to work together and the willingness to strengthen the rear guard (*barisan belakang*) so that it supports Japan's war will certainly be that much greater if every day it is that much clearer to the people that the slogans that are being trumpeted by *Dai Nippon*, and their project of [working] together to bring respect for the level of the Asian races and to seek world peace, are not just empty slogans like those of the Dutch before, but are truly carried out. We believe and hear that later on, greater signs of trust, such as becoming solidiers etcetera, will also certainly be accorded other races, such as the Indonesian race. Later on, military schools and the like will also certainly be established here.⁹⁷

To Winarno and those of his class in particular, the deep appeal of the possibility of a return to a new, improved Asia was enough, for the moment, to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt. They understood as well as their Japanese counterparts that until the war was won, in material terms at least, mutual sacrifice was to be the order of the day. Now gently, now forcefully, however, the message was there: the Japanese had a brotherly bargain to keep.

All things to all Asians: The rise and fall of the Three-A movement

The optimism that dominated the sentiments of Indonesian nation-builders in the early months of the Japanese occupation was underpinned by visions of cultural renovation. But among both the new *priyayi* and other groups within Indonesian society, the embrace of the Japanese-Indonesian project was also fueled by more mundane personal and political concerns and calculations. Taking encouragement in particular from the pragmatically pan-Asianist vision of the propaganda squad's Shimizu Hitoshi, whose East Asian League ideal sought spontaneous Asian acquiescence in Japanese leadership within a framework of local autonomy, representatives of a gamut of elite social and political groupings in Indies society—groupings historically often in rivalry with one another, including secular nationalists, Muslim leaders, elite native officials, and the ethnic Chinese community—seized the offered hand of the propaganda squad, in the form of participation in the “Three-A” (*Tiga A*) movement, as a means of securing influence and security within the new order. To Shimizu, the Three-A thus quickly appeared as a unified Asian mass movement involving all of Indonesia's Asian ethnic and social groups of the sort that he and his mentor Ishiwara Kanji had long envisioned, but never realized.⁹⁸

In fact, almost from the outset, the Three-A movement emerged as a tug of war, with each participant seeking to mold it to his own purposes. Japanese responses to the movement revealed a Japanese side no more unified in its structure and agendas than the Indonesian society over which it ruled. Banging the drum of Asian unity, yet offering little in terms of how to achieve it, the Three-A was to be fractured by the very established, competing social and political forces and agendas—both Japanese and Indonesian—that it sought to overcome in a new, post-Western unity. As such it represented an early object lesson in both the ideological appeals and the practical impossibilities of the Greater Asian project.

A number of subsequent observers later described the Three-A as a Japanese-orchestrated project, and politically doomed as such from the start. A standard Japanese analysis of the Occupation period published by scholars at Waseda University's Social Sciences Institute in 1959 dismissed the Three-A as “a piece of comedy written and produced by Shimizu Hitoshi, its leader, and performed by the Indonesians.”⁹⁹ For his part, Mohammad Hatta characterized the Three-A in a mid-1970s interview as an expression of Japanese aspirations that was hated by Indonesians, its leaders simply following Shimizu's instructions.¹⁰⁰ In his memoirs, former Batavia Consul and advisor to the Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*) Miyoshi Shunkichirō branded the Three-A an “infantile ding-dong party” based on the “worship of Japan,” with “no

aim, no principal, and no structure,” serving simply as a “pacification movement for the beginning phase of the occupation.” Miyoshi did, however, attach to his critique the following, revealing admission: “Like all backward peoples, the Indonesian race have always had a fun-loving character, and love dance and song. Because of this, it is true that ... the movement was quite popular and effective.”¹⁰¹

Essays on the movement from some of Shimizu Hitoshi’s own *bunkajin* colleagues at the Propaganda Squad confirmed the Three-A, at least in their eyes, as a self-absorbed, Japan-centered endeavor. In an article introducing the Three-A movement to Japanese readers in the April 3 first issue of *Unabara*, Asano Akira derided the Allied “V” for Victory movement, whose victory would be none other than a “victory of democracy and finance capital.” While acknowledging that the democracy offered by the Americans and Europeans might seem appealing, it was in fact nothing more than another desperate Western scheme, and, for Asians, a blind alley. Asano warned that Asian intellectuals intoxicated by Western ideas such as independence and autonomy—like the Chinese intelligentsia and Gandhi in India—were simply asking for a “new subjugation ... This is why Japan got involved in the China incident ... Asia is, must be, and can be one,” he continued, but this carried a “great pre-condition ... Asia’s unity must be supported by Japan. In sum, Japan is Asia’s sun, its origin, its ultimate power.” Japan’s imperial history revealed that the Japanese were born to support the divine enterprise of the renovation of neighboring lands, according to the ideal of *hakkō ichiu*.

This expedition to the Dutch East Indies is for nothing other than the completion of the great task of the restoration of Greater Asia, which began with the Russo-Japanese War ... To revive the sublime myth of *Sumera mikuni*. For this reason, we must impart to the letter A the following meanings:

Asia’s “light,” Japan
 Asia’s “mother,” Japan
 Asia’s “leader,” Japan.¹⁰²

In a series of contributions to his daily *Asia Raya* Japanese-language instruction column in mid-May 1942—and thus for an Indonesian audience—*bunkajin* Kitahara Takeo depicted a fictive conversation with the “clever Indonesian” named “Martono-kun” regarding the meaning of the Three-A movement.¹⁰³ After regurgitating the three Japanese versions of the Three-A slogans, Martono-kun was then made to explain each one, citing the following as “what his father told him”: Japan was the Light of Asia because of its military victories. Japan was the Mother of Asia in that it protected and educated her children. Finally, Japan was the Leader of Asia because it “teaches or directs, like a teacher. The teacher gives various instructions. The students must pay attention to the teacher’s words and do as they are told.”¹⁰⁴

At one point in his memoirs, the propaganda squad’s commander Lt. Col. Machida claimed not only that Indonesians “took the Three-A slogans to imply independence,” but that “myself and the members of the [squad] implied that extensively, and, honestly said, this was what we hoped for.”¹⁰⁵ But in Machida’s case, too, there was wartime evidence to the contrary. In a commentary on an introductory radio speech delivered by Three-A leader Samsuudin, published in *Unabara* under the title “Thought and

Practice” on April 24, 1942, Machida equated the Three-A with both the worship and adoration of, and obedience to, Japan, and urged its leaders to pay more attention to *Sumera*-ism.

If Japan is an object of worship of an Asian sort, of adoration of an Asian sort, of obedience of an Asian sort, then the Three-A spirit is the very thing that should be murmuring from the depths of the guts of all Asians. The Three-A has seen success as a propaganda campaign to smash the ABCD powers, to turn back the VICTORY [movement], and to head off a Dutch return, but it is not possible to predict how it will develop. I mean that while the Three-A now stands as a bulwark against the enemy, we must consider that it is still short on the fundamental idea of a world *sumera* movement.¹⁰⁶

Elsewhere in his memoirs, Machida later acknowledged Three-A propaganda as a place in which the Squad's men of enlightenment betrayed the universal values of the Western and Meiji enlightenment in favor of particularistic, ignoble colonial notions of racial and cultural superiority.

Fukuzawa Yūkichi once said, “Heaven does not make one man above another man,” but of course people existed above other people, and of course I also believed this to be only natural.¹⁰⁷ With this special idea of the *Yamato* race, we mistakenly recognized Japan as some sort of special nation, and mistakenly believed the Japanese to be a sort of divine race; because of this, we produced Three-A-ism in all seriousness, even with an air of assuredness. Now I am ashamed, and do not want to speak much of this. Yet if I want to speak of the propaganda squad, without this, I could not touch upon its essence.¹⁰⁸

Even among the most enlightened and brotherly-minded of Japanese, an underlying sense of racial and cultural superiority, puffed up by Japan's great military victories, was seldom far from the surface. But however serious and assured this form of Three-A-ism was, the Three-A movements' Indonesian practitioners themselves in fact pursued their own course, and were little affected by these sorts of pronouncements. Although propaganda squad members besides Shimizu Hitoshi made occasional references to the movement and made appearances at several large early Three-A rallies in Batavia, throughout the movement's tenure, Shimizu Hitoshi remained the only Japanese figure directly involved with the movement. For his part, Shimizu always stubbornly maintained that the shape of the movement, like its strategically Japan-worshipping slogans, was a product of Indonesian imaginations and ambitions rather than his own, or those of anyone else on the Japanese side. Some postwar analysts, he noted, suggested that he had modeled the Three-A on Japan's wartime mass organization the *Taisei yokusankai*, or the Japanese-sponsored *Shin min hui* in Peking, but even where its ostensibly Japan-worshipping slogans were concerned,

the real substance [of the movement] was entirely produced by Indonesians. I only tacked on an interpretation or mediation, so that for the most part there was no

Japanese intent involved ... It never got to the point where we'd say, "in Japan they did it like this, in the *Kyōwakai* they did it like this, in Manchuria they did it like this."¹⁰⁹

The evidence, both from Shimizu's own description, and from the documentary record, would seem to favor this view. As the propaganda squad's Col. Machida recalled, immediately from its inception, "like a prairie fire, like fireworks echoing across the country," the Three-A took off with a speed that took even the optimistic Shimizu by surprise, not to mention the rest of the Japanese establishment, to which the movement had no direct connection.¹¹⁰ Miyoshi's cynical commentary on the movement as a ding-dong party reflected the attitude of many in the Military Administration Department, including its senior officers Harada and Nakayama, who were highly skeptical towards what they regarded as the loose-cannon antics of Shimizu and the propaganda squad generally. This highlighted a point of conflict that had far-reaching implications for the squad and its activities, in particular the Three-A. The divide in Japanese responses to this unexpected chain of events was over the perennial military-colonial question of order and control. But it ran not only *between* the squad and the rest of the Japanese establishment, but even—as revealed in the above essays on the Three-A, and in attacks elsewhere upon the East Asian League concept generally—through the squad itself.

The most prominent participants in the Three-A movement were members of the cooperator nationalist *Parindra* party. Within weeks of the party's founding by Shimizu Hitoshi and *Parindra*'s Raden Samsuudin in mid-March, *Parindra* established dominance in the movement's central office and in its growing number of local branches. In the same period, other *Parindra* men, including party leader Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, ensconced themselves at the propaganda squad-sponsored *Asia Raya* newspaper. Although its editors formally adopted an independent posture vis-à-vis the Three-A, Shimizu Hitoshi viewed the newspaper as an organ of the movement.

Three weeks after the startup of *Asia Raya*, on May 20, 1942, *Parindra*'s leaders announced that, in keeping with the landmark Japanese order of March 20 banning all discussion and political activity regarding matters of state, it had already ceased all "political action," including the acceptance of new members, the issuing of party membership cards, and the collecting of contributions for political action. Those branches or individuals that failed to toe the line, they added, faced dissolution or expulsion. "However," the leaders continued, those *Parindra* institutions "not at all concerned with the issue of the form of the state, that is those only carrying out social and economic improvements, may continue," provided that they made contact with the local administration in each area. Here followed an extensive list of not less than fourteen such *Parindra*-sponsored institutions and activities, including the communal support organizations *Roekoen Tani* and their city equivalents the *Roekoen Kampoen*, grocery-shop associations, fisherman's organizations, assistance for the unemployed, aid for the poor, health clinics and hospitals, elementary schools, the party youth-scout movement *Surya Wirawan*, the providing of public consultation and information, and newspapers.¹¹¹ *Parindra*, it seemed, was anything but dead, and indeed now planned to continue to pursue its old program of gradualist socio-economic reform and improvement—and the establishment of national leadership credentials hereby—

in a powerful framework of “cooperation” with the Japanese regime that had been attempted, but never realized, under the Dutch. *Parindra* leader Soekardjo’s sense of relative comfort with this idea was later reflected in the wartime memoirs of *bunkajin* Asano Akira, a fellow worker at *Asia Raya*, who described Soekardjo’s expression at the time of the May 20 announcement as remaining “full of vitality,” even as that announcement meant “in effect the dissolution of *Parindra*.” Asano added revealingly that Soekardjo seemed to “understand well enough” that there was “no way forward other than the *Asia Raya* movement, via the Three-A movement.”¹¹²

The May 20 list was similar to one issued a month later by the leadership of the Three-A movement, here in the context of an outline for the proposed structure and activities of party branches, which had in the meantime spread to some 58 of Java’s 79 Regencies.¹¹³ According to these mid-June “Instructions,” at each Three-A branch, a total of at least 28 persons were to be charged as branch preparation managers (*Penggoeroes Persiapan Tjabang*). Alongside a branch chairman and an assistant chairman, a secretary, a treasurer, and at least three general assistants, who together were to represent those of the highest authority in the branch, these included the following branch directorships, each of which were to have two assistants of their own: Economic Affairs; Aid to the Suffering; Youth Affairs, Scouting, and Sport; Education and Teaching; Propaganda; Religious Affairs; and Women’s Affairs. The Instructions stated that this was only the beginning, for with the expected “growth of Three-A capabilities,” the number and types of branch managers, as well as the affairs they dealt with, would “certainly increase.” Each section was charged with unifying and coordinating all local organizations involved in their field under Three-A leadership. More ambitious still, a separate section of these instructions encouraged the establishment of subsections (*ranting*) of the movement “in every place that is not occupied by a regent,” whose structure was to be identical to those of the branches. “Members resident in a given village” below this subsection level were in turn expected to establish further village-level subsections of these subsections, each with one chairman and two assistants.¹¹⁴ Observing the moves of the Three-A movement in this period with his usual acumen, the Dutch radio worker Leo Jansen concluded: “The semi-official 3A-movement is issuing regulations, and puts on airs as if it is ready to replace the military administration at any time.”¹¹⁵

The many Three-A-associated activities undertaken in the summer of 1942 also included the forming of a new “Greater Asian Youth Corps” (*Barisan Pemoeda Asia Raya*), composed chiefly of former members of *Parindra*’s *Surya Wirawan* and the boy scout organization *Kepandoean Bangsa Indonesia* (KBI).¹¹⁶ Formed in 1930 as a fusion of preexisting scouting organizations of both a Javanese and nationalist orientation—and as a nationalist alternative to the Dutch-sponsored NIPV (*Nederlands-Indiesche Padvindere Vereeniging*, or the “Netherlands-Indies Boy Scouts Union”), the KBI’s membership had included the sons of many members of the progressive *priyayi* elite.¹¹⁷ Allowed to continue under the Dutch as an ostensibly apolitical organization, the KBI—under the active guidance of *Parindra*’s Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, among others—had nevertheless fostered a strong sense of national identity and an ethic of national service akin to that nurtured in the scouting organizations in Europe and the United States. As was the case with their counterparts in other countries, this mix was

also proffered with a good dose of quasi-military discipline.¹¹⁸ According to former KBI member S.J. Sondakh, “as it happened one of our leaders was made one of the directors in the ‘Technical [and Sport] Section’ [of the Greater Asian Youth Corps] ... in fact we had already begun to receive military instruction—not from the Japanese but before that—and here,” said Sondakh, “we brought with us everything about discipline and about forming ranks that we had already [picked up] from the K.B.I.”¹¹⁹

In fact, on balance, there appears to have been little substantial Japanese involvement in the Greater Asian Youth Corps. Rather—as with many other Three-A projects—there was a good measure of elite Indonesian nation-building continuity, newly catered with a special emphasis and packaging seemingly in line with the demands of the new Asian-Japanese era. Under the leadership of prominent *Parindra* member Dr. Slamet Sudibyo, for example, selected members of the Greater Asian Youth Corps were to undergo a three-month course of practical and theoretical training at the Greater Asian Youth Corps Institute, under a teaching staff consisting entirely of *Parindra* men and national-minded native officials.¹²⁰ By August, the membership of the corps in Batavia alone had swelled to nearly six thousand, including a new girls’ contingent numbering nearly 800. Following the alleged success of a pilot program outside of Batavia, Wijorpranoto further proposed the establishment of Three-A-sponsored youth work-study camps in each of Java’s 1,386 subdistricts: “That means we shall have some 136,800 youth becoming heroes, defenders of the race and nation.” The idea for an *arbeidsdienst* in the form of a work-study camp, noted Soekardjo, was not new, but rather something with which *Parindra* already had had some experience in East Java in the late 1930s, inspired in part by a Nazi-German model.¹²¹ The Three-A further strongly encouraged the establishment of agricultural and small industrial cooperatives at the branch level, again something with which *Parindra* had prewar experience.

While its members dominated the movement leadership, *Parindra* was hardly the only group eager to jump aboard the Three-A bandwagon. “Everyone, including the Chinese, the Arabs, the Indonesians—well, the half-castes [people of Dutch-Indonesian descent] didn’t really come out enthusiastically—but almost all of the Asians entered *en masse*,” recalled Shimizu in a characteristically exaggerated but nevertheless striking statement. “Particularly strong in the Three-A were the Muslims, they really enthusiastically supported it.”¹²² Early Muslim enthusiasm for the Three-A was partly encouraged by the actions of Shimizu himself, who was indeed not above donning a *pitji* and rechristening himself “*Hadji Shimizu*” for the cause.¹²³ As suggested by the recollections of prominent Islamic nationalist Harsono Tjokroaminoto, younger brother of *Pemandangan*’s Anwar and son of *Sarekat Islam* cofounder Umar Said Tjokroaminoto, Shimizu’s shaky Muslim credentials themselves appear to have been taken at face value, although the language barrier severely hampered Shimizu’s ability to play Lawrence of Arabia to Java’s Muslims. “This Hadji Shimizu,” said Tjokroaminoto, “it was indeed a shame, he could not speak fluent Indonesian, only one or two words.”¹²⁴ For Java’s Muslim leadership, interest in working with the Japanese, and with the Three-A, was in any case also determined by other factors than the qualities of Japan’s representatives. Muslims were represented prominently in the movement’s leadership, notably in the form of Three-A number two man, General Secretary Sjahboedin Latief

of the *Sarekat Islam*. In a *Pemandangan* essay dated April 16, 1942, Muslim spokesman M. Hazboellah reflected enthusiasm for the new occupiers and for the Three-A as a site of potential Muslim unification, harmonization, and political advancement. His playful reinvention of the Three-A slogans along specifically Islamic lines simultaneously emphasized both a genuine sense of opening to the new Japanese order, and a desire to domesticate it, to turn the new arrangement towards Muslim ends.

Witness the passion for work and the purity of the hearts of Dai Nippon! In the [Japanese] army ranks all groups are represented, including followers of Islam, and it has already been proven that the Muslim religion is highly respected, because a number of their leaders have called for unity and cooperation ... We have no need for many [political] parties, only one Islamic Party, because the more parties there are, the more splits there are. Let us form a strong Islamic front, with a true Islamic spirit, as a member of the "A.A.A. movement," which is also the slogan of Muslims, that is: "Allah from Beginning to End" (*Allah Awal Achir*).¹²⁵

As with *Parindra*, the early Japanese outlawing of political activity in general, supplemented in this case by the quiet but explicit Japanese banning of the *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (PSII) in early May 1942, further focused the sights of politically ambitious Muslims upon the Three-A.¹²⁶

Not to be outdone was the economically powerful Chinese community, whose support for the Three-A movement was actively sought by Hitoshi Shimizu. Where the "natives" were concerned, however, it was a move that jeopardized the movement's potential from the very outset. That the step was taken in the first place, and the problems thus engendered, highlighted limits both to the practical and ideological applicability of Hitoshi Shimizu's brand of Greater Asianism in the social and political context of occupied Java.

Shimizu's courting of the Chinese was forced in part by practical concerns. As an independent propaganda squad project, the Three-A could not count on any direct funding from the Japanese military, nor was there money available from the squad budget. But for Shimizu, there appears to have been more at stake than simple calculation. If "native" nationalists had a history of perceiving the Chinese as an enemy of themselves and their cause—and many Japanese, too, could see the Chinese only as an implacable, conniving foe—Shimizu seems to have held few such reservations. Shimizu's original area of expertise was China and the Chinese, and while others in China had quickly favored a get-tough approach in response to Chinese resistance, Shimizu had held firm to the possibility of a genuine coming together with the Chinese based upon common interests as Asians. His efforts in China had met with little support, however, either from fellow Japanese or from the local population. With Indonesia's Chinese, Shimizu was anxious to achieve the success that had escaped him in China.

From Shimizu's perspective at least, the first signs could hardly have been more promising. On March 30, 1942, thirty members of the executive of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce were called to an emergency session, in which Shimizu asked for help with the Three-A.¹²⁷ Shimizu recalled of his speech,

I'd had experience with China, I'd been there four or five years, and I could speak Peking dialect, so speaking Pekingese, I more or less said that their past sins would be forgiven if they cooperated with us from now on ... those with power, [give of your] power, those with money, [give of your] money, those with brains, [give of your] brains—with these three, let us work as one. When I said this, my *kakyō* colleagues were delighted.¹²⁸

Whether Shimizu's "Pekingese" was any easier to understand than his Malay remains unclear.¹²⁹ But this was hardly the time or place to offer a critique. The "delight" of the delegates was no doubt genuine in so far as Shimizu's Three-A promised a safe passage in a dangerous situation. After the disaster of the *perampokan*, the Chinese community was most eager to gain Japanese support and protection, and there was further fear of Japanese suppression as "enemy aliens." The delegates pledged to "participate in and to realize the Three-A movement with all their hearts." They began by "covering over allied propaganda posters on all main streets with Three-A posters."¹³⁰

In subsequent weeks, the Chinese community in Batavia contributed the immense sum of 30,000 yen to the new movement, the lion's share of which Shimizu turned towards the production of the new *Asia Raya* newspaper, standard-bearer of the Three-A.¹³¹ Chinese propaganda efforts were equally impressive, getting the jump on those of their "native" counterparts. In what became a monthly celebration of Japan's declaration of war on the Allied powers the previous December 8, Batavia's Chinese community quickly organized street marches for April 8, 1942, accompanied by the following commentary in the Malay-language Hong-Po newspaper: "hopefully the Indonesians will also celebrate this day, in the hopes that Japan's aspirations for building *Asia Raya* will soon be realized and that perfection and prosperity will come to all Asia's races." Citing this text, a front-page cartoon in the nationalist newspaper *Pemandangan* depicted the Three-A movement as an elephant, atop which sat a person in Chinese costume waving enthusiastically to the reader. Retailers in Batavia and elsewhere, the vast majority of whom were ethnic Chinese, were also quick to get aboard. Shops and restaurants with names such as "Weltevreden" were re-christened as "Asia" and the like, while in a striking newspaper advertisement marking the emperor's birthday, the Batavia branch of the shoe manufacturer Bata was bold enough to suggest not only that "Asia is Great," but that it was possible to "add to this greatness by wearing Bata shoes, because Bata shoes are made in Indonesia by the sons and daughters of Asia." To this was added the following new reading of the Three-A slogans: "How sweet to the eyes, the children of Asia wearing Bata shoes, heading towards Greater Asia."¹³²

By the time of the May eighth of the month celebration, Three-A leader Samsøedin remarked that "at this time, for example in Jakarta, in every nook and cranny, along the streets, and even amidst the goods for sale in the shops, you can see the [Three-A] symbol in all sorts of colors and patterns."¹³³ Similar events transpired in Bandung, where a "native" observer wryly reported that members of the Chinese community competed with one another in "pouring out money" for the emperor's birthday (*tenchōsetsu*) celebration of April 29. They "didn't care how much they spent," he added; so long as they could "attain the label of extremely pro-Nippon."¹³⁴ In his May 8 radio speech, Samsøedin too voiced skepticism in this regard.

Honorable listeners! Do not misunderstand! The general management of the Three-A movement and the movement's promoters do not wish you to place a Three-A sign in front of your house, or affix a poster with its symbol in front of your shop, if you do not do this with a pure heart, within the knowledge that you are supporting noble aspirations ... This symbol has no meaning for you or for he who displays it if you do not consider: "What is in fact the basis or principle of this Three-A movement?" In other words, the aspirations of the Three-A will not be achieved if we only just go along for the sake of show, and this sort of action does not represent a support for the *pergerakan rakyat*.¹³⁵

Samsoedin's use of the term *pergerakan rakyat* in reference to the Three-A—something he did repeatedly—was noteworthy. Although *pergerakan rakyat* literally meant a "popular movement," it was also the standard term for the nationalist movement, and for most nationalists the people referred to in the term "popular movement" were those exclusively of "native" ethnicity. Samsoedin's comment here could thus be read as expressing two things. First, the Three-A represented a form of the Indonesian nationalist movement. Second, the enthusiastic involvement of the Chinese community—as well as those of other "non-natives"—was suspect, and not necessarily welcome, particularly when the relationship moved from one of support to one of domination.

So far as it seemed a means of further securing influence and approval, many native officials, including Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo, embraced the Three-A movement. In a speech that followed an introductory radio address by Three-A leader Samsoedin on April 22, Soetardjo warned his colleagues in the public administration that, as the Japanese had strongly condemned all "divisions among the people," so native officials had to remember that they were "a part of the people." While he embraced the general notion of a native official cultural reorientation along Asian-nationalist lines, however, Soetardjo made it clear that, in political terms, such officials were hardly prepared to play second fiddle to any other domestic party, whether in or outside of the Three-A. The Three-A movement, he said, was "entirely appropriate to your responsibilities as an administrator (*bestuurder*)," rather than "as an official (*bestuurs ambtenaar*)."¹³⁶ In the Three-A, he continued,

the elite (*priyayi*) administration can occupy its best possible place, a place where you can truly reveal yourself to be the oldest in your jurisdiction. *Oldest* in the best possible sense. I ask you: Do you love your race and your homeland? Prove it now ... In this new era, the *priyayi* administration has already achieved the position that it aspired to. Take this opportunity to demonstrate to all, that you are truly ready to occupy this new position. I think I may now call upon all the races of Asia in our land, in particular the Indonesian race, to gather immediately and seek contact with the "oldest" of each locality. Our aim is to achieve the creation of this A.A.A. organization immediately, throughout the land.¹³⁷

Soetardjo offered a vision of the Three-A as a place where native officials, as Indonesia's traditional and still presumably best-qualified leaders, could ideally

realize the great opportunity the Japanese had already granted them: an opportunity to use the authority the Dutch had never really availed them to demonstrate a selfless, patriotic national leadership, a leadership worthy of the faith the Japanese had shown by retaining and promoting them in the first place. An intelligence report authored by an anonymous, critical Indonesian nationalist in Bandung in June 1942 described native officials as being “just like the ethnic Chinese” in “trying only to show how pro-Nippon they are.” As an example he cited the statements of a local subdistrict chief (*sonchō*), who proclaimed that from now on there would be only one, government-approved party, with its leader being native officialdom.¹³⁸ The observer noted that he and other native officials “mean by this [party] the Three-A.” “For this reason,” he concluded, “it is hardly surprising that [native officials] work hard for this Three-A movement.”¹³⁹

On the local level, penetration and domination of the movement by representatives of the established colonial order was widespread. *Pemandangan* coverage of the founding of a new Three-A branch in the West Javanese city of Sukabumi in late April described proceedings led by a representative of the Three-A Batavia office named Badjoeri and a local notable named Danoeasmoro. Among those present were the local regent (*bupati*), the mayor, and R. Asikin, the director of the Sukabumi police academy. “From those who desired to contribute with a sincere heart,” the report continued, a total of more than 200 guilders was collected, including 50 guilders from the *bupati*, 25 each from Danoeasmoro and another local notable, “and much more from Chinese and Arabs who contributed. Not to be left behind, the Indian representatives present, including T. A. Gandi, did so too.”¹⁴⁰ At the founding of another branch at Bogor three days later, another native official—this time the district chief (*wedana*) R. Hardjadiparta—was chosen as chairman. The ethnic Chinese Tjan Som Hay was appointed as treasurer, while other prominent members included the ethnic-Arab businessman Sech Moechsin bin Calib bin Tebe.¹⁴¹

Fears of being overwhelmed in this way prompted Samsuodin to explicitly ban native officials from local Three-A branch leadership or membership in his mid-June “Instructions,” reserving for them only posts on separate “Advisory Committees” instead. Where “non-native” Asians were concerned, he ordered the following measures.

There must be Chinese, Arab, and Indian representatives in the [branch] leadership as assistants. If [however] in a given branch there are [too] many Chinese, Arabs, or Indians, then below the top leadership, each group should establish its own organization, that is, in [separate] Indonesian, Chinese, Arab, and Indian groupings.¹⁴²

While uncomfortable with the prospect of domination by the established power of native officials in league with Chinese and “non-native” Asian capital, *Parindra*’s elite leaders were no social radicals either, more comfortable and more experienced with compromise than confrontation. All the more so in full awareness of the overriding Japanese concern with the preservation of social order and social unity, and of Shimizu’s specific insistence on multi-racial Asian inclusion in the movement.

Publicly at least, Samsøedin consistently maintained that the Three-A movement was one whose representatives should hail from

all layers of Asian society—private individuals and civil servants, Indonesian, Chinese and Arab representatives, all sitting together ... not as civil servants or as representatives of a certain party or grouping, but rather as one member of society with a great deal of influence behind him ... In the Three-A movement there is truly a place for everyone who seeks to shape a New Asia with Japanese leadership.¹⁴³

Samsøedin's social prescription was, in a word, cultural: what Indonesia needed was not social revolution in the Western sense, but a change of attitude, from the narrow, the parochial, the selfish, to the social, the collective, the national. What set Samsøedin, Shimizu Hitoshi, and the principles of the Three-A movement apart was their embrace of *all* Asians regardless of race and former colonial history. It was this apparent breadth of vision and moderation—or perhaps one might call it opportunistic flexibility—that seemed, at least to Shimizu, to ideally suit Samsøedin and his colleagues at *Parindra* as allies in the realization of a Java version of the *Tōa renmei*, and in the building of a Greater Asian union. But the Three-A's comfort with the domestic powers that be, and its perceived lack of backbone in defending the interests of the “native” masses against their traditional domestic enemies, also represented a major stumbling block for the Three-A in gaining the trust and support of the masses.

Of still more immediate and pressing concern both to the Three-A leadership and Shimizu Hitoshi was a marked ambivalence of the *Japanese* authorities as a whole towards the project, with whom “unity,” after all, was supposed to be the point. From the outset of the occupation, although Shimizu and the propaganda squad enjoyed the consistent backing and ideological sympathies of Commander Imamura himself, most of the officers directly underneath him, including Imamura's chief of staff Okazaki Seisaburō, and the two men directly responsible with the particulars and execution of the military administration, deputy chief of staff Harada Yoshikazu and Military Administration Department chief Col. Nakayama, along with civilian advisors such as the Foreign Ministry's Miyoshi Shunkichirō and the ambitious local newspaperman Taniguchi Gorō—not to mention the order-obsessed *kenpeitai*—were generally inclined to view the propaganda squad, and Shimizu Hitoshi in particular, as reckless, unprofessional adventurers and interlopers, needlessly stirring up a local population that had already been over-stimulated by Japanese preinvasion and invasion-period propaganda as it was. Miyoshi's description of the Three-A as a “ding-dong party” that nevertheless appealed to Indonesia's “backward people” reflected widely shared views among the military administration. And while it was Nakayama who had originally chosen Shimizu for service in Java, this was for his abilities as a military-civilian liaison, not as a proselytizer to the natives, who, as Nakayama had written in 1941, knew “nothing of politics” anyway.¹⁴⁴ From the perspective of these officials, Shimizu's venture into local politics represented a step entirely outside of his jurisdiction.

Tensions over Shimizu's exuberant activism and the growing momentum of the Three-A did not take long to surface. The first round of public moves revealing the deep

divide in Japanese aims—and a less than consistent Japanese line on the Three-A—came three days before the emperor's birthday celebrations (*tenchosetsu*) at the end of April, when the *kenpeitai* conducted a sweep of arrests of leading ethnic Chinese suspected of past or present sympathy with the nationalists in Chungking. The arrests were made without regard to whether the arrestees had contributed to or pledged participation in the Three-A. Thus were some of the Three-A's main contributors—including, for example, the top three members of Batavia's Chamber of Commerce—summarily tossed into jail. Shimizu complained not just of a double-cross with regard to supporters of the Three-A movement, but of a contravention of the spirit of "imperial mercy" associated with the emperor's birthday itself. "One [Japanese] asks us for help," these men were heard to say, "while the other arrests us." "I felt terrible about this," Shimizu recalled, and he protested vigorously. But, while agreeing that Java's ethnic Chinese warranted a more "moderate" policy than elsewhere in Japan's occupied territories, Toyoshima Ataru, former Japanese vice-consul at Batavia now advising the military administration on policy towards the ethnic Chinese community, nevertheless agreed with the *kenpeitai* that a limited preemptive strike was necessary to make sure that no "enemy Chinese" had an opportunity to disturb the *tenchōsetsu*.¹⁴⁵

Early "native" enthusiasm for the movement seems hardly to have suffered from these arrests, however. If anything, given the anti-Chinese sentiments of many "natives," the effect might have been just the opposite. In any case, the *tenchōsetsu* celebrations unfolded with an "unprecedented" vigor.¹⁴⁶ Batavia was "bathed in the colors of the Three-A," and here alone the movement pulled an estimated two hundred thousand celebrants onto the streets.¹⁴⁷ But subsequent developments revealed that the Three-A's enthusiastic "native" participants were not immune to Japanese suspicion either. Where Shimizu Hitoshi was most pleasantly surprised at the scale and enthusiasm of the *tenchōsetsu* rallies, both the military administration and the *kenpeitai* were not to be seduced by this ostensible demonstration of Indonesian support for Japan, and viewed it with a different sort of surprise, one verging on shock. Propaganda squad offices henceforth received visits from a stream of angry military government officials "from the military governor and chief of staff [General Okazaki] on down," including deputy chief of staff Harada and General Affairs section chief Nakayama. All complained that the squad was "going too far" with the Three-A movement, in defiance of what they interpreted to be Japan's national policy (*kokusaku*). All directed their harshest attacks at Shimizu.¹⁴⁸

"I had argued with the military over things in Peking, so it wasn't much of a surprise to have to fight with them, and I did so with gusto," Shimizu later recalled. In numerous responses to these complaints and suspicions, Shimizu recalled saying "What's the point of having a movement to cooperate in the Greater East Asia War in name only, if it's not from the heart? Of course it's a movement to support Japan—they're doing it, I'm not pushing them, I don't have to. What's the need of suppressing that?" Reports coming from the *kenpeitai*, however, portrayed the Three-A as a threatening movement for independence that was getting out of hand, one that might seem pro-Japanese for the moment, but would "make a fool of Japan once things get more peaceful." Shimizu's complaints, and his insistence that the multi-ethnic makeup of the Three-A made it a true Asian people's movement—one that precisely for this reason could never represent a

threat to Japanese interests in the way that an ethnically exclusive nationalist movement might—fell largely upon deaf ears.¹⁴⁹

Shimizu's personality and missionary convictions appear in turn to have deeply hindered his ability to effectively perform his originally intended role as lubricant between the military and the propaganda squad.¹⁵⁰ In fact, Shimizu himself appears to have been a part of the problem, angering the military authorities with his tendency for independent actions, a failure to keep his superiors apprised of these actions, and a general disregard for military sensitivities.¹⁵¹ At the end of the war, Major General Nishimura Ootshi, later head of the Military Administration General Affairs Section, offered the following commentary on Shimizu himself.

[Shimizu] had lived in Java for a long time, spoke the language fluently, and had many friends among the Javanese. He was a most insolent official, who disobeyed orders, gave himself enormous airs, and was not to be trusted with any secrets. He was most unpopular with his fellow officials, who regarded him as mentally unsound, though at the same time a clever man.¹⁵²

Saitō Shizuo, a civilian employee of the Military Government Section who later rose to head of the Political Affairs Department, and who, like Miyoshi, had worked in the Japanese foreign service, meanwhile echoed Nishimura in his own postwar description of Shimizu, whom he assessed as “half-genius, half-crazy”:

[Shimizu] had been in the country a long time, and was continually boasting of this. He was not altogether in possession of his faculties, and made himself very unpopular with his crazy behavior. It is reported that nobody in the military administration was on friendly terms with him.¹⁵³

Military administration officials were not the only ones whom Shimizu rubbed the wrong way. Togashi Takeomi, translator for the *Beppan* intelligence unit who had run his own *Toko Jepang* shop in West Java for many years before the war, simply described Shimizu as “as big a fool as you’d ever meet.”¹⁵⁴

Along with the movement's domination by *Parindra*, native officials, and the Chinese, it appears primarily the military administration's negative attitude to the Three-A that contributed to another of its early disappointments: the failure to attract the support of a number of prominent non-cooperator nationalists to its cause, including Achmad Subardjo, Mohammad Hatta, and Sukarno's old ally Sartono. As Shimizu recalled,

Sartono and those around him were perceptive. They unfortunately realized very quickly that the Three-A movement was not an organization supported by the military administration, but rather only something the propaganda squad was doing on a voluntary basis.¹⁵⁵

While Shimizu did not mention Hatta or Subardjo, given their connection to the military administration and their regular contacts with Miyoshi, it is likely that they realized this at least as early as Sartono.¹⁵⁶

It did not take long for ripples of military administration and *kempetai* antipathy towards the Three-A at the center to reach the provinces.¹⁵⁷ In some areas, local authorities reacted arbitrarily on their own, not even waiting for the red light from the center.¹⁵⁸ Shimizu later described the situation in the Cilacap regency, on Java's south-central coast, as particularly severe. Here, successive attempts to establish a local Three-A branch by Mr. Iskaq—a *Parindra* leader from Surabaya—encountered unexpected opposition from both the *kenpeitai* and the Japanese official appointed to serve as governor of the former regency, and his local Indonesian underling. "They said 'this is not something the Japanese military is doing, it's just a selfish project from the guys at the propaganda squad.' And then 'that sort of thing is neither good for Japan nor for Indonesia, you'd better stop with that kind of movement,'" said Shimizu. "This sort of incident occurred more and more, in each district. And as you'd expect, that was frightening." Similar reports soon began to emerge from the Cirebon residency on Java's north-central coast and elsewhere.¹⁵⁹ In the eastern third of Java, meanwhile—formerly a *Parindra* stronghold—the movement hardly appears to have gotten off the ground at all.¹⁶⁰ This development undoubtedly had much to do with the more generally conservative stance of the 48th Army division in charge of the military administration in that area early on, along with the harsh, early suppressive measures taken against *Parindra* representatives and other nationalists there by the *kenpeitai*.¹⁶¹

Still, while the military administration was dissatisfied with the Three-A from early on, and certainly let the propaganda squad know about this in no uncertain terms, according to the 16th Army's original command structure—maintained for the first five months of the occupation pending a subsequent permanent reorganization, and only slowly eroded in the months that followed—the propaganda squad, charged with an ostensible military-strategic purpose, did not have to answer to the military administration, but was directly accountable only to 16th Army chief, General Imamura Hitoshi.¹⁶² General Imamura himself was sympathetic to the squad's energies and idealism. This meant that Imamura constituted a critical buffer protecting the propaganda squad from military administration wrath. This allowed for continued optimism among the Three-A's supporters, at least at the center.¹⁶³

On the local level, however, even where it was left to its own devices, the Three-A often collapsed under the weight of its own internal contradictions as an organization seeking spontaneous cultural change and social unity in a society fractured by social, economic, political, and racial divisions.¹⁶⁴ To the frustrated "native" masses, the Three-A generally assumed the appearance of little more than a continuation of the prevailing local power balance with a new window dressing. A report to Achmad Subardjo's office on the situation in Sukabumi West Java in mid-July 1942 was typically unencouraging.¹⁶⁵ The report was coauthored by Endang Soegandi, a leading prewar figure in the Sukabumi branches of both *Gerindo* and the modernist Muslim *Mohammadiyah*, who was also closely associated with a variety of projects for "native" economic uplift.¹⁶⁶ Soegandi reported that

Since the first appearance of the Three A movement in the city of Sukabumi, the B.B. [*Binnenlands Bestuur*, lit. "Internal Administration," the Dutch term for native officials], not wishing to be left behind, entered it, contributed to it, and joined it as

members. From their actions, it is clear that this is not because they understand or are aware [of the aims of the Three-A], but rather it seems as if they are scared or afraid that their sins of the past or present might [otherwise] be uncovered.

A week after he first arrived in Java from Sumatra in early July 1942, Sukarno happened to pay an inspection visit to the Sukabumi Three-A headquarters, likely escorted by Hitoshi Shimizu. Soegandi reported that the attempts of native officials to infiltrate and manipulate the Three-A for their own purposes were

proven the other day, on the 16th of July, when brother Sukarno was in the Three-A building. Here it was truly evident, that the vice regent (*patih*) and his underlings were all sporting the Three-A insignia. This is the way they are towards the people as well. It is no good, they hang anything and everything upon the Three-A. So that if the Three-A pursues measures unpopular towards the people, it is difficult for [the people] to make sense of it; rather in many things they are just toyed with, made to go here, ordered to go there, until in the end they become resentful.

Further on in the same report, Soegandi reported another unhappy event from his perspective, the sort of story repeated in numerous other reports reaching Batavia in this period.¹⁶⁷

A rich Chinese in Kadoedampit, Sukabumi, contributed 1,000 guilders to the Sukabumi Three-A all at once. And according to information from a member of the Three-A movement, another Chinese also contributed f1,000-, bringing the total to f2000-. This development was no doubt pleasant for those on the receiving end, but among those who heard about it, it caused a commotion. According to information and investigations, [these ethnic Chinese] are in fact only playing a game of speculation, in order to cover up all of their 100% pro-Dutch behavior under the former Dutch government ... Their connections with the native officials are very close, to the point that if something happens, it is extremely difficult to do something about it, and it is the people who become the victims of their oppression.

Further sections of Soegandi's report described a seemingly endless litany of cases of misuse and misrepresentation of the Three-A and its funding, mostly by native officials and Chinese. The amount of contributions from the people to the Three-A, wrote Soegandi, had been "truly satisfactory. But," he added wryly, "its expenditures are also very heavy," with most of the money winding up in the wrong pockets. A number of local public officials still on the government payroll, he wrote, were skipping their administrative duties to work instead at the Three-A office, from which they also received a salary. Many ethnic Chinese staff appointed to the branch management committee, he added, hailed from groups of usurers and gamblers disliked by the people—yet "why did others on the management name them as treasurers?" he asked. "It is truly surprising." Another anecdote revealed that paid jobs at the local Three-A office seemed to be on sale to the highest bidder. The activities of the Three-A's

“Economic Bodies” were proving equally unsatisfactory, continued Soegandi, always dishonest where the people were concerned.¹⁶⁸

A nationalist report to Achmad Subardjo’s office on the situation in Poerbolingga residency in central Java authored in October 1942 stated, “as far as the existence of the Three-A movement is concerned, the inhabitants have gotten to the point of making fun of it.” Money contributed by the people in the framework of mutual cooperation (*gotong-rojong*) was instead going to official self-enrichment. “In this town,” the reporter concluded, “the Three-A doesn’t get much attention except from those in authority, because most of its members are only working to impress the authorities, and most of them have been appointed by the authorities.”¹⁶⁹

Soegandi’s report from Sukabumi also boldly suggested a linkage between corruption and favoritism among the Three-A, the Chinese, and the Japanese rulers. He described the existence of an entirely separate purely Chinese Three-A (Three-A *meloeloe Tionghoa*) branch—in contrast, he described the main Three-A branch as the mixed Three-A (Three-A *Tjampoeran*)—whose “actions are much different from those of the mixed one, for example in the way it collects monetary contributions only from Chinese.” The members were “obliged to contribute according to their wealth (as with taxes), with many among them charged from f10- up to f50- per month.” In no uncertain terms, Soegandi then described where all of these considerable proceeds were going:

According to information from one of the members, from the time of its inception up to now, [the “Chinese Three-A”] was [thus] able to contribute one payment of f40,000-, and a second of f20,000-, to the Japanese Army in Sukabumi (at the time Major Marasumi [was in command]).

Soegandi did not indicate the purpose of these great sums, but there is nothing to indicate any connection with Shimizu Hitoshi’s earlier call for ethnic-Chinese contributions to the Three-A movement in Batavia, and it seems more likely that it simply ended up in Japanese pockets. As reflected in many reports like that of Soegandi, episodes of ethnic Chinese payment of bribes and protection money to those in positions of influence were becoming endemic. While remaining somewhat vague on specifics, an internal nationalist intelligence report from the city of Wonosobo in Central Java dated September 1942 maintained that, while the ethnic Chinese “appear different than before, in practice it is quite far from this.” The informant complained that the ethnic Chinese continued to have little difficulty conducting business, while “natives” faced all sorts of impediments. He further maintained that Chinese homes were rarely searched, Chinese goods rarely seized, and Chinese crimes punished more lightly than those committed by “natives.”¹⁷⁰

Amidst the extremely unflattering pictures of the ethnic Chinese painted in these reports, it is important to note how different the realities might have seemed from the perspective of the ethnic Chinese themselves. While some ethnic Chinese—as well as those of other ethnic groups—were indeed profiting from the situation of scarcity and opportunity, for many, the “playing at speculation” to which Soegandi and others so negatively referred could also be translated as trying to protect one’s life and livelihood by whatever means possible in an extremely hostile and unpredictable climate. The

memory of the *perampokan* looting was still fresh, and anti-Chinese crackdowns could and did come from the *kenpeitai* in arbitrary doses. That arrests for hidden weapons were just as common as complaints of corruption and collusion in the first year of the occupation is no small indication of the risks many ethnic Chinese were willing to run to stay above water. While the average ethnic Chinese was a good deal wealthier than the average “native,” it is also important to remember that among the ethnic Chinese, as among the “natives,” much of this wealth was concentrated in a small number of hands. But as these reports reveal, most ethnic Chinese could nevertheless expect little sympathy from the “native” masses or from “native” nationalist notables, most of whom tended to view the Chinese in undifferentiated racial terms as opponents and oppressors, blocking their way towards the improvements they had expected under the new Japanese order.

If the Sukabumi report suggested direct links between Chinese capital and Japanese favoritism, a later report from the capital of Batavia from Abdoel Karim, a postal official and former *Parindra* member, stated that the public was blaming continued Chinese economic dominance squarely upon the Three-A’s “native” leadership alone, perceiving them as traitors to an anti-Chinese cause shared by both “natives” and Japanese alike. The fact that the movement always preached Chinese inclusion in the shared Asian project had no doubt strongly fueled these perceptions.

most recently, it appears that the Indonesian inhabitants have come to hate the Three-A movement in general, and its Indonesian managers in particular. Because they are considered as people committing treason towards Indonesian society and efforts, because ... in broad terms, when the Three-A movement was established, the Chinese bribed the Indonesians who joined them as managers of the movement, in order that they would carry out the orders from the government in such a way that the [Chinese-run] retailer’s associations would continue to receive products from government distribution centers. The public believes that if it had not been arranged this way, these associations would not have received products anymore. This perception has been fueled by a rumor spread by a certain person named Haroen, who said he heard from a Japanese *kenpeitai* officer that no Chinese businesses were to receive products from the government any longer. But it appears that once this (3A) movement was established, it was just the opposite, which can only be because the (Indonesian) managers of this movement made a request to the government that [the Chinese associations] receive allotments.¹⁷¹

Reflecting now widely shared public suspicions of the Three-A as corrupt and corruptible, it was also said that Samsoedin was being investigated for having taken bribes from wealthy ethnic Chinese to keep them out the prison camps.¹⁷²

In point of fact the Three-A, held mostly in low esteem among military administration policymakers as a strictly propaganda squad project, had little or no leverage in Japanese policymaking on these and other issues. But this was not how it looked from below. “If it is true that the Three-A movement is doing these sorts of things,” Abdoel Karim concluded, “is it not better that the government just disband it, to avoid a rift among the people (between the masses and the followers of the movement),

which will certainly disturb the public peace?" As early as August 1942, amidst the host of both internal and external problems that the movement faced, the writing was on the wall. Beseiged by Japanese opposition from without and domestic divisions and corruption from within, this ostensible movement of Asian unity had only highlighted and intensified the competing interests, both Japanese and Indonesian, which it was meant to unify. Locally, and in related projects such as the Greater Asian Youth Corps, Three-A activities continued on a piecemeal basis, amidst declining public interest and attention. But the fire was out.¹⁷³

At the same time, among the ranks of Indonesia's would-be nation-builders a new breeze was blowing, ushered in by the return of the nationalist leader Sukarno to Java after some eight years of exile. Sukarno had dedicated more than fifteen years of his life to the achievement of national unity and nationhood, and held unequaled stature in the eyes of many in the otherwise divided factions of the nationalist-minded "native" elite—young and old, secular- and Muslim-oriented, old- and new-*priyayi*. Surely, it was felt, if anyone could breathe new life into what was beginning to appear a stalled nation-building project, if anyone could oversee the coalescence of the divided national polity, could reawaken the sense of Indonesian brotherhood long lost amidst the Dutch pursuit of *divide et impera*—and gain what there was to be got from the Japanese—it was Sukarno.

Father Figures

Coming to terms

In early July 1942, Sukarno, the great leader of Indonesian nationalism, aged forty-one, reappeared in Java for the first time since being exiled in 1934. The months that followed saw him reemerge on the political stage with remarkable vigor and assuredness. As the star of the Three-A movement declined, so that of Sukarno rose. Like the men of the Three-A, Sukarno declared full support and cooperation with Japan and its aims, staking his energies and his reputation on the dream of a brighter Indonesian future under Japanese auspices. Where the Three-A had failed, Sukarno was confident of success, and his confidence was infectious. Sukarno's move was bred of faith in an ultimate Japanese military victory over the West, and a belief, strengthened in early exchanges with General Imamura and the propaganda squad's Hitoshi Shimizu, that Japan aimed to grant Indonesia political autonomy once the war was won, if not sooner. But like the men of the Three-A and indeed most of the new *priyayi* in this time of unrivaled Japanese hegemony, Sukarno was also seduced by the cultural- and racial-essentialist charms of Asianism. He saw in Japan the glimmer of an alternative Asian trajectory to modern nationhood, the realization of an Eastern old within a Western new—offering, alongside eventual national independence itself, a model for the successful execution of nationhood. This was a model that avoided the tensions of class, faction, and gender inherent in Western modernity—tensions that Sukarno, like so many others of his class, yearned to believe were nothing more than an unwelcome, and expellable, foreign import. For Sukarno, no less than for his ostensibly more conservative, opportunist cooperator counterparts, the Japanese example offered reason to believe.

Abandoned by his Dutch captors as the Japanese arrived, Sukarno spent the first four months of the occupation in Padang, West Sumatra.¹ The order for Sukarno's return to Java came from General Imamura, prompted by a request from the propaganda squad. As General Imamura later recalled,

Once the invasion had ended, the military administration fielded frequent petitions from Java's students and other young people, which went something like this: "How about it, could you please release Sukarno—for the Indonesian people, an object of worship—from exile in Sumatra?" ... The propaganda squad considered that gaining Sukarno's cooperation would be of positive benefit

to the Military Government, so an order was issued that he be released from detention ... At the time, the leadership of the Southern Area Expedition Army Headquarters, then still in Saigon, warned that "having an ardent nationalist like Sukarno brought to Java, Imamura is just asking for trouble." But I remained firm in my decision.²

The direct impetus appears to have come from Shimizu Hitoshi, prompted by contact both with nationalist youth such as those above—including Johar Nur—as well as a number of leading older nationalists unhappy with the Three-A, such as Sartono and Nur's mentor Mohammad Yamin. As Shimizu later recalled it, the officials of the 16th Army Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*) were less enthusiastic. Col. Nakayama did seem to have acquired a vague sense that "Java would not calm down without" Sukarno, said Shimizu, and this appears to have prompted his grudging agreement to having Sukarno return. But Nakayama had "no further intention of using him," and seemed only to want to "have him around in case push came to shove."³

For their part, *Parindra*'s leadership appears to have viewed the prospect of Sukarno's return with a not altogether dissimilar mix of resignation, apprehension, and cautious optimism. Although on the one hand the presence of Sukarno, the quintessential non-cooperator, clearly represented a potential threat to the early influence they had established, on the other hand, *Parindra*'s leaders could not but acknowledge Sukarno's continued, unmatched legitimacy and popular respect as the nationalist movement's original leader—a leader who had paid for his convictions with nearly a decade's incarceration. For the men of *Parindra*, general positive feelings towards Sukarno were also encouraged by the fact that in the period before his exile, Sukarno, who had always stressed the overriding importance of unity among all nationalist factions, had nurtured close relations with *Parindra*'s late leader Mohammad Thamrin.⁴ The differences separating the nationalists of *Parindra* from their non-cooperator counterparts were in any case much more pronounced in areas of strategy and personality than in the more intractable area of political ideology.

In a time of continued economic stagnation and political vagueness, popular hopes were buoyed by Sukarno's appearance. If the majority of Java's largely rural, uneducated population remained ignorant of Sukarno—and, indeed, as nationalist observers often lamented, ignorant of the nationalist movement altogether—among those Indonesians who did know of him, including some among the urban working class, a hopeful rumor mill almost akin to that of the time of the Japanese arrival itself began to churn. In an *Asia Raya* editorial that appeared two days after Sukarno's arrival, Winarno felt it necessary to warn readers not to expect too much too quickly from poor Brother (*Boeng*) Karno, but rather to allow him a quiet chance to reorient himself, to consider his course, and to gather strength.

We must not forget that although he is a prominent and a leader, Ir. Sukarno is just a normal man. So he does not have the power to conjure things out of nothing, nor to move mountains, nor, in a sudden puff of smoke, to make people who are poor and wretched rich!⁵

Winarno's words were well taken, not only in terms of the tremendous domestic hurdles Sukarno might expect to face in implementing whatever reform program he or others might have in mind, but also given the ambivalent position of the Japanese authorities regarding Sukarno's presence, and the limitations many were anxious to apply to his potential influence. The gap in viewpoints on Sukarno's relative importance—at least publicly—was reflected in the makeup of Sukarno's welcoming party at the port of Tanjung Priok, where he arrived on a small boat. Standing at the head of a large crowd of cheering onlookers allegedly assembled on Mohammad Hatta's urging, local dignitaries on hand included *Parindra* leader and *Asia Raya* director Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, *Asia Raya* business manager S.A. Alatas, and Mohammad Hatta, along with two now familiar people with a family relationship to Sukarno: his cousin Anwar Tjokroaminoto, and his son-in-law Asmara Hadi, *Asia Raya's* new cultural commentator.⁶ The only Japanese on hand was Hitoshi Shimizu.⁷

In a reflection of the military administration's lack of initiative where Sukarno was concerned, it was largely Shimizu who would act as Sukarno's first, almost sole Japanese host in the early stages following his return, and they developed a close working relationship. But whatever the mixed feelings within the Japanese establishment, there was a general awareness that this was someone, for better or worse, who required serious attention. Commander Imamura himself was at least convinced enough of Sukarno's potential importance for the war effort to grant him an audience the day after his arrival—the sort of treatment the “native” leadership of the Three-A had never received.

On many of the particulars of this fateful conversation, the postwar recollections of both Imamura and Sukarno showed considerable agreement. Given the vastly different national, social, and personal contexts in which these memoirs were written, not to mention the near-mythical qualities Sukarno here arrogated to himself, including 20-20 foresight and unparalleled skills of orchestration, it was in some sense a surprising agreement, even suggesting the possibility, as scholar George Kanahele noted, that Sukarno borrowed his account directly from Imamura's memoirs.⁸ According to both accounts, Imamura was extremely cordial. As a sign of respect, Imamura recalled that he had himself and Sukarno seated in facing chairs in his drawing room. For his part, Sukarno recalled being charmed at first sight. “General Imamura was a true Samurai. Lean, above average height, gentlemanly, respectful, and noble. After he bade me to be seated, he too sat down. His posture was ramrod straight.”⁹ Imamura later condensed what he said to Sukarno—via his personal translator, the 18-year-old Japanese son of a local Japanese entrepreneur—as follows:

from reading books about Java, and hearing accounts from people here since I arrived, I am well aware of your thinking, of the things you have done, and of the bitter price that you have continued to pay for these. Therefore I will not dictate to you what you should do. Because I realize that you will not do anything inconsistent with your beliefs.

Whether Java will be granted a high degree of autonomy under the guidance of the Japanese government, or independence as a state in a federal system with Japan, or complete independence is a matter to be decided by His Majesty the

Emperor ... The one and only thing that I *can* promise ... is that the military government I run will lead to better political participation and better welfare than that under the politics of the period of Dutch administration. Therefore, whether you cooperate with my army, or you take a neutral position and do nothing except stand by and observe the situation, this is up to you. Even if you choose the latter, the military will fully guarantee your life, your livelihood, and your reputation. However, if you hinder the implementation of Japanese military strategy or the military administration, then we cannot allow you free movement until the war is over. [But] even in this case, we do not intend to incarcerate you as the Dutch authorities did.

In closing, Imamura remembered assuring Sukarno that there was no need to rush in deciding his position. "Once you have thoroughly discussed this with your colleagues and have decided upon a definite posture, please inform me of this via Colonel Nakayama." "I well understand your gist," Imamura recalled Sukarno replying. "I will give it careful thought, and reply in due course."¹⁰

Although he too remembered Imamura saying much the same, Sukarno characterized the shape of the exchange somewhat differently. With his usual bluster, he later recalled, "in terms of political concessions I had the upper hand. [Imamura] was a military leader. He knew about arms. I was a political leader. I knew about nation-building. In my hands he would be a baby." As evidence of his mastery of the encounter, Sukarno offered the following additional exchange with Imamura.

"How long do you estimate the military will function in an administrative capacity here?" I asked.

"I do not honestly know. I have no plan as yet" [replied Imamura]. Well, I had. And I made my first move. "To lead my people in accordance with the military government, I must have people to lead. Civilian affairs can only be expedited when my countrymen are placed in administrative capacities. Only Indonesians know the region, idioms, the ways of their brothers."

"If that is how best to promote prosperity and welfare [replied Imamura], Indonesians will be permitted to participate in solving the State's affairs on an escalating scale. Government positions will be released to them immediately."¹¹

Imamura indeed referred to a similar exchange in his memoirs, but described it differently, not only in where the idea came from, but also in its timing. According to Imamura, this discussion of the role of Indonesian officials came up in a separate conversation with Sukarno sometime later (which he simply described as "one day"). On this day, Imamura recalled *informing* Sukarno of the following:

Concerning the welfare and advancement of the Indonesian people that I promised to [you] Sukarno in the beginning, as a first step, I am thinking of replacing most of the official positions formerly occupied by Dutchmen with Indonesian experts.¹²

This, according to Imamura, was followed by a second pledge.

Under the current war situation, it is impossible to allow the entire people to elect representatives and open an assembly. Therefore, as an organ for listening to the voice of the people, I would like to establish a board of inquiry, which will endeavor to work together to understand what the people want and what concerns them, and to adjust the military administration to actual conditions. [You] Sukarno and Hayashi Kyūjirō [a Foreign Ministry expert on the Southern Regions and the highest-ranking civilian advisor to the *Gunseibu*] will alternate as its chief, and we shall appoint five or six Japanese and roughly ten Indonesians as members, with administration to be in the hands of Colonel Nakayama and another person of your choosing.

The “board of inquiry,” said Imamura, would be provided with ample resources to cover research and travel expenses. Sukarno agreed on the idea, and according to Imamura the selection of the board’s ten “native” members was left to Sukarno.¹³

As this account is based on sources from memory, it is difficult to establish with any certainty what was actually said. When the two accounts are laid side by side, however, Sukarno’s contention of having had the upper hand in his give-and-take with Imamura appears dubious. If anything, it is Imamura’s handling of Sukarno that comes across as adroit. In both atmospherics and language, Imamura seems to have succeeded in emphasizing the difference between his regime and the Dutch one that had preceded it, even as he conceded nothing out of line with the conservative Tokyo mandate. His words and gestures appear to have conjured a climate of mutual respect and consideration, with Sukarno cast as a near-equal Asian comrade, a brother-in-arms in the shared battle against the West. It was Imamura who thus defined the terms of the encounter, with the promise that he offered in exchange for Sukarno’s cooperation framed entirely in these terms: in essence, a better, more brotherly arrangement for Indonesians than that under the Dutch, in spirit if not—as yet—in fact.

Where the “board of inquiry” was concerned, for example, insofar as its advice was to remain entirely non-binding, with proceedings *in camera* and a civilian advisor as its highest active Japanese representative, in substantive political terms it would seem to have offered less than the already limited People’s Council (Volksraad) conceded by the Dutch more than twenty years earlier.¹⁴ Similar observations may be made of Imamura’s “first step” (or what Sukarno described as *his* “first move”). For even as he pledged to Sukarno his ultimate aim of filling “most of the officials positions formerly occupied by Dutchmen with Indonesian experts,” Imamura recalled immediately attaching the following significant qualifiers:

However, I have received word that the Japanese government is sending several dozen chief civil administrators, civil administrators and the like from Japan, to occupy positions such as those of state governors (*shūchōkan*) and mayors of large cities. This is not only with regard to Java but all the occupied areas, for the reason that in preparing to meet enemy counterattacks, harmonious coordination between military and civilian administration is necessary. I do plan to have the essence of the civil administration run through native officials to the utmost, and thus will I fill the level of district chief (*kenchō*) on down with these people as

soon as possible; in due course, if people appropriate to state[-level] politics are produced, I plan to replace the Japanese with these one by one.¹⁵

In fact, at a time when a more permanent structure of the wartime administration was just being determined, if anything, what Imamura pledged to Sukarno was more of a step backward than forward. In dire need of personnel to fill the gaps opened by the quick Dutch departure, and as a positive gesture of high propaganda value, the Japanese authorities had, after all, *already* promoted many “native” officials to the level of district chief, while retaining or promoting those on down as well. In some cases they had even gone above the district level, awarding the prestigious mayorship of Batavia, for example, to Dachlan Abdullah. Imamura was now returning to a classic colonial hypothetical: state- and important mayoral-level positions would first go to Japanese, who would be exchanged at some later date for Indonesians “if people appropriate to state[-level] politics are produced.” In fact, while Sukarno himself may not have been aware of it, for anyone reading *Asia Raya* on June 22, 1942—some three weeks before Sukarno arrived in Java—Imamura’s views on this score had already been stated in extremely plain and succinct fashion.

The Japanese race must do its best to distance itself from all of the mistakes made before by the Dutch. Clever Japanese youngsters are coming to the Southern areas, in the aim of sacrificing all their power to realize a new order in the southern areas. [Java’s] 50 million indigenous inhabitants represent an extraordinary power, a power that can shape a good situation under the direction of people who are wise.¹⁶

And wise people, Imamura clearly implied, who were Japanese. Comments such as these had only added strength to rumors already circulating that the Japanese administration was nurturing strong doubts about whether any native officials appropriate to state[-level] politics yet existed.¹⁷ For his part, in his conversation with Imamura several weeks later, Sukarno appears to have nevertheless taken encouragement from Imamura’s pledge. His comments in his later autobiography seemed to suggest a continued conviction that Japanese tutelage might have its benefits. “Now those poor, downtrodden, stupid natives will become officials. They’ll learn how to make decisions, run businesses, command. I have planted the seed and the Japanese are nourishing it,” Sukarno recalled telling Hatta that same evening.¹⁸

In Sukarno’s general response to the critical questions posed by Imamura in their first meeting, too, the strength of this atmosphere of mutual trust and respect appeared to have won the day. According to Imamura, Sukarno’s reply came some four days afterwards, when Sukarno asked Col. Nakayama to transmit the following pledge to the General. “I have been promised that the Japanese Military Government will advance the welfare of the Indonesian people. I believe this, and [thus] I and my colleagues will cooperate with the Japanese Military Government.”¹⁹

Once again, Sukarno’s postwar account of the basis for this landmark decision was somewhat different. With the perfect foresight and impeccable calculation that he almost always later attributed himself in his autobiography, Sukarno recalled his

very first exchange with Hatta, minutes after stepping off the boat at Tanjung Priok, as follows: "Hatta whispered, 'What is your opinion on the outcome of the occupation?' 'The Japanese will not stay here long.'" Sukarno alleged himself to have replied. "They will lose the war and we will destroy them. That is, provided we do not oppose them openly."²⁰ He then maintained to have announced his decision for cooperation with the Japanese, and his rationale, in a subsequent conversation with Hatta and Hatta associate Sutan Sjahrir that took place on the same day—and thus *before* his first meeting with Imamura.

"To gain political concessions in terms of military training and administrative jobs for our people, we must make an appearance of collaboration," I said.

"Obviously your power is with the masses," outlined Hatta, "so you will have to work on the surface."

"Correct. You will assist me since you are too well-known a nationalist to work underground."

"That leaves me," suggested Sjahrir, "to work underground and organize radio monitoring and other secret operations."²¹

Now in great excitement, Sukarno claimed to have continued,

"This is the chance we have waited for," I exulted. "Of this I am certain. The occupation will prove a magnificent opportunity to educate and ready our people. With all Dutch personnel imprisoned and without enough Japanese to administer the entire archipelago, they'll need us desperately But first our people must be brought to suffering, because only then can they be awakened. Ours is a peaceful, easygoing, forgiving race. Although we were nearly seventy million governed by 500,000, our masses would never rise up enough to fight under Dutch rule. The Dutch tempered their mastery with fake benevolence. The Japs do not."

"We know they cut off people's heads with one stroke of their swords. We know their trick of forcing victims to drink quarts of water, then jumping on their stomachs. We're familiar with those agonized shrieks coming from *Kenpeitai* headquarters late at night. We've heard *Kenpeitai* guards are kept deliberately drunk so as to dull their sensibilities. Japanese are hard. Cruel. Quick to inflict brutalities. They will make our people have to fight."

"They will also give us confidence," commented Hatta. "No more is an Asian inferior."

"These conditions will create determination. When our people are really pressed the mental revolution will come. After that, the physical revolution."²²

Earlier in these same pages, describing an alleged conversation with a certain local nationalist colleague named Wawarunto at the time he was still in Padang, Sukarno remembered producing another version of this same basic argument:

I know all about their brutality. I know of Nipponese behavior in occupied territory—but okay I am fully prepared for a few years of this. I must rationally

consider what they can do for my people. We must be grateful to the Japanese. We can use them. If human beings stay in the groove of colonialism without anything radical to stir them or their colonizers, it is difficult to ever make a revolution.²³

This and the passages cited above give some sense of the foresight that Sukarno claimed for himself in his 1964 autobiography, along with the almost comical pompousness of the mastermind role he retrospectively awarded himself ("Correct"), and his apparent readiness to further reinforce his own opinions by putting words in other people's mouths (in the above case, the mouth of Mohammad Hatta—"They will also give us confidence. No longer is an Asian inferior" is most surely Sukarno talking). For his part, Hatta later denied that the meeting had produced any strategic agreement of the sort Sukarno described.²⁴ As presented here, Sukarno's strange, cruel logic—that it was necessary to cooperate with the Japanese for a few years not only because, as he wrote in the preceding passage, "there was nothing we could do," but because "our people must be brought to suffering, because only then can they be awakened," an awakening only possible through contact with Japanese cruelty, graphically represented by the *kenpeitai*—seems contrived, and smacks of hindsight apologetics. Amidst all the contrivance and self-glorification, however, there were elements of truth to what Sukarno chose to remember.

On one of these elements—Sukarno's continued dedication to the cause of Indonesian nation-building, and his unabashed willingness to express it—there can be little doubt. In this, the fighting spirit Sukarno had demonstrated in the late 1920s and early 1930s seemed, if anything, to have only strengthened and focused in his years out of the limelight, assuming an extra new vitality in the wake of the Dutch defeat. This was clear enough from his very first speech upon his return to Java, given within two days after his arrival. Here—in an address reportedly attended by General Imamura among others, but not reported in the press—Sukarno was said to have proclaimed that "Asia cannot be great, unless Indonesia is great" (*Asia tidak bisa raja, jikalau Indonesia tidak raya*)—an "unusually honest and nearly revolutionary" statement, remarked Dr. L.F. Jansen in his diary, after hearing these words repeated by a young "native" radio coworker named Said who had witnessed the speech. Sukarno, said Said, had revealed himself to be "a great speaker, full of fire."²⁵

Hearing this nearly revolutionary pronouncement, Jansen's personal conclusion was that a change seemed to be in the air. Neither Hatta nor Sukarno "seem to be much inclined to let themselves be pulled along by the little Japanese wagen," commented Jansen, "and thus it may be that the coming of Sukarno means the end of the Three-A movement." As further evidence of Hatta's impatience with Japanese promises, Jansen quoted a wry comment from Hatta on the recent adoption of the Japanese calendar: at a reception aboard a Japanese warship "where everyone was naturally speaking Malay as one should," wrote Jansen, Hatta had been overheard "to say to a friend, in loud Dutch, 'In any event, things are now speeding up. In one jump, we've gone from 1942 to 2602.'"²⁶

As revealed in the above statements, Sukarno did seem more prepared than his *Parindra* counterparts to attach a clear condition—eventual national independence, or at least a high degree of autonomy—to his cooperation with the Japanese. While there

was little question of his boldness and self-assuredness in articulating a nation-building agenda, however, Sukarno hardly seems to have been as inclined as Hatta to be wary of cooperation with the Japanese as something potentially antithetical to this agenda. One reason for the difference was surely the warm personal relationship quickly struck up between Sukarno and General Imamura and, for that matter, between Sukarno and Hitoshi Shimizu—as it happened, two of the Japanese most fervently committed to the war as one of Asian liberation, albeit with their own strings attached. In addition to the above descriptions of the first encounter between Imamura and Sukarno, a reported exchange between Sukarno, Shimizu, and Imamura which appears to have taken place towards the end of July 1942 offers additional illustration of the importance of the underlying understanding these men felt they had with one another. One day, remembered Shimizu in a 1987 interview,

Sukarno came to me and said, “what the deuce is your intention with me? Just to leave me discontentedly playing around? Or do you really want to have me serve a purpose?” He also asked rather firmly, “what are you all thinking regarding Indonesian independence?”

In response, taking the liberty to express a view in fact shared by few in the Japanese leadership, but one with which he believed General Imamura sympathized, Shimizu recalled telling Sukarno,

“Japan’s basic line is certainly the line of the East Asian League (*Tōa renmei no sen*), [that is] in politics, independence; in economics and defense, cooperation ... I will never cross this line, and I shall follow this line.”²⁷

Here Shimizu relayed a story whose particulars do not appear elsewhere, but whose outlines seem plausible enough. He recalled that, shortly after the above exchange, Sukarno returned to unfurl before him the plans for a future independent Indonesian republic in the form of a blueprint—in the habit of an engineer, this was a literal blueprint. At least as Shimizu later described it, Sukarno’s plans for the structure of the republican state were no doubt the product of years of thought and consideration, conducted “long before the war.” But into these he had apparently also incorporated Shimizu’s description of an East Asian League-style arrangement where Japan was concerned. These plans

clearly described how the Indonesian government should look, and how the Japanese government should look, in a cooperative structure (*kyōryoku taisei*). It duly included a cabinet, a presidential government, a republican government. Preparation for [the transfer of] political power would properly begin from that moment. If this were acknowledged, [Sukarno] said, it would be all right if it took 5 or 6 years ... I can still remember it ... [Sukarno] then said in regard to this, “if Japan will realize the contents of this blueprint, I will cooperate fully in all matters, with all my power, on my life.” But “if this is not possible, you might as well send me back to Bengkulu, and return me to my old residence [in exile].”²⁸

According to Shimizu, he brought these plans, and Sukarno's accompanying words, to Col. Nakayama shortly thereafter, asking that they be brought to the immediate attention of Commander Imamura. Knowing that Nakayama would not look kindly upon Sukarno's demands, Shimizu reworded Sukarno's request in what he called the most gentle possible language, in the process apparently removing much of Sukarno's original urgency: "Even if it cannot be today, if Japan will at least give an acknowledgment that things will move gradually in this direction," Shimizu quoted Sukarno as saying, "I will put my life on the line." Hearing this, said Shimizu, Nakayama was indeed angered, and gave Shimizu a dressing down for making trouble. Feeling confident of commander Imamura's sympathies, however, Shimizu responded that if Nakayama refused to help with the matter, he would go to Imamura himself, or even bring the plans with him back to the high command in Japan. Eventually, said Shimizu, Nakayama grudgingly agreed to bring the plans and Sukarno's demands—at least as Shimizu had relayed them—to Commander Imamura's attention.²⁹

Several days later, Shimizu continued, the answer returned from on high. Nakayama told Shimizu that both he and general Imamura "were in principle in agreement. However," said Shimizu, Nakayama added the following important qualifiers: "If this is announced now, it will be a problem." And, secondly, as Nakayama made bitterly clear to Shimizu, the agreement was limited to an informal one between Imamura and Sukarno alone.

This represents only the acknowledgement of the Commander (*shireikan*) based upon the outline. It is not in any way an agreement from the Japanese government, nor from the Japanese military as a whole.

"When I relayed this point to Sukarno," Shimizu continued in this 1987 interview, "on the basis of discussions with Hatta, they answered, 'if that's the case, all right, we shall in any event cooperate in full.'"³⁰

In their postwar memoirs, neither Imamura nor Sukarno made any mention of this private agreement. It is, however, not difficult to imagine Sukarno pursuing such an arrangement as part of a long-term strategy for building a favorable national relationship with Japan. This seems all the more logical if one adds to Sukarno's mental balance sheet another aspect that does not appear in his autobiography. For certainly on one critical, practical incentive for cooperation—Sukarno's calculations regarding the eventual outcome of the Pacific War—there seems little question that Sukarno's wartime estimation differed 180 degrees from that suggested in his postwar memoirs. Mohammad Hatta later maintained that Sukarno "was convinced that Japan would win in the Second World War because it had been able to paralyze the armadas of America, Britain, and Holland."³¹ A number of other sources corroborate this critically important fact. In a private conversation with two students of the Jakarta Medical College that took place at least as late as mid-1943, for example, Sukarno was said to have been so confident of an eventual Japanese victory against the allies that he answered the students' skepticism by saying, "come back to me in five years, and you tell me who was right."³² Mohammad Hatta and one of these two students later independently contended that, upon first hearing of the eventual Japanese surrender

in August 1945, Sukarno simply refused to believe it.³³ Sukarno intimate Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (b. 1911)—one of the prewar founders of the USI student association in Batavia in 1933, a radio and newspaper journalist before the war, an official in the Finance Department during the war, and later finance minister in an independent Indonesia—also seconded this impression in a 1979 interview.³⁴

Sukarno was not alone in this conviction, for not only Japan's early victories themselves, but also their decisive manner, made this seem a more than logical assumption at the time. For any still in doubt, as Prawiranegara also noted, Japanese propaganda was extremely effective in reinforcing the impression of Japanese superiority.³⁵ Even in the years 1943 to 1945, as Japanese defeats elsewhere began to mount, and local material conditions went into a steep decline, for the vast majority of the population who only had access to Japanese-controlled sources of information, there was little impetus to adjust this conviction. As Sukarno himself warned the above students, the Japanese regarded listening to Allied broadcasts as an act of treason. In addition, from June 1942 onwards, radios were taped in such a way as to make violation of this prohibition readily traceable.³⁶ Among the relatively small number of people with radios, with the exception of some in the Chinese community and a very few others sympathizing with the Allied war effort—such as Sutan Sjahrir, the colleague of Sukarno and Hatta mentioned above, with whom the medical students were associated—almost no one dared to tune in to these broadcasts. For his part, when first informed of the Japanese surrender in 1945 by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and a friend named Hasbullah, the prominent Bandung nationalist and newspaper editor Oto Iskandar Dinata was said to have asked, “but how could Japan lose?” Whereupon he threatened to report Prawiranegara and his colleague to the *kenpeitai* for spreading false Allied propaganda. Even the unusually skeptical, cosmopolitan Mohammad Hatta, upon returning from a wartime tour of Japan in late 1943, was said to have been enough impressed by Japanese industrial might that he refused to be drawn on the possible outcome of the war.³⁷

During Sukarno's first weeks in Java, Hitoshi Shimizu made considerable efforts to introduce Sukarno to the activities of the Three-A movement, and to entice him to take over as its new leader. Sukarno, eager to get started, seemed open to the idea of using the movement's already-established network and platform for his own agenda, a nation-building agenda which, after all, did not differ much from what the Three-A's “native” leadership was already aiming at.³⁸ By late summer 1942, however, the Three-A had lost most of its popular support, and discussions began regarding Sukarno's potential participation in a new and improved movement that might overcome the various—and variously perceived—shortcomings of the Three-A movement.

Character-building

In the first months following his arrival in Java, as discussions continued regarding the new movement he hoped to lead, Sukarno made relatively few public appearances, and even fewer appearances in the pages of the media. His public statements as well as his more numerous private interactions nevertheless revealed a fire for the

nation-building cause that had hardly dampened in eight years of Dutch captivity. Indeed, he appeared newly energized, not only by the practical opportunities afforded him by the Japanese, but also by the dizzying power of the Japanese example. Such energy, along with a series of new initiatives in which he was involved, directly and indirectly, lent to the late summer and autumn of 1942 a renewed sense of nationalist anticipation and excitement—above all among the former “non-cooperators” who had been largely passed over in the joint Japanese-Indonesian projects of the first months such as the *Asia Raya* newspaper and the Three-A Movement. For them, as for a wider public disappointed at the gap between the promise and the reality of Japan’s new order so far, expectations of the great leader were high.

First among them were a new generation of nationalist youth who had until now only known Sukarno from a very great distance, and were eager to make up for lost time. Shortly after Sukarno’s arrival in early July 1942, the students of Johar Nur’s circle, led by PPPI chairman Chaerul Saleh, came up with the idea of holding of an introductory meeting between Sukarno, Hatta, and themselves, with the theme of encouraging unity between the two great leaders who had, in earlier days, often been at odds over strategy and program. Thanks to their connections with Hitoshi Shimizu, who was in daily contact with Sukarno, the meeting proved easy to arrange, and it was held in a building next door to the Three-A Information Committee Office. Nur recalled of his impressions that evening,

I was just 21 or 22 years old, and extremely impressed with Sukarno and Hatta and their accomplishments. And then Sukarno gave a speech. It was a speech of spirited rhetoric for which he was known. It was extremely good and his Indonesian extremely fluent. And he had a steady, determined spirit, a grandeur. To the point that you could say the hairs on the back of my neck stood up with awe. I was further struck by Sukarno’s statement to us that perhaps we had earlier read that he and Hatta had always had their differences over the manner of struggle, over the way of confronting the Dutch and the way of educating the masses. “But before you my brothers” [he said], “with you and Allah as my witnesses, there is no difference between myself and Hatta. In the interests of a free Indonesia, we have set aside our earlier differences.”

Also remaining in Nur’s memory was Sukarno’s employment of the Japanese as a model of power and unity worthy of imitation.

in his speech, he continued to maintain, “brothers, witness for yourselves the proof of how a race whose bodies look small, who are colored like we, was able to defeat the white races of England, America, Holland, and France in an unequivocal fashion, leading to our meeting here. This is a model of spirit and of a living conviction, of divinity and diligence, and we can copy these from them.” ... His speech made a deep impression on the students at that time.³⁹

Both privately and publicly, it was a line that Sukarno would pursue throughout the Japanese occupation period, with a contagious enthusiasm. In his first published essay

subsequent to his arrival in Java, in a special glossy magazine published by the *Asia Raya* newspaper to commemorate six months of “Japanese Protection of Indonesia,” Sukarno pulled few punches in a stinging cultural indictment of an Indonesian people whose spirits—under colonialism—had become infected with the self-centered pettiness and passivity typifying a slave mentality, a mentality antithetical to the building of a powerful nation.⁴⁰ The Japanese and their accomplishments meanwhile appeared as a vivid counter-referent.⁴¹

Sukarno began by recalling the overwhelming spectacle of Japanese military and national power he had witnessed in the Japanese entry to Padang on March 17.

How impressive was this Japanese entry! Hundreds of trucks, hundreds of cars, dozens of armored vehicles, dozens of cars towing artillery pieces, hundreds of bicycles and motorcycles entered Padang with a thunderous but organized sound. The *Hinomaru* flag fluttered before this powerful army, urging on the wheels of the hundreds of vehicles that shook the earth beneath our feet, and the airplanes resounding in the air like the supremely powerful *garuda* [bird of Indian and *wayang* legend].⁴²

Sukarno then described two pleasing developments in the immediate wake of the Japanese arrival in West Sumatra. The first was the popular unfurling of the two flags of Japan and Indonesia side by side. The second was the feeling of respect which he said Japanese of all rank and background had shown towards the local population in response to the warm welcome.

Shortly thereafter, however, Sukarno reported the occurrence of “an incident that did not please me.” In his later autobiography—as in so many other postwar nationalist memory documents—the disappointing incident that Sukarno described following the Japanese arrival was the near-instantaneous appearance of a Japanese order banning the Indonesian flag.⁴³ But while the removal of the flags had no doubt irked him as few others, in this different place and time, Sukarno told a different story of the Japanese, and of disappointment—a disappointment, rather, in his fellow countrymen.

The Japanese officers who opened offices were deluged by dozens, hundreds, in total no doubt thousands of people, a great many of whom referred to themselves as “leaders.” The “leader” of this village, the “leader” of this city, the “leader” of this association, customary “leaders,” religious “leaders,” family “leaders,” “leaders” of ethnic groups ... And what did they bring? They didn’t bring anything—they *asked* for things! And they didn’t ask for anything important, not for general necessities, but just for niceties, almost all of which were meant for themselves! One asked for justice because a Dutch person had stolen his money; another asked if his child in another city, who was without a job, could be looked after; another asked for work because he had been deemed redundant by the previous government; another asked to be returned to Java because all of his family was there; another asked to be promoted to village head because, he said, the people in his village agreed with the idea ... Ask, ask, ask, and *ask* again!

"Why do I mention this here?" Sukarno continued. "To reveal a bad quality among our Minangkabau brothers" in West Sumatra?

No! I mention this here to reveal a bad quality among *the people of Indonesia in general*. Because I know: What happened in the Minangkabau area also happened in other areas, in Aceh, Medan, Lampung [all in Sumatra], Java and Borneo and Sulawesi and Bali and Lombok and Madura—and among the "intellectuals" as well! ... Asking is not giving. Asking is not contributing. Asking is not *joining in sacrifice*!⁴⁴

As a further concrete illustration, Sukarno offered an exchange he had personally witnessed in the office of a certain Lieutenant Sakaguchi in the West Sumatran city of Bukit Tinggi, one of the many offices deluged with the sorts of local requests described above. Sukarno described Sakaguchi as "a Japanese officer, a doctor of philosophy, of high character and broad perspective." On a day soon after the Japanese arrival in which he happened to be in Sakaguchi's office, Sukarno wrote, the lieutenant received a visit from a wealthy Indonesian man sporting a "blue-black wool jacket, a pressed white shirt, a flowery tie from [the Dutch luxury brand name] *Tootal*, gray gabardine trousers, and black shoes." Like so many others, the man had come

to ask for something! To ask that he be released from paying taxes, because he was out of work. Lieutenant Sakaguchi smiled. He regarded this young man, who was "jobless" and yet still a dandy. And then he said something to this youngster that made me too feel *ashamed*. This is what he said: "You still have a nice shirt, you still have nice pants, you still have a nice tie, you still have nice shoes. Is it not possible for you to join in making some small sacrifice for your homeland? Look at me! My shirt is in tatters and it's the only one I have. These are also the only trousers I have, and my shoes are no longer in any shape. I have undergone months of shortages, I have *sacrificed* for months—sacrificed *for your homeland*. Can you not sacrifice for your homeland?"⁴⁵

"Although these words of Lieutenant Sakaguchi were spoken in a friendly way," wrote Sukarno, "they struck like dagger into my heart ... into my soul. The youngster's face turned red from shame, but my face turned a bright red." The implications of Sukarno's juxtaposition of Sakaguchi with his pampered, westernized Indonesian visitor could not have been less subtle.

Sukarno's cutting critique highlighted an ongoing nationlist perception of Japan's advent as offering unprecedented opportunity and inspiration not only for a national political revolution, but for a cultural one as well. With talk of political revolutions declared out of bounds for the foreseeable future, for Sukarno and the non-cooperators no less than for his cooperator predecessors, it was on the cultural front that Indonesian nation-builders and Japanese empire-builders continued to seek areas of common ground. Promisingly, the same period saw the establishment of three Japanese-approved organizations charged, in various ways, with the study, understanding, and promotion of local culture: a center for Indonesian arts, a language commission, and a

committee for the investigation of ancient customs. Sukarno was involved in all three projects.

A preparatory committee to establish a Center for Indonesian Arts (*Poesat Kesenian Indonesia*), led by *Balai Poestaka* literary director and *Asia Raya* cultural commentator Sanoesi Pané, convened for the first time on October 6, 1942. Its announced aim was to “create art of the new Indonesia, among other things by adjusting and improving regional arts in this direction.” An accompanying commentary from *Asia Raya* assistant cultural editor Darmawidjaja interpreted “improving” as “examining what we must discard and what we must keep from Western culture.” The indiscriminate importation of Western art of the past, he added, had “brought more harm than good to the Indonesian race.” The importance of the project from a nationalist perspective, and at least semi-official Japanese approval, was confirmed by the membership of a separate advisory board for the center, which included Sukarno and the Military Administration Department’s Mr. Soedjono and Achmad Subardjo, as well as a single Japanese member, the propaganda squad’s nationalist firebrand Ichiki Tatsuo.⁴⁶

Two weeks after the announcement of the Center for Indonesian Arts, in a separate development of deep symbolic importance for Indonesian nation-builders, the establishment of a special committee for the study, standardization, and propagation of the Indonesian language was announced. Again, the committee’s membership confirmed the political importance of this ostensibly cultural project. The nineteen Indonesian members of the Language Commission (*Komisi Bahasa*) represented a selection from among the cream of the nationalist political and literary worlds: Sukarno, Hatta, their associates Mr. Soemanang and Amir Sjarifuddin, military administration advisor Mr. Sudjono, and leading administrators Soetardjo and Hoesein Djajadiningrat were joined by linguistic specialists and men-of-letters including Sanoesi Pané, Armijn Pané, Soetan Takdir Alisjahbana, and the leading Javanologist and literary scholar Dr. Poerbatjaraka. The committee was chaired by Mori Fumi, a Ministry of Education official and head of the military administration’s education unit (*bunkyoōhan*). Other Japanese members were a certain Kagami, a Japanese-language specialist also dispatched from Tokyo by the Ministry of Education, and three former Indies residents: Ichiki Tatsuo, Y. Minami, and Professor K. Uehara, a former Malay instructor in Japan who was chief of the censor section in the broadcasting unit.⁴⁷

The unveiling of the Commission confirmed that the Japanese authorities had accepted the practical logic of arguments such as those of Ichiki and decided to throw their full weight behind the Indonesian language.⁴⁸ Welcoming the committee’s establishment, an *Unabara* reporter noted that repressive Dutch policies towards Indonesian had caused its development and its popularization to stagnate, leaving it little more than a foreign language for most of the population—including the educated elite—and inhibiting its application in such areas as law and science.⁴⁹ On the Indonesian side, the commission’s establishment was greeted as “a measure worthy of praise,” confirmation that “despite being busy thinking about everything connected with the war, the Japanese Military Government is still able to sense how important it is to bring the Indonesian language to full blossom.” *Asia Raya*’s Winarno wrote that, with the Commission’s founding, the great “barriers to Indonesian, part of the Dutch divide-and-conquer strategy, had at last been removed.”⁵⁰

The third of the new institutions linking wartime practicality, nation-building, and culture was the Imamura-sponsored “board of inquiry” first broached in early conversations with Sukarno. Its establishment was publicly announced on September 24, 1942, in an order signed by 16th Army Chief of Staff Okazaki Seisaburō. While Imamura had seemed to suggest something along the lines of the prewar Popular Council (*Volksraad*), the board of inquiry was instead given the weighty but apolitical-sounding title the “Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs.” The title appeared to have taken inspiration from the “Principles of Execution of the Administration in the Southern Occupied Regions” issued by the Tokyo high command in November 1941, which read: “In enforcing the military administration, the existing government structures are to be utilized to the utmost, and pre-existing institutions and folk customs are to be respected.”⁵¹ Okazaki’s announcement described the committee as a point of consultation between “learned and experienced Japanese and indigenous inhabitants of various fields for the purpose of ... fully studying and investigating the traditional customs and systems of Java ... in order to smooth execution of the administration.”⁵²

The Commission convened for the first time on November 28, 1942, several weeks after its newly selected members were treated to an extravagant inaugural banquet at Imamura’s residence. Its ten Indonesian members included all four subsequent leaders of Sukarno’s *Poetera* movement, still as yet in the planning stages: Sukarno, Hatta, *Taman Siswa* school founder Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, and Muslim nationalist leader Kiyai Hadji Mas Mansoer. Alongside them, as in the Language Commission, were the Javanologist Dr. Purbatjaraka and the *pangreh praja* dignitaries Soetardjo and Hoesein, the latter an expert in *adat* law. They were joined by the Western legal expert Dr. Supomo. Besides committee chairman and military administration advisor Hayashi Kyūjirō, Japanese members included Katajima Kenjirō, a former official of the Ministry of Colonies, Adachi Katsukiyo, Dr. Supomo’s boss at the Department of Justice, two former bank directors with several prewar years’ residence in Batavia, and, as in the Language Commission, education unit chief Uehara.⁵³ Military administration civilian advisors and translators Miyoshi Shunkichirō and Taniguchi Gorō headed up the committee’s all-Japanese secretariat, and, as promised by Imamura, General Affairs Section chief Nakayama Mōichirō sat by.⁵⁴

From the outset, the gap between General Imamura’s notion of a general “board of inquiry” and the “ancient customs and institutions” in the Commission’s title was cause for confusion. The Japanese makeup of the committee was official rather than academic, suggesting that the former aim—the study of ancient customs and institutions—would be entirely subservient to the latter one, i.e. the contemporary business of wartime occupation policy and its maximal effectiveness.⁵⁵ Military administration advisor and commission secretary Miyoshi Shunkichirō later said that the board was established “in order to utilize the civilian leaders and to mobilize the inhabitants for the purpose of maintaining public security in Java, the logistical base, through smooth execution of the military administration,” and—by providing the leading nationalists a venue in which to let off steam—preempting the possibility of them turning their backs on the regime.⁵⁶ In his opening address, committee chairman Hayashi described the role of the committee as that of an administrative policy sounding-board. Japan’s great

aim in its holy war, he said, was to establish a new order of mutual coexistence and coprosperity that would “form the basis of eternal prosperity for the Japanese race, and likewise permanently liberate all the races from the Anglo-American fetters of these last several hundred years, and ensure their future prosperity and happiness as members of the Greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere.” Within this context, “what the military administration authorities wish from this committee,” said Hayashi, “is that the intentions of the authorities are sufficiently transmitted down to the people, and that the aspirations of the people are transmitted upwards.”⁵⁷

For their part—with the possible exception of scholar Dr. Poerbatjaroko, whose comments at the first Commission meeting suggested a comfort with the idea of first concentrating on ancient customs, and afterwards determining which of them would be useful in the present—the Indonesian membership too preferred to construe the primary role of the commission in practical social, economic, and political nation-building terms.⁵⁸ In an opening statement heartily seconded by Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta argued that the role of the commission should be to analyze contemporary social conditions and suggest policy with an eye to social progress, and to the “building of new national institutions.” Before speaking of Indonesia’s customs and institutions, noted Hatta, it was important to realize that Dutch rule had “for the most part altered them,” for, as confirmed in the works of Dutch economist Boeke, the “invasion of Western individualism” had “greatly changed, and damaged, Indonesian society.” The great question for the present was how to build Indonesia into a progressive and powerful modern nation the equal of its neighbors, and thus a healthy and worthy ally in the shared struggle against the West. With a characteristic boldness and wariness regarding Japanese intentions, Hatta reminded his Japanese counterparts that “in the course of liberating the East Asian races from Western imperialism and bringing about the co-prosperity sphere, it will serve no purpose if only one or two races are powerful—it is necessary to plan for the strengthening of all the races.” Where employed to this end, Hatta acknowledged that the study of ancient traditions and customs nevertheless had an important function.

There is a need to investigate old customs, to choose which of these should be used and which discarded, and to employ those that we use both for the purpose of future popular well-being, and in the aim of strengthening the Indonesian race to the same level as the other races of East Asia ... Again, in the organization of new national institutions, it is desirable to institute reforms that take ancient national institutional organization as a groundwork. I made this point in the movement that I formerly lead ... The most important area for Indonesian society is village society. In this regard, there are many matters in need of research ... and many problems that represent a hindrance to social progress.⁵⁹

Judging from Hatta’s prewar statements, to which he here referred, the “ancient national institutions” that he saw as representing a useful groundwork on which to build a modern, powerful, progressive society were the cooperative socio-economic relations presumed to have characterized life in the precolonial, precapitalist “native” village. Agreeing on Hatta’s statement of priorities, the committee’s Indonesian participants

quickly passed a motion to gather information on the lives and livelihoods of the mass of the “native” population in rural villages and urban *kampung*, how current policy was affecting these, and how it might be improved.

Outside of the limelight—and away from the constraining eyes of the Japanese administration—Sukarno and company were meanwhile pursuing a small-scale but much more unreservedly political nation-building enterprise. Within a few weeks of their first encounter, Sukarno and Hatta’s meeting with a group of idealistic, ambitious nationalist students had blossomed into a full-fledged cadre training program “to be shaped,” as one of the leading participants put it, “into a staff to accompany the great leaders Sukarno, Hatta and others, in order to build a new Indonesia.”⁶⁰ This “New Generation Residence Hall” (*Asrama Angkatan Baroe*) project would have lasting and in some ways unforeseen consequences for Indonesian history.

Informal Japanese support for the project was provided by the propaganda squad’s Hitoshi Shimizu, who made rooms available for housing and teaching in the majestic former luxury hotel in which he worked and resided, located at 31 Menteng Road in the heart of Batavia. Some of the young men involved included Indonesians associated with Shimizu, the propaganda squad, and the Three-A movement—including Johar Nur. Because of Shimizu’s involvement and sponsorship, the Residence Hall, like the Three-A movement, was often later conventionally viewed as a Japanese-orchestrated affair, its members labeled as “Shimizu’s boys.”⁶¹ Although Shimizu later described it as “an Indonesian independence organization pure and simple,”⁶² as was the case with the Three-A movement, Shimizu’s sponsorship of the program was inspired less by pure brotherly altruism than as the outcome of practical calculations in which Japanese interests indeed remained central. At the same time, again as with the Three-A, due to a mix of the nationalist capacity for seizing the initiative themselves, Shimizu’s faith in the East Asian League-style *laissez-faire* approach to Japanese-Asian cooperation, and the more practical language barrier, the New Generation Residence Hall was in fact an almost entirely Indonesian project, driven and shaped in the interaction between the residents and their nationalist mentors, and bearing a great deal of strategic and ideological continuity with the prewar nationalist movement. The training of young political cadre by the older generation, and the emphasis upon the plight and mobilization of the oppressed masses, were already hallmarks of the movement by the early 1930s.

For at least one of the young men present at the first meeting with Sukarno and Hatta, the encounter with Sukarno was in fact a reunion with an old political mentor. The 26-year-old Sukarni was a graduate of the *Taman Siswa* and had been devoted to the nationalist cause from an early age. Nine years earlier, his energy in helping to establish a branch of the Sukarno-led *Partindo* party in his hometown of Blitar, East Java, had caught the attention of senior party leader Ir. Anwari, who had sent him to Bandung for cadre training under Sukarno. After Sukarno’s exile, Sukarni had led the radically-tinted nationalist youth organization Young Indonesia (*Indonesia Muda*), which strove for unity with the masses and the abolition of hierarchical social distinctions among its members. Between 1934 and 1942, Sukarni was imprisoned three times by the Dutch colonial authorities for nationalist agitation. Shimizu Hitoshi was familiar with Sukarni because he and Adam Malik, who was also present at the meeting with Sukarno and Hatta, were both employees of the *Dōmei* wire service.

Malik, twenty-five, was also a former *Partindo* party member. From 1939 to 1941 he had served as a *Gerindo* leader in Batavia. Malik had joined Sukarni in Dutch imprisonment after Pearl Harbor. He was one of the prewar founders of the first nationalist press agency *Antara*, and his presence at *Dōmei* was automatic, as the two services were merged subsequent to the Japanese arrival.⁶³

Sukarni was to be the *Asrama*'s leader, and at least one source, Maruto Nitimihardjo (b. 1906), a wartime comrade of Sukarni and one of the original members of Sukarno's PNI party, credited the idea to Sukarni himself: "Sukarni [who already worked] at the Propaganda Office and was friendly with Shimizu, was able to convince Shimizu of the need for an *asrama* in order to educate cadres that could assist Japan etcetera"—with his real agenda, said Nitimihardjo, being Indonesian independence.⁶⁴ Johar Nur, however, recalled the idea for the *Asrama* as the product of regular discussions between Hitoshi Shimizu and Nur's mentor, the former *Gerindo* leader Mohammad Yamin, which took place at the *Three-A* Information Committee Office in this period. Shimizu, said Nur, had received a pledge from Yamin to assist him in some fashion following his release from *kenpeitai* imprisonment.⁶⁵

In any event, it was neither Sukarni, Shimizu, nor Yamin but rather Chaerul Saleh, the 25-year-old chairman of the Federation of Indonesian Students (PPPI), who invited Nur to join the membership of the newly-christened New Generation Residence Hall (*Asrama Angkatan Baroe*) in late July 1942. Here Nur joined a select group composed of what Saleh described to him as "20 students and 20 nationalist youth," deemed the "Youth of the New Generation" (*Pemoeda Angkatan Baroe*). As Nur remembered it, Saleh made no mention of helping Shimizu per se. Following selection by Sukarni and Chaerul Saleh, Nur said, "we were checked, tested for becoming or being promoted to [the position of] close assistants to the senior [nationalist] leaders ... in order to shape an independent Indonesia."⁶⁶

Perhaps not surprising given that the selection was carried out by Sukarni, Saleh, and perhaps Mohammad Yamin, in great contrast with those involved in the *Tiga A* movement and its *Pemoeda Asia Raya* youth organization, almost all of the young men chosen for the *Asrama* had a past association with the non-cooperator wing of the nationalist movement, many with its more radical elements. Alongside Sukarni, Saleh, and Adam Malik, they included the 19-year-old propaganda squad broadcasting section clerk D.N. Aidit—who we may recall as the young man who had enthusiastically accosted Shimizu Hitoshi and Asano Akira while they were overnighing in Serang on their way to Batavia on the second day after the landing—and the 22-year-old M.H. Lukman, whose father had participated in the communist uprisings of 1926–7, and who as a boy had accompanied his father during his exile and imprisonment in the infamous Boven Digul concentration camp, where he had largely received his education.⁶⁷ Both were later leading members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in its postwar incarnation.

During the intensive four-month course, Nur and his colleagues were placed under the elite tutelage of such leading nationalist figures as Sukarno, Hatta, Mohammad Yamin, and Achmad Subardjo. As described by Nur, classes were held in an intensive schedule from 7:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and again from 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m..⁶⁸ The following is what Nur remembered:

Bung Karno gave us education in the Indonesian independence struggle. Mr. Hatta gave us education in the sociological sciences, and also on Greek philosophy ... The third was Mr. Yamin, who taught us about the history of the struggle of the Indonesian race for independence, from our ancestral beginnings up to the Japanese period ... Mr. Subardjo gave us education in forms of government, and the structure of the socialist state.⁶⁹

Other nationalist lecturers at the *Asrama* included Mr. Sunarjo and Amir Sjarifuddin. The Leiden graduate Sunarjo, a founding member of Sukarno's PNI party who had subsequent prewar experience in propaganda-making for both the *Partindo* and *Parindra* parties, was responsible for instructing the *pemoeda* in "nationality, nation, and state structure."⁷⁰ Sjarifuddin, also schooled in the Netherlands and chairman of the left-leaning *Gerindo* party from 1939, offered "education in schools of sociology, organization, and popular rhetoric."⁷¹ Two lesser-known men—M.M. Dayoh and Muhammad Zain Djambek—offered courses in the Indonesian language and in Islam respectively. On occasion, other prominent figures such as the modernist Islamic nationalist Haji Agus Salim, a former *Sarekat Islam* leader, were also invited as guest instructors. Alongside its Indonesian instructors, there were a total of three Japanese on the *Asrama*'s teaching staff: Shimizu Hitoshi, a Japanese language instructor named Nagazumi, and the geographer-historian Bekki Atsuhiko. Shimizu, said Nur, gave lectures on "the Japanese spirit, and the principles and aims of Japan in the Greater East Asia War." Bekki gave lessons in his specialty, geo-politics.⁷² Before classes began each morning, the *Asrama* students were given paramilitary training under the direction of Abdoel Latief Hendroningrat, former leader of the Batavia branch of the *Parindra* youth scout organization *Surya Wirawan*.⁷³

More than the contents of any of the lectures as such, what survived most palpably in Nur's memory was the immense psychological impact of the circumstances of the *Asrama* itself: the informal, daily interaction with the very cream of Indonesia's nationalist elite, the exclusive circumstances of selection and of the *Asrama* surroundings, and the leadership role he and his colleagues were encouraged to assume in direct relationship with the masses. All of this imbued the youth of Menteng 31 with a strong conviction of their designated role as stewards of the future nation-to-be.

In Menteng 31 ... I grew, in the sense that my sense of self-confidence grew all the stronger ... Because the leading figures of Indonesia, of our race, who I had seen in pictures when I was around ten years old—for example, Mr. Sukarno with Mr. Hatta, Mr. Yamin—eleven years later, here I was next to them. I was discussing, debating things with them ... Automatically, one's sense of self-worth and self-confidence grows stronger.⁷⁴ ... Perhaps you have heard *Bung Karno*'s speeches? He was truly a master. [When I was younger], Mr. Hatta, he had a nephew who liked to play badminton in his yard—afterwards we'd be thirsty and we'd go into his house—I was really in awe. And now I was studying directly with [Hatta], on occasion we would trade opinions with him. I was truly lucky at that time, I felt—forgive me for saying so—"my, I'm an important person."⁷⁵

For Nur, the plush *Asrama* surroundings only confirmed this feeling. The hotel, called the “Schomper,” had been built and furnished to the most luxurious of standards just four years earlier. It was difficult to keep these shining surroundings from going to one’s head.

Before it was a first-class German Hotel, with furniture like that, the kind of place you wouldn’t have seen people of our race during the Dutch times, you know ... The room in front was big and full of mirrors, with a great big wall clock ... This was where we entered, so it was that kind of place. In material terms, for us, so-called Indonesians from the jungle, from the *kampung*, from simple families, going into a place like that.⁷⁶

Nur’s comments here should be kept in perspective; if he and many of his colleagues felt the *Asrama* facilities and with the contacts with celebrities such as Sukarno and Hatta to be somewhat beyond their station, they did not exactly hail from the bottom of the “native” social ladder either. Of them, Sukarni and Aidit, from obscure social backgrounds and with only intermediate-level commercial school educations, were perhaps the closest to something like middle class. It was in any case with no lack of self-confidence that Nur and his colleagues ventured into the wider society to fulfill the second part of their curriculum, complementing the theory of the classroom with the *praxis* of the streets.

Each one of us was required to put together a social organization ... a mass organization. There were those who made a peasant’s group, those who made a chauffeur’s group, those who made people’s groups, and those who assembled [paramilitary] units (*barisan*), for example Chalid Rasyidi, who made the Buffalo Corps. I and five of my friends—such as Supardjan, who had also been at the Agricultural College—and Aidit, formed a “pedicab corps” (*barisan becak* or “B.B.”).⁷⁷

The inexpensive, human-powered *becak* had first appeared in Java only two or three years before. Perfectly suited to the wartime situation, its numbers were now growing rapidly. With the better-off (Japanese, overseas Chinese and other Asians, and well-to-do Indonesians) as passengers, mostly ethnic-Chinese small entrepreneurs in the middle as owners, and mostly young working class men as renter-operators—scraping by a living in a work situation not unlike that of a pack animal, with a large share of their take going to their (mostly non-“native”) bosses—the *becak* reflected the persistence of colonial socio-economic relations grossly unfavorable to the masses.⁷⁸ At the moment that he first beheld the *becak* some two years before the war, Nur recalled, “I felt in my heart that my race were being enslaved.”⁷⁹ The idea for the *Barisan Becak* was his. “We gathered together *becak* operators the length of the street ... and they brought others,” said Nur.

Most of them were half-educated, Islamic[-educated] ... They were extremely enthusiastic, because our aims were [firstly] that in this time of war, we all shared

the same fate. We [could] look after them in relation to their bosses ... And secondly, we were thinking that later, after the Greater East Asia War was over and won, the *becaks* could be eliminated and modernized.⁸⁰

For the *Asrama* students and the *becak* drivers alike, it was an appealing dream, one small component of an idealized vision of a postwar, postcolonial national order in which—with a new generation of leaders like themselves at the helm—the benefits of modernity and development would be distributed in a new and more equitable way, transcending the colonial fixities of the present. For the moment at least without any funds, however, the *Barisan Becak*—as well as the other mass organizations formed by the *Asrama* students—had to get by on words and ideas alone. Still, in these cross-class relations between Indonesians—as, for that matter, in relations between the Indonesians and the Japanese—so long as the hardships of the present were understood to be a temporary product of the wartime situation, and so much as this unity of fate seemed real, the idea of brotherhood could be said to have much working in its favor. The experience of Johar Nur's *Asrama* colleagues who formed other mass organizations in this same period—the last several months of 1942—appears to have followed a similarly encouraging trajectory. This was the case with the paramilitary “Buffalo Corps” (*Barisan Banteng*) formed of older, largely working-class children in two places—Batavia and Sukabumi—by two groups of three *Asrama* residents each.

At that time, Mr. Samsuudin and mostly members of the old *Parindra* [party] had put together a Three-A Corps [the *Barisan Pemoeda Asia Raya*]. In general, those who joined it were youth from [*Parindra*'s] *Surya Wirawan* [boy scouts], the sorts who were children of officials.⁸¹ In the Buffalo Corps there were many from the lower classes, the common people, peasants and those who lived in the alleys. The popularity and the [public] opinion [of the Buffalo Corps] was so great that it got to that point that it exceeded that of the *Pemoeda Asia* [*Raya*].⁸²

The month of December, 1942, marked a peak in the atmosphere of nationalist optimism that had been building anew ever since Sukarno's arrival in July. Sukarno, who had maintained a relatively low public profile aside from the above newspaper submissions, seemed suddenly omnipresent, in each appearance sparing little energy in his attempts to whip enthusiasm to a fever pitch. His rhetoric and his delivery burned with a near-irresistible assurance that the nation was now, finally, on the right track. In a radio address on December 5, Sukarno admitted that while the short term might have so far brought little new, there was no doubt of Japan's long term aim: to build an Asia, and an Indonesia, that could stand on its own. Now, nine months into the occupation, the moment had finally come to make a beginning on this shared long-term plan.⁸³

Now all of the things important to transit have been restored; now the prices of daily necessities are almost back to normal; now the people are safe and calm once again. Now we arrive at phase three, that is the building of a new society.

Given the situation, Sukarno continued, there was, of course, a limit to what people should expect: "We cannot forget for a moment that outside of our country the war still flares heavily." Thus was it unavoidable that "in building this new society in Indonesia, all powers must be assembled towards winning the war." For, said Sukarno,

If this war does not end in victory, all of our aspirations, all of our hopes, all of our efforts will be shattered, and we shall once again suffer and be oppressed and exploited by allied imperialism. Only a Japanese victory can save us, can save all of Asia.

But this, said Sukarno, was not all bad either. For the war, and the Japanese presence, also presented Indonesia with a unique opportunity to cleanse itself of the effects of imperialism both inside and out. "In order for a given race [to avoid] being swept away," declared Sukarno,

the first and most important prerequisite is: Asia must cleanse itself of the influence of imperialism first—cleanse away its every root, its every sinew ... If a given race is not strong enough to oppose its influence, imperialism will not only enslave that race, but will sweep it right off the face of the earth.

As an object lesson, Sukarno described the experience of the Inca and Aztec races, both formerly great civilizations that had ended up only as "stones and fields of sand" because, he said, they had not been strong enough to withstand the influence of imperialism. In Sukarno's view, this came down not to superior Western military technology or even to the germs that the Spaniards carried with them, but to something lacking in the *character* of the Incas and Aztecs: "Even these races themselves disappeared completely," said Sukarno, "because they did not have the manliness to resist this influence." On this gendered scale of resistance to Western imperialism, the Japanese would appear to have been located at the most manly—and most desirable—extreme.

On December 8, 1942, Sukarno addressed a throng of tens of thousands assembled in Batavia's Ikada field to mark the one-year anniversary of the Japanese start of hostilities against the Western powers, now christened the Celebration of Asia Building (*Kōasai*). Here he announced the birth of what he called "a Popular Organization, a certain Popular Movement" (*Pergerakan Rakyat*). The latter term also translated as a nationalist movement. In the way of particulars, there was as yet less to tell than many had hoped, for discussions with the Japanese side had yet to produce a plan acceptable to all. Sukarno could only promise the crowd that on January 1, "a great open meeting shall be convened, and here we will enlighten you in full as to the entire program, all of the principles, the entire arrangement, all of the plans, all of the departments, and all of the activities of this people's organization."⁸⁴

One thing Sukarno could already be precise about was the identity of the top leadership of the new People's Organization, which, he said, had "been left by the Japanese Military Government to myself, brother Mohammad Hatta, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, and Kiai Mansoer." The selection of these two men to join himself and Hatta at the helm had been known since the beginning of November, when the four

leaders had together been christened the Four-Leafed Clover (*Empat Serangkai*). They had been carefully selected: both men had broad social legitimacy, while at the same time neither seemed likely to pose any threat to the leadership or initiatives of Sukarno or Hatta. While their nationalist credentials were solid, the two men were both of an older generation than Sukarno and Hatta, and less prominent for their politics than for their social and cultural activism: Dewantoro, now aged fifty-three, was the former *Indisch Partij* activist who had withdrawn from active politics twenty years earlier to found the *Taman Siswa* schools. Hadji Agus Salim, aged fifty-seven, was a prominent modernist Muslim with a long history of association with the *Sarekat Islam* and later the *Mohammadiyah*, clearly meant to shore up support for the new movement among Muslim activists.⁸⁵

In choosing these men, Sukarno and Hatta had passed over those associated with the Three-A movement. In his subsequent statements on basic principles of the new movement, too—the banning of ethnic Chinese participation, the involving of all social classes and all strands of political opinion, and the undivided backing of the Japanese authorities—Sukarno sent a clear message that the new organization was going to be different from the Three-A.

The people's organization that is born today, is truly an organization of *popular unity*. All of the people of Indonesian race—those who are not of the Indonesian race shall not join this organization—all of the people of Indonesian race, young and old, male and female, the aristocrat (*ningrat*) and the common man (*marhaen*), the Muslim and the non-Muslim, the left and the right—all of the people will be forged into one in this organization. Secondly, this people's organization will receive the full assistance of the [Japanese] Government. The Government has decided that it will leave this organization entirely to the people—meaning, the Government will not interfere with its establishment or its manner of working, but that it will nevertheless remain ready to assist and support it at any moment.

The fundamental aim of the new organization, said Sukarno, would be to “forge the Indonesian people into a strong people, a people worthy of being a member in the Greater Asian family, one that will assist in Japan's war with all its might.” There was no other choice, he said, for “this Greater East Asian War will shape a certain Asian race, and as a member of this race the Indonesian people cannot [afford to] be soft.” Two days later, the name of Sukarno's new organization was announced: *Poetera*, an acronym made from three words meaning “The Center of Popular Power” (*Poesat Tenaga Rakjat*), together also meaning “son”—an organization, as Sukarno later described it, for those like himself, “a son of the New Era, of the New Struggle, of the New Life, a son of Indonesia.”⁸⁶

For many among the Indonesian nationalist elite, it was a heady moment, one not to be spoiled by the lack of concrete details. For those inclined to be more critical, however, it was perhaps somewhat harder to see how Sukarno's platform differed in fundamental terms from that of the Three-A platform on which it was supposed to improve—beyond, that is, in its blatant exclusion of the ethnic Chinese, and in its general avoidance of those associated with the Three-A. For their part, the men of

Parindra—who believed that they had, after all, been out ahead on much the same sort of platform before Sukarno had even arrived—felt the rug had been pulled out from under them.⁸⁷ Soekardjo Wirjopranoto and Winarno did continue in their prominent positions at *Asia Raya*, all the way until the end of the occupation. But with the quiet death of the Three-A—never officially announced, but universally acknowledged—*Parindra*'s play for the nationalist limelight, and for special Japanese favor, was largely finished.⁸⁸ The turn of the non-cooperators had arrived.

Among those most excited by Sukarno's fiery oratory were the students of the New Generation Residence Hall, whose four-month intensive training program had just ended. At a celebration of the "Day of Youth" held in the same field just two days before the December 8 rally, and attended by a crowd of similarly great proportions, a sizeable proportion of Sukarno's audience had been comprised of the membership of groups of local youth and young men, mostly from among the working class, that Nur and his comrades had assembled as part of their training. Newspapers reported a great procession of "youth from all levels [of society] and all corners of the city," who "marched towards the Ikada field in ranks the length of the street, mobilizing other residents to join them."⁸⁹ "We who were busy with the *becak* drivers mobilized our friends," said Nur, "and the Buffalo Corps also mobilized [theirs], to the point that the gathering was a very merry one indeed."⁹⁰

The first order of business that day was an extremely symbolic one: *all* of the youth groups present—"including the [Three-A Movement's] *Barisan Pemoeda Asia Raya*," noted *Asia Raya*'s editors, who apparently were eager to make a point of this—"joined in handing over leadership ... to Ir. Soekarno."⁹¹ At this point, recalled Johar Nur,

Mr. Sukarno gave a speech to the effect that he greatly trusted in our race, and that our race was capable of doing things that would carry us to the great goal, that is an independent Indonesia. He said that we not only needed youth that could move mountains, but youth that were capable of defending their homeland.⁹²

Sukarno further pledged that in the imminent establishment of his new "People's Organization ... the youth of Indonesia will be the most important pillar."⁹³

Exploiting the opportunity and the protections provided by Shimizu Hitoshi, and fed by Sukarno's boundless optimism, the young men of the New Generation Residence Hall had gotten all dressed up, but like so many other Indonesians, they would shortly discover that there was no particular place to go. Within the context of military-colonial normalization, the great expectations nurtured by the promises of 1942 demanded a wider range of action and expression than the wartime regime was in fact prepared to allow. Control over the mobilization of youth in particular was a target upon which the regime had now set its sights. The combination of the special sense of national mission nurtured at the New Generation Residence Hall and the growing feeling that not only the Japanese regime but also their own nationalist mentors—who continued to cooperate with that regime—were betraying the mission they had been led to believe they all shared, was to prime them for an alienation from the established order, both Japanese and Indonesian, exceptional among those of their class and status.

Normalization

The high life

In late March 1942, *bunkajin* Abe Tomoji offered his Japanese readers an essay entitled “A Great Nation” (*Dai kokumin*). Full of compliments and flush with the optimism of an unexpectedly easy victory, it was also a cautionary message.

Recently, I met an eminent (*sugureta*) German woman. Surprised even now at the power of the Japanese army, she was truly amazed at this army’s discipline, as well as its generous and magnanimous disposition. “Seeing this,” she revealed, “I believe we Germans have a good deal of reflecting to do.”

“We are now a great nation,” continued Abe. “Indeed we make our appearance in the world as a greater race than we ourselves thought.” But this also meant a great responsibility. Aware both of the relative inexperience of many of his countrymen in dealing with people of other ethnicities and cultures, and of their less than exemplary recent history on the Asian continent, this was something Abe was clearly worried about.

The citizens of a great nation must have an attitude as such. The behavior of the various races that we daily encounter here in Java may not always seem pleasant in our eyes. It is unfortunate but true. Yet those who retain a great broadmindedness and confidence do not get nervous and frustrated over trifles. We should remain composed. Hair-splitting behavior should not be allowed. Once again to speak the truth: An Australian P.O.W. said that the Japanese Army is a “Magnificent Army.” We must also become a “Magnificent Nation.”¹

As the weeks and months ticked by—and the thrill of the great battle of liberation began to slip into the background in the face of the banality of colonial life, with its everyday temptations and trifles—it was a message that the propaganda squad’s purveyors of enlightenment felt compelled to repeat with increasing frequency, and increasing shrillness. “Many tragedies occur because of misunderstandings,” wrote Shimizu Nobuo on May 22, 1942. “Consider the examples in Kabuki, consider the examples in Shakespeare. Inability to speak the language can invite misunderstandings. Differing customs also invite misunderstandings.” Like Abe, Shimizu Nobuo had no

question of the fundamental superiority of the Japanese race, and its natural leadership role. But also like Abe, only more openly, Shimizu was concerned that, as expressed by real live Japanese people in daily interaction with the “natives,” the Japanese culture that was supposed to represent the *solution* to Asia’s problems was starting to look like a problem in itself.

Japanese-type short-temperedness (*Nihonteki tankisa*) must not bring about a tragedy for the natives. Their tragedy is our tragedy.
 The more one has contact with the natives, and the more time has passed, the more the chance of a tragedy becomes a commonplace.
 The more commonplace this becomes, the more tense things get.
 The laziness of heart that comes when one thinks the battle is over, the waxing of the spirit—these can also become the cause of tragedy.
 The Japanese, all of us, are the leaders of the natives.
 We must retain the awareness of this historical necessity when we mix with the natives.
 As the days of material wealth and easy life continue, the battle will be forgotten.
 Keep this in mind.²

In line with domestic discourses in which the Japanese military was presented as a paradigm of selfless dedication to the nation, *Sendenhan* spokesmen in wartime Java continually harked back to the military’s comportment in the glorious first week of March 1942—and its brotherly encounters with the welcoming native population—as a model for a Japanese rule that would transcend Western colonialism, steering clear of its characteristic decadence, immorality, and exploitative relations. Japanese victory in the struggle against the West, too, was seen as dependent upon the successful maintenance of the Japanese spirit that had powered its early victories, and inspired Asian admiration. From mid-May 1942, in a column called *Chōonpū* (“the Sound of Waves on the Breeze”), *Sendenhan* commander Lt. Col. Machida began to offer *Unabara* readers daily reminders on proper Japanese behavior, often drawn from the *Senjinkun* (the Code of the Soldier) and the Chinese classics. As Machida described it in an early June entry, the issue boiled down to one of character.

On the fifth of March in Batavia, [the day of the Dutch withdrawal from Batavia], a unit of Japanese troops led by an officer knocked loudly upon the door of a house. Here they exchanged money for a bit of salt and rice. The Japanese soldiers all said “arigatō!” Then the soldiers cooked the rice, poured the salt over it and ate it. Seeing this, the residents of the house—already aware of the results of the fighting at this time—made the following observation: “the Australian and Dutch soldiers who cannot live without butter, cheese, and meat, and the Japanese soldiers who can get by on rice and salt—this difference in character clearly made the difference in determining winner and loser.”³

Yet the nostalgia for the moment of arrival, and the increasing stridency of such *Sendenhan* appeals to the selfless simplicity of the Japanese character, to brotherly

consideration for the natives, and to the unity of the Japanese nation—qualities also trumpeted by Indonesian nation-builders as symbolic of the essential Japanese difference from the West, and as a national model—only reflected a post-surrender reality whose parameters, both where the Japanese community was concerned, and where its relations with the local population was concerned, were substantially and irrevocably changed: during the invasion, the relationship was one of allies in the field against a powerful, shared enemy, a relationship that encouraged a spontaneous sense of brotherhood, and brotherly behavior, that indeed seemed to transcend that of colonial or military occupation. This was a situation that could not have contrasted more to that experienced in such places as China and Korea. But with Japanese victory assured, these dynamics were replaced with a static, prototypically colonial arrangement in which Japanese dominance, over both the conquered Dutch and the native population, was an established fact, unquestioned and absolute. Mirroring and reinforcing their position of political dominance, the Japanese overlords found themselves in a position of material opulence and social mastery—in housing, in food and drink, in the command of legions of native servants, in sexual domination not only over Indonesians but, more intoxicatingly still, over their former European rulers—that made Java appear, for many, an irresistibly seductive colonial paradise, a place existing merely for the satisfaction of Japanese wants. It was, in sum, a situation that opened the way for a speedy reappearance of military-colonial habits learned in China and elsewhere, and against which the cultural arguments and ideals of Greater Asianism, with rare exceptions, were little match.

The shift from front-line battlefield to a primary role as a rear base of supply and support to military operations elsewhere—and the accompanying shift towards a kind of peaceful colonial normalcy—was speeded and confirmed by the gradual arrival, from May 1942 onwards, of boatloads of Japanese civilians. Among them, Greater Asian missionary zeal was a markedly rarer commodity than among the “liberators” who had landed before the enemy in March. A certain proportion of these were administrators, the rest businessmen, technicians, medical personnel, clerks, and typists, individuals and representatives of firms who were to be entrusted with non-military activities in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, mining, shipping, and oil. Their numbers, which grew to over 20,000 by war’s end, included perhaps as many as 2,000 former Indies residents. By December 1942, with troops needed elsewhere, the original invasion force of 55,000 had meanwhile been exchanged with an occupying garrison of roughly 11,000–13,000 men.⁴ Thus did civilians, in private and military employ, come to outnumber enlisted men.⁵

Given the anti-capitalist sentiments dominant among the military and prevalent within Greater Asianism more generally, coexistence with representatives of Japanese private firms was an uneasy marriage of convenience. Just as in Manchuria and China, army officers and civilian ideologues like Shimizu Nobuo greeted claims of selfless national devotion from representatives of Mitsubishi, Mitsui and the like in Java with skepticism. Emphasizing their lowly status in military eyes as mere profit-seekers (*rieki tsuikyūsha*)—“there were even those who publicly said so,” noted former Indies resident Nishijima Shigetada with irritation—those Japanese not in military employ were made to wear a cherry-blossom (*sakura*) emblem, and nicknamed

sakura. Both the *sakura* and military-employed civilian *gunzoku* resented military attitudes as a “privileged class of ‘men above the clouds.’” From the point of view of the local population, however, both Japanese civilians and soldiers were generally seen as comprising a single military-colonial package, whose members all shared such a status.⁶

The situation was unlike anything most of the Japanese had ever experienced at home in Japan—let alone in war-torn China. As Machida related,

In Java, whose nickname was “paradise,” the Japanese Army wanted for nothing ... The residences et cetera of the propaganda squad were of a luxuriousness that people at home could not even dream of. In every city, most stayed in such places as the finest hotels, or the mansions of high-ranking Dutch officials. Each and every one of them rode around in their own personal automobile, and in that automobile was a chauffeur. At home, there were *djongos* (servants) and a cook, even a gardener—it was as if they were millionaires.⁷

The contrast with conditions on the Pacific Front to the east—particularly as the Allied island-hopping campaigns gained momentum with decisive victories at Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands in August and November 1942—were enough to inspire disbelief, and sometimes disgust, among the many soldiers who now made Java their destination while on temporary leave from the war zone.⁸ The comparison with Japan, where rationing and shortages of all sorts of daily necessities had been a fact of life since the early days of the China War—and worsened in the wake of the loss at Guadalcanal—only added to Java’s dreamlike quality. A series of cartoons depicting this contrast appeared in the *Java Shimbun*’s January 1, 1943 edition. Leo Jansen noted with some irony that these represented

the same contrast as earlier depicted of that between the Dutch at home and in the Indies, but now enlarged several times. The luxury knows no end. Japanese can sit for hours striking piano keys in occupied houses with one finger. Also indescribable is the pleasure of leaning back and driving through the pitch-dark city while turning on the overhead lamp. The sound of grinding gears is heard less often lately than in the beginning—they’re beginning to get the hang of driving.⁹

For many Japanese who had lived in Java before the war, the contrast with prewar experience was no less incredible. Tsuruta Tsukasa had been studying medicine in Surabaya before being repatriated to Japan—his first visit there—in November 1941. Tsuruta was the 24-year-old son of a Japanese woman who had been lured onto a boat at Nagasaki at age eighteen, headed for a bordello in Singapore. She had escaped and ended up as a Dutch officer’s housekeeper in the northern Sumatran province of Aceh. His Japanese father had run a small hotel in Padang, West Sumatra. Returning to Java with the Japanese invasion forces as a translator, Tsuruta was housed in the mansion of J.C. van Waveren—the former director of the Java Bank—along with Count Kodama Yukio, the highest-ranking civilian political advisor to the 16th Army. “Tsuruta finds living in the house of Van Waveren, where servants await his every command, a fairy

tale out of the 1001 nights,” observed Jansen in a diary entry dated June 8, 1942. “He can’t stop talking about it.” Still, Tsuruta appeared to identify more with the former Dutch rulers than the new Japanese ones, whom he found “incompetent and dilettantish” in their policymaking, “dumb and arrogant” in their attitudes. He complained that Japanese economic policy had led to the stifling of trade and enterprise, leading to starvation in some areas. Yet clearly unmoved by the Greater Asianism that had stirred the imagination of some of his more politicized young former resident Japanese counterparts—particularly those like Ichiki Tatsuo and Nishijima Shigetada who had been raised in Japan and whose emotional links to Japan went much deeper—Tsuruta also treated Japanese promotion of the cause of Asian brotherhood with disdain. He “burst into laughter,” wrote Jansen, at the thought of a *becak* driver who had the nerve to address him as “brother” (*saudara*).¹⁰

Symbolic of the process of military-colonial normalization, within a few months of the landing, Java’s alleyways and back streets became dotted with *ianjo* or comfort stations, institutions of sexual slavery catering specifically to the Japanese.¹¹ The *sendenhan*’s Colonel Machida later wrote,

On the island of endless summer, Spring arrived ... just as on the continent before, the *ianjo* were opened. Human meat market that it was, groups of women (*nyonan-nonan*) [*sic*] rich in international color blossomed gorgeously.¹² Be they fearsome *samurai* [i.e. soldiers], or pale-faced civilian intellectuals (*interi*), it goes without saying that they headed off in *becaks* in search of the butterflies of the night.¹³

As in China, the establishment and running of the “comfort stations” were entrusted in the main to representatives of the Japanese underworld, or *yakuza*. These were licensed by the military, and supplied kickbacks to the military in exchange—a major source of corruption among high-ranking officers, according to former intelligence unit member Nakajima Masachika.¹⁴ Also following a model evolved in China, Java’s comfort stations were arranged in a racial hierarchy, with customers correspondingly ordered in a hierarchy of rank and economy. In China, Japanese women were at the top of the *ianfu* hierarchy, most expensive and reserved for the most exclusive clientele; next in the racial and economic order came Koreans, considered racially close to Japanese; at the bottom, the least expensive and most commonly provided for enlisted men, were Chinese women. In Java, the top of the *ianfu* hierarchy, reserved for officers, was occupied by Japanese women, whites, and Eurasians. Chinese, Koreans, and other non-“native” Asians fell somewhere in-between, with “native” women provided in the largest numbers and lowest cost for the enlisted men (with both money and time limited—enlisted men did not have the privilege of overnighing outside the barracks—the customers at these “soldier’s comfort stations” or *hei ianjo* often waited in long lines for service).¹⁵ The propaganda squad’s Wakabayashi Teruyuki later recalled there being five officer comfort stations alone in Jakarta, in what he angrily described as an inequitable distribution: one for high-ranking officers, three for middle-ranking officers, and one for petty officers.¹⁶ In an undisclosed year of the Japanese occupation, an officer on a visit to Jakarta jotted down the following notes in his diary.

27 April (Tues) ... First went to the half-caste (*hāfu*) *ianjo* in Manggarai. I was told this was exclusively for officers and that one hour cost 4 yen, with an added hour bringing the total to 6 yen ... It was apparently full, the women were sold out. Then we visited the Indonesian *ianjo* in Cikini. Here it was 2.50 or something an hour, and there were lots of black ones. Frightened, I took to my heels and went home.

29 April (Emperor's Birthday) ... At dawn I had a lot to drink and went to Jakarta's Southern Paradise (*Nanten*) *ianjo*. Of some 30 women there, they say three of them are "white" (syphilis-free).¹⁷

The circumstances of many of the comfort station arrangements, with daily customers numbering in the dozens and refusal or escape difficult or impossible, were often much closer to institutionalized rape and sexual slavery than to prostitution as such, although male Japanese did not generally see it this way.¹⁸ In his postwar memoirs, 16th Army commander General Imamura himself insisted that *ianfus* and *ianjos* were not an institution unique to the Japanese army, as other national armies also had what he called "special nurse units" (*tokushu kangōfutai*)—a term that Imamura professed to prefer to *ianfu*.¹⁹ Imamura made no direct mention of the extensive comfort station system installed in Java under his command. But at the same time, this "gentlemanly" commander of the 16th Army, respected by (male) friend and foe alike, related his involvement in an earlier such project in southern China—just one year before his arrival in Java—in a nonchalant fashion.²⁰ In passing, Imamura also mentioned that it was the elite troops of the *Konoe* division under his command at the time—two divisions totaling roughly fifty-five thousand men that also subsequently made up the bulk of the 16th Army expeditionary force in Java—who had proven the most frequent customers of the southern China comfort stations.²¹

Where Japanese men exhibited any concerns about the comfort stations and fraternization with local women generally, these most commonly fell into two related categories: (Japanese) health and racial purity. In October 1942, a doctor named Nakamura, participant in a special propaganda-squad-sponsored seminar on health and hygiene, reassured *Unabara* readers that levels of venereal disease in Java, while high, were not out of proportion with what one would expect given the general low level of hygiene among the "natives" (earlier in the seminar, one of Nakamura's colleagues had indeed accused the "natives" not only of being generally unhygienic, but also of harboring a "latent resistance" to Japanese efforts at improving public hygiene, a resistance that needed to be "overcome for the benefit of all"). The results of Nakamura's tour of Batavia's comfort stations—of which he noted there were "quite a number"—were none the less shocking. Of a sample of one hundred "comfort women," fifty-seven had tested positive for gonorrhea, and levels of syphilis were "quite high ... Indeed one might assume," he added, "that all of them have syphilis." Dr. Nakamura's warnings on the subject left little doubt as to his priorities.

This is the situation. From now on the demands upon the outstanding human resources of the sons and daughters of Japan will be great; therefore, in the interest of bodily purity and the prosperity of our children and grandchildren, mindful of our superior race, we must be careful here.²²

In memoirs written more than twenty years later, Colonel Machida—who hosted the above seminar—still revealed a similar slate of misgivings where Japanese sex lives in Java were concerned.

In that peaceful mood—more precisely said, [the] decadent—life of troops stationed on Java, it went beyond a mere romantic mood (*pinku mūdo*); the holy war (*seisen*) became a sex war (*seisen*), sexual diseases became widespread, there was an explosion of children of even more mixed-blood than Eurasians, and the pure blood of both Japanese and Indonesians became sullied.²³

Japanese concerns about the possible sully of their pure blood, however, were for the most part outweighed by the appeal of romantic and/or sexual encounters with exotic local women against the exotic tropical backdrop. “It may have been a bit sad to leave one’s loved one back in Japan, but if you wanted to make love, they were not Japanese, but you had both white and black, and the appropriate mood was in no short supply,” wrote Machida elsewhere.²⁴ Japanese civilians had the most free time and were among those who most frequently availed themselves of the opportunity. These included the *bunkajin*: Machida recalled in particular Ōya Sōichi and Takeda Rintarō. The latter had at one point gone missing, presumably on a “romantic adventure,” for more than a week. The *bunkajin* talents nevertheless got their work done and maintained the proper spirit, noted Machida, who therefore saw no need to interfere.²⁵

For many of these Japanese men, the conquering of the resident female population was a means of experiencing an intoxicating sense of colonial hegemony akin to that portrayed in Hollywood movies and romantic novels. Most preferred were white or Indo-European women, like the stars of those same movies and novels, bearers of status and beauty hitherto inaccessible. As reflected in the pricing scheme at the comfort stations, it was above all Eurasian and white women who were most sought after. With husbands and fathers in the prison camps, many of these women were in a desperate situation—a situation of which it appears few Japanese, given the chance, refrained from taking advantage.

Among Japanese officers and civilian personnel was a group known as “the so-called ‘white horse society’ (*hakuba kai*) ... a group that specialized only in white women,” Machida later wrote, composed of “*tuan-tuan* [the Indonesian word for foreign gentlemen] who behaved as a gentleman should, towards just one woman.” Elsewhere Machida referred to the white horse society as “a friendship organization (*shinboku dantai*) for Dutch women who’d been left behind by their husbands.”²⁶ He recalled the story of a certain accounting officer named major “K.” who expressed to General Imamura an interest in horseback riding when he first arrived in Java. As a joke, Imamura directed him to the white horse society. “As it turned out,” wrote Machida working towards his punchline, the officer got “promoted,” ending up as “chairman of the *hakubakai*. One could not but praise his diligence.”²⁷ In doing so, Major K. had apparently replaced *bunkajin* Ōya Sōichi, also identified as chairman in another Machida text. Ōya had gained notoriety for his invention of a classification scheme of fellow Japanese according to racial preference: Japanese who favored white women were deemed white-Japanese (*hakkei nipponjin*); those who favored “natives” were

referred to as black-Japanese (*kokkei nipponjin*); while those who limited themselves exclusively to the small number of *geishas* and comfort women from Japan he deemed Japanese-Japanese (*nikkei nipponjin*).²⁸

During an evening stroll in Batavia in early September 1942, Leo Jansen observed a large brothel under construction in Chaulan Alley, complete with a replica of the Chinese Great Wall around it. Jansen further witnessed crowds of native onlookers peering into exclusive cafés such as the former Hof van Holland, watching “European waitresses who sit and chat with the Japanese customers at various tables. In the end they’ll replace the native waitresses at the Concordia too. European women,” he wrote, “appear to best fulfill the amorous dreams of the Japanese.”²⁹ Partly in response to rising complaints regarding this form of Japanese fraternization with the enemy, caucasian Dutch women and their children were moved into prison camps beginning in October 1942. But where available, these women remained a prized commodity at the comfort stations, and Indo-European women, who were spared the camps, remained a favorite target for the affections of officers and civilians.³⁰ In a diary entry dated April 20, 1943, Jansen remarked that “everyone has sweethearts that they visit in the dark of night, or who come to visit them. Preferably Indo-girls. Even Colonel Nakayama stands so accused.”³¹ Several months on, an internal nationalist report offered the following commentary: “In general one observes relationships between Japanese and Indo women. Events such as these are connected together with others, and actively ballyhooed, to the point of imprinting disappointment in the Japanese in all Indonesian hearts.”³²

With the institutionalized rape of the comfort stations functioning as a semi-private outlet for Japanese appetites and aggressions, public episodes of sexual violence were not as widespread in Java as sometimes later remembered, but they did occur. In April 1942, incidents of drunken Japanese forcing their way into Indonesian homes for sexual encounters were reported in several localities. Those who refused, as well as those who tried to intervene on their behalf, received beatings. *Kenpeitai* officers, officially charged with maintaining public order but prone to act with the impunity that comes from feeling above the law, were also frequently cited as perpetrators in such incidents, particularly where Dutch and “Indo” women were concerned.³³

One startling such incident, directly crippling to Japanese propaganda efforts, was the rape of Misna, a young Javanese dancer and movie actress and one of the leading attractions in the propaganda squad’s second touring campaign launched in June 1942. The assault was perpetrated at one of the stops along the tour by a Japanese soldier who cornered Misna while she was bathing. According to tour participant Yasuda Kiyoo, this incident occurred “despite heavy precautions,” and caused “severe friction” between the performers and the Japanese army, forcing the suspension of the tour. While it was not clear whether or not this soldier had numbered among the original invasion forces, Colonel Machida later suggested this as an explanation: “Alas! The good intentions behind the leaflet concerning ‘things to bear in mind’ [in contacts with the local population], which the *Sendenhan* had authored back in Taiwan [and which included the warning, ‘looking at women bathing is a man’s shame’],” he wrote, “had clearly not penetrated to the soldiers who came later.”³⁴ “It is not surprising,” noted a nationalist informant to Achmad Subardjo, “that word of these sorts of incidents

travels quickly from mouth to mouth. What is dangerous, however, is that these sorts of incidents can be used by the enemy to implant hatred of Japan amongst the inhabitants.”³⁵

While elite Indonesian women generally avoided such treatment, one more subtle but still shockingly cynical incident involving Achmad Subardjo's niece Herawati Latief, her Indonesian fiancé, and head of programming of the Overseas Broadcasting Department of the Batavia radio service Matsui Iwane, reflected the degree to which even some highly-educated Japanese were willing to abuse their positions when it came to interest in local women—and the price paid in local sympathies. The events transpired in July 1942. Iwane was an English expert whose résumé included work as an advertising agent for an American firm. In his employ was Herawati, who had recently returned from university-level study in the United States. Charmed by Herawati's intelligence and looks, one anonymous propaganda squad reporter referred to Herawati as a “flower blooming in one room of the broadcasting bureau.”³⁶ In the early weeks of the occupation, Latief had begun a romantic relationship with a young coworker named B.M. Diah. Diah, also fluent in English and a graduate in journalism from the *Kesatrian Institute* run by leading prewar nationalist figure Douwes Dekker, had landed a job under Matsui as an English- and Indonesian-language radio commentator just one day after the Dutch surrender. Diah's gift for fiery commentary, and in particular his propensity for stirring, incisive critiques of Western crimes and failures both past and present—under such catchy titles as “The White Man's Burden, Alias Capitalism”—had also brought frequent early publication of his radio addresses as well as specially-authored pieces in *Pemandangan* and in *Asia Raya*, where he was later employed as assistant editor-in-chief. Jusuf Ronidipuro, a former wartime colleague of Diah, later confirmed that Diah had been one of Japan's most outspoken and enthusiastic supporters in the early months of the occupation period, but that at one point fairly early on his feelings had turned decisively in the opposite direction.³⁷

This reversal was prompted by the brazen, immature actions of Matsui, who also had a special interest in Herawati, and did not hesitate to sacrifice Diah and his Greater Asian passions to satisfy his own more worldly ones. The August 16, 1942, entry from the diary of L.F. Jansen, who worked in the same office, described the following series of events:

Something has happened between Matsui and Diah, as a result of which Diah was held for 2 days at the *kenpeitai*, from where he was freed after intervention from Sudjono. Thereafter, tonight, he married Herawati Latief. Neither are to return to the radio. Matsui's action has thus brought much critique.³⁸

In another entry three days later, Jansen added that “the biggest [item of] rumor is still the marriage of Diah and Herawati, now that it appears that Matsui turned Diah over to the *kenpeitai* out of jealousy!” This was not the first time that the military administration's Mr. Sudjono intervened to free an unjustly imprisoned nationalist colleague, and it would not be the last. None of those involved in the incident made reference to it in their postwar memoirs, but one can only imagine the extent of the stir that it created in elite nationalist circles. When Jansen subsequently visited the new

couple for the first time at their home almost a month after the above events, he noted down the following personal observations:

Visit to the young newlyweds Diah. They were very reserved, but if I'm not strongly mistaken, cooled off in their [pro-]Japanese sympathies. Diah said to me, that in conversations with the Indonesians, it is difficult to discern much about their political orientation. But [that] a single word could say a lot. Open-heartedness is more dangerous than ever ... In his short imprisonment by the *Kenpeitai* he had seen Mrs. Loudon, after she had been beaten up. "She looked terrible." He had also seen Mrs. Van Mook [wife of the former governor-general] after she'd been beaten.³⁹

Whether or not accompanied by unwanted sexual advances, the drinking that inevitably accompanied Japanese carousing was itself a further source of general public irritation. "In the city of Batavia, in the city of Surabaya, you encounter many *suikan* (drunkards) who are hardly *suikan* (gentlemen)," wrote a certain Namio Ikeru in *Unabara* in August 1942. From his familiarity with local ways, he appeared to be a former Indies resident.⁴⁰ "How do Indonesians feel when they see this?" Indonesian precepts, he noted, included what were called "the five [forbidden] 'M's':

1. *Mentjoeri* (stealing)
2. *Minoem keras* (drinking alcoholic beverages)
3. *Madat* (opium)
4. *Main djoedi* (gambling)
5. *Madan* (taking a prostitute)

"Drunken Japanese people behave in a way you wouldn't see back in Japan," the author continued, "and Indonesians stare in astonishment. Nay, it's appropriate to say they are watching a spectacle. And they're not watching because it's interesting. In their hearts, they think of their precepts and feel contempt for Japanese."⁴¹

To these local precepts could be added many others that were constantly contravened by ignorant Japanese, such as the avoidance of public exposure by wearing proper shirts and pants and the avoidance of urination in public. In an early 1945 journal interview for a local Japanese audience, former Indies residents Ichiki Tatsuo and Yoshizumi Tomegorō—a youthful prewar associate of Ichiki who returned from Australia as part of a prisoner exchange in the summer of 1942—identified these and other infractions as part of a larger pattern. Their words drew attention not only to Japanese ignorance of the local culture as such, but also to the relationship between changes in Japanese behavior in Java after the occupation and changes in the balance of power. Comparing the prewar situation of Japanese in Java to the current one, Yoshizumi observed,

Nowadays Indonesians are making a distinction between "Mister Nippon" (*Toean Nippon*) and "Mister Japan" (*Toean Jepang*). We [who were here before the war] were [called] Mister Japan. Mister Japan had a very good understanding of Indonesian habits and customs, but Mister Nippon is different. I hear this quite

often. If I reflect upon myself, I can't say that what I was doing before the war was more honorable. But in those days, Indonesians had a yearning for Japan. When we'd get into fights with the Dutch, they'd pay tribute to us, saying, "Mr. Japan has no fear of the Dutch." And then the Japanese they'd longed for arrived. But these Japanese were very different from the Japanese they had viewed as heroes under Dutch rule. In the way we live, there's no difference. But just in the way we used to drink, or the way we used to fight, we gave a thought to maintaining face as Japanese.

Ichiki: I do feel in an awkward position. We're propounding the Japanese spirit and explicating Japanese culture, and meanwhile there's a Mister [Nippon] wearing [only] a loincloth and leisurely pissing in a corner of the garden. Seeing this sort of thing, Javanese people get an odd feeling, and seek to grasp the true nature of the Japanese ... Before the war, we practiced the restraint appropriate to visiting someone else's home.⁴²

That Japanese had little trouble finding local entrepreneurs and officials only too eager to satisfy their unrestrained material needs and passions constituted potent fuel for added "native" resentment toward both the ethnic Chinese and native officials. Complaints to this effect were frequent in nationalist reports to Subardjo's office. A July 1942 report from the West Java city of Sukabumi headlined "several groups of colonial officials" as bootlickers whose offences included providing the Japanese with local women and a building to house them as a gift.⁴³ An August report from Poerwokerto in Central Java maintained that, although there had been a number of arrests of ethnic Chinese for weapons possession, "relations between the Chinese race and Japan are generally close." The informant went on to describe the establishment of a meetinghouse in town meant "for the people of Asia, to encourage close relations with one another and with the Japanese." This "good idea" was credited to Lt. Col. Horie, installed as chief (*Shidōbuchō*, lit. Guidance Department head) of the Japanese administration for Banjoemas residency in May 1942. But, said the report, in deciding to charge a membership fee of 2 guilders per month for entry and offering "drinks served by female hostesses," the establishment's Chinese sponsors had betrayed the ideal of Greater Asian unity that the meeting place was presumably meant to foster. Because of the high prices, it had rather become an exclusive Chinese-Japanese club, in which "most Indonesians from the leading group (the [nationalist] movement) cannot participate. Besides which," the reporter added disapprovingly, "in this still-difficult era, this is hardly the time to be throwing money around."⁴⁴

As the occupation moved towards its second year, the gap between haves and have-nots widened, as a combination of price controls, scarcity, and speculation fueled an accelerating black market, making a still-difficult era still more difficult for the indigenous population, while seemingly little affecting the Japanese and the mostly ethnic Chinese middlemen who serviced them. A series of highly-publicized *kenpeitai* crackdowns on accused black marketeers, mostly ethnic Chinese, in September 1942, quickly proved of little more than symbolic value. The Japanese response—both to ensure the flow of resources deemed necessary for the war effort, and to allow, in theory, for a minimum of native subsistence—increasingly took the form of a control

economy, in which the state was to establish production targets of staple goods, most importantly rice, and to obtain a monopoly over their distribution. Ambitious “native” entrepreneurs first welcomed these measures to the extent that they were to be provided a new economic foothold vis-à-vis the old Chinese monopolies. Both were theoretically to be treated equally in the granting of distribution franchises. But increasing scarcity brought rises in inflation, making the prices paid by government purchasers to rural producers artificially low, and encouraging further speculation, hoarding, and black marketeering between the purchasing and retail ends of the economy. Those reliant upon the latter, particularly the urban population, felt the pinch in terms of spiraling shortages and inflation.

In December 1942, an anonymous businessman in Batavia observed that shops were closing or heading for closure in formally bustling areas. New to the scene were “distribution shops and stalls; these are operated by natives and are a result of the Japanese policy to involve more of the native population in the sale of daily necessities.”⁴⁵ Yet complaints of the shortage or disappearance of many consumer goods, notably clothing, were already rampant. By early in the following Autumn—predating the infamous, sustained Japanese move towards increased agricultural production and resource requisition that began in November 1943—there were reports in the cities that many unemployed workers were having trouble affording even the small amount of subsidized clothing specifically earmarked for them. Entrepreneurs—“Chinese, Arab, and Indonesian”—were reportedly providing them with money to purchase these exceedingly desired items, which were then turned over to the moneylender in return for a percentage.⁴⁶

As early as November 1942, in response to numerous letters complaining of shortages of consumer goods, *Asia Raya*’s Winarno could only reply that “these items are luxuries anyway, do we really need them?” Under the headline “Don’t Be Sad” (*Djangan Sedih*), he assured readers that “things will return to normal once the war is over.”⁴⁷ Placed in contrast with the standard of living and lifestyle of the Japanese overlords—a lifestyle that increasingly seemed propped up by cozy relations with wealthy ethnic Chinese merchants—it was a pitch that rang increasingly hollow. Konoe Yoshiaki, prewar resident of East Java who returned in May 1942 and worked as a rice distribution supervisor, recalled that, despite continually worsening shortages of consumer goods, “anything you asked for, the Chinese would come up with.” Konoe and his Japanese colleagues found themselves bombarded with gifts from Chinese rice millers seeking to smooth over the problem of the perennial gap between amount demanded and amount supplied. With official pay levels for Japanese civilian officials in Java less than half those they were used to in Japan, said Konoe, there was little choice but to accept the bribes and look the other way.⁴⁸ In August 1943, an anonymous “native” informant declared that many Japanese employees in offices in Jakarta were taking bribes from businessmen to allow them to operate.⁴⁹ “With things going this way, it is already certain that Indonesians do not have the capital to pay, or are scared [to do so], because they are not used to it,” the observer continued, “whereas the Chinese are indeed already used to doing things this way since olden times.” He further warned that “the Japanese Military Government should be careful where this bribery is concerned, because it greatly lowers the prestige of all Japanese [in Indonesian eyes],

to the point that in the end, [Indonesians] will lose all faith in the Japanese Military Government.”⁵⁰ In tours of the Central Java countryside near Semarang, Hibino Hideo, another Japanese former resident charged with duties similar to those of Konoe, later recalled that due to an ever-increasing scheme of requisitions the local inhabitants “could not eat what they’d grown” and that “the distribution of clothing, too, shrank, with the number of old folks wearing burlap on the rise.” Appeals from village officials for more food, he said, were

mostly a lost cause. From [before the war] Java’s food situation had never been one of self-sufficiency ... and yet there were demands for large-scale export to [military] bases in various parts of the Southern Areas, and the villages were ordered to supply all manner of quantities.⁵¹

As a further irony, by the end of 1943, when campaigns for increased production and resource requisition went into overdrive, sustained Allied attacks on Japanese merchant shipping had brought the transport of goods to the areas intended to a virtual standstill, resulting in ever-larger surpluses piling up in Java, and making Japanese lives ever more comfortable, even as Java’s producers—not to mention the Japanese in the field meant to be at the receiving end—were forced to go without.⁵² With pregnant understatement, one anonymous nationalist reporter to the Department of the Director of the Military Administration noted, “in general the inhabitants of the large cities like Surabaya tend to compare the difficulties of their daily lives with the luxurious lifestyles on evidence in restaurants and other sorts of eateries. Of course, this produces no small amount of sentiments of various sorts.”⁵³ The Japanese in wartime Java “wanted for nothing,” recalled Hibino, living at a material level unimaginable in Japan. But this only encouraged further extravagance—and further distance from the local population over which they presided. “There was meat, there was drink, there were women,” he wrote. And yet,

once you got used to it, you’d selfishly complain that the liquor didn’t taste good, the food didn’t taste good. Human beings are weak animals: Once they get used to a certain environment, they consider it normal.⁵⁴

Lording it

As they availed themselves of the comforts of their position, even as they expressed sympathy for the downtrodden natives and called on others to do the same, the Japanese overlords—from haughty military officers to cosmopolitan *bunkajin* like Ōya Sōichi—also revealed a colonial impatience and disdain with regard to native behavior and practice. Here, the boundary between Greater Asian paternalism and colonial arrogance and superiority was all too often breached.

Expressions of a Japanese colonial mentality regarding the “natives” were no more pronounced than in the case of the Indonesian working class. The language of an official announcement from the Military Government’s Education Unit heralding the

establishment of a new Farmer's Training Center (*nōmin dōjo*) in Batavia in October, 1942, was representative, an ominous sign of Japanese colonial ignorance both towards the peasantry and to the realities of tropical agriculture.

There is no progress among Java's blessedly simple peasantry—they lack the farmer's spirit of tenaciousness seen in Japanese villages. If a Japanese-type farmer's spirit is imparted to Java's villages, naturally possessed of [favorable growing] conditions—even if you do nothing, you get three harvests—it will not be too difficult to get four or five harvests.⁵⁵

If Indonesian nationalists often agreed upon the need for scientific rationalization and spiritual awakening where Java's slumbering peasantry was concerned, the peasants themselves were often not as quick to come to. Five days before the opening of this new training center, newspapers reported that, despite an island-wide appeal to candidates for the all-expenses-paid three-month study program, only twenty of a desired two hundred candidates had volunteered—eight of whom had failed the physical.⁵⁶ By 1943, attendance problems for programs such as these—which were eventually established in each of Java's residencies—were solved at the stroke of a pen: they were simply made compulsory.

Servants often came in for particular Japanese derision. At a seminar (*zadankai*) in which the *bunkajin* discussed first impressions of Java in mid-April 1942, Ōya Sōichi, the entertainer Matsui Akikata, and an assortment of newspaper journalists conducted a lengthy give-and-take on the stupidity and servility of their male and female servants (*djongos* and *baboe* respectively).⁵⁷ “They’re like house pets,” said Ōya. “You don’t see them like this in any other colony.” He credited the exceptional passivity of Indonesian servants to centuries of intensive training by the Dutch, whom, he said, had made a science of easy living. Seconding him amidst general laughter, Matsui compared the *djongos* and *baboe* to servants in British India, who were “like very well-trained slaves,” but who at least “still retained some ability to make decisions.” The Indians might sneak out while their master was away, but Indonesian servants, like the dog Hachiko who was famous for his undying loyalty to his master, always stayed faithfully in the house. To this Matsuyama Tameyoshi from the *Dōmei* wire services recorded his astonishment at his servants’ failure to ask for missed pay when he had returned from an extended absence. A reporter from the *Asahi* newspaper named Irie was more positive, if no less backhandedly disparaging. Irie said he felt an attachment to Indonesians, who were, unlike the “Annamese” (Vietnamese) he had dealt with in French Indochina, cute (*kawaii*). “Yes,” Matsui replied, unlike the people of Indochina, “they are really cattle (*kachiku*), incapable of entertaining bad thoughts at the bottom of their hearts.”⁵⁸ To Matsui’s subsequent suggestion that Indonesian servants be given training in Japanese, the *Yomiuri* newspaper’s Hosomi Yasuo replied,

No, there’s no way. In the beginning I thought I’d beat Japanese into them, and tried various things, but no matter what, it didn’t work, against their strange Malay it was just incomprehensible shouting. In the end I did all the shopping myself, but I didn’t get very far that way. So at last I hired a boy who understands English.⁵⁹

Few Japanese had the time or inclination to consider that the observed working-class lack of initiative and passivity, a strategy geared to the conditions of colonial subordination, was only heightened by fear and paralysis generated by their new bosses' quick resort to verbal abuse and the threat or actuality of physical abuse. Even men of letters like Hosomi automatically assumed that it was the employee's responsibility to surmount linguistic and cultural barriers. Saina, a maidservant who was fifteen years old when the Japanese arrived, prepared food for Japanese officers resident in a house in Jakarta for the duration of the occupation. She recalled in a 1994 interview that she had never encountered a Japanese who could speak a word of Indonesian, or who showed any consideration for the fate of Indonesians generally. None of the working-class Indonesians she knew employed by Japanese had ever dared to hold any sort of conversation with them—apart from a number who had love affairs with Japanese, in which case, the Japanese “were nice to them.” “We were too frightened to even consider it. They were in power, they just gave orders. If they weren't happy with something, then we'd get *bakero*'d.” *Bakero*, meaning “to be called an idiot or imbecile,” and derived from the Japanese expletive *baka yarō*, entered the Indonesian language during the war, and remains in use.⁶⁰

In mid-May 1942, already wary of the devastating effects of the Japanese habit of resorting to violence, the propaganda squad's Shimizu Nobuo attempted to draw a line between constant criticism of native habits—which he believed was warranted, and which might include the occasional well-intentioned slap—and malicious abuse. “Indonesians require unending, stern criticism,” he wrote in his *Unabara* editorial column.

But if we aimlessly strike them with eyes clouded with suspicion, the ardor that echoes in this race will disappear beforehand—this sort of thing must not happen. Now is the time that demands the utmost of the sun's benevolent light, the time of the blossoming of the most important spirit.⁶¹

Writing for a domestic Japanese audience, *bunkajin* Asano Akira later provided one case in which he felt the beatings were justifiable. Japanese soldiers and other Japanese like himself, he wrote, found it trying to be followed around by bands of “filthy, runny-nosed children” endlessly assaulting them with calls of “brother!” (*saudara*). Upon reflection, he realized that it was not fair to fault these children, for it was only their way of paying tribute. But when the children supplemented their irritating cries with requests for money and the like, they were simply asking for a whacking.

At these moments, soldiers et cetera would all of a sudden dish out a slap. But they weren't striking them out of spite. Behind this is a sense of, “don't do such a shameful thing.” It originates, as one might expect, out of an overflowing sense of love ... Compared to Dutch people who beat their young servants with cold eyes, it's completely different. And these children understand the difference.⁶²

By September 1942, *Unabara*'s editorial staff was nevertheless concerned enough about the widespread beatings—and the message they were sending—to issue a series

of daily warnings to local Japanese, for a period of some three weeks, in straightforward and uncompromising language. "Exterminate the evil deed of hitting. For the sake of a bright construction of Java," read the first. "Striking the natives out of a mistaken sense of superiority is madness," read another. Others included: "the best way to alienate the natives from the imperial army is to hit them"; "take that raised fist and hit your own head with it—hard"; and "the natives detest being hit more than poison. When words do not penetrate, this is no whip of love (*ai no muchi*)."⁶³ Alongside this limited public information campaign, General Imamura issued a number of ordinances to the Japanese side attempting to stop beatings and misunderstandings. But according to the recollections of former intelligence officer Nakajima Masachika, rank-and-file soldiers, who were doing most of the beating, did not read them. Nor were the majority of them reading the newspapers, he added: a later survey conducted by his unit revealed that just three in ten Japanese soldiers were reading the *Jawa Shimbun*, the successor to *Unabara*. The average Japanese soldier in Java, he noted, only had education to a fifth- or sixth-grade level. "They could read," Nakajima said, "but they had no desire to, and preferred to goof off" in their free time.⁶⁴

The abusive behavior was not limited to lesser-educated soldiery, however. In early November 1942, a newly arrived Japanese doctor at Batavia's Central Public Hospital slapped an Indonesian doctor "to the ground," apparently for speaking to nurses at an inappropriate place or time. "I'm no servant (*djongs*)!" the victim was heard to say in reply. An Indonesian schoolteacher who stood at the wrong place during rehearsals for the November 3 Meiji Festival was similarly beaten.⁶⁵ Internal reports of Japanese bosses beating Indonesian employees in the Batavia Telephone office appeared in December.⁶⁶ In an April 1943 sitting of the Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs, leading West Java nationalist Otto Iskandar Dinata felt it necessary to offer the following list of Japanese customs "that run against Indonesian sentiments."

1. Dispensing Justice

If I am not mistaken, according to Japanese law, if one person is guilty, then those who are punished are the group with which this person is associated. In this way many people who are innocent are also punished. This is something that disturbs the refined sentiments of Indonesians ...

2. Often this punishment, including verbal abuse, is carried out in front of many others. This truly disturbs Indonesian feelings. It is desired that this punishment be carried out in a closed space.

I understand that punishing someone publicly causes others to be intimidated. But for Indonesians, who were already regularly terrorized under the Dutch Government, the system of intimidation is degrading to the spirit, and in the end it does damage to the constitution of the Greater Asian family.

3. Proper manners

Many Indonesians are being beaten, because they fail to pay respect to Japanese in a Japanese manner. This makes for a peculiar situation. Many ask me, must Indonesians exchange their own ways of being respectful for those of Japan? This is impossible, because the Japanese leadership has promised that the customs and manners of the southern races shall be well-respected. With regard to the beatings,

I have heard from the Japanese that this beating is not meant as an insult. But Indonesians feel otherwise.⁶⁷

Japanese impatience with local ways and norms also expressed itself in a stream of regulations and impositions in daily life that often seemed to go far beyond those of the Dutch. A small but irksome example was the early Japanese attempt to eliminate the element of disorder and chance involved in the customary bargaining that preceded rides in urban pedicabs (*becak*) and horse-drawn taxis. Fares were said to have a tendency to rise when the customer was Japanese. In response, the authorities mandated the registering of all drivers and standardization of their fares according to a complicated system based on units of time, as in Japan. A minor and logical intervention from the standpoint of most Japanese, it represented a revolutionary, impractical, and confusing change in the way these generally uneducated or semi-educated working-class men were used to doing business.⁶⁸ If in early May 1942 *Unabara's* editors were publicly proclaiming, "lift the hat of a *becak* driver and find a crew-cut underneath," by late September, Leo Jansen noted in his diary that at least one of his regular *becak* drivers "lets the air out his tire, as a rule, when he sees a Japanese coming."⁶⁹

Japanese attitudes of contempt and impatience—if not always accompanied by physical abuse—reproduced themselves at all levels of relations with Indonesians, observable too in dealings between high-ranking military men called upon as peacetime administrators, and "native" officials often placed in positions of new responsibility under their direction. Speaking to assembled journalists in Bandung in late May 1942, upon returning from his first tour of the areas under his jurisdiction, Colonel Kumajirō Matsui said most officials "only do what they are ordered, without thinking further about progress in other areas. This is a result of the way they were trained by the former government." Matsui was the highest military official in the 16th Army Second (*Isamu*) Division in Bandung, which had early responsibility for the governing of all of West Java apart from the city of Batavia itself. He added that he could praise "only one Indonesian official" for being "diligent" and "commanding his people to take pride in agriculture, encouraging the planting of empty fields with necessary foodstuffs and the like."⁷⁰ The unexpected economic might of the Chinese had impressed upon him that "the Indonesian race does not think, or thinks little, about economic issues." On top of this, Matsui added, "there are not many Indonesians who can count using their 10 fingers and 10 toes. And for that matter there are many who don't know their own age." Matsui illustrated this assumption with reference to a recent encounter with an unnamed well-known Indonesian and his wife, whom he guessed were both over seventy years old. When he asked their ages, however, the wife had described herself as forty and her husband as fifty years old. "Are these the correct answers?" asked Matsui contemptuously. "If you consider this sort of thing," he concluded with equal disdain and bluntness, "then it is not possible for Indonesians to have a strong economy."⁷¹

Representative of a more shockingly cynical line of opinion on the Japanese side—though one seldom openly expressed to an Indonesian audience—were the private observations of Batavia overseas radio programming chief Matsui Iwane. In an October 1942 conversation with his Dutch underling Leo Jansen, Matsui made it clear that he had no use for Greater Asianism and its supporters.

Our army, [Matsui] says, was stupid enough to promise independence to the Indonesians ... The Dutch government was smarter than we. They never allowed anything. They made no propaganda for themselves as we have, with big posters and banners over the streets. This is all nonsense ... what worked in the Dutch government, was the civil service and the police. Those with dangerous ideas were removed. That is the best way. Japan should not involve itself with Indonesian intellectuals. Japan has enough intellect of its own. It only needs coolies. When it needs intellect, it's better off using the Dutch ... The Japanese army doesn't understand that *Realpolitik* is the end for everything. Unfortunately old Imamura is pro-Indonesian. He feels something for these people. But the old general won't stay here forever. And then it'll be the turn of men like us, who will make an end of the useless coddling of Indonesians, which is unnecessary and useless.⁷²

Col. Yamamoto Mōichirō, subsequent head of the military administration General Affairs Department who was promoted to chief of the military administration late in the war, later insisted that the military had at first sincerely planned to rely as much as possible on Indonesian officials. But these had proven a disappointment, and this had forced a Japanization of the top administrative ranks.

The intention had been to maintain the existing [administrative] organization so much as possible and to involve only a handful of officials from Japan in the execution of the administration. For this purpose, the Ministry of War made some 50 high-ranking and 150 low-ranking administrators available. When it then appeared, however, that the competence of the native administrators, upon which had been counted, was far below par, and was inadequate for the execution of the prescribed policies, appropriate people from the [Dutch and former Japanese resident] citizenry were sought ... Because this was an emergency measure, which was not in the long term conducive to the regular development of the administrative apparatus, a large number of government administrators (800 higher and 1500 lower-level) arrived from Japan in August 1942.⁷³

In a preliminary development in late June 1942—a development regarded by the Indonesian elite as “a bolt out of a clear blue sky”—four Japanese were summarily appointed as mayors of Java's four largest cities, and Batavia's Dachlan Abdullah was demoted to the position of assistant mayor.⁷⁴ While those “natives” still counting on “progress in the direction of self-government” could take some heart in the subsequent distribution of the rest of Java's smaller city mayorships to “natives”—under the Dutch, Java had had only two “native” mayors—general developments pointed rather in the direction described by one critical Indonesian observer by the Dutch term for “tutelage” (*bevoogding*).⁷⁵

In August 1942, with the arrival of the officials from Japan completed, the belated new structure of the Japanese ruling regime was announced. At the top, these changes resulted in the unification of the military administration of Java—hitherto divided geographically between the 16th Army Military Administration Department (with direct administrative jurisdiction over Batavia and surroundings), the 2nd Division

Command (with administrative jurisdiction over the remainder of West Java), and the 48th Division Command (the same for Java's eastern half), and further divided in functional terms between the 16th Army's military government and military command departments (the *Gunseibu* and the *Gunshireibu* respectively) at the center—into one central organ called the Department of the Commander of the Java Military Administration (*Jawa Gunseikanbu*). The Dutch administrative separation of Java into three provinces (West, Central, and East Java), along with its three corresponding governorships, was abolished. In the old Dutch administrative structure, Dutch assistant residents, *controleurs*, and *aspirant controleurs* had been placed in a parallel, supervisory position above and alongside the native *pangreh praja* officials, a position of rule that was technically indirect but through which Dutch administrators had nevertheless exercised considerable control. This arrangement was now also shelved in favor of a straightforward pyramidal hierarchy under the central leadership of the newly created office of the commander of the military administration (*Gunseikan*), whose position corresponded in general terms to that of the old Dutch governor-general. The department that he commanded was one of several departments within the Military Command Department (*Gunshireibu*).

At the all-important provincial level, the new structure answered the pressing question of the granting of “native” autonomy—at least at the top—decisively in the negative. Under the commander of the military administration was a single layer of nineteen state governors (*shūchōkan*) (corresponding to the former residents), all of whom were Japanese. The only exceptions were the two Sultans who remained, as under the Dutch, in charge of the two special royal districts of Surakarta and Jogjakarta in central Java. Under the state governors, the former native administrative structure, comprising regents, district heads, and subdistrict heads, was also retained, with the additional extension of the pyramid downwards to include village heads and hamlet heads, hitherto not a direct part of the chain of command.⁷⁶ Assemblies at the residency and local levels, such as provincial councils and boards of deputies, which had shared in administrative authority, were eliminated, and their powers concentrated solely in the hands of local administrators.

At the center, the administrative changes initiated in August 1942 confirmed the hegemony of the staff of the former Military Administration Department (*Gunseibu*) in the formulation and execution of policy regarding the Indonesian population. The General Affairs Department (*Sōmubu*) was by far the most important and influential of the new military government's eight departments, and of the *Sōmubu*'s three sections—General Affairs, Personnel, and Planning—it was the Planning Section (*Kikakuka*) in particular that represented “the pivotal organ in the execution of the military administration,” with jurisdiction over the full range of local economic, social, and political policymaking.⁷⁷ The General Affairs Department was headed by former Military Administration Department chief Harada Yoshikazu, while the Planning Section came under the direction of Harada's former deputy Col. Nakayama Yasuto.

Compounding this trend towards the solidification of conservative hegemony, in late November 1942, General Imamura was reassigned to the island of Rabaul on the eastern front, where most of his men had already been transferred. His replacement as Java commander-in-chief, for the remainder of the occupation, was another man named

Harada, General Harada Kumakichi, who had years of experience in the China theater, but no familiarity with the southern regions. While not a hardliner of the sort seen in occupied areas such as Sumatra and Malaya, Harada revealed little of Imamura's sense of Greater Asian mission with regard to the local population either. He tended to defer to the opinions of the Department of the Commander of the Military Administration on most local issues, including those regarding the Indonesian nationalists.⁷⁸ In this situation, it was Java's second-highest ranking officer, Lt. General Okazaki Seisaburō, who had from the outset supported the cautious, conservative line of the Military Administration Department, and who now served concurrently both as commander of the military administration (*Gunseikan*) and chief of staff in the Military Command Department, who held sway in matters of local policy.

In comparison with the Japanese military men making policy in other occupied areas, men such as Colonel Nakayama, Lt. General Harada Yoshikazu, and subsequent General Affairs Department Chief and Commander of the Military Administration Department Yamamoto Mōichirō—who arrived in February 1943—were a relatively cosmopolitan and moderate lot.⁷⁹ Under them, the extremely repressive, cynical turn suggested in Matsui Iwane's assertion that once Imamura had gone, "it'll be the turn of men like us, who will make an end of the useless coddling of Indonesians," never fully materialized. But, while sympathetic in principle to the downtrodden natives, the leaders of the Department of the Commander of the Military Administration were above all practical military men, with a deep military-colonial instinct for control and caution where native autonomy was concerned, above all in the political realm. All energies and resources were to be channeled and heightened towards the needs of the war effort, and nothing with a chance of distracting Java and its inhabitants from this aim was to be tolerated. As the general military outlook worsened, this focus only sharpened.

From the Japanese perspective, the new administrative structure was in some ways reflective of the peaceful and cooperative local context that set the Indies apart from the hostile territory of China. It was also reflective of lessons learned of the negative effects of direct military rule, which were acknowledged by such figures as General Imamura and subsequent commander of the military administration Okazaki Seisaburō to have inspired antagonism among the native inhabitants in Manchuria and China.⁸⁰ Of the seventeen state governors, only five were military men, all of these senior or retired. Of the rest, all were career civil servants with lengthy résumés from mainland Japan and/or Taiwan, former heads of various prefectural government departments such as economy, agriculture, and police affairs. Two had held prefectural governorships in Japan, one in Taiwan. Another had been mayor of Taipei.⁸¹

Yet while its preponderance of civilian professionals suggested an enlightened improvement over China, this was little in the way of a revolutionary shift away from colonial systems and methods of rule. Indeed, under these officials, the manner of rule was often of a more overbearing style than the Indies had seen in the past. As noted by Nishijima and Kishi in their 1959 study,

the increase in personnel caused the orientation of the development of military administration to change gradually from "administrative guidance" to

“administrative execution,” to abandon the indirect method of rule and move to the direct means of rule, the method employed in Japanese-style colonial policy.⁸²

These tendencies were exacerbated by the extensive autonomy granted to each state governor. In this regard, a Japanese source cited in a postwar Dutch intelligence report stated that

the position of the *shūchōkan* was completely different from that of the former [Dutch] resident. The latter was more of a supervisory and coordinating figure, while the *shūchōkan* had the right to make the rules in a variety of areas, including education, health, religion, industry, and the maintenance of order. Their authority was further expanded over the course of 1943.⁸³

Furthermore, the appointment of these sorts of officials meant a decisive prioritization of administrative experience and familiarity with Japanese domestic and colonial policymaking over familiarity with local conditions. With the appointment of these new officials at the top levels, the few Japanese men with local expertise who had been hastily appointed to such high positions in the early days—such as Jakarta Resident Ogura, singled out by *Asia Raya*’s Winarno for a job well done—were made to step down.⁸⁴ More generally, as later lamented by former Indies resident and Greater Asian firebrand Yoshizumi Tomegorō, the regime overlooked the strengths special to former Indies residents in favor of professionals who only knew the Indies from books—if at all.

Of course there are people coming from Japan and doing research. The Chinese population is such-and-such, Indonesia’s products are such-and-such—they’re truly knowledgeable on this sort of thing. But to me, an expert on the Southern Regions is a person who thinks from the standpoint of Indonesian feelings, and at the same time from the standpoint of Japanese feelings. At the time I came back from Australia, former Japanese Indies residents were really being looked down upon as unschooled ... It is rash to assume that the fact that someone has lived here ten or twenty years is unimportant. Someone who’s lived here five years will have that much concern with how a certain policy will impact Indonesians, and what they’ll think of it—they’ll have an immediate sense of it. To ignore this is a terrible mistake ... What bothers me the most are [Japanese] officials who are outstandingly well-informed on Japanese politics and on the international situation, but who, as far as Indonesia is concerned, are just like a Japanese country bumpkin ... who could write a whole book about Tokyo after having visited there on a holiday.⁸⁵

Under these conditions, in a situation systematically explored in Shigeru Sato’s *War, Nationalism and Peasants*, Java’s states took on the shape of autonomous, competing fiefdoms, led by ambitious men such as Matsui Kumajirō, quick to associate the failure of local policies with such assumptions as “the Indonesian race does not think, or thinks little, about economic issues.”⁸⁶ Military advisor Miyoshi Shunkichirō later

complained of a “sectionalistic utilitarianism” (*sekushonarizumuteki kōrishugi*) and a routine of competition for “merit based upon an ideology of the bottom line” (*jisseki hon'i shugi*) which was “reflected to the very ends of the provincial administrations.”⁸⁷ Ignorance, arrogance and an interventionism propelled by ambition, the corporatist ideology of the times, and increasing pressure from the center translated into a tendency to attempt to impose disjointed, imported economic schemes from Japan and its northern colonies onto a society and an economy profoundly different from Japanese experience. When these failed, the response was generally additional rules and regulations. The single pyramid structure also meant that, below the state-level, native officials were largely left to their own devices to respond to the increasing number of often impractical demands from state governors and the center, with a combination of increased powers and little coordination or oversight. One Indonesian observer later aptly described this system as a “hierarchy of autocrats.”⁸⁸ Almost always, it was the weakest members of society who were left to bear the brunt of others’ mistakes, fears, and ambitions. For the impoverished masses, many of whom had hoped that the end of the Dutch rule also meant the end of the colonial social order, things only seemed to go from bad to worse. Miyoshi later described the effects of this system on policies regarding food production and distribution.

In order to maximize their prominence, the heads of each of the states engaged in desperate competitions over production output. It was the population who paid the price. Although Java was a rice-producing area, rice could not be grown everywhere. Besides the cities, there were also villages where rice could not be produced. People living in areas that didn't produce rice were dependent upon rice from neighboring areas, but because of local controls on rice imposed by the military administration, even if the rice came from a village right next door, if it happened to be across the state line, rice transport over that line was entirely forbidden.⁸⁹

While remaining largely unaware of what was happening in Java's villages, many among the Greater Asian missionaries of the propaganda squad, too, felt a sense of betrayal and powerlessness at the course of events. For the restructuring that began in August 1942 also heralded the end of their brief heyday. Officials of the military administration had from the beginning aimed to limit the squad's purview to the execution of propaganda alone, and to establish direct oversight over the aims and contents of this propaganda. In October 1942, they got what they desired. Hitherto located within the command hierarchy directly under the military commander himself, and thus independent of the reach of the Military Administration Department officials, the propaganda squad was now placed directly under these officials, and reduced to one of twelve subsections within the Planning Section (*Kikakuka*) of the General Affairs Department (*Sōmubu*). Here it was officially rechristened the Information Department (*Jōhōbu*), although it retained a nickname similar to its old one: the Propaganda Department (*Sendenbu*). As Colonel Machida later wrote, with the reorganization, “the frictions between the propaganda squad and the Military Administration Department were dissolved” in favor of the latter, and “the government was unified.”⁹⁰

In comparison to those of the propaganda squad, the Propaganda Department's jurisdiction and activity were considerably narrowed. One by one, control over projects the squad had previously initiated was entrusted to other departments within the Department of the Military Commander, or to newly arrived representatives of the Japanese private sector. The *Chihaya* schools—one in Batavia and another in Mataram, Central Java, returned to the status of normal public elementary schools, and were placed, like other schools, under the authority of the military administration's new Education Office (*Bunkiyōkyoku*), in the Department of Internal Affairs (*Naimubu*).⁹¹ On October 1, 1942, following an agreement in Tokyo between Japan's film companies and the military in which responsibility for the Southern Areas was delegated to the Japan Film Company (*Nippon eigasha*) and the Film Distribution Company (*Eiga Haikyūsha*), the facilities and native staff of the propaganda squad's Theater Direction Center (*Engeki shidōsho*) were taken over by the newly founded Java Motion Picture Company (*Jawa eiga kaisha*), a public/private subsidiary.⁹²

Also in October, preparations began for the transfer of authority over the squad's centerpiece projects, the *Unabara* and *Asia Raya* newspapers, to the *Asahi* newspaper company.⁹³ Administration officials had chosen the *Asahi* in September 1942, largely on the recommendations of advisor Taniguchi Gorō, prewar Java newspaperman and also a former *Asahi* correspondent, who had from the beginning resented the squad's dominance of the newspaper realm. From December 9, 1942, *Unabara* was replaced by the *Asahi*-sponsored *Java News* (*Jawa Shimbun*), its *bunkajin* staff exchanged for a staff of some fifty *Asahi* writers, technicians, and business representatives. Under the direction of the *Asahi*'s Suzuki Bunjirō, the new Java Newspaper Company (*Jawa shimbunsha*) also assumed responsibility for *Asia Raya*. By January 1943, of the original propaganda squad staff formerly involved with *Unabara* and *Asia Raya* projects, only the translator and former Indies resident Nakatani Yoshio remained in the office.

The editorial course followed by the newspapers subsequent to the changeover was reflective of the larger trend towards bureaucratic normalcy within the Japanese regime. In February 1943, the Java Newspaper Association (*Jawa shimbun kai*), an organization linking together the finances and supervising the operations of all "native newspapers" in Java, was established with Suzuki as its first president, and Taniguchi Gorō as director. Managers and journalists at each of Java's Indonesian and Chinese-language newspapers were now supplied with supervisors from the *Asahi*.⁹⁴ All journalists were to be duly registered with, and responsible to, the Java Newspaper Association. Censorship duties were to be performed by a separate unit under the military command, the censor squad (*ken'etsu han*). The effect was one of centralization and standardization of local newspaper fare across the island, with increased Japanese and military oversight. Already in September 1942, the General Affairs Department's Planning Bureau issued an outline of policy on "The Control of Newspapers" which stipulated,

regarding the management of newspapers, profit-making ends shall be thoroughly rejected, and direct guidance by the military forces shall be attempted. In view of the importance of speech and press control, demands for the transfer of control to

civilians merely for the purpose of simplifying administrative matters or for private profit must be treated with caution ... In the control of native newspapers, we shall march forward toward the ideals of “one spirit for all papers on the island” ... The unity between *Asia Raya* and the Japanese-language *Unabara* [subsequently the *Jawa Shimbun*]⁹⁵—the nucleus of control—must be thoroughly strengthened and maintained.

The *Asahi* newspaper's company history later proudly noted that its entry into Java had been opposed, among others, by the *kenpeitai*, along with certain unnamed radicals in the propaganda squad—one might suspect *Unabara* editor Shimizu Nobuo—who were said to resent “the advance of big newspaper capital” and viewed Suzuki Bunjiro with suspicion as a sponsor of “dangerous Anglo-American thought.” In at least one exchange related by Okada Shūichi, a member of the *Jawa Shimbun*'s editorial staff, Suzuki came across as a sympathetic figure where Indonesians were concerned. In a daily editorial penned sometime in early 1943, said Okada, Suzuki wrote, “we speak of production, production, but it is no good just to squeeze Indonesians. A policy towards the peasantry like that of [Japan's feudal] Tokugawa era cannot be approved of.” But even before it had a chance to reach the censors, however, this and other controversial editorials were struck out by *Jawa Shimbun* editor-in-chief Iijima Mamoru, who declared a desire to “avoid printing anything that might provoke the military.” After Suzuki returned to Japan and was replaced by the *Asahi*'s Nomura Hideo in May 1943, Iijima wrote the editorials himself.⁹⁶

Produced by newspaper professionals, the *Jawa Shimbun* was of higher visual and textual quality than its forerunner. Its editorials retained a general sympathy towards Indonesians, enough at least to inspire a later comment from avowedly pro-Indonesian former Indies resident Nishijima Shigetada, an intimate colleague of Achmad Subardjo, to the effect that Japanese-Indonesian tensions could be greatly reduced “if we could only make Indonesians realize how much Japanese are thinking about them”—as confirmed, for example, “in the editorials of the *Jawa Shimbun*.”⁹⁷ But in contrast to the lively spontaneity, relative independence, and missionary zeal that had characterized the propaganda squad's *Unabara* newspaper, the *Jawa Shimbun*, whose editors described it as “one wing of the military administration,” was closer to an official gazette. As the administration's emphasis shifted to building up defenses against Allied counter-attacks and maximizing Java's potential as an economic resource, the *Jawa Shimbun* duly followed suit. Assistant editor Okada recalled,

Java was a base in the rear, also for the New Guinea campaign, and the reporters set their sights entirely on defense and production. Dividing up their duties, they did such things as touring each state (*shū*) in the company of the state governors (*shūchōkan*), and wrote about things like methods of double-cropping and increasing production of sugar, rubber, and cotton for military use.⁹⁸

Already largely outflanked in the political realm by the non-cooperators, the Indonesian men who had staked their reputations on a working alliance with the propaganda squad and its idealistic *bunkajin* now found themselves under a new and

less inspiring regime. With the arrival of the *Asahi*, officially at least, *Asia Raya* was now “turned over,” as Winarno later maintained, “solely to Indonesian hands,” with Soekardjo Wirjopranoto as director, Winarno now as editor-in-chief, and Alatas continuing as commercial director.⁹⁹ But, as time went on, the unity between *Asia Raya* and the *Jawa shimbun* at least at the editorial level was indeed “thoroughly strengthened and maintained.” Official Tokyo-centered propaganda reports trumpeting the course of the war and local essays emphasizing the need for continued sacrifice, increased production, and economic self-sufficiency, while not new, came to dominate the pages of *Asia Raya*. This effect was heightened by the move from the original four-page to a two-page format, prompted by concerns of dwindling paper stocks, beginning in March 1943.¹⁰⁰ More lofty early hallmarks, such as the daily culture column pioneered by Sanoesi Pané and Asmara Hadi, were reduced to only sporadic appearances. On the workfloor, meanwhile, while relations between the Japanese staff of the *Jawa shimbunsha* and the Indonesian staff of *Asia Raya* were generally cordial, there was little of the pretense of brotherhood so prominent in the early days.¹⁰¹ Within an increasingly strict censorship regime and centralized oversight, local reporting took on a more sterile, businesslike character. Taniguchi Gorō later recalled,

The focus of the *Jawa Shimbun* was to facilitate the penetration of the military regime. In this sense it had a very different coloring ... Moreover, the military adopted a policy of pre-publication censorship, and limited circulations. This was convenient for those involved in that undesirable articles could be suppressed, but those who suffered for it were not only all of the Indonesian papers, but the *Jawa Shimbun* itself ... It got so that young Indonesian writers would let fall comments like, “Under this military regime, the strain is such that it’s not possible to produce a newspaper.”¹⁰²

Censorship and other frictions, however, were not new, and although the balance leaned more heavily towards staid coverage of the war effort, particularly in the case of *Asia Raya*’s editorial submissions, there remained a great deal of continuity. From the outset, *Asia Raya*’s Indonesian editors had pledged themselves ready for the great sacrifices to come, in the hope of a brighter future. If the fire and conviction of *Asia Raya*’s early months had cooled somewhat, the now familiar new *priyayi* nation-building line of Winarno and Soekardjo, packaged comfortably and encouragingly within a Greater Asian motif, remained a regular feature.

For the *Sendenhan*’s self-styled stewards of the Greater Asian enlightenment, the period of administrative normalization was a trying time. Colonel Machida recalled that the more pressure that had built up between himself and the military administration, and the more the situation of Japanese rule diverged from what he had imagined, the more he had sought solace in the bottle. “With no outlet, my exasperation stagnated. I left my work to my subordinates, and drank only booze. Java’s liquor was good for drowning sorrows.”¹⁰³ There were limits to Machida’s disillusionment, however, limits that were applicable to sentiments of the *bunkajin* as well. The anti-military and anti-official resentments did not translate into a rejection of Japanese war aims or a questioning of national loyalties, but stemmed rather precisely from a sense

of wounded pride as fellow patriotic Japanese whose efforts were under-appreciated by an unyielding, ignorant establishment.

Even in the full light of retrospect, Colonel Machida's postwar memoirs reflected the confused purposes and inclinations of the time. He complained bitterly of jealous bureaucratic interferences and mistrust, of Tokyo high command and military administration double-crosses on the issue of Indonesian independence, and subsequently in the increasing turn towards a colonial-style policy of maximal resource exploitation, all of which he said betrayed the hopes of the propaganda squad's Greater Asian idealists just as much as those of Indonesians themselves. "The great banner of the 'Greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere,'" he wrote, "in fact meant only a new Japanese colonial exploitation, a sign advertising beef that is really dog meat (*yōtō-kuniku*), containing nothing resembling an ideal. And yet," he admitted, the perceived betrayal was one of means, not of ends. As Machida himself acknowledged, the after-the-fact regrets, and the sense of betrayal, were shaped and sharpened in the full light of postwar hindsight.

This is something I can be sorry about now, but at that time, I was of course furious about the tight position Japan was in, and it never occurred to me to criticize changes in Japanese policy. Nay, even now I have no intention of blaming Japan. I am not someone lacking a sense of national citizenship to that degree ... After all, Japan wanted the resources of the Southern Areas, and without them Japan could not sustain itself, so there was no reason for me not to support this.¹⁰⁴

In fact, most of the propaganda squad's original membership, including Machida, were not on hand in Java to witness the final two and a half years of the occupation, a period in which the Japanese colonial exploitation that Machida described built to a fever pitch, with murderous consequences. With their one-year contracts reaching an end and their tasks completed or assigned to others, most of the *bunkajin* returned to Japan in late 1942 and early 1943.¹⁰⁵ Colonel Machida, too, was reassigned to duties in Japan in this period. His place was taken by Major Adachi Hisayoshi, a career military man who had come to Java as a member of the military administration. By early 1943, of the original staff of the Java propaganda squad, alongside translators Ichiki Tatsuo, Nakatani Yoshio, and several others, only Hitoshi Shimizu and a handful of *bunkajin* remained: novelist Takeda Rintarō, cartoonist Ono Saseo, filmmaker Ishimoto Tōkichi, and composer Iida Nobuo. With a few exceptions, these men now worked under separate auspices, in isolation from one another. Shimizu Hitoshi was made head of the Propaganda Section of the Propaganda Department, one of its three subsections, the other two being News and Press, and Administration. Ono Saseo also remained with the *Sendenbu*. Ishimoto became an employee of the *Nichiei* film company. In April 1943, Iida Nobuo and Takeda Rintarō, formerly of the *Sendenhan*-sponsored Theater Direction Center (*Engeki shidōsho*), took up supervisory positions at the new "Center for the Direction of Popular Cultural Enlightenment" (*Keimin bunka shidōsho*), which was in the same location as the *Engeki shidōsho*.

Upon their return to Japan, the more prominent *bunkajin* writers, including Tomizawa Uio, Asano Akira, Kitahara Takeo, Abe Tomoji, Oe Kenji, poet Ōki Atsuo,

and later Takeda Rintarō, set about recording their experiences in Java for the domestic wartime audience. Each produced a number of newspaper and journal articles and at least one full-length book on the subject. Almost without exception, their accounts focused on the dramatic story of the invasion, and of the early weeks that followed. Thus was the lightness of this moment of overflowing Greater Asian optimism idealized and frozen for posterity, even as events both in the Indies, and in the wider Pacific theater, were taking on a steadily darkening hue.

While Abe Tomoji too followed this general pattern, he was exceptional in offering words of criticism as well as praise for the ways in which Japan's mission in Java was being executed. In his *Islands of Fire: Stories of Java and Bali* (*Hi no shima: Jawa/Bari shima no ki*), which appeared in July 1944, a year and a half after his return to Japan, Abe continued to cling to the central tenets of Greater Asianism: Japanese Tradition represented the only light capable of dispelling the dark clouds cast across Asia by Western imperialism, and Japan's racial mission in Asia had been preordained by History: "The great evolution of the fate of a race is eternally determined in the coursing of its blue blood."¹⁰⁶ The solution to the problems of both Japan and Asia lay therefore in racial and cultural awakening, and in the spontaneous establishment of mutual understanding of Japan's pure aims in Asian hearts and minds. But while Abe remained convinced of Japan's mission and of the innate goodness and purity abiding in the souls of all Japanese, his commentary also suggested doubts regarding the practical possibility of getting Japan's message across through talk and interaction alone, particularly in the critically short-term timeframe within which wartime Japan necessarily needed quick successes.

According to Abe, the essential challenge facing Japan had remained unchanged since his first submission to the *Sekidōhō* newspaper in March 1942. In battle, the Japanese had revealed an absolute grandeur. For a local population immersed in Western-style individualism, Japan's unflinching bravery, technological mastery, military and moral discipline, and state-of-the-art organization had been a lightning strike, a revelation, inspiring "awe and reverence ... For us," wrote Abe, "there was nothing at all mysterious about this. It was only a natural event: Our blood, coursing with eternal tradition, blossoming like a flower on the battlefield." The problem came in finding an effective way to communicate Japan's naturally lofty qualities and intentions to the occupied, amidst the subtle complexities of daily life in a more peaceful sitting. Here, he wrote,

we must admit that while we have good hearts, we suffer from insufficient practice and insufficient expression. In the way that we express our desires and feelings, of course in words, but also in actions, in the shape of our food, clothes, and shelter—whether we are clumsy, or too delicate, or perhaps too clever, or whether the problem is different with each Japanese—is it not true that we have difficulty in getting our point across to people of other races?

Was it not for the same reason, asked Abe, that "in places like Manchuria and China too, despite our best intentions and efforts, many problems have arisen?" Some might offer an explanation in terms of the existence of two kinds of Japanese, some upstanding

(*rippa*), others not. But this, Abe wrote, was “an irresponsible answer, and something that I do not want to believe.” The issue was rather one of execution.

We [all] have a benevolent spirit, but we have difficulty expressing it ... In our impatience, we sometimes impulsively explode, or unnecessarily refrain in silence, and things only get more complicated. As this is repeated over and over, our nervousness accumulates until it boils over and rebounds upon us, in the end resulting in exhausting, nitpicking criticisms and nervous frictions between Japanese themselves. When it reaches this point, the flexibility to see things from the perspective of others, both where other races are concerned, and where fellow Japanese are concerned, is lost.

Japanese, wrote Abe, “had a tradition of cherishing beautiful thoughts deep in their hearts, and remaining faithful to them. The races of East Asia would one day surely come to understand this inner Japanese beauty. But today’s circumstances,” he admitted, “are not such as to nourish such a breadth of perspective” among the native population. The urgent circumstances of the wartime present, Abe argued, demanded

clear expressions of a more universal, objective kind ... For example in the political realm, providing concrete manifestations of our sense of morality through the allowing of independence or political participation, or by restoring to them lands stolen by the Westerners, invites clear expressions of gratitude from their side.¹⁰⁷

As Abe set about writing *Islands of Fire* back in Japan, however, developments in the Indies seemed to be moving in the opposite direction. Amidst all of Sukarno’s optimistic talk in this same period, the painstaking process of negotiation surrounding the *Poetera* movement—which dragged on well past the promised starting date of January 1, 1943, eventually concluding only two months later—revealed discouraging limitations to the regime’s trust and faith in its Indonesian brethren, no matter which Indonesians. As had been the case with the Three-A, as Shimizu Hitoshi later explained, General Imamura had been supportive of the idea for the new movement, but officers from the Military Administration Department had always been hesitant. Many of them, including Colonel Nakayama, inclined toward the idea that nothing of the sort was needed, a view seconded within the *kenpeitai*. The civilian officials directly charged with negotiating the task and shape of the movement—the Indonesia hands Miyoshi Shunkichirō and Taniguchi Gorō, and the “bureaucratic-minded” Foreign Affairs Ministry political specialist Saitō Shizuo—had vastly differing ideas of their own.¹⁰⁸

In negotiations with the *Gunseikanbu*, Hatta and Sukarno placed priority on the following four conditions: that the organization’s name include the word Indonesia; that the national flag and anthem be allowed; that membership be restricted solely to “natives”; and that native officials be allowed membership.¹⁰⁹ Divided amongst themselves over these and other issues as it was, the 16th-Army authorities also had to take into account the opinions of the Tokyo High Command as well as the Southern Area Headquarters, whose conservatism regarding the stirring up of local nationalism was reflected, for example, in criticisms of Imamura’s decisions regarding the return of

Sukarno to Java, and the reopening of schools, as a “repeat of our mistakes in Korea.” However Java’s local military and civilian officials felt about Sukarno and Hatta’s requests regarding the flag and anthem—the postwar recollections of *Gunseibu* advisor Miyoshi Shunkichirō and the *Sendenhan*’s Hitoshi Shimizu give the impression that opinions were mixed—both the Southern Area command and Tokyo flatly rejected these proposals, with their chief complaints, firstly, that Indonesia’s ultimate disposition had yet to be decided, and secondly that allowing these nationalist symbols in Java would stir unnecessary passions in the rest of the archipelago.¹¹⁰

Nationalist frustrations built further with a landmark announcement from Prime Minister Tōjō on January 28, 1943—highly publicized in the local media—promising national independence to Burma and the Philippines in the near future. In painful contrast, Indonesia’s fate remained unaddressed.¹¹¹ While Tokyo’s logic remained unexplained at the time, the decision for a different policy towards Burma and the Philippines could be traced to four principal factors: (1) the USA had already promised independence to the Philippines in 1937; (2) Burma was now on the front lines of the battle against the Allies; (3) the support of the local population in both places was considered less reliable than in the Indies; and (4) neither Burma nor the Philippines possessed the natural resources that the Indies did, resources which representatives of the Japanese Navy in particular felt should remain in permanent Japanese possession. The ultimate fate of Indonesia—if it should be promised independence at all, and if so, for all or only part of the archipelago—remained a bone of contention between the two armed services (army and navy) and three occupying forces (the 16th Army, the 25th Army, and the navy) among which the archipelago was divided. These would continue to wrangle amongst themselves until late 1944, when the much-deteriorated war situation forced them to reach agreement in Indonesia’s favor. Even here, however, independence was promised only for an undisclosed date in the future.

An internal nationalist report dated February 2, 1943 reflected the deepening shadows of doubt cast by the continued postponement of *Poetera* and the trumpeting of Japanese announcements on Burma and the Philippines, doubt directed not only towards the Japanese regime, but indeed towards the ever-optimistic Sukarno himself.

In anticipation of the first of January [on which date Sukarno had promised the convening of a popular congress to found the *Poetera*], people from many parts of Java streamed into Jakarta. They were just full of anxious expectation. [But] on the 31st of December, Sukarno announced that the establishment of the People’s Organization would once again be postponed. The disappointment was very great, not only among the intellectuals and politicians, but among the people. Two opinions were expressed: (1) Ir. Soekarno is too optimistic, or (2) the Japanese Government does not want to live up to its promises. In each case, then, there is an element of “scant trust,” which is not conducive to cooperation. Ir. Sukarno’s announcement that preparations were proceeding smoothly was treated as a gilded pill. Pessimists attached to this no value whatsoever. In their case, this assurance allowed a certain mistrust to take hold. In time of war, people have indeed been forced to learn that one can safely assume the opposite of what is announced. It is now February, and one hears nothing from the organization ... The only thing

that people wish is a *positive explanation from the Government* about the fate of Indonesia. The absence of this leads to a passive posture among the intellectuals and politicians, yes even apathy. People now feel completely in the dark as to the true intentions of the Government. This dejected mood reached its high point after the speech of the Prime Minister in Tokyo ... in which clear statements were made regarding Burma and the Philippines, but Indonesia was mentioned only in passing ... Indonesian intellectuals have had to endure disappointment after disappointment. Neither the administrative nor the popular policies are clear. It is not surprising that they are apathetic, or passive. It is generally hoped that this atmosphere will quickly be cleared up.¹¹²

Adding to the somber mood among nationalist intellectuals and politicians, and to a growing sense of distance vis-à-vis the regime, *kenpeitai* suspicions of nationalist motives reached a peak in the same period. In connection with alleged contacts with the Dutch involving the establishment of an anti-fascist underground at the outset of the occupation, January saw the arrest of Sukarno and Hatta intimate (and *Asrama Angkatan Baroe* lecturer) Amir Sjarifuddin—one of thirteen nationalists on *Poetera's* planning committee—along with fifty-two others. Like Sjarifuddin, most of those arrested were former members of the left-wing *Gerindo* party. They also included some from *Parindra* and several former members of the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party. The underground had never materialized, but the charges were serious. Only through direct intervention from Sukarno was Sjarifuddin's life spared.¹¹³

Hatta's General Advisory Office (*Kantor Penasehat Oemoem*), and its central figure Achmad Subardjo, also now came in for special *kenpeitai* attention. From the outset, the *kenpeitai* had been aware of Hatta's outspoken prewar criticisms of Japanese fascism, and mistrusted his cooperation as a mere cover for anti-Japanese sympathies and activities. Hatta's continued capacity for bold statements, epitomized in a speech at the mass *Kōasai* rally of December 8, 1942—where he proclaimed that “the youth of Indonesia would rather see Indonesia sink beneath the waves than for it to remain, once again, as someone's colony”—had not failed to raise eyebrows.¹¹⁴ The *kenpeitai* had also become aware that the résumés of both Hatta and Subardjo included such nefarious activities as attendance as Indonesian delegates to an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist conference in Brussels in 1927, and, for Subardjo, a visit to Moscow in the same period.¹¹⁵

In light of the *kenpeitai* inclination to view both men as closet communists or communist sympathizers, the bluntness with which developments under the occupation regime were assessed and criticized in reports issued by Hatta and Subardjo's *Kantor Penasehat Oemoem*—reports whose candid testimonies have been frequently cited in this study—did little to aid their cause, either with the *kenpeitai* or indeed among more conservative sections of the army and the *Gunseikanbu*. As Subardjo associate Nishijima Shigetada later wrote,

The original aim [of the Hatta Office]—that is, to siphon up the hopes, frustrations, and dissatisfactions of Indonesians, and to reflect these within the military administration—had been a good one. But as criticisms of the military

administration continued to build, the office became an “Office of Complaints against the Japanese Military Administration.” And so the Army decided to disband it.

For now, Mohammad Hatta’s prominence and connections within the *Gunseikanbu* allowed him to get off with a series of *kenpeitai* warnings and interrogations. He turned his energies towards the *Poetera* movement. Achmad Subardjo, however, fared worse. “Without proof of his being a communist,” Nishijima later recalled, the *kenpeitai* resorted to arresting Subardjo on largely trumped-charges relating to “a minor incident of alleged dishonest dealings that dated back to his prewar legal practice in Bandung.”¹¹⁶ Just as with Subardjo’s nephew B.M. Diah, the effect was to insult and alienate one of Japan’s most enthusiastic early Indonesian supporters.

For Subardjo’s prewar colleague Nishijima, the arrest was part of a distressing pattern that he had observed since his return to Java from Australia in July 1942. “While I had expected the military to be firmly in the saddle” in Java, he later wrote, contact with the reality of military rule had brought “an irrepressible feeling of, ‘you scoundrels!’”

Some of the military men were gentlemanly, understanding people, people I could respect. But it is also true that there were more than a few who exulted in their own power, who pushed through all sorts of perversions in the name of the army. The *kenpeitai* in particular lorded it not only over the Indonesians, but also over the Japanese ... Seeing and hearing the profound arrogance of the military men, including the *kenpeitai*, I felt gloomy and indignant ... I could not keep my ingrained spirit of defiance from asserting itself. The fact that I later made such efforts to gain parole for Indonesians whom the *kenpeitai* had hauled in or arrested for trifling reasons was probably a product of this devilish spirit of my youth.¹¹⁷

It was thanks to Nishijima’s old friend Satō Nobuhide, who arrived in Jakarta in November 1942, that Nishijima, and eventually their mutual prewar comrade Subardjo, were both able to find a harbor in the storm. Blacklisted by the 16th Army for unreliably pro-Indonesian sympathies, Satō had originally been prevented from returning to Java, but he had circumvented this by finding employment with the navy instead, as head of the research section of the new Office of the Naval Liaison (*Kaigun bukanfu*). Nishijima was subsequently taken on in the “native section” of the *bukanfu*’s research department, headed by Satō, and in mid-1943 they were joined by their friend Subardjo upon his release from prison. As navy employees, the eighty-odd men of the *bukanfu* enjoyed a uniquely autonomous status, virtually beyond the reach of the local army authorities. This situation, along with the relatively liberal atmosphere of the *bukanfu* under its leader Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi, and the pro-Indonesian sympathies of staffers such as Satō and Nishijima—who believed that Japan owed a debt of honor to Indonesia, and that only the granting of independence would ensure continued, effective Indonesian cooperation with Japan—subsequently positioned the *bukanfu* to play a unique and significant role in furthering the Indonesian nationalist cause.

Although he later went down in Indonesian history for making his residence and offices available to the Indonesian nationalists in order to prepare the declaration of independence two days after Japan's surrender to the Allies on August 17, 1945, however, Maeda's aims in proposing the establishment of the Jakarta *bukanfu*, and in subsequently leading it, were those of strategic practicality, not Asian liberation.¹¹⁸ During an inspection tour of the southern occupied areas in the summer of 1942, Maeda concluded that, given plans for Java to function as a source of supply to the navy-occupied areas on the eastern battlefield, a Navy Liaison Office was needed in Java's capital to ensure the smooth exchange of resources and information.¹¹⁹ Still, while Maeda's prime concern was efficient foodstuff distribution, and his "way of thinking was in the Axis vein," Nishijima later wrote, "he possessed a liberal bent of mind, and on top of this—thanks to his years of experience abroad—a cosmopolitan sensibility. He was also 'an understanding old man,' with a good ear for the opinions of others." Achmad Subardjo recalled Maeda as having "a liberal and humane approach, different from the stiff perspective of the Army."¹²⁰ Indicative of his flexibility, Maeda trifled little about the political history of his employees, so long as they were capable—it was from Maeda, for example, that Nishijima first learned of Satō's previous army blacklisting.¹²¹ Where the work of the Research Department was concerned, Maeda was also broadminded enough to accept Satō and Nishijima's proposition that Japanese understanding of the perspectives and experiences of Indonesians under military rule was of critical importance to the successful prosecution of the war, and therefore fell within the *bukanfu*'s investigative purview.

Thus did Nishijima spend the bulk of the occupation preparing a series of thorough reports on the lives, livelihoods, and mood both among both the Indonesian nationalist elite and the masses, unsparing in their criticism and candor with regard to the effects of Japanese policy, often "acting as a spokesman for Indonesian sentiments." Nishijima later wrote,

I believed that in order to win the war, we had to give Indonesia independence. I was after all a Japanese. If my mother country were to lose the war and to meet an ignominious fate, I did not think it good. Winning the war meant making Indonesia strong. That meant giving it independence, and then asking cooperation from this powerful Indonesia. This was more or less the thinking of the membership of the *Kaigun bukanfu*, including Satō and Maeda.¹²²

These reports were addressed not only to local and regional Japanese commanders but also to the highest reaches of the Tokyo hierarchy. Here, to the relief of Nishijima and company, their forthrightness and quality met with general approval, if having little effect—at least until late in the war—on official policy.¹²³

As interactions in occupied Java went, however, the relaxed, collegial atmosphere of the *bukanfu* was an exception to the rule. While the dramatic experience of *kenpeitai* arrest undergone by Subardjo and his nephew remained a relatively limited phenomenon among prominent Indonesians, the degrading sense of being "lording over" was much more commonplace. In the early months of the occupation, the Leiden-educated, upper-*priyayi* official Hoesein Djajadiningrat had on occasion proclaimed

to Leo Jansen that the Japanese were “by nature trustworthy for Indonesians,” and had boasted that the Japanese officials with whom he worked at the new Department of Religious Affairs, unlike the Dutch, relied so much on his opinions and expertise on the old Dutch system (through years of service in the old Department of Internal Affairs) that they “cannot do without me.”¹²⁴ Yet by October 1942, Hoesein reported to Jansen that his early optimism—along with that of many other Indonesian officials in Japanese employ—was giving way to disillusionment. The suggestiveness of Hoesein’s commentary, as paraphrased by Jansen, warrants citation at length.

Without my bringing up the subject, [Hoesein] began to talk about Japanese exhibitions of disdain for Indonesians. This is expressed not only in the ignoring of every suggestion, the full retention of all responsibility for themselves, but also in confessions like those of Matsui [Iwane, cited above]. Colonel Matsui [Kumajirō, also cited above] went quite far in this way ... From Kotani, too [former Japanese consul in Batavia, now promoted to mayor of the city], Hoesein had an anti-Indonesian impression ... A family member (Soejono), who, as chief administrator of Sugar Factories of the [Central Java] Sultanates, negotiated with the Japanese authorities over the possible [re-]opening of the factories, was mockingly asked if he could really make sugar, as opposed to “just syrup.” Characteristic too was the surprise one Japanese expressed at the old Dutch system with Indonesian chief administrators who gave assignments to Dutch—this[, he said,] would be out of the question for him. Even the lowest Japanese would never take an order from an Indonesian! ... They want to keep responsibility purely in Japanese hands. Department heads [in the military administration] are Japanese. Ditto their close advisors. At [the Department of] Justice, it’s a General that pushed [Dr.] Supomo [Leiden graduate, law professor, and former high official of the Dutch Department of Justice] aside. They’re taking over the city police too. They’re striving for a copy of the Japanese administrative system. The respect that they demand proves that they regard themselves as a higher class of men. There is a lot of attention to *hormat* [codes of respect-paying]. In the countryside, cars (in which, as a rule, authorities sit) must be greeted by the population. The Sultan, coming back [to Central Java] from Batavia, was surprised at the removal of headgear and the deep bows. He made the car stop and was told that there had been an order [to that effect]. To Hoesein’s pleasure, the Bantammers [residents of Jakarta and surroundings] have not joined in this. [But] his brother the regent has now once again released a circular on the subject, after the *kenpeitai* brought the public failure to greet cars to his attention.¹²⁵

Among the educated elite, the tendency for skepticism towards the Japanese, and a corresponding quickness to take offence at the gap between Greater Asian propaganda and colonial reality, was perhaps highest among native, official insiders such as Hoesein, who had already “made it” as far as the Dutch system allowed, and for whom more than anyone else the general continuity of Japanese dominance juxtaposed against the great promise of new autonomy represented, in the words of William Frederick, “an unstable limbo of heightened potentiality.”¹²⁶ But the cycling down of expectations prompted by the processes and patterns revealed in the normalization of Japanese rule

was a widespread phenomenon. As Jansen remarked on Hoesein's above commentary, "the honeymoon period between the Japanese and the Indonesians is over. There is disenchantment on both sides." As further illustration of this trend, Jansen cited a comment from a nationalistic young "native" coworker at Radio Jakarta named Said, an ardent follower of Sukarno. "The civilian Japanese," he said, "have turned out to be worse than the Dutch."¹²⁷ For the Japanese luminaries of the Asian enlightenment in the propaganda squad and elsewhere, too—who had staked their hopes and reputations on the notion that their countrymen could rise above the sorts of self-centered interests, pursuits, and divisions that had brought the Dutch low—the process of normalization brought little in the way of encouragement.

And yet the picture remained confused. The possibility that, given time and a proper chance, the Japanese might yet provide a superior Asian alternative to the Western rule of the past—and the inclination to blame the shared military conflict with the West for its failure to materialize at more than a rhetorical level—remained seductive. On the Japanese side, even among those Japanese most critical of their countrymen, including remaining members of the propaganda squad such as Takeda Rintarō and Ichiki Tatsuo, the problems of the present and the shortcomings of their fellow Japanese only seemed to strengthen the commitment to the tenets of Asianism as they construed it: the notion of Asia's shared modern problems as a Western-made product, and of a brotherly association of national tutelage between Japan and Indonesia as a natural and indeed heavenly-ordained mission.¹²⁸

To a degree, this was true not only for Japan's Asian missionaries, but also for members of the Indonesian nation-building elite. Three months after making the above complaints, even the proud, skeptical Hoesein came across as mixed in his feelings about Japanese rule. "The core notion of the Greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere," he told Jansen, "is a good one." That its realization in practice left much to be desired could be attributed, as the Japanese maintained, to the "war situation."¹²⁹ In the same period, when Jansen asked his young radio colleague Said what it was that the Japanese had done better than the Dutch, he produced a similar reply. The Japanese, he said, "*want* better. But there's a war on."¹³⁰ For his part, Jansen himself offered a concise explanation for the oscillations of opinion regarding the Japanese so common among his elite "native" acquaintances: "As I see it, the educated Indonesian is swung back and forth between his desire to become just like these powerful Japanese, and his unwillingness to be treated as a child in need of rearing."¹³¹

As the first year of occupation drew to a close, it was clear in any case that the early Japanese-Indonesian honeymoon was over. As Colonel Machida and his comrades at the propaganda squad lamented, an atmosphere of coercion and colonial-style disrespect and aggrandizement were poisoning the brotherly relationship, and with it, the promise of a Japanese-sponsored Asian renaissance. But for Indonesian nation-builders, the Asian solution continued to entice. Even amidst an increasing sense of estrangement, mistrust, and a declining standard of living, it remained a common notion that Japan had more to offer to Indonesia than the Dutch ever had, and that for better or worse, Indonesia needed to stand by Japan, at least until the war was won. For those more directly at the receiving end of Japanese policies and practices, however, this was becoming an increasingly difficult position to maintain.

Reckonings

In March 1943, as the one-year anniversary of the Dutch surrender approached, occupied Java hung in an awkward state of limbo. So many promises had been made in the past year, yet so few had come to fruition. After a dramatic early heyday, the personnel on both sides who had trumpeted these promises most loudly in the early going—the men of the propaganda squad, and the nationalists who had staked their reputations on collaboration with their early projects—had proven no match for stronger forces on both sides. On the Japanese side, these were the less-than-revolutionary personnel of the military administration and their conservative allies in the high command. On the Indonesian side, the stronger forces were the former “non-cooperator” nationalists led by Sukarno and Hatta, whose popular legitimacy made negotiation and appropriation the most practical Japanese strategy despite their more “radical” (and formerly less pro-Japanese) reputations. The stronger forces on the Indonesian side had also turned out to include native administrators and their allies at the local level in the preexisting colonial power structure—a structure which the Japanese, despite a rhetoric of rejection of the Dutch colonial order, sought in any case to exploit rather than dismantle.

The nationalists and the administrators were awkward bedfellows and, for both, ongoing subordination to the suspicious, taciturn, arrogant Japanese remained fraught with perils and constraints. Yet the great military confrontation against the shared Western enemy continued unabated. And in comparison with the already-bleak state of affairs they had experienced under Dutch colonial rule, for both groups, the nation-building promise of power and potentiality in working with each other and with the new regime, both ideological and practical, continued to outweigh whatever less-cooperative alternatives they might have entertained. Their resultant willingness to compromise with the Japanese, however, risked compromising their standing not only among Indonesia’s long-suffering masses in whose name both claimed to serve, but also among the increasingly impatient younger generation of elite nationalist youth who identified with them—ironically, the same youth whose imaginations and energies had been set most alight by the very revolutionary developments and pronouncements of the previous year.

Militarily, the outlook for Japan was meanwhile growing increasingly dim. From late 1943 through the war’s end in mid-1945, growing military desperation would combine with ongoing administrative misrule and military/colonial arrogance into a disaster of truly biblical proportions. Yet even in the face of such brutal late-occupation

realities, the transnational seductions of Greater Asia would remain of remarkable ideological appeal, not only for Japanese but even for many Indonesians shielded from the worst of Japan's deprivations—above all members of the privileged nation-building new *priyayi* class. Against this backdrop, the social fissures that were already opening with the “normalization” of Japanese rule in the first half of the occupation—both between Japanese and Indonesians, and among Indonesians themselves—were primed to yawn into a precipice.

Standing still

On March 9, 1943, the first anniversary of the Dutch surrender, *Asia Raya* carried the following headlines in extra-large, bold type: “A New Java, A New Society, A NEW LIFE!” After all the ups and downs of the previous year, the moment seemed in many ways a fresh beginning. At a mass rally attended by tens of thousands at Jakarta's Gambir square, Sukarno's *Poetera* movement finally saw its official launch, and the newspaper carried pictures and encouraging statements from all four of its leaders on its front page. The Dutch and their imperialism, said Sukarno, had “demolished the lives of Indonesians in every area”: the economy, shipping, agriculture, culture, spirit (*semangat*), “our greatness”—“they demolished everything that once made our race powerful and renowned.” *Poetera*, he said, had now come to “build again what had been demolished.”¹ “Behold our working program,” declared Sukarno.

Agriculture, cattle-raising, fisheries, trade, industry, cooperatives, shipping, work camps, banks, education, culture, battling illiteracy, sport, health care, support to the unemployed—in short, there shall be no terrain in our society untouched by the activities of our movement ... Come, come Indonesians, let us roll up our sleeves, let us get to work. Let us bravely work alongside the Japanese, combining all our powers, so that we may move mountains! ... Brothers, it is not by chance that we have named our movement *Poetera* (son) ... Art thou a *poetera*? Answer only: Yes, I am a *poetera*, a son of the new era, a son of the new struggle, a son of the new society, a son of Indonesia! ... I am a *poetera*, because I owe so much to this country, which feeds me with its rice, and quenches my thirst with its water. I am a *poetera*, because I want to defend this nation's name, so that it will not go down in history tainted, because it did not join in sacrificing itself in the Greater East Asia War.²

In an accompanying interview, Mohammad Hatta—who had clearly played a substantial role in developing *Poetera*'s economy-centered program—was quoted as saying that the war situation and Japanese encouragements to self-sufficiency and heightened, diversified production, however demanding, brought advantages and opportunities for Indonesian development. Thus were Indonesians now compelled to substitute the fruits of their own labors for imported goods, and to develop industries formerly neglected by the Dutch in their single-minded pursuit of the export economy. Through vocational education—another nation-building tool ignored by the Dutch, but favored by the Japanese—Indonesians could equip themselves with the practical

knowledge to build a nation. On his return from a tour of Java's countryside, Hatta acknowledged that new Japanese policies of economic decentralization, encouraging competition between Java's states and denying intercourse between them, were bringing hardships in some areas. These regulations, however, were "only temporary," and his tour had convinced him that "our race can produce all of the necessities that we used to receive from abroad." *Poetera*, he hoped, would help "lead the people"—and particularly the "natives," hitherto excluded from the means of production—in the direction of economic self-sufficiency.³

Fellow *Poetera* leader and education specialist Ki Hadjar Dewantara reminded readers of the shared Japanese interest in restoring "refined Eastern morals" to Indonesia, as reflected in early pronouncements banning Western music and women's wearing of short pants. "Since then," he said, "we Indonesian men of culture have felt joyous, because we sense a basic similarity with the Japanese in our spiritual lives." Subsequent policies such as the encouragement of the study of native dance, song, literature, and theater, and calls for the strengthening of the Indonesian spirit had added to this conviction. "And we cannot forget," he added, the Japanese establishment of the Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs, whose aim was

to investigate the possibility of shaping a society based upon the customs of the race itself, before our lives and livelihoods were destroyed by the pressure of the European spirit in general, and by the violence and arbitrariness of the Dutch race, who viewed our land of Indonesia as nothing more than a storehouse of worldly riches.

The participation of himself and other prominent leaders in the *Poetera* enterprise, said Dewantara, was proof of their shared conviction that the final victory, and the establishment of "a Greater Indonesia within the sphere of Greater Asia ... can only be achieved under the leadership of the Japanese race, which lights the way toward changing the Indonesian spirit."⁴

Representing the Islamic community, the fourth member of *Poetera's* "four-leafed clover," Kiyai Hadji Mas Mansoer, reminded readers that

Allah determined that the Japanese Army should come to Indonesia and liberate us from Western imperialism, and this freedom from Western imperialism is something to treasure. But if we are not careful in maintaining it, this thing we treasure may be lost again. Upon every child of Indonesia weighs the responsibility to work together with the government to ensure that this thing we treasure is not lost, is never again confiscated by Western imperialism.

Indonesians, he acknowledged, still faced many problems and difficulties arising from three and a half centuries of Western domination.

But has God not given mankind the power of initiative, in order that all difficulties may be solved? Out of the shared efforts of the people and the government, I am sure that a new society will be born, bringing salvation to all its members.⁵

Positive sounds came, too, from other Muslim leaders, H.R. Moehammad Adnan, chief justice of Java's Islamic Supreme Court, and Wondoamiseno, chairman of the all-Muslim alliance the MIAI. Neither man nor his organization were connected with *Poetera*, but they expressed appreciation for the separate, special attentions they, too, had received from the Japanese authorities recently with regard to their cooperation and input in the building of a new order. Both men cited a recent audience between the commander of the military administration and leading Muslim clerics as proof that the Japanese respected and aimed to promote Islam in a way the Dutch never had. They pledged, in response, to do all they could to awaken the population to the shared cause of a Greater Asia.⁶

The same day saw the announcement of the long-awaited reopening of the Jakarta Medical College (*Ika daigaku*), which had been closed, like other institutions of higher education, since the Japanese arrival.⁷ In the same week, a Japanese plan for Java's elementary schools to begin offering classes in two shifts per day was also unveiled—thus theoretically doubling the number of children receiving rudimentary education. As the week's festivities came to a close, L.F. Jansen noted in his diary that “the Japanese have been enthusiastically thanked, thousands have publicly prayed for their victory, and the people, in general, do not appear openly dissatisfied. The Japanese military administration leaders have in any case worked hard lately. There is pace to it.”⁸

In subsequent weeks, the newspapers at least continued to confirm this impression. The continued buzz over the new order was accompanied by descriptions and discussions of *Poetera*'s wide-ranging series of planned activities. *Poetera*'s charter called for the establishment of branches across Java from state (*shū*) through regency (*ken*) down to the district (*gun*) level.⁹ Along the lines proposed by Mohammad Hatta, *Asia Raya*'s Soekardjo Wirjopranoto foresaw the building of a new society, under Japanese tutelage, in terms of the development of a self-sufficient Indonesian economy that would “leapfrog the stage of capitalism” (*Melontjati tingkatan kapitalisme*). Indonesia, wrote Soekardjo, already had enough material resources and labor power for industrial self-sufficiency. “The only thing we need is leadership ... The Dutch, both their government and their capitalism, had a non-cooperative attitude towards native industry,” but the Japanese could provide it. True, he noted, Indonesians suffered from a great shortage of capital, yet, far from being a hindrance, the lack of native capital was “in fact a blessing for the building of a new society,” which, when mixed with the indigenous penchant for mutual cooperation (*gotong-rojong*), would lead to “a more complete industrial construction.”

This new society will not be shackled by capitalism as seen in Europe and America, and it will not experience the bad effects of a capitalism that is nothing other than every man for himself. Social progress, particularly the changeover from agriculture to industry, indeed normally requires going through a capitalist stage. But Indonesian industry will jump over the capitalist stage by following the path of *gotong-rojong*.

Japan's industrial development in the early Meiji period, Soekardjo wrote—the key to which had been “cooperation between the government and the people”—could serve as Indonesia's model for capital accumulation. In this model,

The state undertakes high-risk ventures requiring large amounts of capital. The wealthy contribute their money, and those who are clever contribute their cleverness. The workers (men and women) provide the labor. At that time [Meiji Japan] had a shortage of experts, and these experts were imported from outside the country. In short, the development of industry in Japan was genuinely guided by the government itself. For this reason we are sure that the Military Government will lead Indonesia in the direction of heavy industry.¹⁰

As measured by the amount of activity afoot in *Poetera*'s central office from the moment it opened on April 17, 1943, public expectations of *Poetera*, at least in Jakarta, were running high. In an interim report to the military commander's office, Hatta described developments reminiscent of the experience of the Three-A movement a year earlier.

No one had imagined that so many people, seeking so many kinds of aid and information, would visit Headquarters so soon. The Correspondence Section received a great many letters, and, on opening day, the Public Welfare Section received not less than seventy guests. All were people living in miserable circumstances, and they wanted different sorts of help. The majority were unemployed ... Delegates from a number of places came to the Organization Section to ask about the structure of *Poetera* and to request that branches be set up soon in their area. The other sections also worked overtime, listening and replying to visitors' requests for information ... all of this showed what high hopes the people had for *Poetera*.¹¹

In May, a newspaper appeal for the registration of all “native” economic organizations from *Poetera*'s Economic Affairs Section yielded some 198 responses from cooperatives, commercial firms, and the like in just two weeks. Early activities at this section included a display of rubber goods made by a local “native” cooperative in the *Poetera* Headquarters, and, at the end of June, the cosponsoring of an exhibit of “native”-made products related to handicrafts, fishing, agriculture, and animal husbandry, assembled from all over Java, at Jakarta's *Pasar Malam* festival.¹²

Behind the public displays of energy, unity, and optimism, however, was an all-too familiar sense of going nowhere fast. In December, Sukarno had pledged that the new movement was to be conducted by and for Indonesians, with the full trust of the military authorities. But the months of negotiation involved, and the outcome of these negotiations—in which, as military administration advisor Miyoshi Shunkichirō later admitted, “almost all of the nationalists' demands were denied”—had in fact revealed great limits to this trust. Three out of four of Sukarno and Hatta's central proposals for the movement had been rejected: the use of the flag, the anthem, and the word Indonesia were refused, and native officials were *not* to be allowed to participate. Of

the four, only on the race question—participation by “natives” alone—had Japanese approval finally been gained. *Poetera* was *not* to be allowed to take on the shape of a political party—there were to be no members or members’ dues. Its funding was to come from—and be controlled by—the regime. Branch chairmen at state level were to require prior approval from the local Japanese state governors and, below them, native officials.¹³

In an equally critical and disappointing development for the nationalists, jurisdiction over the various youth movements originally started under loose Three-A auspices, and ceremoniously transferred to Sukarno’s direction in early December 1942—including both the *Parindra*-backed *Barisan Pemoeda Asia Raya*, the “Buffalo Corps,” and other various groups established by the members of the New Generation Residence Hall—was not transferred to *Poetera*, but rather to the Education Office of the military administration’s Internal Affairs Department. Confirming official intentions regarding control in this area, the announcement of two new Japanese-sponsored Java-wide youth organizations, into which the above groups were to be absorbed, followed on April 29, 1943: the Java Youth Corps (*Jawa Seinendan*), under the central direction of the Education Office, for “native” youth aged between fourteen and twenty-five; and the Civil Defense Corps (*Keibōdan*), under the direction of local police departments, for “native” and Chinese young men aged twenty to thirty-five. Both were modeled on pre-existing youth organizations in Japan. The first was a sort of intensive scouting organization, emphasizing physical fitness and the forming of ranks; the second was intended primarily for local order maintenance, and was regularly mobilized for such tasks as firefighting drills and blackout controls. For the Youth Corps, selection of regional commanders and personnel was entrusted to state governors and, below them, native officials.¹⁴ The same period also saw another Japanese innovation aimed at harnessing the untapped power of Java’s unemployed young men, as compensation for the local Japanese military manpower deficit: the “opportunity” for “native” men aged seventeen to twenty-five to be trained and to serve as auxiliary soldiers, or *heiho*, in the Japanese army.¹⁵ *Poetera* was given no role or say in any of these mass undertakings.

Article Two of *Poetera*’s Charter, duly cited by Sukarno in his speech to the large rally assembled at Gambir square for the movement’s opening on March 9, made clear that there was nothing radically new afoot, at least in political terms.

This movement is a movement of the Indonesian people. Its aim is to support Japan and to cooperate towards gaining the final victory in the Greater East Asia War. It desires to smoothe the tasks of the Military Administration, that is, the building of a new society, which shall be a powerful member of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity sphere.¹⁶

Making the best of a limited and difficult situation—but one which, from their vantage, still carried greater nation-building potential than that under the Dutch—Sukarno and the movement’s other leaders found, and trumpeted, two areas in which they believed their aims agreed with those of the Japanese, and for which the new movement might still function as a vehicle: socio-economic development, and spiritual awakening and strengthening.

But as the movement got underway, even in these presumably “safe” domains, the now entrenched political structure and mistrust of nationalist motives—from officials within the Department of the Commander of the Military Administration (*Gunseikanbu*), from Japanese state governors, and from native officials—quickly stifled most of *Poetera*’s attempts to establish a social foothold. Along with the military administration’s ubiquitous, conservative Java hands Taniguchi Gorō and Miyoshi Shunkichirō, Hitoshi Shimizu, now head of the Jakarta Propaganda Department office, was named as a *Poetera* “trustee,” with the job of acting as a liaison between *Poetera* and the central and local government administrations. Shimizu later recalled that at the moment *Poetera* began, all the (Japanese) state governors and (“native”) district governors had issued strict pronouncements limiting the parameters of the movement. As a result, even in comparison to the Three-A, he said, *Poetera* was “extremely fettered,” and assumed a “somber tone.”¹⁷

In his interim report to the military administration, submitted in August 1943, Mohammad Hatta complained bitterly of the general opposition faced by *Poetera* from local officials.

Although they have been confirmed in their positions by the Japanese, and although they have greater power than before, the native officials still resent the fact that others are recognized as popular leaders. For the existence of such leaders means that they will lose status in the eyes of the people. The feudal spirit requires one leader only, not two.

Mistrust among local officials was only heightened by the non-cooperator status of *Poetera*’s leadership. Those few local nationalists who did manage to gain local approval as *Poetera* representatives, Hatta complained, were largely of the elite “cooperator” lineage. While some of these had solid nationalist credentials, they in turn balked at appointing anyone with a history of conflict with local officialdom or—as a result—a history of previous run-ins with the *kenpeitai*. “As for the *Poetera* leadership, we will not cease searching for a meeting ground between ourselves and native officials, nor will we cease trying to win them over,” wrote Hatta. “Without pressure from the Japanese authorities, however, they will only have smiles on their faces and burning resentment in their hearts.”¹⁸

More often it was rather the nationalists who were put under pressure by local Japanese state governors, who, with little or no familiarity with the local terrain, were prone to take advice from native officials. And even at the center, where the nationalists generally found a more sympathetic ear, the Japanese authorities were loath to intervene. Sukarno, Shimizu later recalled, complained to him “in tears” at the equal billing given to native official leader Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo at every *Poetera*-sponsored public event. The problem he said, originated with the military government’s refusal to favor one side over the other. “For me,” recalled Shimizu, “it was a very hard time.”¹⁹

As a result of these sorts of constraints, while the Three-A had fielded fifty-eight district-level branches in the first weeks of operation, *Poetera* could boast only five state-level branches five months after its founding. If Three-A sponsored cooperatives and other economic ventures had aroused public interest only to fall prey to local elite

interests, *Poetera* was hardly able to manage the attempt in the first place.²⁰ Only under the sympathetic administration in Malang state, in East Java, was *Poetera* allowed “a broad leadership role in the people’s economic affairs.” Elsewhere, *Poetera*’s role was limited to that of propaganda alone, and even here there was often strong resistance. In his interim report to the *Gunseikanbu*, Hatta cited an example from West Java: “In the villages of Priangan shū, the *Poetera* branch has not been permitted to propagandize on behalf of agriculture and handicrafts because, according to the authorities, this is the job of native officials.”²¹ *Poetera*’s already limited efforts to improve the economic situation for the “natives” faced opposition, too, complained Hatta, from the self-centered speculations of “Chinese merchants, whose only desire is for profit.”²²

For their part, officials within the military administration added to the fettering of *Poetera* by acting jealously to safeguard their own jurisdiction, even in areas within which nationalist and Japanese aims would appear to have unproblematically overlapped. Perhaps not surprising given the importance placed upon the mobilization and control of the energies of youth, these efforts were particularly pronounced, and damaging, in areas such as education and sport. From the outset, noted Hatta, *Poetera*’s Education Department had been a site of great public interest.

A great many schoolteachers have come to offer their services to *Poetera*. Unfortunately, however, the high school teachers in Jakarta received orders—if we are not mistaken from the Seinendan leadership [i.e. the Education Department]—that they are to have no connection with *Poetera*. Is *Poetera* a group of bandits capable of corrupting teachers who come too close? If the Japanese persist in this narrow-minded attitude towards an organization that was expressly established by the government to support the Army behind the front lines, it will be difficult for Indonesians to respect them.²³

Developments involving the *Poetera*-supported “Athletic Training Movement” *Gelora* (*Gerakan Latihan Olah-Raga*), founded in May 1943, further illustrated the extent of Japanese official mistrust and inconsistency. “The intentions and goals of *Gelora*,” wrote Hatta,

are explained in its constitution as being to develop the bodies and souls of the people through athletics, so that the people will have healthy bodies and a noble spirit ... *Gelora* is also intended as a direct contribution to the government from the people. The people are organizing their own training program and are enthusiastic about expressing their will to stand united behind the Army.

Still, some two months after the application was made to the military administration for official approval of *Gelora*, there had been no response. With characteristic boldness, Hatta wrote, “whatever decision the department of the military commander makes regarding *Gelora* and its relationship with *Poetera*,”

one thing should not be forgotten: *Gelora should be allowed to remain an autonomous body of the people themselves*, a body which will makes its contribution

directly to the government. We advise strongly that the leaders not be changed, for if there are different ones, we are afraid that the public will be disillusioned. The damage will not be inconsiderable.²⁴

By the time Hatta wrote the conclusion to his interim report in August 1943, however, the damage had been done. While Article 16 of the *Poetera* Special Regulations had assigned to the Education Section the task of “a) leading and supervising all physical education, so that the people’s bodies may be strengthened and their spirits hardened,” and “b) to encourage sports for training the bodies and spirits of village people,” wrote Hatta,

the attempts to fulfill the intention of this article too have been frustrated. After this Section succeeded in founding Gelora as an autonomous body enthusiastically supported by people of all classes, government action nipped these efforts in the bud. Gelora was forcefully disbanded. Just as the second portion of this report was completed, it was announced in the newspapers that the government was setting up a Jawa Tai Iku Kai, or All Java Sports League ... Its purposes are identical with Gelora’s. The most striking difference is that in all of the provinces, the leadership has been turned over to native officials.²⁵

In practice, at a time of increasing difficulty for Java’s population, the situation left *Poetera* in the unenviable position of a pure propaganda organ, building up enthusiasm for programs it could not implement and making promises it could not keep, all in the name of cooperation with a regime that seemed bent on going its own way regardless.

Even in the areas of propaganda and culture there were further setbacks. While it might have seemed a logical and popular move to entrust *Poetera* with jurisdiction over the Center for Indonesian Culture (*Poesat Keboedajaan Indonesia*), whose preparations had been in the works since the previous October,²⁶ here too the Japanese preferred to keep the reins in their own hands. Several weeks after *Poetera*’s launch, the *Poesat* opened under official Propaganda Department control, in the same location as the former propaganda squad sponsored Theater Direction Center (*Engeki shidōsho*), with its Indonesian name unchanged, but a very different new Japanese one: the “Center for the Direction of Popular Cultural Enlightenment” (*Keimin bunka shidōsho*). Its staff combined Indonesian members of the Center for Indonesian Culture Preparatory Committee, including committee chair Sanoesi Pané and several other writers and visual artists including writer and playwright Andjar Asmara, with most of the Japanese and Indonesian artistic staff of the earlier Theater Direction Center, including Takeda Rintarō (literature), Iida Nobuo (music), playwright Arifin, and painter Basoeeki Abdoellah. For his part, Colonel Machida later characterized the appearance and character of the Center for the Guidance of Popular Cultural Enlightenment as typical of the larger trend toward Japanese bureaucratic normalcy.

Once the propaganda squad was moved into the military administration, [the *Engeki shidōsho*] was sacrificed to the yearning for formalization that is the quintessential nature of the bureaucrat, and was given the grandiose title the Center

for the Direction of Popular Cultural Enlightenment. "In light of the fundamental aim of the construction of Greater East Asia, to foster and to propagate the proper spirit and cultural atmosphere among the 50 million people of Java tyrannized under 300 years of Dutch colonial policy, a central guidance organ whose duty is to encourage popular enlightenment and awakening, foremost in the realm of arts and culture"—That's the horrifying sort of thing they turned it into.²⁷

The new center was structured into departments comprising a central office, administration, literature, music, art, and theater, each, wrote Machida, "of course with its own pompous slogan." In reality, he noted, its task was little changed from that of the Theater Direction Center: "In sum, simply to provide guidance to young local residents aiming to work in each area." Indeed, while formally under military direction, and expected to act as a propaganda organ for military administration policy, the Japanese official with direct oversight over the center was Shimizu Hitoshi. With a general hands-off operating philosophy, little experience with the arts, and his hands full with dealings with Sukarno and others in his function as a *Poetera* trustee, Shimizu interfered little in the art center's operations. Shimizu's simple speech at an artists' convention sponsored by the military administration and the arts center preparatory committee on March 5, 1943 suggested his basic philosophy, one with which nation-building Indonesian artists—later center director Sanoesi Pané first among them—were not unfamiliar or uncomfortable. The aim, he said, should be to "discard all of the Western arts practiced by artists before, and introduce Eastern arts as a basis for constructing the art of Greater East Asia," to "create art and culture that is completely Eastern."²⁸ But however much seeming common ground adhered in these aims, it was the military administration that still insisted on retaining final control.

Pulling no punches, the exasperated Mohammad Hatta concluded in his August 1943 report,

Within *Poetera* itself the question often arises of what more there is for *Poetera* to do. The youth have been taken over by the *Seinendan*. Women have been organized into the *Fujinkai* [a Java-wide women's association founded on the Japanese model in August 1943]. Sports is regulated by the *Java Tai Iku Kai*. For culture there is already the Center for the Direction of Popular Cultural Enlightenment. Effective leadership in the fields of education and economics is not permitted. For propaganda there is already the Propaganda Department ... If it is only a matter of propaganda ... there was no need to set up *Poetera*.

Hatta for one was under no illusions about the ill effects of *Poetera*'s continued operation under these circumstances, and he made no attempt to hide these from the military administration. The project was becoming a public relations disaster.

For the people, *Poetera*'s present situation is unsatisfactory, since it was previously widely believed that *Poetera* would give leadership to various popular efforts. On *Poetera* were pinned the hopes for easing the complaints and lightening the burdens of the people. But all these hopes have proved to be in vain, since *Poetera*

has not been allowed to exercise any initiative ... Whoever wishes to do so may go into neighborhoods and marketplaces to hear for himself people's opinions of Poetera. Of course people do not everywhere want to speak frankly, since they are afraid, but an intelligent person can catch the nature of their hidden feelings from remarks that are dropped. Except for small groups who help Poetera here and there, people's feelings about the organization are generally cool. What the masses are saying in the *kampong* and other places—which is quite often relayed to us—is frequently not very nice. There are some who say, “Our leaders are now living the good life but we are just as poor as ever” ... People from many quarters are even saying, “If this is the way it's going to be, we were better off with the Triple A movement.” And indeed, the Triple A had more freedom of movement ... A paralyzed body such as Poetera is now can only give rise to suspicion in various quarters.²⁹

Among Indonesian nation-builders, the sense of getting the runaround was increasingly palpable. The bright mood of 1942 was taking on the aspect of a distant memory. In a diary entry in mid-May 1943, Jansen related a conversation between his friend Hoesein Djajadiningrat, serving among other things on the Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs, and Hadji Agoes Salim, a highly-regarded elderly Islamic nationalist now serving on *Poetera's* Advisory Council—a body which, as Hatta noted, had yet to convene because, as the situation stood, there was “nothing for them to advise on.”³⁰ The two men attempted to analyze what had lain behind the “feverish atmosphere of liberation” among Indonesian intellectuals a year earlier, which, in light of the altered mood of the present, had taken on an almost mysterious aspect. Salim believed it to have been a simple case of “mass psychosis,” malicious enjoyment of another man's defeat. Djajadiningrat found this too shallow, and saw an explanation rather in a combination of hatred against the Dutch and a belief that Indonesia was going to gain autonomy. What the two men agreed upon, in any case, was a thoroughgoing disillusionment where the Japanese were concerned. “Now the complete mood-reversal does appear to be a generally acknowledged fact,” wrote Jansen.

The Japanese have taken the Indonesians for a ride. The One Asian family means, according to Djajadiningrat, that the Indonesians may be allowed to work as servants in the Japanese house. They are brutalized and treated like dirt. The economic situation is terrible. Hatta made a report [to the commission] after a trip to Central Java about which Djajadiningrat was shocked ... Hatta is writing completely academic reports about industrialization and so on, which will require a billion in capital, for after the war. In the Commission, Suzuki ([president] of *Asia Raya*) threatened that in consideration of the growing paper shortage, it might be necessary to make paper available for education only where it is absolutely necessary—[thus suggesting] the closing of all middle- and high-schools!³¹

As one of several further examples of Japanese contempt for Indonesian priorities, Hoesein cited another lecture in the commission, this time from the Japanese head

of the Health Department, who had presented “extensive propaganda in favor of the improvement of the popular diet through pig-raising. The [counter-arguments with relation to] Islam,” he said, had “made no impression.” At the newly opened Jakarta Medical College, he continued, three Indonesian professors had been named, “after many intrigues.”

But each one has received a Japanese supervisor above him. Above Asikin for tropical diseases, for example, is a Japanese for general internal diseases. A young second lieutenant is placed above an assistant with years of experience, and so forth.³²

For the young men of the New Generation Residence Hall, experiences in the period surrounding the birth of *Poetera* had also been sobering, where both the Japanese and the nationalist leadership were concerned. Having received a public promise of the central role that youth would be playing in *Poetera*, and assuming that *Poetera* was to act as a kind of preparatory national government, the young men of the Residence Hall instead discovered that the fledgling mass organizations they had been urged to establish were either co-opted or eliminated by the military administration, with Japanese officials calling for their services as youth leaders in “mobilizing all the powers of the Indonesian people in Java and Madura in order to win the Greater East Asia War”—and the nationalist leaders they so looked up to, publicly at least, marching in step.³³ Particularly distressing, and symbolic, was the Japanese breakup of Chalid Rasyidi’s popular Buffalo Corps youth paramilitary group in Jakarta, and the brief arrest of its leadership, in January or February of 1943.³⁴

In response to Japanese offers to absorb the Residence Hall residents into military administration youth projects—and the senior nationalists’ inability to offer any alternative—Nur recalled that “in general, my friends who had attended the [Residence Hall] courses were dissatisfied and felt annoyed and angry.”³⁵ A Japanese intelligence report issued shortly after the launch of *Poetera* reflected these sentiments: “The fact that the leadership of youth movement[s] has been handed over to the official authorities has stirred displeasure. People are afraid that the youth movements will be run like a government office.”³⁶ Opinions differed, said Nur, on how to respond. Perhaps out of family considerations, he said, a number of the Hall’s older members opted to hew the official line of “assisting Dai Nippon” adopted by the *Poetera* leaders, some joining the *Poetera* organization itself. The leader of the Residence Hall, Sukarni, also chose to stay on the inside, remaining in the official employ of the Propaganda Department, and taking up a position as a secretary in the central headquarters of the new *Jawa Seinendan* Youth Corps.

For a young man of relatively little education, Sukarni’s was a relatively high-ranking position, and it provoked jealousy and suspicion among some Indonesian observers.³⁷ But for this prewar leader of the nationalist *Indonesia Muda* youth organization, who had founded his own branch of the Buffalo Corps in Sukabumi before the Japanese authorities broke it up, it cannot have been a fully satisfying situation: of the *Seinendan*’s remaining twelve secretaries, eleven were Japanese. The *Seinendan* program emphasized the building of healthy bodies, discipline, order-maintenance,

farming skills, and readiness to sacrifice for the war effort, leaving no official space for the sorts of nationalist political mobilization that Sukarni and his Residence Hall colleagues had held as their central aim. Plans called for *Seinendan* members to devote three hours a week to Indonesian language study—and fifteen hours learning Japanese.³⁸ Whatever their private misgivings, however, Sukarni and his Residence Hall comrades also in Propaganda Department employ, Chaerul Saleh and *Dōmei* worker Adam Malik, remained in their official positions, stayed on at the *Asrama* building at Menteng 31, and—along with their mentor Mohammad Yamin—continued their formal association with Hitoshi Shimizu and the Propaganda Department until 1945.

In the meantime, Johar Nur later recalled that the sentiments of the masses had undergone a decisive shift.

In society, which had been pro-Japanese, there was already a sense of a reversal of Japanese attitudes. Moreover, in their propaganda before they arrived, the Japanese had said that Japan would flood Java with Japanese products, products of the sort that were already here in Dutch times. But this had proven untrue ... The economic and employment situation ... had already begun to be difficult, and towards our people, the Japanese were very cruel. Whereas before they had considered us the same color, the same race, the same Asian race, just as high and just as low, now the Japanese were half-inclined to see us as semi-slaves. Out of this the Japanese forced education upon us ... *bagero*, meaning the native inhabitants were stupid ... To the point that [popular] sympathy towards the Japanese, which was before, say, 50%, had changed into a sense of antipathy, quickly rising to the point that only 20% were pro-Japanese. By the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, it was perhaps already only 5%.³⁹

While public skepticism and frustration were hardening, however, the positioning of many of the “new *priyayi*” in particular—the group most heavily exposed and receptive to the propaganda preachings of Sukarno and the like—remained more nebulous. When L.F. Jansen relayed Hoesein Djajadiningrat’s negative observations to his youthful radio colleague Said some two months after the launch of *Poetera*, for example, Said offered reason to conclude that, for all the private disappointments among *Poetera*’s leadership, and the disillusionment among the masses, *Poetera*’s energetic public propaganda campaigns continued to find a sympathetic audience in some nationalist quarters—notably among youth. “The youth remain unswervingly behind Sukarno,” said Said, “even if they know that he does not have all the qualities of a leader. The areas in which he falls short are made up for by the other members of the Four-Leafed Clover. Only the old folks fail to understand that Java is now undergoing a renovation.” Asked by Jansen what he meant by renovation, Said reiterated that “it is war—one can make a start on very little or nothing. [But] every village must become self-sufficient, must do its own weaving. *Indonesia is becoming itself*.”⁴⁰

With the members of Shimizu’s Residence Hall left to follow their own paths, Johar Nur applied to the Jakarta Medical College in March 1943. He began his studies there the following month. The idea had come from an older Residence Hall colleague named Mohamad Darwis.⁴¹ Nur’s entry to the Medical College was eased by the fact that the

selection committee was composed of his Indonesian peers, instructors, and junior and senior medical college students, including Darwis, who had studied medicine before the war. Rejecting all Chinese applicants including continuing students on the basis of “foreign ancestry,” the committee also went out of its way to include several students whose applications in the Dutch period had been refused because of nationalist and other political agitation.⁴²

Among the returning students at the Medical College were Sudjatmoko and Sudarpo, the latter a prewar follower of Mohammad Hatta. It may be recalled that, at a hastily convened student meeting back in March the previous year, these two men had taken the unpopular view that the incoming Japanese, and their aims, needed to be viewed with caution.⁴³ Over the course of the previous year, the two had both taken part in a small, informal study group led by Amir Sjarifuddin. Schooled in the Netherlands and a 1933 graduate from the Batavia Law College, Sjarifuddin had served as chairman of the left-leaning *Gerindo* party in 1939–40, and had also worked as a consultant for the colonial Department of Economic Affairs.⁴⁴ Before his arrest by the *kenpeitai* in January 1943, Sjarifuddin had also numbered among the elite nationalist teaching staff at the Residence Hall. Sjarifuddin’s teachings, recalled Sudarpo, had sharpened his political philosophy and his wariness of Japanese pretenses.

Well! Amir Sjarifuddin was a brilliant man ... He clarified [for us] the difference between fascism and democracy ... He was able to explain how in fact all of sorts of things represented a crisis of Western democracy, which was really a crisis of capitalism, and would lead to socialism ... He explained the weaknesses of democracy very clearly. Fascism [in contrast,] could mobilize and build up a sense of nationalism in all areas, but what was its negative point? The individual loses his power. With the Nazi’s, everything was done in the name of racial progress, but here the individual was pulverized, or was forced to go along, and if he went along, he would lose everything he had, he would sacrifice his values and his dignity as a human being.⁴⁵

In the course of these informal meetings, which Sudarpo later described as a time of intellectual and political “warming up,” he and Sudjatmoko had also been impressed by the admonitions of a little-known Sjarifuddin colleague from Bandung, a former local newspaper editor named Mohammad Koerdi.⁴⁶ Against Sjarifuddin—who argued that the extreme policies of the fascist Japanese had a positive merit in their potential to “stimulate the masses” in a way the Dutch never had—Koerdi warned that

there was a danger that if they were exposed to, and shaped by, the Japanese influence for an extended time at the most sensitive time of their lives, the behavior and way of thinking of youth would become based on that of Japan. [Indeed] the legacies [of this experience] are still very evident. [Koerdi] truly urged us to look out for comrades in need of rescue from fascist influences.⁴⁷

At the time when he and Sudjatmoko first arrived at the Medical College to renew their studies in April 1943, Sudarpo recalled that the student body was for the most

part intellectually and politically “unsophisticated.” Many of the new students had previously attended the Netherlands-Indies Doctor’s School (NIAS) in Surabaya, whose lengthier program admitted students at a younger age with a year or two less education than those in Batavia. Hailing from the social upper crust, most of the students “were close to those in power ... who were identified by their cooperation with Japanese policies.” For Sudarpo and Sudjarmoko, who were already pondering how to foster a sense of individuality, social consciousness, and unity among the students in the face of a regime they viewed as deceptive and dangerous, circumstances and developments at the Medical College nevertheless followed a productive course.⁴⁸

Used to studying in the familiar Dutch language and under Dutch instructors—who, while often stiff and aloof, were generally highly competent—the students generally found the classroom experience at the Jakarta Medical College a disappointing and alienating one. In some of their subjects, the students were pleased to find Dutch instructors replaced by Indonesian doctors, who approached their students in a much more friendly, informal, and interactive way than the Dutch had, placing the priority on student understanding.⁴⁹ As noted in the cynical commentary of Hoesein Djajadiningrat, however, the senior teaching and administrative staff of the college were all Japanese, and, for a number of reasons, the interaction here left much to be desired. While a number of the Japanese instructors spoke German, they often insisted upon conducting classes in Japanese, and using Japanese textbooks. The students were compelled to attend classes on Japanese language and culture. For Johar Nur, who was already functional in Japanese thanks to his classes at the Residence Hall, the language barrier represented less of a problem than for most of the other students, and he even helped to act as translator. But there were other problems. The classes began at a very simple level, covering areas he had studied long before. And viewed in comparison with his old Dutch instructors,

in my opinion, these Japanese teachers were incompetent. They’d stand in front of the class, and often they looked quite young, and their clothing was disheveled. The Dutchmen who had taught me had been so neat and orderly, so I was indeed disappointed to see this. This was quite a blow to me ... I was very eager to study, and had made a lot of effort to get this far—thus was the blow all the heavier.⁵⁰

There was also a problem of attitude. While some of the Japanese staff, including college president Sakagaki Masamitsu, were accomplished civilian doctors, most, recalled a former student named Tadjuludin, were from the military. “From the very first days” at the college, said Tadjuludin, “small conflicts with the Japanese staff began to arise, precisely with these military doctors, who were used to dealing with soldiers. They thought that Indonesian students could be treated that way too.”⁵¹ Tadjuludin also recalled being irritated by a routine that had by now become a standard procedure at Java’s educational institutions and places of employment: the daily early morning ritual of saluting the Japanese flag, singing the Japanese anthem *kimigayo*, and bowing towards the imperial palace in Tokyo, followed by calisthenics or *taisō*. The ritual of bowing, known as the *saikeirei*, had already been a point of friction among the more devout portions of the Muslim community for some time, and complaints from

Muslim leaders had even succeeded in gaining its suspension in certain particularly sensitive quarters. For those in non-Muslim institutions, however, the practice continued throughout the war. Not all Indonesians reacted negatively to all aspects of the morning ritual. Some among the elite in particular saw a value for nation-building, and morning calisthenics would indeed remain a permanent feature at many postwar Indonesian offices and schools. But as the occupation progressed, the *saikeirei* itself grew into a resented symbol of Japanese oppression, particularly where discontent was already present.

At the Medical College it was rather a celebrated event in the main lecture room on a Saturday in early October 1943 that crystallized the sense of vague dissatisfaction among many of the students, helping to forge among the disparate group a new sense of unity—a unity founded primarily upon shared anti-Japanese sentiments. The incident represented an insulting display of cultural indifference and political mistrust. Viewed from the Japanese side, it was a colossal public relations blunder, serving to alienate a small but important, idealistic, and energetic segment of the elite—youth whose energies many Japanese saw as especially important to mobilize and cultivate—at a time when most members of this class, if not fully content, were still largely resigned to the conditions of wartime normalcy.

The event occurred in the wake of a general failure among the student body to respond voluntarily to a Japanese order mandating crew cuts for all of Java's students. While some such as Sudarpo might have originally chosen to ignore the Japanese order partly as a conscious political statement, for many others the reluctance appears to have been primarily based upon issues of culture, age, and status: Japanese-style crew-cuts were considered alright for boys, but short hair was seen as degrading for grown Indonesian men, particularly those of elite stature. In any event, local Japanese officials appear to have interpreted the students' failure to heed the regulation as a sign of misplaced pride and Western-style dandyism, and determined to make a point of the matter. Thus at a most unexpected moment did the young men of the Medical College receive direct exposure to the tools of brute coercion underlying Japan's brotherly regime. Added to the shocking Japanese display of force was a local cultural issue of which the Japanese either had no understanding or, worse, were determined to ignore: as had already been repeated in both Japanese- and Indonesian-language journals on many occasions, the head was considered by the Indonesians a sacred area, not to be touched by others, let alone handled or struck. Sudden, unexpected outbursts of Japanese abuse in Java's city streets were a phenomenon with which the Indonesian masses were by now more familiar, but as Sudarpo later remembered, for these Indonesian men of great expectations—used to being called "Mister" (*meneer*) by their old Dutch instructors, and considering themselves a breed apart—the treatment represented an eye-opening experience of social leveling.⁵²

At first glance the story had an almost comical aspect. Attending a lecture in pathology, the students were suddenly surrounded by a group of Japanese soldiers brandishing firearms. Other armed soldiers stood before the classroom doors. Only when a number of Japanese assistants entered the room with electric hair clippers did the surprised students realize what the fuss was about. An ugly exchange quickly ensued. As three Japanese soldiers sought out the first haircut candidates, another

student—a normally calm, quiet, inconspicuous 19-year-old named Gusti Gde Ngurah—exchanged angry words with a Japanese officer. The officer threatened Ngurah with a pistol, but settled for a slap in the face. The exchange immediately brought the classroom into tumult.

A number of students picked up chairs to defend Ngurah, while others screamed and weeped. The Japanese soldiers grabbed the heads of several students and clipped their hair by force. These included Sudjatmoko, whose hair was cut in a way that resembled that of the Indian in *The Last of the Mohicans*. At almost the same moment, the Japanese soldiers cocked their weapons, ready to fire. From the back of the room came the distinct voice of [one of the older students,] Idris P. Siregar, asking that all students allow their hair to be cut, warning them that they were in danger of being killed, because the Japanese soldiers were armed and ready to fire. So the students gave in to the forced haircuts. Each student had his turn.⁵³

Assembling in the dormitory to discuss the issue afterwards, the students unanimously decided upon an immediate boycott of all classes, which continued for two days. Successive visits to the dormitory from school officials, who warned of a harsh Japanese response, failed to move them. Word of the strike meanwhile spread through the city, and was said to evoke sympathy and respect among the populace. On the third day, the students received a visit from Sukarno himself, who attempted to explain to the students his own rationale for maintaining a cooperative posture towards Japan, and to convince the students to do the same. Sukarno assured the students of his own allegiance, and that of the *Poetera* leadership, to the cause of Indonesian nationhood. He described cooperation as the most effective tactic towards ensuring a “final victory” in this aim.⁵⁴

The strike had in fact come at an extremely inopportune moment for Sukarno and other senior nationalist leaders, who were once again in a relatively optimistic mood, buoyed by a promising pledge from the Japanese authorities some four months earlier, which was just now about to see practical realization: in mid-June, on the eve of a highly publicized visit to the southern occupied areas, Prime Minister Tōjō had proclaimed that Java was to be allowed a measure of “political participation” (*seiji san'yō*). In September, Tōjō's pledge had been made concrete in the form of an announcement of the establishment of “Advisory Councils” at central and state levels (called the *Chūō sangi'in* and *Shū gi'in* respectively), to be peopled by prominent Indonesians, chosen in the main by the *Gunseikan* and local officials. Alongside a predictable assortment of “safe” appointments from among native official and cooperator ranks, the non-cooperator nationalists had received a healthy representation in these bodies, and healthy salaries to go with them.⁵⁵ Sukarno had been named as *Chūō sangi'in* chairman. As it happened, the first session was due to take place within a week or two of the strike.

Typically vague on specifics, Tōjō's pledge had in fact represented a compromise reflective of three basic issues facing Tokyo: the need to strengthen local enthusiasm for the regime, acknowledged to be flagging in the wake of the worsening economic situation, an ineffective *Poetera* movement, and the promising of independence to the Philippines and Burma; the continued inability of the Tokyo military authorities

to reach a decision regarding Java's, and Indonesia's, ultimate political status; and the darkening war situation, in the face of which Tokyo tacticians had decided to shift Japan's military posture in the Pacific towards a massive defensive buildup. In Java, this would mean a greatly intensified mobilization of human and material resources, which made the ensuring of local solidarity and legitimacy all the more urgent. Japan's mounting losses, and the all-too-practical rationale that they prompted, however, remained largely hidden from Indonesian view.

Most of the students were swayed enough by Sukarno's forceful and optimistic arguments to call an end to the strike. They returned to classes the next day. But Sudjatmoko and Sudarpo remained boldly critical of Sukarno's tactics and their results. Some days afterwards, a number of the students were hauled in by the *kenpeitai* for questioning, but all were released after failing to name anyone as a strike ringleader. In December 1943, however, nineteen senior students were again arrested in the wake of an incident in which students who had assembled for military drills departed the training field to avoid a sudden downpour, and then refused to return. This time the *kenpeitai* were in earnest, as word of the earlier student strike had in the meantime somehow been leaked to the Allies, receiving mention in a Radio Australia broadcast. In *kenpeitai* custody,

the students were held in a room measuring three by four meters, and only allowed to sit cross-legged. They were not allowed to go outside for fresh air. Their food was rationed, a small amount of rice and dried salted fish. Each day, [each student] contributed one spoonful of rice to one designated comrade, so that at least one of them could have a satisfying meal. The torture they underwent was heavy enough: They were beaten, burned with cigarette butts, hung high up with their legs tied, and subjected to many other varieties of torture, to the point that they were black and blue, and covered with wounds. Each time they were interrogated, their answers were always the same—no one gave in.

After some twenty days of confinement, the students were released. But roughly half of them, including Sudarpo and Sudjatmoko, were expelled from the Jakarta Medical College. Several others received suspensions.⁵⁶

These events set in motion not only a hardening and unification of sentiments among many of the medical college students regarding the Japanese, but also the opening of a serious fissure between the senior nationalists—and the elite young men who supported them in their formally cooperative position, including *Sendenbu* workers such as Sukarni and Chaerul Saleh—and a smaller group of elite young educated “new *priyayi*” men who were coming to view not only Japan, but also cooperation with Japan, as an enemy to the national cause as they envisioned it.⁵⁷ For Sudarpo and others, beyond the issue of the realization of the nation and the mobilization of the power necessary to its achievement alone, these events drew attention to the question of what *sort* of nation Indonesia was to be. Contact with older figures like Amir Sjarifuddin, and subsequent conflicts with the Japanese, strengthened him and his fellows in the conviction that the liberal ideals for which the Japanese had little time or respect—democracy, social justice, individual human rights, freedoms, and dignities—were

of the essence. Over subsequent months—a time of sharply worsening material conditions, and a deepening sense of alienation from the Japanese—the influence of these young men, and connections with other groups of disgruntled, educated youth, was to spread slowly and quietly. Subsequent contacts with older nationalist leaders who had chosen to avoid the path of cooperation with the Japanese—notably Sutan Sjahrir—encouraged them in their independent stance. In his own sentiments, Johar Nur, as both an associate of the young men at the propaganda squad and a medical college student, appears to have balanced somewhere in-between the two groups. By 1945, however, shared impatience with the conditions and contradictions of Japanese rule was to bring both groups of *pemoeda* around to similar, defiant conclusions.

Into the abyss

The month of October 1943—in retrospect, the halfway point of Japan's three-and-a-half year hegemony in Java—represented in many ways a defining moment in the occupation. Alongside the disturbances at the Medical College and the opening session of the Central Advisory Council, October 1943 also saw the establishment of an all-“native” volunteer paramilitary force called the “Defenders of the Homeland” (in Indonesian *Pembela Tanah Air*, or *PETA*). At the same time, these moves, which were publicly propounded and interpreted as signs of Japanese benevolence and broadmindedness, were accompanied by others that betrayed the less glamorous military-strategic *modus operandi* in fact underlying them: in sum, the enabling of Java's maximal exploitation for defensive purposes.

These aims were confirmed all too clearly, to begin with, in the shape of the proceedings at the Central Advisory Council itself. For those such as Sukarno, who appear to have nurtured great hopes for the *Chūō sangi'in* as a legislative or policy-making body (an assumption not unreasonable in light of Tōjō's use of the term “political participation”) the opening session, held from October 17 to 20, 1943, was another crushing disappointment.⁵⁸ The contents of the proceedings, which were to be convened only for several days at three- to four-month intervals, involved the answering of prearranged, narrowly-framed questions posed to the membership by military administration General Affairs Department chief Yamamoto Mōichirō. All of these questions followed the same general format, that is, requests for “methods of strengthening the cooperation of the native inhabitants towards the successful prosecution of the war.”⁵⁹ The members were allowed only to offer answers to the questions posed by Yamamoto; they were not to introduce alternative questions or statements of their own.⁶⁰ With the inception of the *Chūō sangi'in*, the Commission for the Study of Native Customs (*Komisi Adat*)—in retrospect, a much more spontaneous and open forum for policy discussion—was meanwhile disbanded as ostensibly redundant. If the latter had already compared negatively to the toothless Dutch-sponsored *Volksraad* of the prewar, in both political and topical terms, the *Chūō sangi'in* could be seen as a further step backward. From the (former) non-cooperator nationalist point of view, however, there was one important improvement over the prewar *Volksraad*: their own presence. In this regard, like the Commission for the

Investigation of Ancient Customs, but this time in full public view, the *Chūō sangi'in* did seem to represent a Japanese acknowledgment of nationalist political legitimacy on a par with that of the native administration, in symbolic if not in concrete political terms.

An essay published in a Japanese-language journal by an administration official named Yamashita Tetsuo one year after the first meeting of the Central Advisory Council—but never made available in Indonesian—later acknowledged continued nationalist disappointment with regard to its narrow parameters and extremely limited powers. “It is a fact,” Yamashita noted, “that at first there were some among the intellectuals who interpreted political participation as participation in the rights of rule or the prerequisites near to it.” But he maintained that in light of the situation of wartime and global confrontation, one in which “the so-called liberal parliamentary functions have been suspended in many countries in the world,” these expectations were completely misplaced.⁶¹ In an earlier essay in the *Jawa shimbun* that predated the council’s first session, an anonymous military administration spokesman noted that comparison between the *Chūō sangi'in* and the *Volksraad* was in any case inappropriate. The *Chūō sangi'in*, he wrote, took as its model not the *Volksraad*, but Japan’s wartime Diet and its Parliamentary Imperial Assistance Association (*Yokusan gi'in dōmei*).⁶² In the Japanese Diet too, political parties had been banned and subjects of discussion restricted. The *Yokusan gi'in dōmei* had been formed in the aim of offering united support and advice to the government in the shared, supreme aim of winning the war and uniting the populace while avoiding the useless, harmful dissonances and selfish, petty squabbling characteristic to Western-style liberal parliaments.⁶³

Once again, the senior nationalists had been led along with Japanese promises of trust and entrustment, only to find the reins of power denied—even as their public cooperation added an important stamp of legitimacy to Japanese policies. In confirmation of the military administration’s determination to tighten rather than loosen its grip in the face of the increased demands of “Defense and Construction,” plans were now indeed underway for the dissolution of the *Poetera* movement and its replacement with a new all-encompassing movement called the Java Patriotic Service Association (*Jawa Hōkōkai*). This was again to be based upon a Japanese domestic wartime model, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei yokusankai*). Here, under direct Japanese leadership, all of Java’s hitherto divided social power bases, and ethnic groups—native officials, the ethnic Chinese, Muslim leaders, and the nationalists, were meant to combine their forces together, with the Japanese and native officials remaining politically transcendent, and the nationalists and Muslim leaders to be utilized chiefly for their public relations skills. In a move billed as an encouragement to local mutual cooperation (*gotong-royong*) in a time of shared crisis—but whose central aim was in fact to further enhance the penetration of military administration policies and the potential for social mobilization and control—the launch of the Patriotic Service Association was accompanied by the introduction of another wartime institution imported from Japan, the *Tonarigumi* (neighborhood association). Via the *Tonarigumi* system, the lowest local levels of Java’s society, including both urban and rural village headmen (*lurah*) and, under these, all households within each jurisdiction, were perforce incorporated for the first time directly into the state hierarchy.

Like the Three-A movement before it, *Poetera* was allowed to flounder along for several more meaningless months before its official dissolution, which coincided with the launch of the *Jawa hōkōkai* in February 1944. Whatever their grievances, however, the senior nationalists opted to stay the cooperative course. As Japanese demands ratcheted higher, this course would carry both nationalists, their native official rivals, and many Muslim leaders as well, steadily further afield of the masses whose interests they claimed to represent.

Here, too, the month of October 1943 can be seen as a critical turning point, for it marked the beginning of sustained Japanese-sponsored drives both for the intensified production and requisition of food and other defense-related supplies, and the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of workers from Java's cities and countryside to assist in local, regional, and overseas projects in the new aim of "Defence and Construction" that would continue in ever-increasing intensity until the very moment of surrender in August 1945. Described at the time in Indonesian by the patriotic term "worker-soldiers" (*pradjoerit pekerdja*), it was by their Japanese name that the latter institution gained infamy: the *rōmusha* (lit. "laborers").

Early in October 1943, Japanese officials in charge of labor resources from each of the occupying armies in the southern regions had come together at Singapore to discuss ways to satisfy Tokyo's demands for a defensive buildup. Their attentions focused upon Java, the potential of whose huge population remained, in their eyes, severely underexploited. Thus was the Central Advisory Council, in its first session, called upon to approve a proposal from the military administration regarding the establishment of labor recruitment offices in each of Java's states and cities. According to a later policy statement from April 1944, the aims of the labor offices were to "exalt the positive spirit of labor service to induce the inhabitants to participate voluntarily in military or other important works." These included the construction of airfields, shipyards, roads, and defensive fortifications. Conditions of recruitment were to be thoroughly explained to laborers, and their families were to receive compensation, counseling, and communication with their loved ones in the field, "thus eliminating worry on the part of the laborers."⁶⁴ Since the war had begun, unemployment had been among Java's most pressing problems, and for the nationalists, promises such as these made cooperation and support for the Japanese venture more palatable. On the ground, however, there was little incentive provided for their execution. Rather, the combination of often unrealistic demands and pressures from the Japanese and limited local oversight provided powerful incentives for coercion, corruption, and exploitation. As one anonymous nationalist informant reporting on conditions in Central and East Java reported in August 1944, "what is clearly making life very difficult for the residents are the various recommendations from the top that are [supposed to be] voluntary [but] which in practice, by the time they reach the people, have become orders."⁶⁵

Viewed from the point of view of the peasantry and the working class, the Japanese occupation, welcomed at its inception, evolved into a system of extreme exploitation and oppression that undermined every semblance of legitimacy to the claims and urgings of Japanese Greater Asianism—hollow justifications that rarely ever seem to have even made it to the village audience in the first place. In the classic words of one village resident in East Java, "the Japanese didn't come to the villages—only their rules

did.”⁶⁶ Local officials, for the most part far removed from the Japanese at the higher levels, also appear to have had little experience with Greater Asianism. But politically and materially, there were benefits to be gained from the Japanese system. If some more socially committed local officials did what they could to try to shield those under their jurisdiction from the worst effects of this situation, there were many others who took advantage of the many temptations for self-enrichment, enjoying an extraordinary position of privilege and profit unheard of under the Dutch, and pursuing their duties with an enthusiasm that made them seem “more Japanese than the Japanese.”⁶⁷

The workings of the one-two punch of *rōmusha* enlistment and resource requisition at the village level in the latter half of the occupation—and the multivalent experiences of local Indonesian officials and their allies as both victims and victimizers, mobilized and pressured by the regime to do its bidding, but also invested with practically unlimited powers of local political leverage in order to achieve them—are candidly and vividly described in the postwar testimony of Partosentono (1899–?), who served as headman (*lurah*) of the village of Plaosan in the Madiun residency in East Java from 1933 to 1955. During the early days of the occupation, Partosentono recalled having an extremely favorable impression of the new rulers. “The Dutch, it could be said they just exploited us and acted haughty. They had no interest in mixing with [native] society.” In contrast, Partosentono recalled in a 1975 interview, “the Japanese certainly did.” To his extremely pleasant surprise, a short time after the Japanese first arrived, “the [new Japanese] Resident ... appeared at one of our weekly meetings [of village headmen], and chatted with us” through a translator in Javanese. “Don’t worry, don’t be frightened” he remembered this man, a certain Iriguchi, reassuring his audience. “The government is now in the hands of Dai Nippon, and we shall look after the livelihoods of Indonesians.” “Things were going to be better, and we were happy,” said Partosentono. “But that was before we knew anything.”⁶⁸

The situation for Partosentono and his village changed drastically in the context of the move towards “Defense and Construction.” In early 1944, the military government introduced new regulations that attached the *lurah* firmly into the state hierarchy. The new rules provided for a small salary, but also required that *lurah* have a certain level of education; Partosentono recalled that all illiterate *lurah* were forced to retire. Formerly appointed for life, under the new rules, *lurah* candidates required approval from the district head (*wedana*), and served renewable four-year terms. Dissatisfactory *lurah* could be removed by regents (*bupati*) in consultation with state governors. The *lurah* were required to be actively engaged in the drive to increase production, and for this purpose, new training facilities for village headmen called Drill Centers (*rensei dōjō*) were established in each state.⁶⁹ Alongside lessons in agricultural work, the *lurah*, including those as old as seventy or more, were made to form ranks and pursue a vigorous physical regimen. Strength, health, and hard work were stressed. There does not appear to have been any political or intellectual content to the training to speak of. For many of the older *lurah* in particular, the training was physically overwhelming—at least ten *lurah* died while at the *rensei dōjō*, Partosentono remembered. After finishing training, Partosentono was frequently recalled to the *rensei dōjō* to help with farming instruction. In many rural principalities in Java in this period, he said, the mass of villagers were increasingly forced to make do with dried cassava (*gaplek*) in place

of rice “if they had it.” Partosentono, as a *lurah* and relatively well-to-do landowner, appears to have escaped this fate at home, but he vividly remembered that it was the only food provided for the *lurah* at the Drill Center.⁷⁰

While Partosentono was not positive in his postwar recollections of the occupation period, it is nevertheless clear from his description, and from other sources, that in comparison with the mass of villagers over whom they ruled with almost complete impunity, the *lurah* found themselves in a relatively comfortable position. When state government authorities began to mandate that villagers sell a certain proportion of their rice yield to government representatives in late 1943—a standard yield calculated by these same authorities upon receipt of registers and yields compiled by the *lurah* himself—it was left to the *lurah* to appoint a purchasing agent. The agents, usually those with capital, experience, and connections—and therefore mostly ethnic Chinese—purchased the rice at Japanese-stipulated prices, increasingly at levels well below the black market value.⁷¹ This price gap, combined with the large quantities of forced requisitions, represented an irresistible temptation to participate in the black market for those in the middle of the hierarchy between the peasant producers and the state. Regularly profiting from this gap, buying agents became “exceedingly rich.” While Partosentono did not say so, this situation also placed the *lurahs* and other local officials in a prime position to do likewise, and many did.⁷² Dissatisfied with the perennially insufficient quantities of rice thus received at the center, the response of the Japanese authorities was generally to continue to up the ante: by late in the war, Partosentono recalled an official requisition level as high as 60 percent. Inevitably, given the balance of power, the ever-increasing burdens were passed along to the poor peasantry. Numerous contemporary reports complained of additional, unofficial fees and deductions levied by local collectors, so that in places peasants were forced to part with their entire harvest, and still found themselves in debt.⁷³ If they failed to deliver, “there were threats from the government, from the subdistrict head (*camat*), and from the *lurah* ... If they still refused, they’d be *kenpeitai*-ed (*dikempeitai*),” said Partosentono. Elsewhere he admitted that while the *kenpeitai* had made a terrifying visit to his village during the crackdowns against looters in 1942—and remained deeply feared as a result—it was the local native police, under the command of the *lurah* himself, that carried out subsequent punishments and enforcement.⁷⁴

This near-impossible situation from the standpoint of the peasantry was further greatly exacerbated both by inflation at levels of several hundred percent between late 1944 and mid-1945, and by severe droughts and subsequent crop failures that struck Java in 1944. The requisitions, however, only increased. Taking advantage of the extensive autonomy allowed to each state (*shū*) under the Japanese administrative structure, a number of individual *shū* governments, particularly those with an historical surplus, heightened enforcement against outflows of rice and other products to other states, making problems in deficit areas even more extreme.⁷⁵ For those charged with enforcement, this represented a further standing opportunity for bribery and corruption. Again it was those at the bottom who paid the price, while others only profited more from the scarcity.⁷⁶

When another form of Japanese-sponsored demand began to make its way to the *lurahs* at about the same time as the first rice requisitions, in late 1943—this time for

human resources, in the form of *rōmusha* laborers, for both agricultural and defense projects, both within Java and further afield—the selection was again left entirely up to the discretion of the *lurah*.⁷⁷ Partosentono used his police to collect the unlucky *rōmusha* from among the village population. “How they got them, I didn’t know, I left it up to them, just so long as we got enough of them. I didn’t know who they were,” he said. The first request was for forty people from the four villages in the area. This was followed by smaller requests as needed, eventually reaching a total of some two hundred. “Most of them did not return. I don’t know what became of them,” Partosentono recalled. “They had no choice in the matter, this was an order from an official, and they could not refuse ... They were scared of us, and just followed orders.” Families of the *rōmusha*, he said, received “no compensation whatsoever.” Although he claimed that he had not done so himself, there were other officials, he said, who selected “people they did not like” for service. In an unusual admission from a member of his class, Partosentono concluded, “during the three years of life [under Japanese occupation], it may be said that the society here was somewhere between dead and alive ... the powers of the *lurah* were extraordinary. No one was bold enough to resist.”⁷⁸ Across the island, only a few attempts at resistance were ever made, all in West Java: the Singaparna rebellion near Tasikmalaja, led by a local Muslim cleric, in February 1944; and two rebellions in the state of Indramaju between April and August 1944. All were quickly and brutally suppressed by the *kenpeitai*, with the assistance of local native police and police-trained *keibōdan*.⁷⁹

For the masses in the cities, also regularly rounded up for labor duties, and reliant for their food and clothing for the most part upon increasingly paltry rations sold at controlled prices, conditions often became equally desperate. A.M. Dudung, a former *kuchō* (in Indonesian *kepala kampung*, the urban equivalent of a village headman) in central Jakarta, later recalled that each local resident was allowed to purchase one coupon from the *Tonarigumi* leader per day, which the holder redeemed at grocery stands (*warung*) for a daily ration of what he remembered as 250 grams of rice—although contemporary reports from other urban areas put this figure as low as 100 grams or less.⁸⁰ “It was impossible to fulfill our needs” with these amounts, said Dudung, and those like himself who could afford it supplemented their diets with black market purchases. But these prices were “beyond the reach of the common people,” he admitted. “So they suffered.”⁸¹

The story was the same with clothing. As the occupation wore on, supplies of cotton and clothing drastically dwindled. Those who were “better off, from the middle class” and above, were able to purchase clothing on the black market; but for Jakarta’s masses, said Dudung, the only option were emergency garments distributed by the local authorities, at first made from gunny sacks, and later—as even these disappeared—rubber. By 1945, he recalled, “they were all wearing rubber. It was really rubber. When they’d walk, you’d hear a creaking sound.” Dudung himself had no direct contact with, or supervision from, any Japanese official, only from his direct Indonesian superiors in the city government. “We got instructions from them, and then we were left on our own.” He was well aware of the popular misery, and of the resentment the situation aroused, but “whether we liked it or not,” it was the duty of local officials to mobilize the local population for physical training and work on local projects. “There were

those who silently opposed us ... They were, you know, half-dead ... and we'd make them take part in drills. They'd only come out after we screamed at them. And it was the same," he recalled, "when we made them do *corvée* labor."⁸²

On March 16, 1944, an anonymous Dutch observer in hiding noted in his diary that

news of the unrest in the Tasikmalaja area [the Singaparna rebellion] has also reached the capital, and according to reports from travelers, has echoed amongst the population. A few nights ago, some unknown Indonesians pasted the following slogans on the windows of the electric clock across from the Delice shop on Prapatan boulevard [in Jakarta]: The Japanese must die, we are hungry! (*Nippon mesti mati, kita lapar!*)⁸³

Like many among Java's working class, Saina, a teenaged maidservant who spent the occupation preparing food for Japanese officers resident in a house in Jakarta, remembered the latter part of the occupation as a nightmarish haze of "dizzily searching for food," eating cassava for lack of rice, being ashamed to venture outside for lack of decent clothing, hated participation in physical drills, and forced labor. Many of her friends, she said, suffered from hunger and beriberi, and a number of them eventually died. The "arrogant" Japanese, she said, did not seem to care. They offered no explanation, "only more orders." There was no sense of shared suffering. Indeed, it seemed to Saina as if the Japanese had willed this hellish situation in order to wipe out the local population. "We were all half-dead," she remembered, "and thinking to ourselves, when will they leave?"⁸⁴

In the employ of the Jakarta Navy Liaison office, Achmad Subardjo and his Japanese colleague Nishijima Shigetada spent much of the last two years of the war gathering information and writing critical reports on the increasingly distressing effects of Japanese policies on the lives and livelihoods of Java's population, and pleading for Indonesian independence.⁸⁵ Subardjo still cherished positive memories of contacts with Japanese naval officers dating back to his prewar days in Tokyo, and both the character of Rear Admiral Maeda and the atmosphere of the Naval Liaison's office (*Kaigun bukanfu*) encouraged him to retain a faith in the broadmindedness and humanity of the Japanese Navy. In fact, unbeknownst to Subardjo, it was the navy leaders in Tokyo who remained, throughout the war, the most steadfastly and consistently opposed to Indonesian independence, indeed arguing instead for permanent possession of the outer islands of the archipelago that were under direct navy control. For Subardjo, however, whose negative early experiences under the occupation had all come at army and *kenpeitai* hands, and whose experience at the navy *bukanfu* contrasted positively, the blame lay with the arbitrary, inhumane Japanese army. Contact with the masses on a tour of the Java countryside in 1944 confirmed this sense of betrayal in a cause he had once believed all Japanese to share.

none of the Army policies contained any humane consideration of the needs of the people. The Army never cared about the disastrous effects of its policies upon popular living conditions. It was absorbed with [the idea of] spirit based on power, which it mobilized, in accordance with its militaristic mission, towards military

victory. I came to this conclusion after traveling throughout Java, accompanied by my Secretary Embah Sudiro and by Nishijima, who could speak Indonesian well, a man with a liberal outlook and a sense of sympathy towards Indonesia and its people ... This three-week journey, in which we conducted research from village to village, from district to district, and from city to city ... brought us face to face not only with the Army's fully arbitrary policies regarding agricultural products, but also to the ways that sons and other men were pressed into service for military ends. The Japanese Army made them into *rōmusha*, who were sent out of the country to build roads and perform other sorts of corvée labor. This journey afforded us the opportunity to hear the screams from within the hearts of the people.⁸⁶

Subardjo's shock when confronted with the seeming arbitrary nature of Japanese policies as a result of his research in the Java countryside, however, is also indicative of a more general state of acquiescence among much of the Indonesian elite who were *not* directly forced to confront the problems facing the working class. For their part, while material conditions too went into a relatively steep decline—the increasingly meager standard rations forcing many, including the students of the Medical College into the unfamiliar, demeaning role of small-scale farmer, street-vendor, and the like—members of the Indonesian elite generally experienced the last two years of the occupation as difficult and challenging, but not absolutely desperate. If by now the Japanese occupiers and their policies could not be said to be popular, many among the nation-building elite continued to accept the idea that a final Japanese victory over the Allies was superior to its alternative, and thus to accept the inescapable logic of the ordering of all priorities to this end.⁸⁷ After the war, many leading new *priyayi* figures were quick to wield the suffering and exploitation of the *rōmusha* as representative of the national experience at Japanese hands, but in fact during the occupation itself many either remained ignorant of the exorbitant price paid by Java's working class, or rationalized it as a part of the wartime bargain.

In this regard, the statements of Mrs. Soepardjo, wife of a Central Java doctor and *Parindra* leader who herself served in the women's sections of *Poetera* and the Patriotic Service Association—and who also appears to have been the enthusiastic author of the 1942 *Pandji Poestaka* essay on “the Women of Japan” cited in an earlier chapter—are not unrepresentative.⁸⁸ In a 1975 interview with Indonesia's national archives, Soepardjo proclaimed that “after 350 years of [Dutch] oppression,” the Japanese “made us *rōmusha* for three and a half years.” She nevertheless maintained that this experience of shared national suffering was an inevitable, indeed heavenly-ordained, trial-by-fire, necessary to the struggle for nationhood. When the interviewer subsequently asked Soepardjo if she had “often visited *rōmusha* encampments,” she replied “No. What we had around here were *PETA* [‘defenders of the homeland’ paramilitary] unit commanders (*daidanchō*),” for whom, she said, “the Japanese should be thanked.”⁸⁹

Even among those in intimate contact with the *rōmusha*, there were some among the new *priyayi* who managed to maintain positive sentiments where the Japanese and their regime were concerned. A striking example is that of Soejono Hadipranoto, son of a district headman (*Wedana*) in Central Java, who was twenty-seven years old

and studying at the ultra-elite Law Faculty in Batavia when the Japanese first arrived. Hadipranoto had studied medicine for one year before beginning law school, and spent most of the occupation rooming at Jakarta's 71 Cikini Road, a residence hall filled mostly with students of the Jakarta Medical College. This address, along with that of the other Medical College *Asrama* at 10 Prapatan Road (*Prapatan sepuluh*), later became famous as a hotbed of anti-Japanese sentiments, but Hadipranoto was an exception. In 1943, with the Law Faculty closed, Hadipranoto had gained employment in the Labor Section (*Rōdō bunshitsu*) of the military administration Internal Affairs Department. Here he worked under an almost entirely Indonesian staff, including prominent nationalist officials such as former *Parindra* member Mr. Raden Pandji Singgih and former *Boedi Oetomo* chairman Raden Mas Adipati Airo Koesoemo Oetoyo. The only Japanese official here with whom he had contact was the head of the office, a certain Mr. Oshima, whom he remembered as "a good man, well-educated. We spoke together in English." Oshima was one of several Japanese whom Hadipranoto taught Indonesian, for a healthy salary.⁹⁰ As he described it, his job with the Labor Section involved collecting *rōmusha* assembled by local officials and escorting them to trains for transport to workplaces within Java, as well as looking after *rōmusha* stopping over in Jakarta during transit on their way to places outside of Java. Although he later acknowledged that these *rōmusha*, while officially "volunteers," were often in fact "coerced or semi-coerced" into service, he claimed that there were no signs of trouble or unrest among them.⁹¹

In the middle of 1944 Hadipranoto was called upon to assist in the administration of *rōmusha* involved in the construction of an airfield in the Jakarta suburb of Curug. At his administrative level, there was no direct contact with any Japanese. Here too, as he remembered it, relations with the *rōmusha* went smoothly: *rōmusha* were mobilized locally, worked in two-week rotations, were fed a substantial 400 grams of rice with salted fish and vegetables each day, had access to a doctor for medical problems, received a reasonable daily salary of 35 cents, and were "generally happy." He heard later of *rōmusha* elsewhere, particularly those sent long distances from home, who had "happened to" come under the direction of "inhumane" bosses, who maltreated them "because of the emergency situation ... Viewed through today's lenses," he said, what had happened to them was "tragic. It was, however, a time of war." Regular discussions in this period with students from the Jakarta Medical College and others more negative had failed to sway Hadipranoto in his opinions about the Japanese.

I was happy with Japan, in the sense that I believed that Japan was going to liberate us. They were already giving us training in various ways—before, we were not allowed to become soldiers, but the Japanese took us and gave us military training, so I had faith in them. But my friends, they were suspicious, they'd say, "What are you talking about? Japan is making us poor and miserable, they're treating us the same way we were treated in Dutch times." They saw evil in Japanese hearts. But I was still not convinced. I felt quite positive about Japan.⁹²

In retaining their conviction in the necessity and appropriateness of cooperation with Japan in the shared wartime endeavor—no matter the hardships—members

of the nation-building elite like Hadipranoto and Mrs. Soepardjo no doubt took encouragement from the unrelenting propaganda campaigns waged by the senior nationalists. Publicly at least, Sukarno in particular was ubiquitous and unflinching in his enthusiasm for the shared Japanese-Indonesian cause. His most extreme expression in this regard—an action whose implications would continue to dog him throughout his postwar career—came in the first week of September 1944. The event was reported with great fanfare in all of Java's newspapers.

The third of September shall remain an unforgettable day for the entire Indonesian race, for on this day, for the first time in history, Indonesian leaders and men of the educated class displayed genuine proof of their dedication to the Government. No event of this nature was ever witnessed under Dutch rule. Representing the first group [of its kind] to voluntarily offer its services, more than 500 volunteer *rōmusha* in the form of Indonesian educated men, accompanied by Japanese, Chinese, and Arabs, departed to a certain location to work to strengthen Java's Fortress of Struggle. Early in the morning, a throng of people gathered around the offices of the Java Patriotic Service Association, desiring to witness the departure of the *rōmusha* corps, led by Ir. Soekarno himself ... Ir. Soekarno was dressed in short pants, a regular shirt, and a straw hat. Mr. Shimizu [Hitoshi] from the Japanese contingent also wore short pants, a shirt, and tennis shoes, with a piece of cloth over his shoulder, and a *petji* on his head.⁹³

After arriving at their destination—a defensive emplacement somewhere near Jakarta—the group, which included a number of senior Japanese and Indonesian officials, was greeted with speeches from the local Japanese works supervisor and the state governor. The latter concisely clarified the central aim of this propaganda exercise: “I salute your arrival with gratitude. We hope that your support will increase the desire to work among the regular *rōmushas* working here.” Thanking the authorities for their words of welcome, Sukarno replied, “although this group does not consist solely of young people—some of us are over sixty—we are all filled with a youthful spirit.” Sukarno asked all participants to refrain from shaving for a week, as “proof to society that we are working non-stop.” He further explained that “the purpose of this action is to prove to the entire world that for the sake of achieving the final victory, all the inhabitants of Java are as one with the Japanese Army in life and death.” After sharing candies received as a token of appreciation from the chief of the Propaganda Department, the honorary *rōmusha* set to work in different detachments.⁹⁴ One group carted boulders from the river, while another smashed them with hammers. “The volunteers were not generally used to this sort of work,” the newspaper report noted, “but thanks to good cooperation and a pleasant working atmosphere, it went well, and there was no sign of fatigue on their faces. Together with the state governor, Ir. Sukarno made himself useful hammering a pile of rocks.” An accompanying photo recorded the moment for maximum propaganda value—and an uncomfortable posterity.⁹⁵

Privately, through their various contacts, the nationalists were not unaware of the increasing hardships of the masses, and nervous about the consequences of their continued public support for unpopular Japanese policies. Already in his final report

on *Poetera* to the *Gunseikanbu* in early 1944, Hatta commented wryly on the awkward position of the former non-cooperators turned cooperators.

Since September of last year, the villages were propagandized intensively on the subject of increasing agricultural production. In this campaign, *Poetera* ran into many obstacles, because of the problems people were having with the rice supply ... The *Poetera* propagandists who went into the villages were constantly attacked with the same words: "We're going to sacrifice our lives for our country all right, but it will be by starving to death." In the Priangan [state in West Java], especially in [the city of] Garut, *Poetera* workers propagandizing greater production frequently heard insinuations such as: "You speak well, sir, and we are willing to give our rice to the government, but what about the present situation: our families eat rice once a week, while the Chinese have it three times a day."⁹⁶

Here and elsewhere, however, Hatta and others associated with *Poetera* did not dispute the judiciousness of Japanese efforts to increase output and encourage self-sufficiency per se. They reserved most of their criticisms, rather, for the traitorous middlemen who they perceived as sabotaging these necessary and well-intentioned Japanese-Indonesian efforts: Chinese capitalists, self-centered native officials, and their henchmen. Hatta's response was to suggest deeper state intervention and control of the economy, a remedy that seemed to take surprisingly little heed of the ways in which the mounting tangle of ill-advised, Japanese-authored economic regulations and controls was *itself* at the heart of the problem, fueling the black market and enabling the proliferation of oppression and corruption.⁹⁷ Direct criticism of the Japanese and their policies was of course a risky business, but where questions of the building and maintenance of the national economy, government control, and self-sufficiency were concerned, there also appear to have been genuine areas of overlap between Japanese and nationalist agendas.⁹⁸ In the above report, Hatta continued,

The *Poetera* leadership hoped that their propagandizing for increased production would be effective if the distribution of rice in the villages were regulated to insure that each person would be able to buy his daily rice on the spot in the established amount. If a law of this kind were enacted, the people's reluctance would undoubtedly vanish. Of this, the *Poetera* leadership was convinced until their organization was brought to an end.⁹⁹

As the situation deteriorated further over the course of 1944, the senior nationalists, led by Mohammad Hatta, continued to lobby the Japanese for what was in effect a "national" solution to Java's socio-economic crisis, one in some ways similar to the drastic wartime measures now in effect in Japan itself. "The nationalists," noted an Indonesian-authored intelligence report,

hope that all enterprises connected to the everyday needs of the public will be deemed Vital enterprises, and [as such] be put directly in Government hands. In this way the number of small enterprises can be controlled. For a race

emerging from colonialism, heading towards a self-sufficient economy built upon cooperation, this is the ideal arena in which to move the economy forward.¹⁰⁰

These aims were formally confirmed in a resolution adopted by the members of the Central Advisory Council in mid-November 1944.¹⁰¹ Here, as elsewhere, it possible to discern not only an intersection between Japanese and Indonesian wartime concerns, but also a wartime inflection of issues that would remain central to postcolonial development, in Indonesia as elsewhere: economic nationalism and import-substitution. Yet beyond a common agreement on “native” racial preeminence, the thorny question of who should assume control over these “national” enterprises, i.e. whose interests best represented those of the nation as a whole, remained unanswered. Or rather, the implied or explicit answer, both in wartime, and in an independent Indonesia, most often involved a kind of socio-political mythology: the key to a society “built upon cooperation” seemed to inhere within the racial and cultural essence of Indonesian-ness itself, providing a naturally unified, shared, classless agenda for all members of “a race emerging from colonialism.”

The November 1944 resolution also included a restatement of the notion that the central barrier to the smooth functioning of the wartime controlled economy was the fact that the public was still “not yet aware of the point of handing over rice,” nor of the importance of increasing rice production. To Java’s villagers, and particularly the huge, propertyless underclass, however, it was difficult not to read all the calls to selfless cooperation from those higher up—however well-intentioned—in an increasingly ironic light. These feelings were reflected in the texts that accompanied the above citation regarding “Vital enterprises” recorded in the beginning of September 1944, in the context of an exploration into the causes of recent popular unrest in the face of government policies, with specific reference to the rebellions in the Indramaju district on West Java’s north coast. To some extent, the author of this study, apparently a former *Parindra* member named R. Achmad, viewed the rebellious actions of the Indramaju villagers in light of the peasant tendency to turn to “primitive superstition” in times of trouble. But he admitted that this turn had been prompted by a series of recent developments that had undermined any faith in the possibility of benevolent government intervention, no matter who might be in charge.

The local inhabitants described feeling helplessly caught between government production targets that failed to take account of local conditions, and local officials who merciless pursued requisitions to the letter regardless. Between the two, a region that had enjoyed a prewar rice surplus had been brought to desperation and hunger. Clothing was also in desperately short supply. Compounding the misery, as elsewhere in Java, local officials further insisted that service as *rōmusha* was mandatory, and threatened imprisonment to those who would attempt to evade it. Also as elsewhere, local inhabitants complained of an economy “in the clutches of Chinese and Arabs.”¹⁰²

But the villagers also felt betrayed by their “own people,” members of the Indonesian social elite such as schoolteachers and Muslim clerics, who had joined in urging them to hand their rice over to the government. A local *kiyai* who attempted to calm the disturbances at Indramaju was greeted with “enough already, you *kiyai*-for-hire (*Kiyai tjap oelang-kertas*) ... We don’t need prayers—we need rice, clothing, and justice.” The

villagers took an equally skeptical view of the Patriotic Service Association, which they saw as a “body of officials whose job it is to oppress the people.”

This is also the way they feel about the other bodies, such as the State Assembly (*Sangi-kai*), which is viewed as just another government propaganda trick like the Three-A, Poetera, the Central Advisory Council, and the Java Patriotic Service Association. The State Assembly in particular is viewed as a retirement club, where the members receive pay for doing nothing at all, let alone making efforts to improve popular conditions.¹⁰³

The reporter added that an incident at the village of Cidampet in Indramaju that preceded one of the recent rebellions had heightened local “disappointment and resentment” towards both the Japanese authorities and the nationalists. Hearing of growing unrest in Indramaju, a group of notables led by the former Three-A leader Raden Samsoedin and his old colleague Shimizu Hitoshi—now assistant chief of the Patriotic Service Association General Affairs Office—had been dispatched from Jakarta to try to calm the situation. Speaking through a megaphone, the two men promised disaffected villagers that they would not be arrested or punished. They asked “that the villagers present their desires to the Government,” and promised that these would “be negotiated together.”

But suddenly, after the people had gathered [before the speakers], a group of police and *Kenpei* arrived, and they arrested them, piled them into the back of a truck, and brought them in for incarceration at Indramaju prison.¹⁰⁴

Perhaps out of embarrassment, in two extensive postwar interviews about his wartime experiences, Shimizu Hitoshi himself made no mention either of this incident, or of his time accompanying Sukarno and the group of “volunteer *rōmusha*” later the same summer, preferring to focus on the brighter, more promising days of the early occupation. In postwar accounts, most of the senior nationalists, too, preferred not to dwell on such subjects.

But for the nationalists, the first week of September 1944—the very same week in which Sukarno and the elite detachment of temporary *rōmusha* were hammering rocks somewhere near Jakarta—also produced something more positively memorable. On September 7, Japan’s new prime minister, Koiso Kuniaki, promised that Indonesia would be granted independence “at a later date.” It was a dramatic announcement that appeared to suggest that the strategy of cooperation, for all its drawbacks thus far, was finally bearing unmistakable fruit, at least for the nationalists themselves.

This historic declaration from Tokyo, prompted by a shift within the views of the Army leadership, finally brought an end to the divisive internal debates within the Japanese military over the eventual disposition and possible breakup of the former Netherlands East Indies—with the exception of New Guinea, upon whose permanent possession the navy stood firm.¹⁰⁵ The decision had once again been prompted primarily by a factor external both to Japan and to Indonesia: that is, by Japan’s starkly worsening war outlook, hastened by the dramatic fall of Saipan to Allied forces in July 1944.¹⁰⁶ As

in previous announcements, the details remained unclear, most importantly regarding the date and precise form of any handover of power.

Indeed, in the wake of the announcements, at least one senior Japanese official in Java—the Foreign Ministry's Hayashi Kyūjirō, top military administration advisor and former chair of the Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs—spoke openly of the need for a period of political and social tutelage that might last as long as “thirty to forty years,” a view that was seconded by Captain Nakamura Hiroshi, a political expert attached to the military administration's Planning Section.¹⁰⁷ How much influence men like Hayashi and Nakamura actually had upon policymaking either locally or in Tokyo is questionable—commander of the Java Military Administration Okazaki Seisaburō, for one, later said that he “did not usually consult with Hayashi, and when I did it was after I had made my decision”—but Hayashi's statements nevertheless provoked “great indignation among Indonesian leaders.”¹⁰⁸ For his part, even Shimizu Hitoshi—who always claimed to have supported national independence as an essential part of the brotherly Asian bargain—now made publicly clear that the granting of actual independence would come only *after* a final victory against the Allies.¹⁰⁹ The contrast with Japanese treatment of Burma and the Philippines—which had already been enjoying formal independence since 1943—remained all too clear.

Just weeks after Koiso's announcement, the compulsory nature of *rōmusha* service was meanwhile formally confirmed in official policy, with the promulgation of a series of measures towards the “Strengthening and Promotion of Labor Mobilization,” including the mobilization of unemployed laborers and all those engaged in “non-essential work,” the introduction of female *rōmusha*, and the “enhancement of labor efficiency” with a view to freeing up further “surplus labor.” To these ends, the decree called for the forced registration of all the island's males between the ages of sixteen and forty and all unmarried females between sixteen and twenty-five. For those inclined to read the promise of independence as little more than a sop for expanded exploitation, this was further fuel to the fire.¹¹⁰

Still, for the nationalists at least, the advances brought by the Koiso Declaration were significant in symbolic and more substantial ways: public display of the red and white Indonesian flag was allowed, so long as it was accompanied by a Japanese one. The ban on the national anthem *Indonesia Raya* was also repealed. At a meeting at the palace of the military commander in Jakarta, Sukarno greeted the announcement with three shouts of “long live the emperor (*tennō heika banzai*)!” Symbolic of the new and encouraging state of affairs where the national question was concerned, Commander Okazaki replied with three shouts of “long live Indonesia (*Indonesia banzai*)!”¹¹¹ Java's newspapers were immediately filled with references to an independent Indonesia (*Indonesia Merdeka*), and framings of the shared war effort in its interest. *Indonesia Raya* echoed over the airwaves.

In the name of expanded political tutelage—another part of the Koiso pledge—plans were now launched to involve both the nationalist elite and native officialdom more directly in policymaking, through the official attachment of high-profile Indonesian figures as advisors (*san'yō*, lit. “participants”) to several military administration departments. Among the nationalists, Sukarno and Hatta, for example, were named

advisors to the important Department of General Affairs, Mohammad Yamin to the Propaganda Department, Dr. Supomo to the Department of Justice, and Islamic nationalist Abikoesno Tjokrosoeroso to the Department of Public Works. Together they formed the “Council of Advisers to the Government” (*Sanyō kaigi*), which was to conduct policy research and to hold regular, private discussions with high-ranking Japanese officials in a format similar to that of the now-defunct Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs, again producing non-binding resolutions, but—with a view towards an eventual transfer of power—presumably to be taken more seriously than either the commission or the Central Advisory Council.¹¹² The membership of the latter was itself meanwhile expanded, with nationalist figures now occupying the majority of seats.¹¹³ Again in the vein of tutelage, in each of Java’s seventeen states, the new position of “assistant state governor” (*fuku shūchōkan*) was introduced, and filled with Indonesian appointees. Those chosen were almost all native officials, but some had positive relationships with the nationalists.

Finally, a week after the declaration, the Japanese gave the green light to the launch of a new youth movement under Patriotic Service Association auspices, known as the “Vanguard Corps” (*Barisan Pelopor*, in Japanese the *Suishintai*). Its establishment had first been proposed by Soekardjo Wirjopranoto at the Central Advisory Council’s third session in May 1944. The membership of the Vanguard Corps was to comprise men aged seventeen to twenty-five, in units set up mainly in cities and towns across Java, with formal tasks resembling those not only of the Japanese-sponsored *Seinendan* and *Keibōdan*, but also Soekardjo’s now-defunct *Pemoeda Asia Raya*—“promoting cooperation between the masses and the administration,” assisting with the “defense system,” doing agricultural work, and performing social welfare services such as distributing rations. Like the *Seinendan* as well as the earlier nationalist-sponsored groups the *Pemoeda Asia Raya* and the New Generation Residence Hall’s Buffalo Corps, they were to be taught to form ranks and armed with bamboo spears. What distinguished the *Barisan Pelopor* from the *Seinendan*, however, was that its leadership, from the Central Headquarters in Jakarta through units at state- (*rengōtai*), regency- (*daitai*), district- (*chūtai*), and sub-district level (*shotai*), rested entirely in nationalist hands, with the nationalists allowed to recommend appointments without native official mediation, and with recruits to be freely indoctrinated with nationalist ideology.¹¹⁴ At the top, Sukarno was named chief of the combined *Barisan Pelopor* units, with Oto Iskandar Dinata and the prewar KBI youth-scouting movement leader Dr. Muwardi as assistant chiefs.¹¹⁵ The young men of the Residence Hall and the *Sendenbu*, Chaerul Saleh and Sukarni—the latter the founder of the *Asrama*-sponsored Buffalo Corps, and a member of the *Seinendan* leadership—also joined the staff of the *Barisan Pelopor* Central Office. Shimizu Hitoshi, one of those in a direct position of oversight, later claimed that, as with the earlier Three-A movement, he endeavored to give the *Barisan Pelopor* a free hand, only “giving a speech once in while” when called upon. Unlike the Patriotic Service Association itself, which he described as a “Manchurian-type” organization with the Japanese pulling all the strings, the *Barisan Pelopor*, said Shimizu, was “the real thing,” i.e. a project by and for Indonesians.¹¹⁶ As with the prewar *Indonesia Moeda* organization and the early *Asrama*-sponsored “Buffalo Corps,” efforts were made to attract members from all

classes and walks of life. By mid-1945, the organization totaled some eighty thousand young recruits, representing the concrete realization of a long-frustrated nationalist program, and a new and potentially powerful social force under nationalist control and influence.¹¹⁷

Still, as might be expected, the Japanese side attached a number of qualifiers. The movement remained under the official auspices of the Japanese-led Patriotic Service Association. Contrary to nationalist hopes, leadership of the units was decentralized, thus cutting off the nationalists at the Central Office from direct control at the ground level. Against nationalist wishes, drill commands were required to be given in Japanese. At an early meeting on the shape of the *Barisan Pelopor* attended by a number of leading nationalist youth representatives, it was proposed that the corps oath of allegiance consist of three entirely Indonesia-centric phrases—"we are one race, that is, the Indonesian race; we have one homeland, that is, Indonesia; we have one language, that is, Indonesian"; but this too was rejected.¹¹⁸ Leaders of the *Barisan Pelopor* were rather asked to swear an oath that more clearly intermingled Japanese and Indonesian agendas.

In full awareness of the aims of the Greater East Asia War, we the leaders of the Barisan Pelopor submit to all rules of discipline, and will faithfully and precisely execute all orders from the General Management [of the Patriotic Service Association] and the Japanese Army, in the aim of the full realization of all efforts in this war to destroy the Allies, and in order to achieve an independent Indonesia. We are ready to serve and to sacrifice body and soul for the final victory, and for Indonesian independence.¹¹⁹

For his part, whatever the continued limitations, Sukarno was encouraged anew, and continued to take the lead in articulating a shared Japanese-Indonesian agenda. At the sixth meeting of the Central Advisory Council in mid-November 1944, Sukarno offered a "five-point life-compass for the Indonesian race" which he called the *Pantja Dharma* (lit. "five duties"):

1. We, together with the other races of Greater East Asia, are as one with Japan in struggle, in life, and in death. We shall sacrifice with utmost sincerity, because this is a war for the defense of justice and truth.
2. We shall build an Indonesia that is independent, unified, sovereign, just, and prosperous, a nation that remains appreciative of the deeds and character of Japan, and lives as a true member of the Greater East Asian family.
3. We shall make every effort to attain a lofty nobility by maintaining and enhancing our own civilization and culture, drawing upon all the cultures of the world.
4. We, in a brotherhood firm and sturdy among the races of Greater East Asia, shall serve our nation and our race with utmost sincerity, with an unshakeable faith, always devout towards God Almighty.
5. We, in a burning fusion of desire, shall struggle towards the attainment of world peace eternal, pivoting upon [the idea of] all the people of the world as one family, according to the principle of *Hakkō ichiu*.¹²⁰

Outside, meanwhile, prosperity seemed further away than ever, and the human costs of wartime policies of social mobilization and economic control were becoming increasingly glaring. Representing the tip of the iceberg, the sprawled, silent, half-naked bodies of men and women too hungry, sick, or exhausted to move another step—runaway *rōmusha*, or those simply overworked or too far between meager meals—began to dot Java's city streets and country byways. For the Jakarta neighborhood headman A.M. Dudung, arranging the removal and emergency burial of these bodies became a daily ritual.¹²¹ Izumi Shinjirō, a *Japan News* (*Nihon nyūsu*) cameraman who arrived in Java from the bloody Burma theater in early 1945, later recalled,

Sukarno and the others, the local people all seemed generally very pro-Japanese. Only, the gap between the rich and poor was absolutely horrendous. If you walked on the main streets, the buildings and everything looked nice, but if you went just a bit between the big buildings and into the local neighborhoods, the people who lived there, who worked as errand-boys, cooks, and housekeepers, they were in bad shape ... Once in a while I'd be invited to parties attended by Sukarno and government people, and the feasts were sumptuous, there was everything you could imagine ... Luxury goods seized from the Dutch were still piled up in great heaps. But the gap between the rich and poor was terrible ... I thought to myself, this gap—isn't that what the war should be about?¹²²

Students at the Jakarta Medical College—some of whom were put to work as doctors for ill-treated, malnourished *heiho* auxiliary soldiers, others in Jakarta's hospitals—were coming to similar conclusions, but from a more Indonesia-centric perspective. Johar Nur later recalled,

There were lots of people dying on the main streets. [Their bodies were scattered] from trash bins in [Jakarta's central] Senen [district] to the hospital morgue. At the time I was just a second- or third-year student, so I was still busy with anatomy, and always coming into contact with these bodies. At the Jakarta hospital, meanwhile, the main hospital in all of Indonesia, there was practically no medicine left. We couldn't even get any quinine pills to treat malaria patients ... People with boils on their legs, we didn't have bandages to give them anymore, they had to make do with banana leaves. That was the situation. Among the students, emotionally, there was real hatred of the Japanese.¹²³

These sentiments were further intensified amidst desperate Japanese requisition schemes that now extended to iron, precious metals, and jewelry, vague reports of uprisings and mass killings in the outer islands, and, closer to home, the imprisonment and summary execution of a highly-respected doctor and teacher at the Medical College, Professor Dr. Achmad Muchtar, who was said to have been framed for what appeared another Japanese blunder: the suspicious deaths of a large number of *rōmusha* at the Cakung works near Jakarta after receiving tainted inoculations.¹²⁴

Following the Koiso Declaration in September 1944, Nur and a number of young associates, including former *Asrama* colleagues D.N. Aidit and Lukman (both later

prominent members of the Indonesian Communist Party), formed a group that became part of a new “Special Vanguard Corps” (*Barisan Pelopor Istimewa*), whose hundred members were officially under Sukarno’s direct command. As at the earlier New Generation Residence Hall—and indeed with an almost identical teaching staff, with the important addition of Sutan Sjahrir—selected young men of the Special Vanguard Corps received biweekly instruction from the senior nationalists. The site, this time, was not Shimizu’s Menteng 31, but the “Free Indonesia Residence Hall” (*Asrama Indonesia Merdeka*). It was established under auspices of the Office of the Naval Liaison (*Kaigun bukanfu*), with the full approval of its chief Maeda Tadashi, who later explained that “the Residence Hall was set up after the Koiso Declaration, which was very disappointing, since there was no follow-up. I felt very strongly that Indonesia would need capable leaders of the younger generation.”¹²⁵ The Residence Hall was supervised by Nishijima Shigetada and Yoshizumi Tomegorō. Yoshizumi had recently joined the Naval Liaison Office upon returning from two years of propaganda service in Makassar in the navy-occupied island of Celebes. He shared with Nishijima a prewar history of association both with Indonesian nationalism and left-wing politics. Like Shimizu at the earlier New Generation Residence Hall, the two men left the curriculum and the Hall’s running in nationalist hands, with leadership in this case falling to the liaison office’s Achmad Subardjo and Wikana, a student and former *Gerindo* member—and another subsequent prominent member of the Indonesian Communist Party.

But over the course of the two years that separated the opening of the two *Asramas*, even as their mentor Sukarno in tandem with their old mutual associate Shimizu Hitoshi vigorously continued to swear by a unity of Japanese and Indonesian interests, among these young men who had once shared this conviction, the mood had undergone a dramatic shift. Fueled by experience of the suffering of the masses, ongoing discussions and debates in the student residence halls, and quiet contacts with older nationalist figures like Sutan Sjahrir—now respected for having remained faithful to a prewar “anti-fascist” stance by abstaining from cooperation with the Japanese from the outset—they and an increasing number of others of their age and status, known simply as *pemoeda* (lit. “youth”), shared a growing perception of a contradiction as opposed to an overlap between the two agendas. The quiet sharing among them of the contents of Allied radio broadcasts, which had begun in 1943, and from which Japan’s desperate military situation became increasingly clear, added considerably to their anti-Japanese momentum.

In the period between the Koiso Declaration and the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the *pemoeda* became increasingly assertive and confrontational towards the senior nationalists and their cooperative posture, and developed closer ties among themselves. Those who had been closely associated with Shimizu Hitoshi and the propaganda squad—Nur’s group, along with a number of their former associates from the New Generation Residence Hall who were also involved with the *Barisan Pelopor*, including Chaerul Saleh, Sukarni, Adam Malik, and Aidit—now emerged among the most politically radical. As warmly as they had once embraced the Japanese, these young men now rejected Japan with an equal passion. Alongside an acute sense of betrayal at Japanese hands, many of them already had a history of prewar and

wartime associations with the left-wing of the nationalist movement. Their anti-Japanese sentiments, combined with Java's social crisis, fueled a fresh engagement with the revolutionary politics of the left, which in turn heightened and sharpened their radical inclinations. "After hearing a fiery speech from *Bung Karno*, in which he appeared to praise Japan and to be grateful to Japan, we got together and made a decision that this was dangerous for our people," Nur later recalled. "We decided that the contradictions between the people and the Japanese needed to be sharpened, and that if possible there should be an uprising to seize power [from the Japanese] before the Allies landed."¹²⁶

When later confronted with *pemoeda* radicalism at war's end, which exploded at times into brutal, terrifying violence towards the Dutch colonizers, the response of most Dutch observers was to blame the Japanese for mass brainwashing of Indonesian youth; conventional Indonesian narratives, in contrast, also positioned the hated Japanese as a stimulus—but as an entirely negative one. As argued here, the true impact and exchange between the two sides was more ambivalent, and can only be understood in historical terms, as an evolving interaction over time. Put simply, the social-revolutionary currents *as well as* the revealed contradictions of Greater Asian ideology, not only among the Japanese but also among Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno, all contributed to the *pemoeda* mindset. Greater Asianism's critique of the contradictions and injustices of Western colonialism and capitalism, and its calls for mobilization against these in both body and mind—along with the apparent Japanese representation of a viable modern alternative—had set *pemoeda* imaginations alight. But the "older brothers" so eager to proclaim this noble mission of Asian purification now appeared as its deepest betrayers, as hypocrites more despicable than their Western enemies. As Sudarpo noted in recalling the swing of sentiments among "Shimizu's Boys," with whom he had earlier differed regarding the Japanese,

in general, we had all welcomed the Japanese as a symbol of the people of the East rising up against the power of Western imperialism ... We took pride in Japanese achievements. But it was the pattern of behavior of the Japanese themselves that turned us around ... This stimulated a reaction, to the point that the Japanese were destroyed by the ideals of their own propaganda ... Menteng 31 had been a Japanese creation, but by now the youth there shared our views. The lies were just too big.¹²⁷

As one means of exposing the contradictions between cooperation with Japan and the interests of the Indonesian people as they perceived them, Nur and his colleagues arranged for an embarrassing incident between Sukarno and the residents of several villages on Jakarta's outskirts in October 1944. Unknown to Sukarno, the young men spread the word among poorly-clad villagers that on *Lebaran*, the day marking the end of the annual fasting month, the great leader would be distributing clothing from his home in central Jakarta. When the crowds appeared at his door, said Nur,

Bung Karno thought it was a sign of his popularity. But the people asked for clothing. Apparently *Bung Karno* was unable to produce it at that time. The Japanese had

indeed provided clothing and other gifts in honor of the *Lebaran*, but this was for members of the Java Patriotic Service Association. For the masses, there wasn't anything. In the end, Sukarno's assistants ... were forced to hand out five or ten cents to each visitor. The people went back home, automatically thinking that they had merely been mobilized by the Japanese.

As Sudarpo later put it, "I believe that many people were not aware" of the gap between Japan's promises and its true aims, "but we, the students in our group, were very aware."¹²⁸ While perhaps educational for Sukarno and many others of his class, however, it may be argued that the masses already *living* the contradictions between the promises and realities of the ruling regime were not in need of further eye-opening (nor, for that matter, did their political education likely require an additional, exhausting jaunt to Sukarno's house in central Jakarta for clothing that did not exist). Illustrative in this regard were the conclusions reached in the nationalist analysis of the rebellions in Indramaju and general unrest in Java's countryside of September 1944. Alongside mistaken policymaking, the report stated, there were two fundamental problems alienating Java's masses from the government and its aims. The first was the haughty, arrogant behavior of many Japanese and local government officials. The second problem lay with "the manner of government propaganda, which always bandies about the slogan 'co-prosperity.' It is hoped," the writer concluded with candid understatement, that this propaganda "might be brought into line with the [true] priorities of the Japanese military government in Indonesia."¹²⁹ And while both Japanese and senior nationalist spokesmen continued to bang the drum of communal mutual cooperation Asian/Indonesian-style (*gotong-royong*) as the answer to Indonesia's socio-economic crisis, Java's underclass were rather learning to equate *gotong-royong* with unilateral government exactions, inventing a new passive verb form derived from *gotong-royong*—"di-gotong-royong-kan"—to describe the experience of "being mobilized for forced labor."¹³⁰

For his part, in private conversations with the *pemoeda* at least, Sukarno continually insisted that his pro-Japanese posture, however publicly convincing, was merely strategic. When one group of disgruntled *pemoeda* from the Medical College asked him why he and the other leading nationalists "were assisting the Japanese, and allowing the *rōmusha*, our people, to be used like cannon fodder," Sukarno was said to reply, "you remember this. I am not at all in favor of this [policy]. But it's better than all of us getting pounded by the Japanese. Everything we can do to reduce our suffering, I'm doing it."¹³¹ At the seventh meeting of the Central Advisory Council in February 1945, Mohammad Hatta later recalled launching into a fierce attack on the *rōmusha* system as it was then functioning, demanding a halt to further recruitment and the improvement of *rōmusha* conditions.¹³² At the same meeting, however, the nationalists also proposed the launch of what they called the "New Life Movement" (*Gerakan Rakyat Baroe*), based upon some thirty-three principles in keeping with the overlapping moral and cultural agendas both of *new priyayi* nationalism and Greater East Asianism, including "strengthening Indonesian patriotism and the spirit of the Greater East Asia War," "submission to discipline," "strengthening the spirit of mutual assistance," "respecting customs and traditions and the culture of the East," "eliminating

self-interest,” “honoring one’s father and mother,” “getting used to awakening and immediately going to work,” and “avoiding empty talk”(!)¹³³

In this context, while Sukarno later maintained that his speeches contained coded anti-Japanese messages that only his Javanese audience could catch, those in the audience themselves—the people who had the chance to hear the nationalists speak, along with many of the *pemoeda*—remained generally unsatisfied with nationalist “excuses” (*alasan-alasan*), and unconvinced of their attempts to distance themselves from the Japanese, particularly in the case of Sukarno.¹³⁴ During a discussion in one of Sukarno’s late-war colloquia, Johar Nur recalled pointedly inquiring of the great leader,

“Brother (*Bung*),” I asked, “what do you make of the comparison between my ideas and [your] *Pantja Dharma*?”

Bung Karno then asked, “okay, brother Johar, what are your ideas?”

I answered: “[Indonesia as] a unified Republic, Political Democracy, Economic Democracy, Social Democracy.”

Bung Karno was silent, until it reached the point that the hundred members of the Special Vanguard Corps in attendance all applauded loudly.¹³⁵

News of the Allied defeat of Japan’s “invincible” ally Germany in early May 1945, suggesting that Japan’s days too were numbered, further emboldened the *pemoeda*. At a youth congress in Bandung held from May 16 to 18, 1945, in which a large number of young local nationalists were joined by representatives of various groups from across Java, including a contingent from the Jakarta Medical College and Menteng 31, speakers called for a unification of all of Java’s youth groups, openly criticized the Patriotic Service Association, and demanded immediate independence, adopting as their slogan “liberty or death (*Merdeka atau mati*)!” Shortly afterwards, the young men of the Medical College, Menteng 31, and the Free Indonesia Residence Hall joined local high school students for a boisterous mass rally in the Jakarta City Zoo. Here the goals of the Bandung youth conference were reaffirmed, accompanied with demands for military training, and Lincoln’s slogan “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Urged on by Nur and his colleague Darwis, one of the speakers, a first-year medical student from Cirebon named Abdul Fatah Untung Surjadjaja, proclaimed that “if Indonesia does not get its independence, we will not fight!” A motion was taken to carry these messages personally to Sukarno and Hatta. Thus ensued the largest popular march to take place in Jakarta since early in the war. The length of the column of rally participants, stretching perhaps one kilometer long, quickly doubled with the addition of young local spectators who spontaneously joined up.¹³⁶

Surprised on that day by the sudden appearance of countless numbers of local youth bearing banners such as “Freedom for the People,” both Sukarno and Hatta were said to have given speeches revealing that they were deeply moved and impressed by this display of youthful energy and determination, proclaiming their full agreement with the ideals expressed, and acknowledging a central role for youth in the coming struggle for freedom.¹³⁷ Their spontaneous positive responses on that day were followed by enlarged attempts from the Japanese and nationalist sides to include representatives of the youth groups in subsequent official deliberations over the shape

of the nation-to-be in the Japanese-sponsored Committee to Investigate Preparations for Independence, a body whose membership included sixty-two Indonesians (mostly nationalists) and eight Japanese military government officials. These developments, along with Sukarno's concurrent unveiling of his famous "five principles" of Indonesian nationalism, the *Pantjasila*, in a June 1 address to that committee—which, unlike the earlier *Pantja Dharma*, made no mention of Japan, incorporated ideas of social and political democracy, and warned against the dangers of national chauvinism—somewhat improved shaky relations between the *pemoeda* and the senior nationalists. Fundamental disagreements over collaboration with the Japanese, however, continued to simmer until the Japanese surrender on August 15. These would culminate in an incident that quickly assumed mythical proportions in the history of the Indonesian nationalist struggle: the brief kidnapping of a hesitant Sukarno and Hatta at the hands of a number of medical college students, including Johar Nur, on the day after the surrender, in an ultimately successful attempt to pressure the two men to declare Indonesian independence unilaterally.

If relationships between the *pemoeda* and the nationalists thus evolved ambivalently, those between these youths and the Japanese had by early 1945 deteriorated to one of barely disguised animosity. *Kenpeitai* arrests and interrogations of suspected youthful militants were becoming ubiquitous. In July, angry about continued Japanese hesitation regarding the designation of Indonesia as a republic, Chaerul Saleh and Sukarni refused their appointments to the Committee to Investigate Preparations for Independence, and were fired, in response, from their long-held posts at the Propaganda Department. But the break with Shimizu had already been in the cards for a long time. Before holding the youth rally at the Jakarta zoo around the end of May, students had obtained official permission from the military administration and local officials by promising to stick to "themes in keeping with Japanese desires." If Johar Nur's later story is to be believed, the advance preparations taken by Nur and his colleagues for an eventual Japanese suppressive action were symbolic of the depths to which the relationship between the *pemoeda* and their former Greater Asian comrade Shimizu Hitoshi—along with the Japanese regime he represented—had sunk. Before the rally at the zoo, said Nur,

Some of my student colleagues were given instructions that if the Japanese tried to interrupt [the rally], we had to mount a resistance. In short, I gave a broad-bladed knife (*belati*) to brother Hasnan Tjenan [an influential member of the Menteng 31 group¹³⁸], and wherever Shimizu sat, he was ordered to sit behind him. If Shimizu cried out against us, and did not go along with things, he was to be stabbed from behind. [Hasnan] was ready, and the others were too. But apparently God decreed that this rally should not be interrupted.¹³⁹

What sentiments lay behind Shimizu's inaction at the above rally are unclear. During and after the war, Shimizu always maintained his "love" for Indonesians, complained of his frustrations with shortsighted Japanese policies, and reaffirmed his consistent commitment to Japanese-sponsored Indonesian independence.¹⁴⁰ Propaganda squad commander Machida even later referred to him as "more

Indonesian than Japanese.”¹⁴¹ But Shimizu was also a spokesman for Japanese official opinion, and the radical declaration that Indonesians should withhold cooperation from Japan unless independence was granted ran against the stated position both of the military administration and Shimizu himself. In a 1987 interview, Shimizu acknowledged that *pemoeda* feelings by this time had turned strongly against Japan. “It never came to blows, but I was strongly threatened. I did my best to understand them and to move forward.”¹⁴² In any case, to the *pemoeda*, Shimizu now seemed to represent little more than a devious fascist trickster, whose life they were prepared to sacrifice in the good cause, and whose show of restraint at the above rally could only be interpreted as caused by a power outside of the bounds of Japanese reckoning. While the overlap between the ideals of Greater Asia and those of Indonesian nation-building had never entirely disappeared, the realities of Japanese practice and the sense of an impending collapse of the Japanese empire had brought Indonesian nationalists—led by the *pemoeda*—towards a full rejection of Japan and *its* Greater Asia, and to an embrace of what now seemed its opposite: *merdeka* (freedom) in the form not only of national political sovereignty, but in a sweeping *popular* sovereignty informed by the universalist promises both of the French and Russian revolutions, encompassing both political and economic realms.

Regarding the wartime evolution of *pemoeda* sentiments towards the Japanese, medical college student leader Sudarpo later offered the following thoughtful analysis, one which did not fail to acknowledge the promise and power of Japanese propaganda appeals even as Japanese rule had betrayed them.

In the beginning, those with pro-Japanese feelings were full of passion. But Japan’s big mistake was, its propaganda promised liberation of the races of Asia, but its attitude was one of suspicion. Suppose that the Japanese had from the beginning been less suspicious, and had invited us, saying “come, let’s fight together against your former oppressors, and we’ll begin from today getting ready for independence.” Our people would have caught alight ... But it never got that far. In fact they were still very conservative, reactionary ... They had their propaganda, but they didn’t put it into practice ... They managed to get our leaders to help them in their war effort, and they eventually put together a Committee for the Preparation of Independence, but their plan was for a limited government. There were some Japanese whose motivations saved them, who really followed [the propaganda], who were sincere because they believed it. But most did not. They were reactionary, they considered themselves a race superior to the others. They saw us as a lower species, like the monkeys in the Japanese fairy tale *momotarō*. This was a spur to our sense of nationalism all together. If they hadn’t been like that, we [who opposed them] would have had problems! (Laughs).¹⁴³

Clinging to Asia

In December 1944, in an impassioned and sympathetic text that in some ways acknowledged the problems indicated by Sudarpo, *bunkajin* Takeda Rintarō—now

back in Japan after serving a two-year stint in Java—pulled few punches in describing how Japanese ignorance, an inappropriate sense of superiority, and a shortsighted focus on material requisition alone were betraying Japan's Greater Asian mission in Java. In a succinct collection of essays entitled *Java print (Jawa sarasa)*, Takeda revealed a deep sympathy for the “natives” and their culture, a longstanding concern for social justice and the common man dating back to his earliest works of proletarian literature, and repugnance towards the “Western-style” colonial arrogance displayed by many of his fellow Japanese. In this regard *Jawa sarasa* represented an affirmation of the most brotherly, progressive ideals within Japanese wartime Greater Asianism, a lasting testimony of one who was “sincere because he believed it.”¹⁴⁴ The role of “imperialist” could not have been much more strongly rejected. Yet at critical junctures, it was also clear that Takeda still subscribed with equal sincerity to a Japan-centrism grounded in racial and cultural essentialism, to a division of the world into a bad West and a good East, and to the notion of Japan as rightful imperial hegemon in Asia. For him as for other Japanese Greater Asianists, two years' experience of Greater Asia in practice on Java's rocky soil, far from weakening Greater Asia's foundations, had only appeared to strengthen them.

From the first page of *Jawa sarasa*, Takeda launched into a sustained diatribe against the persistence of what he saw as Western-style colonial attitudes regarding Indonesians among his fellow Japanese. Since he had returned to Japan, he wrote, he had been struck by the great public interest in the Southern Regions (*Nampō*), and the great quantities of new publications on the subject. Yet among these texts, he lamented, “very few seem trustworthy ... and I cannot help but worry that this is creating a mistaken impression.” Most of the publications lacked what he deemed the essential prerequisites to the task: an awareness of the changed situation under Japanese rule, a view to the future, and “affection for this land and people now bathing in the imperial graces.” The main reason for these shortcomings, he noted, was the continued, ubiquitous reliance on sources authored by Westerners (*ketōjin* or barbarians, lit. “hairy people”).¹⁴⁵ “Just from the fact that they are not written via the eyes and heart of a Japanese,” he wrote, “there are already great flaws in the basic conceptions.” But they were also “wrong in even the simplest of facts ... no matter which book, the same errors keep coming up—it's enough to make you laugh.”¹⁴⁶

The result was the reproduction of attitudes resembling those of Westerners, who “ridiculed not only Indonesians, but all the people in their Asian colonies and semi-colonies as incorrigible lazybones, made fun of them as imbeciles who could be kicked or trampled with impunity, and treated them as ignorant primitives.” Takeda was “dumbfounded” at being repeatedly asked how Indonesians, “lazy and apathetic” from all “the abundance of the tropics,” could “possibly have such things as literature or culture?” Such Japanese often used “the word ‘native’ (*dojin*),” which “reeks of the old colonial mentality. They still think of Indonesians as coal-black, barbaric primitives.”¹⁴⁷

Pumped up with these sorts of false assumptions, Takeda noted, Japanese in Java too had dismissed native lifestyles—their alien diet, their habits of napping in the afternoons, taking cold baths and washing in muddy rivers, their general “apathy,” their seeming inability with figures—as evidence of irrational backwardness and laziness. A substantial portion of *Jawa sarasa* represented an admirable attempt to counter

such stereotypes: the Indonesian masses were not lazy but industrious, working long hours in country and city. "Who is it," Takeda wrote, "that is tirelessly tending the rice paddies, the rubber and quinine fields?" Contrary to common assumptions, the habit of napping in the afternoon increased one's work effectiveness. Japanese spokesmen had ridiculed Indonesians for not knowing their own age and for "having no sense of numbers"; for the latter, a lack of education was to blame, while the former was simply rubbish—Indonesians, wrote Takeda, were in fact more precise than Japanese, regularly counting not only the full years but also the full months of their life. This accounted for their habit of saying "I am roughly 'x' years old," which Japanese had wrongly taken to mean they were unsure of their age—"indeed," wrote Takeda, "the ones who are strange are those [Japanese] who don't realize this." Yes, the common people went into muddy river waters to bathe and do the washing, but to conclude from this that they were "dirty" was again "strange." Often there was no alternative water supply, and things washed this way came out clean. In fact, he wrote, Indonesians "take cleanliness extremely seriously. Their fondness for washing reminded me of the fastidious women of Japan."¹⁴⁸

And on it went: hot, spicy food, dried fish and eggs, coffee with sugar for breakfast—yes, these were different from the Japanese diet, but in the tropics, they made sense, stimulating one's energy and resisting spoilage, representing a "method of hygiene and health appropriate to the environment." Japanese complained of the local habit of bathing in cold water, but this, too, appeared to be the healthy choice. As evidence of native genius on these scores, Takeda noted that in their brief months of residence, most of his Japanese propaganda squad colleagues had succumbed to illnesses like Dengue Fever and malaria, while he, who had from the beginning done his best to "follow the lifestyle of the local inhabitants," had "not been sick once" in his two years in Java.¹⁴⁹

Regarding the so-called "easy life of the natives," Takeda's fellow Japanese had failed to take note of the dim economic realities facing the "native" common man: yes, fruit was everywhere visible, but every fruit orchard, every banana tree had an *owner*. At the market, fruit was relatively expensive, and your average Indonesian was happy if he could afford *one* banana. The Dutch colonial system had rigged Java's economy: with the Dutch on top and the Chinese in the middle, poverty, not plenty, was the essence of native life. There was no clearer reflection of this than in Java's thriving pawnshop institution—more than five hundred of them across the island. The Indonesian common folk were already happy and proud if they had something to pawn! Yet even with what little they had, they were "naturally" unconcerned about and generous with their money, a quality Takeda compared to that of the natives of Tokyo (*edokko*). Unfortunately, he noted, this quality had also left them doubly open to exploitation by greedy Chinese moneylenders.¹⁵⁰

Apathetic natives? In former times, the Western oppressors had indeed pursued an "inhuman" policy of stupefying the natives, wrote Takeda, and had left them as "completely apathetic slaves." But "once bathed in the Emperor's graces, the heavy clouds that had oppressed them for 300 years immediately parted, and it is common knowledge that they are now striving to return to their original shape." In their willingness to serve as auxiliary soldiers (*heiho*), their request for the formation of

the *Peta* battalions, the importation of Japanese agricultural techniques, and their positive response to Japanese military training, Indonesians were now “throwing the ‘apathetic’ label back in their old master’s faces,” as if to say, “just leave Java to us.”¹⁵¹ The “incomparable” commitment and enthusiasm of Indonesia’s new generation of men and women in particular towards the shared Asian cause, wrote Takeda elsewhere, had so impressed him that in his position as head of the literature section of the Center for the Direction of Popular Cultural Enlightenment, he had taken a hands-off approach, and simply “waited for the results,” which had inevitably been positive.¹⁵²

Most alarming to Takeda were fellow Japanese regarded as experts on Southeast Asia who “outdid the old Europeans” in their colonial attitudes, denigrating the local populations as “the same idiots as ever,” and “arguing that the only thing we need to do there is to seize products.” Watching one such “pragmatist” with thirty years of experience running businesses in [British] Malaya, Sumatra, and Java “dismiss the current plans for the industrialization of Java out of hand” in a public lecture, Takeda felt an “indescribably unpleasant sensation.” Such views amounted to a proposition that Japan “continue the thieving transgressions that the West perpetrated against the East—that we should take their clever (?) colonial policies as a model.” Newspaper articles trumpeting “the resources of the Southern regions” were guilty of the same. “The acquisition of military resources is critical to the prosecution of the war,” he wrote, “however—however, I say—the hard truth is that a war for resources is not a holy war. . . . What about the grand ideals of the Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof (*hakkō ichiu*), of Asia’s awakening and liberation?” The presence of increasing numbers of such “pragmatist”-type Japanese in Java, he noted, had prompted among Indonesians a revealing nostalgia for the first wave of Japanese soldiers—and for the brotherly idealism they had brought with them, which now seemed a distressingly rare commodity.¹⁵³

Still, as in other Japanese wartime Greater Asianism, Takeda’s idealism and his positive appraisal of his Indonesian brethren was not without its brackets, its Japan-centrism, its function in reflecting—indeed constructing—a Japan, and a Japanese race, that was naturally positioned to take the leading role in the shared mission of Asian revival. In a passage from what he described as an excerpt from a diary entry penned sometime in September 1942—six months after his arrival—Takeda tellingly noted his alarm at becoming too used to local sensations such as the weather, the slow sense of time, and local customs, to the point that he feared losing touch with his essential mission and identity as a Japanese.

Is this a small matter? I don’t think so. These realities affect one’s other senses as well; and if this same situation also impacts upon one’s conceptions, this is something truly frightening. In sum, although it may seem a bit fantastic, at times, opinions that are too much informed by the local reality are, just for that reason, off the mark . . . We must hold the imperial proclamation of December 8th in our hearts, and never forget that we are at war.¹⁵⁴

Elsewhere in *Jawa sarasa*, Takeda’s disdain for Japanese “practicalists” was shown to apply not only to those who would see Java only as a storehouse of material wealth

and labor resources, but also to extend to another group whose thinking he denigrated as “ruled by expediency”: those who favored altering and simplifying the Japanese language in order to make it more accessible to the other inhabitants of Greater East Asia.

There are those who assert that because the study of Japanese is currently in extreme difficulty, we need to instigate various linguistic reforms and methods to make it more appropriate to the residents in each part of Greater East Asia. At first glance, this seems a realistic proposition based upon current realities. But we cannot afford to ignore the fact that behind the mask lurks a frightening form of thinking ... Our national language (*waga kokugo*) is not simply a medium or a measure [for communication]—we must clearly grasp the essential significance of the fact that the language itself is, in sum, the Japanese heart, the Japanese spirit ... To lower the Japanese language, whether out of a desire to teach it to people of a lower level (*mindō no hikui mono*), or any other reason, is not possible, but if it were possible, it would no longer be authentic Japanese. We would be destroying the spirit of our linguistic soul (*kotodama*)—what would then be the point of spreading it widely around?

For all his commitment to Asian brotherhood, Takeda's fear of the prospect of “the language of the *Yamato* (*Yamatogotoba*) making a jump into Greater East Asian-ese (*Dai tōago*)” was symbolic of his continued commitment to racial and cultural essentialism, to a defense of the barriers “naturally” separating Japanese not only from Westerners but also from other Asians, to the preservation of Japan as a pure, superior model for other Asians, upon which, for him, the legitimacy of Japan's Asian mission stood.¹⁵⁵

While he rejected colonialism, Takeda here narrated a process that was quintessentially colonial: the perceived need to present a proper, superior face to the colonized as a spur to the construction, defense, and reproduction of discourses of cultural superiority and purity—and, by extension, racial superiority and purity.¹⁵⁶ “It was only when we found ourselves in the position of teaching it to others ... when we were editing a variety of textbooks for Indonesians,” wrote Takeda,

that we realized for the first time how much our own Japanese had forgotten its essence, how far it had fallen. Were we not using a vulgar, unrefined Japanese riddled with impurity? ... There were too many examples to count; the egregious errors in conversation made me shudder. It was crisscrossed with frivolous fragments, mixed with Western lines of thought full of bad influences. The spirit and the investigation of our national language, which should be purity itself (*meijōchoku*), had been trampled and laid waste by *ketō*-type conceptions. There was not a shadow of it to be seen ... As a Japanese, I was truly ashamed.¹⁵⁷

In this context, Takeda expressed “gratitude” for the occupation and the war situation in offering the stimulus and the opportunity to expunge the Japanese language of these impurities—and the chance to show it off in all its glory. “Now,” wrote Takeda,

they [the Indonesians], who have been resurrected in a happiness and prosperity born of the graces of the Emperor, are able to follow, happily and diligently, the glorious path of breaking their bodies over the Japanese language and the Japanese spirit.

As an example, Takeda recalled observing the students of a Japanese language class in a public elementary school in Jakarta in late 1943. When a student writing *kanji* on the blackboard was suddenly asked by the Japanese teacher if he remembered where he had encountered a certain character meaning “end” or “descendent” before, the student replied,

“yes, Descendent of the Gods”—and then, changing his manner of speaking to that point, the boy sternly commanded, “at attention!” The entire class assumed a correct posture.

Standing motionless, the boy drew his wheat-colored cheeks together and replied clearly, “It was, Descendent of the Gods, the Emperor!”

Standing far behind him, I was struck by an indescribable emotion. I had to fight back the tears welling up from the depths of my breast. I was grateful. I was simply grateful for the all-permeating majesty of the Emperor.

And this was less than one and a half years after the imperial army had landed in Java.¹⁵⁸

Roughly two a half years after the imperial army had landed in Java, and some three months before the publication of *Jawa sarasa*, the issue at the top of many an educated Indonesian agenda—national independence—had finally been addressed, at least in the form of a promise for the future. In the closing passage of *Jawa sarasa*, framed in the form of a letter to Armijn Pané—the man who had replaced Takeda as head of the literature section of the Center for the Direction of Popular Cultural Enlightenment—Takeda congratulated Indonesians on the Koiso Declaration. “As a complete Indonesiaphile,” he wrote, “I was moved by [the declaration] as if it were my own.” Still, he acknowledged,

I never liked the old-fashioned smell that adhered in the word “independence.” So far as it has to do with autonomy, it’s fine, but as a concept of resistance that takes as its precondition a policy of colonial exploitation and enslavement, it is a word out of place within the Greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere.¹⁵⁹

For all its passionate commitment to the defense of Indonesians, *Jawa sarasa* confirmed that, even late in the game, the thinking of even this most socially committed of *bunkajin* had evolved little since the beginning of the occupation. Among the true believers, Japan’s real-life failure to live up to the dreams of a Greater Asia thus far was hardly forcing a reappraisal of Japanese Greater Asianism itself. Rather, it seems, these setbacks—set against glimpses of “success” as in the classroom scene above—were only intensifying its appeal.

Whatever its impact in Japan proper, *Jawa sarasa* and its arguments did not in any case make it back to Java, which was now increasingly cut off from the outside world.

Here, with the war outlook turning from gray to black, Japanese-sponsored exploitation and its social costs continuing to mount, and living standards—with the important exception of the Japanese and their local associates—continuing to plummet, the view of Greater Asia's prospects taken by the remaining Japanese Greater Asian missionaries was, as might be expected, often more sober than that of Takeda.

In the wake of the Koiso Declaration, growing official recognition of past and current policy failures, and an increased realization of the importance of securing active Indonesian support as an ally in the now desperate war effort, the more general intellectual climate among the occupier community had meanwhile loosened up. In panel discussions and interviews recorded in the new local Japanese-language journal *New Java* (*Shin Jawa*) in early 1945, perennial Japanese defenders of Indonesia and critics of the regime such as Ichiki Tatsuo, the former Marxists Nishijima Shigetada and his Naval Liaison Office colleague Yoshizumi Tomegorō, along with other seasoned civilian Indonesia hands such as the Propaganda Department's Nakatani Yoshio, were provided a public forum for the relatively free expression of their views on the Japanese-Indonesian relationship and its future. While all acknowledged that Japan's ship of Asian dreams was foundering, however, none appeared ready to abandon it—let alone the sense of Japanese national identity and loyalty that underpinned it.

"Under the war economy, things have come this far," said Yoshizumi in a conversation with Ichiki published in January 1945.

Of course it is necessary that the Indonesian people undergo hardships such as the delivery of rice and shortages of clothing. But the feelings of the people when the Japanese army landed at Bantam, when they brought us rice and chickens with tears in their eyes, burning with emotion—today that feeling is completely gone. Neighborhood residents shudder with fear—it is a very precarious time. We need to think seriously about how it is that this situation has come about. For the most part, the penetration of the military administration extends at best to the regency level. What gets through to the general public are only orders, and the eyes of the police.

Such criticisms did not indicate doubts as to the essential good intentions of the Japanese regime, nor to the natural role for the Japanese as leading the way toward Indonesian betterment. The problem area lay in the middle, in arbitrary native officials and ignorant Japanese rank-and-file that had, between the two of them, built a wall of misunderstanding and suspicion between the well-meaning Japanese administration and the Indonesian masses. "If we are really to lead Indonesians," continued Yoshizumi,

we need a warmer sort of political penetration. For example, as a New Year's Day present, the Department of the Commander of the Military Administration made all sorts of sacrifices to distribute clothing. If you think about it, it is not an exaggeration to see this sort of thing as a blessing arising out of the sympathy of a blood relation. But is this warm Japanese parental affection really reaching the local inhabitants along with the clothing? As a practical matter, few Indonesians sensed that Japanese affection, or received the clothing. Rather, eluding detection,

[Indonesian officials] practiced deception, or appointed blood relatives or henchmen as distributors, and for this reason public animosity towards the administration only grew further.¹⁶⁰

For both Yoshizumi and Ichiki, the solution lay in two areas: the Asian-style enlightenment of fellow Japanese and improved policy implementation. "At this sort of juncture," said Yoshizumi,

it is absolutely necessary to open up a line of policy through which the Japanese desire to do something for the local inhabitants is transmitted to the general public ... At all times, we must assume the position of leading them—and Indonesians too are aware that they have to fully acknowledge Japanese leadership. But within this relationship, in order to really pull the Indonesians along ... it is important that the two races gain a bit of understanding of one another's histories, customs, and habits, and seek compromises from there.

Reacting to Yoshizumi's critique, Ichiki responded with a less-than-revolutionary program of his own.

The sensibility of the feudal ages still remains among the people of Java. The peasants here react much more to having their heads rubbed by a regent (*kenchō*) than by a nationalist leader. Through their clever, evil policies, the old Dutch managed to keep popular enmity in check somewhere below the *kenchō* level. In contrast, no matter how many benevolent policies our military government decrees, because we do not have a handle on the regents, the good intentions of the military government are obscured below the regent level ... The Dutch evolved the system from regent down to village headman (*kuchō*) over a long period of time, and it is very powerful. Much more than dealing with nationalists or intellectuals ... effective use of these officials is essential to having a grasp of hearts and minds.¹⁶¹

While Ichiki rejected Dutch "evil" itself, even at this late stage in the game, the principle of working through a colonial ruling structure that the Dutch had developed for their own purposes did not, in itself, appear to be problematic. Indeed, at the policy level, for someone generally perceived as an exceptionally pro-Indonesian Greater Asian idealist, Ichiki's words suggested a surprising subscription to a certain colonial and class *Realpolitik*. For Ichiki, as other Japanese wartime Greater Asianists, what separated the Japanese from the "evil" Dutch was less the structures or system of rule itself than the quality of the culture that infused the Japanese-Indonesian relationship. It was Western-style *attitudes* that needed to be abandoned.

Westerners often write on their views of Indonesians, but because they are only looking on from outside, they never decipher their true shape. Here, however, you could say the Japanese have the strong point of being of the same race. They are able to jump in among them, and are able to trust the other.

It was in this sense, said Ichiki, that "... the Japanese and Dutch way of moving forward are completely different," and that there was "no need whatsoever to examine the Dutch way of doing things."

So long as we do not lose touch with our renewed awareness since the Manchurian Incident, with our ideas that have solidified all the more in the course of the Greater East Asia War, Japan and Indonesia are inevitably made to melt together. On that point I have a great deal of hope. If the relationship between the two parties becomes strained, this can only be because, in the end, the Japanese became like the Dutch.¹⁶²

On this score, both Ichiki and Yoshizumi remained convinced of the existence of a special, shared racial character that inclined Japanese and Indonesians towards one another in a way that differed not only from previous relations between Indonesians and the Dutch, but between Japanese and other Asian races.

People say Indonesians are ignorant and vague, but if Japanese train them positively, they inevitably respond well. Unlike with races like the Filipinos, who have been tainted and ruined by American culture, the good thing about the Dutch was, their devious policy did not involve the implantation of their culture. Although you could say [the result] is ambiguous, they are like a blank slate. If you venture into the hearts of the people with a positive program, they will follow you. One must not lose heart at their ambiguity, but rather keep faith in its power ... Unlike the Chinese, Filipinos, and the like, only the Indonesians can truly be our allies from the heart. Indonesians are a pro-Japanese element.

Like Takeda Rintarō, Yoshizumi here turned to what he saw as Japan's biggest success story in Java thus far, a model for the continuation of the Japan-led Asian renaissance: the elementary schools. Indonesia's "ambiguous" adults, he suggested, were best reached through their children.

I believe the elementary school teachers represent the most effective result of all of the policies pursued by the military administration thus far. I am nothing less than amazed at how good Jakarta's children have become. And if the children become good boys and girls, I believe their power for reforming their parents is greater than we imagine.

Ichiki, whose primary work over the past year had been the translation and preparation of military training manuals and the editing of a magazine for the *Peta* paramilitaries, warmly seconded Yoshizumi's observation, offering the *Peta* as an example of the same sort of success.¹⁶³

"In its dealings with the races of Greater East Asia up until now," Yoshizumi admitted, "Japan has been unable to avoid having one experience after another that aroused suspicion" towards its aims. For both Yoshizumi and Ichiki, Indonesia still represented imperial Japan's last and best chance to set the record straight, to reveal its

“sincerity” in offering national tutelage to its less advanced Asian brethren. “I believe that where Indonesia is concerned,” concluded Yoshizumi,

we need to return to the mental drawing board ... We must express our complete sincerity towards the idea of educating Indonesians to be a race that can attain independence. And I believe that in response to this Japanese sincerity, unlike other countries, Indonesia has the purity to establish a faith in living and dying together.

“Yes,” agreed Ichiki, “for the manifestation of the Japanese ideal, this is the one and only place left.”¹⁶⁴

Some four months after the above conversation, Ichiki joined Nishijima of the Naval Liaison's Office, the Propaganda Department's Nakatani, Ono Seitarō of the Java Newspaper Company, and *Peta* paramilitary trainer Yanagawa Motoshige for a roundtable discussion concerning “Indonesia's intelligentsia and its youth,” whose transcript appeared in the May 1945 edition of *Shin Jawa*. All of the participants were critical of common Japanese ignorance and arrogance towards Indonesians, and they lamented past failures. But with the promise of independence in the air, they remained generally upbeat about Japan's future prospects in Java. Ichiki continued in much the same vein of his earlier commentary. “Both in terms of character and thinking,” he said, “this [Indonesian] race is a young race, without the difficult-to-remove deep-rootedness of the Chinese, etc. They are easily influenced by those with power. So as long as Japan stands firmly as Asia's central nation, they will easily absorb the Japanese national ideal.” Nishijima argued that the key to success in dealing with Indonesians was remaining open and frank, and also maintaining a sympathy for Indonesia's developmental backwardness. It was “no exaggeration,” said Nishijima,

to say that the level of Indonesian culture is the same as that of Japan eighty years ago. Whenever you are interacting with them, try to compare their situation in many ways with the Japan of eighty years ago, think twice about how Japan was in those days. In this way, we have to lead them and teach them, but not control them.¹⁶⁵

Propaganda Department translator Nakatani, whose daily interactions were almost exclusively with the members of the educated Jakarta elite, took a more somber view. At least where the views of members of the Jakarta intelligentsia were concerned, he said, the gap between Indonesians and Japanese was yawning dangerously wide.

The large majority of Indonesian intellectuals are extremely skeptical ... They don't move one inch from the idea of, “if the Japanese do this for us, then Indonesia will do this for them.” ... Although Japan is working hard to provide leadership in many areas, the positive determination to make efforts in response to that leadership is not there. In fact, they are always trying to resist it. As one might expect of a racial character warped for 300 years [of Dutch rule]—and on top of this, Indonesians are famous for their extremely feminine-type sensibility,

with a sensitivity for minor details—everything is viewed with skepticism, you could even say with suspicion. They have a strong inclination to judge Japanese on the smallest of things. Lately such youth organizations as the *seinendan* and the *keibōdan* have been quite active, and for the Japanese, they are a source of great hope and expectation. But Indonesian intellectuals only see them as bowing to power, moving in an extremely passive way. So they would never see these as actions coming from Indonesians themselves.¹⁶⁶

While Nakatani thus began with a typically racial and cultural essentialist analysis of Indonesian attitudes—one that seemed determined to ignore the possibility of Indonesian resistance and suspicion as an informed *political* gesture—his appraisal of the deteriorated state of Japanese-Indonesian relations, and their causes, went much deeper than those of his colleagues.

I believe that Indonesian skepticism and warped hearts can be swept away, but only if Japanese keep at it for quite a long time, with great effort and perseverance. As it stands now, however, let alone sweeping away the skepticism, there are many places in which the skepticism is only deepening. In sum, no matter how much the top might preach a grand logic, expounding upon the ideal of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, in their daily lives, the feeling from the Japanese that they actually get is a continued sense of insult as a race under Japanese control.

“Particularly here in Jakarta,” Nakatani continued,

both the Indonesians and the Japanese are to blame. When Indonesians witness the Japanese in their daily lives, in their behavior in town, in their homes and offices, whether in material terms, or in spiritual terms, they harbor an extraordinary repulsion and antipathy. Without looking further, they readily assume that these people called Japanese are at war only for their own fortune and pleasure. If you tell them that there are Japanese off in the mountains, in places unreachable by train or car, living and working together with thousands of *rōmusha*, they seem very surprised. The leaders in places like Jakarta tend to think that the Japanese right in front of them represent all Japanese, and the whole war. It is our duty to enlighten them on this. If we make more efforts in that direction, I think things will improve in all areas.¹⁶⁷

While his identification and acknowledgment of the problem and its graveness was exceptionally sharp, Nakatani’s solution, and his assumption of the Japanese position vis-à-vis Indonesians, thus differed fundamentally little from that of his colleagues. In sum, things would improve in proportion to the degree to which Japanese approximated the ideal of selfless, dedicated Japaneseness, and approached Indonesians as a brother-tutor. “Indonesians are like warped juveniles,” concluded Nakatani. “To deal with these juveniles requires a leader with a superhuman patience, and I think this is what we must demand from all Japanese.”¹⁶⁸

Put simply, the problem for Japan's mission was that Indonesia was no more a nation of "warped juveniles" than the Japanese were supermen. Yet no matter how aware they were of the flaws of their fellow countrymen and the system of rule they had implemented in Java, no matter how much they grasped the social breadth and depth to which Indonesian skepticism and suspicion regarding the Japanese had sunk by the spring of 1945, even these most sensitive, enlightened, and progressive of Japanese Java-hands could entertain no other future than one of staying—and rectifying—the Greater Asian course. The power of Greater Asia's appeals and ideals continued to hold them in its seductive imperial grasp.

Conclusion: Resituating Greater Asia

I, as President of the Republic of Indonesia, have assembled a government whose cabinet I call the Mutual Cooperation (Gotong-Royong) Cabinet. This title is more than just a name. Indeed it precisely represents the life-essence of the Indonesian Volk as family-society. We must therefore continue to preserve gotong-royong with care. Because only by discarding all personal interests, can we work together shoulder-to-shoulder in mutual cooperation to escape from the crisis that has concerned us for so long.

— Megawati Sukarnoputri, August 2001¹

In March 1942, in a time of global crisis, members of two Asian societies met one another as occupier and occupied and sought in one another not only a means of defeating a shared Western enemy on the battlefield, but of transcending the constraints they believed the hegemonic West had imposed upon them in the name of modernity. They hoped and believed that this cause, underpinned by a shared racial and cultural identity, would allow Japan's relations with other Asians to transcend those of the imperialist West. This book has traced this hopeful but ill-fated wartime encounter, as expressed in one of the most distant territories in Japan's far-flung wartime empire. It has centered around the experiences of the heterogeneous group of Japanese who bore Japan's Greater Asian message to Java, and of Indonesians who, for their own varied reasons, saw and acted upon the promise of a new Asia.

In postwar accounts, Greater Asianism was largely seen as the creation of elite, cynical Tokyo military schemers who employed it as a cover for an imperialism even more brutal than the Western imperialism that it replaced. Indeed, in hindsight, the disastrous results of Japan's wartime occupations in Asia, and the near-universal anti-Japanese sentiments these occupations aroused among local populations, revealed Japan's brotherly Greater Asian promises, as H.B. Jassin later put it, as no more than "beautiful balloons, each bigger and more brilliantly colored than the last, but their contents only air." In acknowledging the beauty of these balloons in the eye of certain Indonesian beholders, however, this 1948 statement from the nationalist editor of *Pandji Poestaka* magazine, one of the founding figures of Indonesian literary studies, also points to the heart of this study. For Greater Asia was a place where the wartime agendas of Japanese and Indonesians appeared, for a time, to overlap. A survey of these areas of overlap and their evolution across the war highlights the complexity,

ambivalence, and depth of the wartime Japanese-Indonesian interaction—and points towards its hidden trans-war dimensions.

In the end, the success or failure of Japanese Greater Asianism as a transnational ideology—and the reason that it mostly failed—might be said to have come down to this: at the start of the occupation, many Indonesians, particularly of the new *priyayi* class, were open to the idea of instruction in Asian nation-building from a brotherly tutor. Japan seemed to possess many promising credentials. But in offering only renovated race and culture as the means to the transcendence of the relations of colonizer and colonized, the onus ultimately fell upon each individual Japanese, in all of his dealings with Indonesians, to behave as a model of the transcendent new Asian.

In the right place, at the right time, and with an appropriately receptive Indonesian audience, a handful of Japanese of exceptional character and motivation were able to approximate this ideal. The crowning example was the “ruthlessly impartial” *Peta* paramilitary trainer Lieutenant Yanagawa Motoshige, who not only had a life-shaping impact upon many of his Indonesian trainees during the occupation, but also chose to ignore official instructions after the Japanese surrender to the Allies, staying behind and helping to lead Indonesians in the field against the returning Western imperialist enemy.² Along with several hundred other Japanese who fought in the war of independence for a variety of reasons, Yanagawa was joined in this regard by Java hands Ichiki Tatsuo and Yoshizumi Tomegorō, both of whom made an appearance in this study, and both of whom—unlike Yanagawa—died on the battlefield.

Thus it is not surprising that a protagonist modeled on Yanagawa appeared as the central figure in the film *Murudeka* (2001), named after the Japanese transliteration of the Indonesian nationalist rallying cry “Freedom!” (*merdeka*). This was one of a number of Japanese commercial films funded by resurgent right-wing revisionists beginning in the late 1990s, aiming to offer a “true account” of Japan’s Greater Asian mission unavailable to postwar Japanese until now. Yanagawa’s close wartime relations with his Indonesian trainees and his attachment to Indonesia both during and after the war, documented in Indonesian and Western as well as Japanese sources, indeed represented a real-life story that challenged and complicated received black-and-white images of Japan’s Asian wartime occupations. In a planned follow-up to this volume provisionally entitled *Anticolonial Fascism*, I shall profile the complex, ambivalent wartime history and postwar legacy of Japanese paramilitary training of Indonesians, including its troubling implications for the rise of the murderously anti-communist military dictatorship which—ironically enough in intimate alliance with now-allied Western and Japanese Cold War interests—indelibly repainted the Indonesian social and political landscape in the bloodbath of 1965.

For all its postwar resonances, however, the wartime story of Yanagawa, like those of Yoshizumi and Ichiki, was that of an exceptional Japanese Asian missionary among several tens of thousands of more unexceptional Japanese who passed through Java during the occupation period. And it was the vast majority of the rest of these, and their overwhelmingly less than superhuman wartime behavior—with some assistance from local elites—that revealed the promises of Japan’s wartime Greater Asianism to most Indonesians, in the end, as no more than a series of beautiful balloons, the epitome of

empty contradiction. As the former leading new *priyayi* Japanophile Achmad Subardjo later wrote,

Soldiers in wartime act harshly—this goes without saying. White soldiers such as the English and Australians who landed just after the surrender were harsher [than the Japanese had been] ... But the harshness of the Japanese stood out all the more, precisely because our *expectations* of Japan had been so high.³

If the early Japanese victories over the Western imperialists and their sweeping, dramatic manner added great momentum to the convergence among Japanese and Indonesian nation-builders towards the dream of a Greater Asia in March 1942, so the developments of mid-August 1945 gave a similarly powerful boost to psychological trends of distancing from Japan's wartime regime and its associated ideology among many of these same sorts of Japanese and Indonesians. The blinding light of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, the Japanese surrender on August 15, and the Indonesian declaration of independence on August 17, watershed events that followed upon one another with a dizzying rapidity reminiscent of the events of late 1941 and early 1942, confirmed imperial Japan's descent into powerlessness and irrelevance in the shaping of Asia's future as quickly and forcefully as events three and a half years earlier had seemed to confirm the opposite.

In Japan itself, all but the most diehard of imperial apologists were now compelled to acknowledge Japan's bold expansion into Asia as an unmitigated disaster. It had brought unprecedented death, destruction, and misery to the homeland, the collapse of the empire, humiliating occupation by a foreign power, and deep antipathy from Japan's prewar Western friends and Asian neighbors. The voices of many influential Japanese public figures who had been outspokenly implicated in the Greater Asian mission—men like Asano Akira and Tomizawa Uio—now fell silent; when they reemerged, most remained silent on their wartime pasts. Among both less-tainted representatives of Japan's civil society and a host of foreign observers, the public search now began to identify "What Went Wrong"—to isolate the distinctive features of Japanese society, history, and culture that had led Japan, or rather allowed Japan to be led, down the road to destruction.⁴ Many embraced Japan's defeat, and the world-historical triumph of democratic social values that it heralded, as an opportunity to attempt a wholesale reprogramming and modernization of Japanese culture and society as they saw it.⁵

Emerging in the limelight after years of repression, Japan's Marxist-Leninists now resumed long-suspended prewar debates over the definition and nature of Japan's emperor system, with many seeking the roots of Japan's modern evolution into a totalitarian state and imperialist oppressor in the semi-feudal, absolutist nature of its socio-economic system, beginning with the flaws of the Meiji settlement as an incomplete bourgeois revolution. Leading liberal political philosopher Masao Maruyama argued rather that the root of Japan's modern problems lay primarily in its essential developmental deficit in the cultural realm, in the persistence of subservient, feudal modes of thinking in which the political and the moral/religious were inextricably intertwined. These modes of thinking, dating back to Tokugawa and earlier times and

held in place and reinforced under the powerful prewar emperor system, had allowed no room for the development of an independent relationship of state and society that Maruyama saw as the historical key to social progress in the modern West. The muddled, essentially immodern nature of Japanese thought, he argued, was reflected in the “lack of a solid conceptual structure” in Japanese wartime “ultra-nationalist” ideology, which had “emerged instead in the form of shrill slogans such as ‘The Eight Corners of the World under One Roof.’” That these illogical, empty slogans had been effective in mobilizing the population was proof of the general Japanese psychological entrapment in “a many-layered, though invisible” ultra-nationalist net.⁶

Among Indonesia's new *priyayi*, now attempting to remobilize themselves and their new nation for the inevitable showdown with the returning Dutch imperialists, a similar process of retrospective narrative distancing was underway. The interests of the self and of Indonesia as a modern, progressive, liberal, universalistic, egalitarian, social, free nation were cast in inherent contrast to those of wartime Japan and its representatives as fascist, repressive, backward-looking, primitive, cynical, racist, and imperialist. Any Japanese wartime claims to the contrary were rejected as just so much “Japanese scheming and trickery” (*Tipoe moeslihat Jepang*), vividly confirmed in retrospect by the banning of the *merah-putih* flag shortly upon arrival, the failure to grant independence for the entire duration of the war, the depraved conduct of the Japanese rank-and-file and the hyper-exploitation to which Japan had subjected Indonesia and its people, doing “more damage in three and a half years than the Dutch had managed in three hundred fifty.”⁷

The result of these converging, overdetermining binary narratives of distancing and separation, which mutually reinforced one another in the assumption of an essential Japanese underdevelopment as a modern nation, was, in effect, a severing of wartime Japanese culture and ideology from its modern historical context. The severing consisted of several components. One was sociological, involving the disconnection and reification of an essentialized Japanese culture as a variable relatively independent of the changing social conditions in which it evolved and of which it was a product. Another was geographical, an obscuring of the dialectical inter-relationships between social and ideological developments in wartime Japan and those of the rest of the prewar and wartime world. A third component was chronological, i.e. an obscuring of the place these developments occupied in a lengthier trajectory of change and continuity in modern Asian and global social and cultural history spanning the twentieth century.

The effect of these sorts of tropes upon the historical imagination in postwar Indonesia—as well as in other nation-building, postwar Asian societies in which similar black-and-white narratives of wartime oppression and resistance evolved—was a similar disconnection of wartime experience from the flow and context of history. Here, however, the end result was almost always positive: the Japanese occupation appeared almost exclusively as part of a foreordained parable of national birth and triumph, a brief but intensive “Prelude to Independence,” in which—“just as I predicted” (Sukarno)—the evils of Japanese fascism pushed the Indonesian nation to the material and psychological breaking point, but also in so doing unified its anti-imperialist popular aspirations, honing it for rebound like a fiery boomerang in the face of the returning Dutch.

The binary, mutually-exclusive national “us” versus imperialist “them” categorization that structured Indonesian narratives of experience under Japanese occupation was characteristic of postcolonial histories of nation-building generally. But in the Indonesian case at least, the distancing effort—the sharpness and definition of the black-and-white—was more extreme vis-à-vis the Japanese than generally seen, for example, in historical narratives of prewar resistance, struggle, and interaction with the Dutch. The most ready explanation for this phenomenon lay in the exceptionally high objective level of suffering the Japanese wartime regime inflicted upon Indonesian society as a whole, as well as the high level of cultural friction precipitated by Japanese wartime behavior. One might also cite the historical hindsight factor, i.e. that history belonged to the winners. While wartime Japan appeared in the eyes of many nation-building observers to represent the wave of the Asian future during the occupation years, Japan’s thoroughgoing defeat at Allied hands had consigned the Japanese wartime empire, and the Greater Asian visions associated with it, to the dustbin of history. In contrast, while ambiguous feelings about the Western former imperialists remained among Asia’s postcolonial elites, it was clear that they and their ideals were now in step with the global times.

But there were also more politically sensitive factors informing the particular intensity with which Indonesian historical chroniclers generally dissociated their nation and themselves from Japan and its wartime regime. Conveniently obscured in accounts of the occupation pitting unified nation against unified nation were the great discrepancies and inequities in how wartime burdens had been distributed among the community of occupied themselves, principally along lines of socio-economic class.⁸ Accounts of nation versus nation also served to obfuscate the related “grey areas” of overlapping interests and identifications that linked Japanese occupier with Indonesian occupied, overlaps in fact deepest between Japan’s Greater Asian missionaries and those among the nation-building social classes from which independent Indonesia’s subsequent political elites—and the writers of history—largely emerged. This study has represented an attempt to re-illuminate some of these grey areas consigned to postwar history’s overlapping shadows.

While I have chosen to close my account with the ending of the Japanese occupation in August 1945, Greater Asia’s history did not stop here. In some social locations within Japan, the wartime version of Greater East Asia remained in fossilized form. To the present day, the families and descendants of war veterans, along with right-wing nationalists, continue to put forward Japan’s Greater Asian case in much the way it had been made in the 1930s and 1940s: Japan’s battle represented one of Asian right and morality against Western might and depravity, of Asian liberation versus Western imperial oppression. They dismiss the great postwar taints upon Japan’s wartime empire as the product of victor’s justice and political opportunism among Japan’s competitors and enemies. Japan’s resurgence as economic success story in the late 1970s and 1980s, and the resultant slew of positive reevaluations of Japanese culture as its explanation both in and outside of Japan, put wind in the revisionist sails. But revisionism’s strongest postwar ascent has occurred in the last quarter century, as Japanese society confronted a new identity crisis in the form of seemingly unending post-industrial stagnation and recession, and as reparations claims from citizens’

groups such as former comfort women and forced laborers in surrounding Asian countries grew in volume. In this context, revisionist opinion became more assertive, penetrating increasingly into the mainstream of opinion via such vehicles as the best-selling cartoon series of Kobayashi Yoshinori (1993–) and slick commercial films like *Pride* (1998)—a depiction of the Tokyo war crimes trials taking defendant Tōjō Hideki as its hero—as well as the film *Murudeka* noted above.

To highlight these sorts of survivals of Greater Asianism in the postwar is nothing new. Official spokesmen for Japan's Asian neighbors, led by the PRC and the Koreans, along with scholars, veterans, and other interested groups the world over, reacted with indignation and alarm at the spectre of a resurgent Japanese nationalism reflected in the influence of revisionist views in areas from school textbooks to popular culture. But if this study has anything new to offer on these issues, it is that an effective critique of these glowing Greater Asian narratives must move beyond reversed black-and-white caricatures of Japanese wartime ideology as the antithesis of everything modern, progressive, and enlightened. An informed critique of Greater Asianism requires an understanding of its subtle and sophisticated appeals, its multi-valent, deceptively all-inclusive, radical yet conservative, and thoroughly modern political nature.

To a degree, Greater Asianism shared these traits with fascism generally, a fact rarely acknowledged in global postwar memory, which, in the wake of the undeniable disasters wrought by fascist regimes in both wartime Europe and Asia, depicted fascism simply as the most extreme form of backward-looking right-wing fanaticism, synonymous with conservative reaction, cynicism, racism, and barbarism.⁹ While Greater Asianism shared fascism's combination of anticapitalism, anticommunism, social corporatism, and racial, cultural, and gender-essentialism, its distinctive trump cards in the context of the advance into Southeast Asia were its ability not only to claim a natural affinity with Asia's populations based upon shared race, culture, and history, but also to associate itself with history's most progressive forces in battle against the hypocritical, anti-progressive (racist, oppressive, exploitative, feudal) imperial regimes of a common Western enemy.

It was this mix—and the way that it seemed to address a range of shared dilemmas, to offer an idealized means of transcending the dislocations associated with capitalist modernization in non-Western societies in a Western-dominated world—that fueled the appeal of Greater Asia across Japanese-Indonesian and other Asian boundaries in the prewar and wartime eras, particularly among Asia's nation-building bourgeoisies. And while by August 1945 all but the most committed of Japanese emperor-centered die-hards were forced to acknowledge Japan's wartime version of Greater Asia as a failure, these transnational questions remained as prominent as ever. Shorn of its Japan-centrism, the broader appeals of Asianism as a harmonious non-Western alternative to the chaos and social tension of capitalist modernity—a discourse which had peaked during the war years, but which in any event had its roots in a longer transnational historical trajectory of national identity-building—continued to influence and inform the ideological landscape of postwar Asia.

In postwar Japan, there were other, more subtle voices of Asianism besides those of the revisionists, voices from the Left and center as well as from the Right. While rejecting the prejudices of the war period, spokesmen both of the Japanese political

and economic establishment and the leftist opposition, each eager in their own ways to re-establish themselves and their nation in Asia after the wartime debacle, offered a variety of updated constructions of a Japanese Asian identity in step with Japan's postwar ideals of peace, prosperity, and democracy. During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, leading left-wing and progressive figures sought a new identity for Japan in rejecting ties with the United States and joining forces with Asia's newly independent young nations as a member of the non-aligned movement. The rise of Japan to first-world status and economic "miracle" from the late 1970s brought a revival of notions of a distinctive, alternative "Japanese model" of capitalist socio-economic development based upon a selective mix of advanced modern technology, state guidance, and Eastern cultural values that echoed some of the rhetoric of the 1930s and 1940s. Among Japan's political and intellectual mainstream, concern for the sensibilities of Japan's Asian neighbors and postwar Western-centrism represented hindering factors in the extension of this sort of discourse into a full-blown Asianism of the prewar and wartime sort. But in the early 1990s, with the appearance of the "Asian Tigers" and their own discourses of "Asian Values," emboldened Japanese spokesmen such as the Foreign Affairs Ministry Economic Affairs Bureau chief Ogura Kazuo reached the point of calling for a "restoration" of the ancient, communal "Asian spirit" as a possible global antidote to the social dislocations wrought by excessive "industrialization and Americanization." Strikingly, Ogura's 1993 "Call for a New Concept of Asia" suggested some less-than-novel sources from which to begin reconstruction: the works of Okakura Tenshin and Rabindranath Tagore.¹⁰

As Southeast Asia's prewar and wartime subelite classes of would-be nation-builders climbed into the postwar position of elite nation-builders, Asianism made the journey with them, returning in various guises, mobilized now mostly in the form of an elite, conservative discourse of order-maintenance against both foreign and domestic opposition. The most obvious example of this was the "Asian Values" discourse championed from the 1980s onward by the political and intellectual elites of such societies as Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, who attributed the postwar economic success stories of theirs and other Asian societies—including Japan, Taiwan, and Korea—to the existence of shared Eastern cultural traits. Figures such as Mahatir Mohammad and Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (son of wartime *Asia Raya* editor Abdullah Salim Alatas) argued that their societies were pursuing an alternative, harmonious Eastern model of modern development based upon a combination of the respective strengths of Western technology and indigenous cultural traditions, upon which the imposition of Western notions of universal individual human rights, gender equality, and democratic values represented little more than cultural imperialism.

At more subtle levels, there was more of "Greater Asia" remaining in postwar Southeast Asia than in just these obvious examples, however. As one suggestive illustration, I close with a brief examination of this phenomenon in the origins of that presumably most quintessentially Indonesian of documents, Sukarno's national-foundational text the *Pantja Sila*. Composed in late May 1945 and presented in a lengthy speech at the first session of the National Independence Preparation Committee on June 1, 1945—a bit more than two months before the Japanese surrender—the malleable *Pantja Sila*, interpreted with varying emphases, survived and blossomed as Indonesia's

official national ideology not only throughout the twenty years of Sukarno's presidency but beyond its bloody downfall, remaining equally prominent under the conservative Suharto regime and the two decades since its own demise. To the present day, the *Pantja Sila* continues to fire the imaginations of Indonesia's nation-building classes—if perhaps not necessarily those of the much larger proportion of Indonesia's population who enjoyed only a trickle of Indonesia's developmental progress under either regime, and continue to bear the brunt of Indonesia's socio-economic ups and downs.

An exploration of continuities between wartime Greater Asianism and the *Pantja Sila* is of particular relevance not only because of the *Pantja Sila*'s influence and staying power, but because it was consistently treated by official and scholarly observers throughout the postwar as a kind of museum piece, a transcendent creation both nationalistic and universal, essentially unaffected by its wartime place and time. In a 1950 introduction to an English translation of Sukarno's original speech, minister of information of the newly independent republic Arnold Mononutu presented the interpretation that remained the norm: "Though the principles laid down in Panjasila were enunciated during the Japanese occupation, they are, in fact, the nucleus of Indonesian philosophy dating far back from the earliest periods of the Indonesian national movement for independence."¹¹ In his standard 1967 study of Indonesian nationalism under the Japanese occupation, historian George Kanahele wrote of Sukarno's *Pantja Sila* speech, "in this singular revelation, Soekarno showed that even after three years of intimate contact with Japanese officials and almost total immersion in Japanese propaganda, he remained ideologically untouched by it all."¹² The *Pantja Sila* appeared as the preeminent symbol of Indonesian distancing from Japan.

Indeed, given its place and time—and given Sukarno's previous penchant for pro-Japanese posturing, strategic or otherwise—the *Pantja Sila* and the speech in which it was originally unveiled were characterized both by a striking absence of references to Japan and a bold embracing of values and ideals not generally associated with the Japanese wartime regime. Both Sukarno's plea for immediate independence and the formulation of the *Pantja Sila* itself—with its principles of Indonesia as a single unified national republic, internationalism, democracy, social justice, and freedom of religious belief—could be read to reflect the influence of Sukarno's extensive exchanges with the increasingly restless anti-Japanese *pemoeda*. At one point in his original speech, Sukarno acknowledged as much by referring to the "two million youth" who had "conveyed to me their cry" for "a Free Indonesia, now!"¹³ At the same time, Sukarno was at pains to stress these aspirations, and the *Pantja Sila*'s origins, as nothing new at all, but rather as ideals that he had been striving for since the earliest beginnings of the nationalist movement.

But while Sukarno's speech, as the historian Kanahele maintained, was indeed "void of any sycophantic allusions to Dai Nippon," and appeared to contain "nothing of the propaganda of *Hakoo Ichiu*, the Co-prosperity Sphere or the Greater East Asia War which heretofore Soekarno had faithfully parroted," a closer reading suggests that it did not represent a wholesale abandonment of many of the aspects of Greater Asianism to which Sukarno had originally been drawn (and which he had not in any case so much "parroted" as interpreted to his own purposes).¹⁴ An analysis of Sukarno's *Pantja Sila* for its quotient of Asianist tenets more broadly defined—i.e. minus its explicit Japan

component—reveals continuities not only with prewar nationalist ideology, but also with that of the Japanese occupation period as well.

Resonant with Greater Asianism, for example, was Sukarno's resort to what he characterized as the most modern of scientific methods to simultaneously adduce the existence of a natural, essential, unchanging Indonesian cultural and racial identity and to link this to a specific geographical space. In his lengthy explication of *Pantja Sila's* first principle, nationalism, Sukarno began by citing Otto Bauer's definition of a nation as "a community of character (*Charaktergemeinschaft*) which comes into being as a community of fate (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*)."¹⁵ He added to this Ernst Renan's definition of the requirement for a nation as "the will to unite." But these alone, said Sukarno, were insufficient and "out of date," because in their day "there had not yet emerged a new science, a new knowledge, called geopolitics."

Men and place cannot be separated! ... God Almighty made a map of the world, created a map of the world. If we look at the map of the world, we can show where the "entities" are there. Even a child, if he looks at the map of the world, can show that the Indonesian Archipelago forms one entity ... the Indonesian people are all the human beings who, according to geopolitics ordained by God Almighty, live throughout the entity of the entire Archipelago from the northern tip of Sumatra to Papua!¹⁵

Sukarno's discovery of geopolitics might be traced to the *Sendenhan's* Bekki Atsuhiko, who had published and presented widely in Java during the occupation, and who had joined Sukarno on the staff of the New Generation Residence Hall. It is also possible that Sukarno, like Bekki, had come to geopolitics independently, via the German route.¹⁶ The argument here, in any case, is that Sukarno's reproduction of discourses of divinely ordained national cultural and racial essences, and his resort to geopolitics to substantiate them, represented an ideological continuity, and an apparent evolution, *across* the war: the continued overlap between the Greater Asian worldview and that of Indonesian nationalism, even as Japan itself receded from view.

Ambiguities of continuity and change with wartime Greater Asianism appeared among the other principles of the *Pantja Sila* as well. Sukarno's description of internationalism, for example, appeared at one point as the "unity and brotherhood of the whole world," at another as a striving to create "one family of all nations." International brotherhood was proclaimed, while at the same time national essences remained sacred and inviolate.

But when I say internationalism, I do not mean cosmopolitanism, which does not recognize nationalism, which says there is no Indonesia, no Japan, no Burma, no England, no America and so on. Internationalism cannot flower if it is not rooted in the soil of nationalism.

Passages relating to principles three and four—"democracy, or consent," and "social justice," elsewhere described as "prosperity," suggested further intersections with Greater Asia.

Gentlemen, if we are seeking democracy, the need is not for the democracy of the West, but for conferring [that] which brings life, which is politico-economic democracy, able to bring about social prosperity ... Do we want a free Indonesia where capitalists bear sway, or where the entire people prosper, where every man has enough to eat, enough to wear, live in prosperity, feel cherished by the homeland that gives him sufficient keep?¹⁷

It was the closing of Sukarno's speech, however, that represented the most compelling site of seeming Greater Asian-nationalist intersection. Here Sukarno suggested to the committee that the five principles of *Pantja Sila* could in fact be reduced to one, expressed in

a genuine Indonesian term, the term "gotong rojong" (mutual cooperation). The State of Indonesia, which we are to establish, should be a state of mutual cooperation. How fine that is! A Gotong Rojong state!

Gotong-royong, Sukarno continued, was "a dynamic conviction, more dynamic than 'brotherhood'" ...

Gotong Rojong means toiling hard together, sweating hard together, a struggle of help-me-to-help-you together. The piety of all for the interest of all. Come-on-pull-together for the interest of all! ... The principle of Gotong Rojong between the rich and the poor, between the Muslim and the Christian, between those not originally from Indonesia and their children who become Indonesians. This, gentlemen, is what I propose to you.¹⁸

It was the vision of a modern non-Western nation which, through a reawakening to a genuinely indigenous system of communal cultural values, might somehow enjoy the full benefits of Western capitalist modernity without its rival classes, without its social tensions—without its contradictions. The sort of vision that continues to hold many an Asian nation-building imagination—Left, Right, and center—in its spell.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 H.B. Jassin was wartime editor of the Indonesian arts and culture magazine *Pandji Poestaka*. Quote from H.B. Jassin, *Kesusastaaran Indonesia di Masa Jepang* (Jakarta: Balai Poestaka, Sixth printing, 1991), p. 15. “All the World as One Household” is an English approximation of Jassin’s Indonesian translation of *Hakkō ichiu* (“Seluruh Dunia Satu Rumah Tangga”). The standard English translation of *Hakkō ichiu* is “all the world under one roof.”
- 2 Machida Keiji, *Tatakau bunka butai* (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1967), p. 28.
- 3 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, *Report of the Working Group for Asia and the Far East*, Supp. 10 (1947), pp. 13–14. The same source estimated deaths in the rest of the archipelago at a further one million.
- 4 The term “rampage” is taken from Nicolas Tarling, *A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1941–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); “not fully modern” is a classification of interwar Japanese society found in the history textbook by John Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert Craig, *East Asia in Transition*, revised edition (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), p. 724, long a standard in the English-speaking world; “semi-feudal” was a designation for interwar Japanese society and culture applied by many Marxist scholars as well the extremely influential progressive scholar Maruyama Masao during and in the early decades after the interwar period. See Maruyama Masao, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism” and “The Ideology and Dynamics of Japanese Facism,” in Ivan Morris, trans., *Thought and Behavior in Japanese Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). On Marxist scholarship see, for example, Germaine Hoston, *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) and Andrew Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).
- 5 On Japan see, for example, Sheldon Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987) and *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), along with Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); on other places see, for example, Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century* (London: Abacus, 1995), particularly chapter 4, “The Fall of Liberalism,” pp. 109–141, and Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1998), particularly chapter 4, “The Crisis of Capitalism,” pp. 104–137.
- 6 See, for example, Miles Fletcher, *Intellectuals and Fascism in Japan* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Yoshiaki Yoshimi, *Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People*, trans. Ethan Mark (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2015), originally published as *Kusa no ne no fashizumu: Nihon minshū no sensō taiken* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1987); Gregory Kasza, *The State and*

- the Mass Media in Japan, 1918–1945* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Garon, *Molding*; Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and The Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Barack Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2006); *The Culture of Japanese Fascism*, ed. Alan Tansman (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009); and Kenneth Ruoff, *Imperial Japan at Its Zenith: The Wartime Celebration of the Empire's 2,600th Anniversary* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
- 7 For conventional treatments of the cultural history of Japan's wartime occupation of Indonesia see, for example, Mas Slamet, *Japanese Souls in Indonesian Bodies* (Batavia: s.n., 1946); Achmad Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams* (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), in particular p. 156; George Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), in particular chapter 4; Theodore Friend, *The Blue-Eyed Enemy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), in particular pp. 60–61; William Frederick, *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1988), in particular p. 97; Grant K. Goodman, "Introduction," in Grant K. Goodman, ed., *Japanese Cultural Policies in Southeast Asia during World War 2* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Satō Shigeru, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994), in particular pp. 12–21, and *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia*, eds. Robert Cribb and Li Narangoa (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute for Asian Studies, 2003), in particular p. 8. In recent years, a series of works dealing with the cultural history of Pan-Asianism by scholars such as Prasenjit Duara, Sven Saaler, and Cemil Aydin have taken its appeals both to Japanese and (to a limited extent) non-Japanese much more seriously, but none have considered the Indonesian or Southeast Asian wartime experience in this regard.
- 8 For critical explorations of this history elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region, see, for example, Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) and Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). For a recent African and European inflection of this history, see, for example, Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).

Chapter 1

- 1 The term *bunkajin* refers to purveyors of modern culture generally, including writers, artists, musicians, journalists, etc.
- 2 Asano Akira, *Jawa kantei yowa* (Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 1944, reprint, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1996), p. 23, and Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 28. The ship carrying the 16th Army's commander General Imamura Hitoshi was also sunk. On popular enthusiasm for the Greater East Asia War at its outset, see, for example, Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Kusa no ne no fashizumu* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1987), pp. 77–78.
- 3 Some propaganda squad members in the West Java contingent landed at Merak, rather than Banten. Other contingents landed at Surabaya and at Palembang in Sumatra. The

- one casualty was a correspondent for the Mainichi newspaper. Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 55–59, 73, 102.
- 4 Tomizawa Uio, quoted in Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 62.
 - 5 Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, p. 26.
 - 6 Asano Akira, et al., “Seisen jūgun—‘Kiraikan ari’ zadankai,” *Bungei shunju genchi hōkoku*, December 1938, p. 64. Tomizawa (b. 1902), had been 1935 cowinner of the acclaimed Akutagawa prize for fiction. Asano (b. 1901), a graduate of the law department of the ultra-prestigious Tokyo Imperial University and a member of the nationalist literary group the Japanese Romanticists (*Nihon rōmanha*), was known for cultural and literary criticism.
 - 7 Asano Akira, “Shina no jōheki,” *Shisō*, November 1938, pp. 108–112. Tomizawa even went so far as to describe China as “a grand place for a young man to die.” Asano et al., “Seisen,” p. 61.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, p. 64.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, pp. 76–77.
 - 10 Tomizawa Uio, *Tōyō* (Tokyo: Nitsubon shobō, 1939); Asano Akira, *Okakura Tenshin ronkō* (“Okakura Tenshin: A Study”) (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1939), and *Tōyō no risō* (Osaka: Sōgensha, 1939) (Translation of Okakura, *Ideals of the East*, 1903). As with his other works, Okakura’s *Ideals of the East*, which touted Asia’s cultural glory and unity, had originally been written in English and aimed at inducing respect from a Western audience.
 - 11 At the same time, Kamiizumi maintained that China’s villages and peasants were “completely different from those of Japan in their thinking and ways of life,” and that it was clear that Japan would not succeed simply by “transferring her own experience” to China. Kamiizumi Hidenobu, “Kore kara no bōkyōsen,” *Bungei shunju genchi hōkoku*, December 1938, p. 65.
 - 12 See Andrew Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), and Henry Smith, *Japan’s First Student Radicals* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
 - 13 See, for example, Harootunian, *Overcome*, and Bernard S. Silberman, “Conclusion: Taisho Japan and the Crisis of Secularism,” in Harry Harootunian and Bernard S. Silberman, eds., *Japan in Crisis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 437–454.
 - 14 See, for example, Kita Ikki’s 1919 “Plan for the Reorganization of Japan,” Ōkawa Shūmei’s 1924 *Fukkō ajia no shomondai*, and Takahashi Kamekichi’s late 1920s writings on “Petty Imperialism.” Despite great differences among them, each of these highly influential texts were profoundly informed by Marxist-Leninist worldviews and categories, even as each characterized the Japanese case as an exception to the standard Marxist-Leninist model. On these texts and their political impact, see, for example, George O. Wilson, *Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Ōtsuka Takehiro, *Ōkawa Shūmei: Aru fukkōshugisha no shisō* (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1995), and Germain Hoston, “Marxism and Japanese Expansionism: Takahashi Kamekichi and the Theory of ‘Petty Expansionism,’” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 10:1 (1984), pp. 1–30.
 - 15 It should be noted that Japan had already been experiencing problems of economic instability, grossly uneven economic development and stagnation years before the world depression of 1929. The depression brought these problems to a head. See, for example, Hugh T. Patrick, “The Economic Muddle of the 1920s,” in James William Morley, ed., *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).

- 16 As an example, see Robert K. Hall, trans., *Kokutai no hongi* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949). See also Kenneth J. Ruoff, *Imperial Japan At Its Zenith: The Wartime Celebration of the Empire's 2600th Anniversary* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
- 17 Western ideas and culture were described in these years as a superficial veneer, or even as so much "dandruff" which, with proper treatment, could be brushed off to reveal the Japanese essence underneath. See Tsurumi Shunsuke, *An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Inc., 1986), p. 31 and the cartoon image in John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 191.
- 18 Cited in John Gunther, *Inside Asia* (New York, NY: Harpers, 1939), pp. 49–50.
- 19 See, for example, Crowley, "Intellectuals as Visionaries," in Morley, ed. *Dilemmas of Growth*, and Fletcher, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
- 20 "The terminology is often bewilderingly reminiscent of the Moscow *Pravda*—though communism in Japan is a crime," observed journalist John Gunther of army propaganda pamphlets issued at the time, "and it borrows heavily from the totalitarian doctrine of the Fascist states. The prevailing spirit is of a vigorous dislike of communism and capitalism both." Gunther, *Inside Asia*, p. 50.
- 21 On this commonality with European fascism, see, for example, Miwa Yasushi, *Nihon fashizumu to rōdō undo* (Tokyo: Azekura shobō, 1988), p. 12. In contrast to German and Italian fascisms, Miwa points to the relative predominance of state actors and weakness and dependency of civil society actors in the case of "Japanese fascism."
- 22 Examining opinion surveys of young army recruits conducted by the Ministry of Education in early 1940, Yoshimi Yoshiaki found that "graduates of teacher-training schools (*shihan gakkō*) were the most cooperative and sympathetic to the war, followed by graduates of middle schools (*chūgakkō*), trade schools (*jitsugyō gakkō*) and youth schools (*seinen gakkō*). These 'persons with the educational background to be in the Japanese middle class of the future' represented the core support of Japan's war." Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne*, pp. 23–24.
- 23 See, for example, Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.
- 24 By the mid-1930s, Japanese trade had surpassed that between the Indies and the Netherlands itself. Gotō Ken'ichi, *Kindai Nihon to Indonesia: "koryū" hyakunenshi* (Tokyo: Hokuju Shuppan, 1989).
- 25 See Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
- 26 On the use of the term "corporatist" in this regard, see Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, "Facism and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept," *Journal of Asian Studies* 39:1 (November 1979), pp. 65–76.
- 27 In 1920s and 1930s Japan, overpopulation was commonly regarded as a major cause of Japan's economic problems, particularly in the countryside. This perception prompted large-scale emigration programs to Manchuria, which continued from the 1930s until the end of the war. Few Japanese, however, proved eager to go, leading by the early 1940s to an increasingly coercive transmigration regime, on the receiving end of which were mostly social undesirables who could offer the least resistance: landless peasants at the bottom end of the rural social ladder. See Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, chapters 7–9.
- 28 See, for example, Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, chapter 5. One of the new capitalist mavericks was Yoshisuke Aikawa, president of the Manchuria Industrial Development

- Corporation, favored by the Kwantung Army over the older, established South Manchuria Railway Company. See Gunther, *Inside Asia*, p. 91.
- 29 See Sakuramoto Tomio, *Bunkajin tachi no daitōa sensō* (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1993), pp. 29–37, for an extensive list of *bunkajin* publications resulting from their tours in China.
- 30 Expansion into Manchuria itself was, of course, not without its price. Internationally, it cost Japan its support at the League of Nations, and led to its highly-publicized withdrawal from that body in January 1933. See, for example, Ōuchi Tsutomu, *Fashizumu e no michi* (Series: Nihon no rekishi, vol. 24, Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1967), p. 354.
- 31 See, for example, Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*.
- 32 Mabuchi Itsuo, *Hōdō sensen* (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1940), pp. 191–196. Chinese nationalist efforts were largely credited for turning American public opinion strongly against Japan.
- 33 Although the Japanese use of the term “holy war” is best known in reference to the Pacific War (1941–5) against the Allied powers, it was already in use with regard to the war in China at least as early as 1938.
- 34 This notion of uniting all the “races” of Asia “under one roof” was often referred to as *Hakkō ichiu*, a term credited to the ancient emperor Jimmu, which was in usage among right-wing circles at least as early as the early 1930s, and first officially propagated under Education Minister (General) Araki’s “spiritual mobilization” program in August 1938. Ben-Ami Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). A discussion of *hakkō ichiu* appears in chapter 4, part 1.
- 35 My wording here takes inspiration from Harry Harootunian’s neat paraphrasing of Slavoj Žižek’s characterization of fascism as “Capitalism without Capitalism,” in *Overcome by Modernity*, p. xxx. For Žižek’s discussion see *They Know Not What They Do* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 186.
- 36 See, for example, Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) and Norman Smith, “Regulating Chinese Women’s Sexuality during the Japanese Occupation of Manchuria: Reading between the Lines of Wu Ying’s ‘Yu’ (Lust) and Yang Xu’s *Wo de riji* (My Diary),” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 13:1 (January 2004), pp. 49–70.
- 37 While nationalist, communist, and mass resistance to the Japanese in China was intense, Greater East Asianism did gain a limited number of Chinese adherents. See, for example, Akira Iriye, “Toward a New Cultural Order: The Hsin-Min Hui,” in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
- 38 “Sekidōhō” editorial section (Shimizu Nobuo), *Unabara*, July 2, 1942, p. 1.
- 39 Tomizawa Uio, “Waga shina hōsaku” (“My China policy”), *Shinchō*, March 1939, pp. 186–187.
- 40 On initial popular support for the war see Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne*, pp. 21–22.
- 41 See, for example, Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne*, and John Hunter Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 56.
- 42 On conflicting Japanese historical attitudes towards China in the modern period, see, for example, Donald Keene, “The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan,” in Donald Shively, ed., *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971). On the Tokugawa period (1600–1867), see, for example, Harry Harootunian, “The Functions of China in

- Tokugawa Thought,” in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
- 43 This analysis continued to have postwar circulation, although it is now clear that the Japanese command was complicit in the rampant misbehavior and cruelty of the troops in the field, in failing, for example, to establish proper supply lines for its troops, in its racist attitudes toward the Chinese citizenry, in its support for the exploitation of “comfort women,” and in its regular ignoring or even encouraging of misbehavior. On the complicity of the Japanese command, see, for example, Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne*, pp. 43, 45, 54, 63. On the shortage of Japanese rank-and-file enlightenment, see, for example, Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 21.
- 44 On Saitō and popular responses, see Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne*, pp. 42–43, and Earl H. Kinmonth, “The Mouse that Roared: Saito Takao, Conservative Critic of Japan’s ‘Holy War’ in China,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 25:2 (Summer 1999), pp. 331–360.
- 45 Typical was Tomizawa Uio’s 1939 observation that “our present problems in China differ little from those we faced in Korea thirty years ago.” These problems, he argued, were fundamentally a result of “misunderstandings and a mutual lack of comprehension.” If the problem was at least rhetorically acknowledged to be “mutual,” however, its actual solution was to be unilateral: Tomizawa proposed implementing a “cultural policy” in China (*bunka hōsaku*) whose central thrust would be a “language policy” (*genko hōsaku*) of the sort which had been “key” in Korea and Taiwan—in sum, a mass indoctrination in the Japanese tongue. Tomizawa, “Waga taishi hōsaku,” *Shinchō*, March 1939, pp. 185–188.
- 46 See, for example, Mark Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 311–312.
- 47 Hashikawa Bunsō, “Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Coprosperity,” in Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese*, p. 350, and John Hunter Boyle, *Japan and China at War, 1937–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 46–47.
- 48 Shimizu Hitoshi, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” in Forum for Research Materials on the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia, ed., *Shōgenshū Nihon senryōka Indonesia* (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1991), pp. 297–298.
- 49 See, for example, Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji*, pp. 323–325.
- 50 Boyle, *Japan and China at War, 1937–1945*, pp. 46–47, 53, and Gotō Ken’ichi, *Hi no umi no bohyō: aru ajishugisha no ryūten to kiketsu* (Tokyo: Jijishimpōsha, 1977), p. 142.
- 51 Hashikawa Bunsō, “Japanese Perspectives,” p. 353.
- 52 This experience and its ambiguities are insightfully explored in Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, pp. 268–303.
- 53 On the *Shōwa kenkyūkai*, see Crowley, “Intellectuals as Visionaries of the New Asian Order,” in Morley, ed., *Dilemmas of Growth*, and Fletcher, *Search for a New Order*.
- 54 Fletcher, *Search for a New Order*, p. 112.
- 55 On growing domestic suffering under economic controls and signs of war weariness in the years 1940–1, see Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne*, pp. 75–78, including a revealing reference to a “growing” rate of failure to report among Japanese civilian draftees, a rate that had reached as high as 20–30 percent by October 1941. The loss of invaluable young male family laborers to the draft, observes Yoshimi, was a severe blow, resented by many. In the field, however, former Java *PETA* trainer Morimoto Takeshi, who served as a foot soldier in the Japanese army in China before his later transfer to Java, remarked that from his perspective there was no questioning of the war’s aims among his Japanese colleagues, even as the war dragged on. Personal interview with Morimoto Takeshi, Tokyo, July 3, 1997.
- 56 Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne*, pp. 75–78. See also p. 46, note no. 2.

Chapter 2

- 1 As Reto Hoffman writes, “Recognizable fascist movements were springing up seemingly everywhere, its members donning a rainbow of shirts—white in Syria, green in Egypt, blue in China, orange in South Africa, gold in Mexico. Politically, Hitler took office in Germany in 1933; in China, Chiang Kai-shek launched the New Life Movement (1934) to counter socialism, liberalism, and democracy; two years later, Spain’s Francisco Franco staged a military coup with the support of the right-wing Falange movement.” Reto Hoffman, *The Fascist Effect: Japan and Italy 1915–1952* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). On China see also Maggie Clinton, *Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925–1937* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017).
- 2 For more on Yusuf Hasan see Masuda Ato, “Indoneshijain no Nihonkan” [Indonesian views of Japan], *Shakai Kagaku Tokyu* 20:2–3 (March 1975), pp. 97–134.
- 3 Text of Indonesian-language speech broadcast on Radio Tokyo, published in *Pemandangan*, March 27, 1942, p. 1.
- 4 The estimates are from Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 215–216.
- 5 See, for example, Harry Benda, “Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia,” in Harry Benda, ed., *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1972).
- 6 Lecture by William Roff, Columbia University, Autumn 1990.
- 7 Javanese, lit. the “younger brothers” of a prince. Bernhard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1971), p. 7.
- 8 Kahin, *Nationalism*, p. 32.
- 9 See Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, p. 35. Heather Sutherland points out that in pre-Dutch times, too, membership in the *priyayi* ruling elite was not based exclusively upon birth, but also upon merit and other factors. It was the Dutch who interpreted the native class system, and *pangreh praja* status as local rulers, in rigid hierarchical terms, in the process helping to undermine the *pangreh praja*’s social legitimacy and flexibility. See Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite* (Singapore: Heinemann Books, 1979).
- 10 Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, pp. 34–51.
- 11 A union between Dr. Soetomo’s party of “Indonesian Unity” (*Persatoean Bangsa Indonesia* or PBO) and the longstanding *Boedi Oetomo*, *Parindra* (in long form the *Partai Indonesia Raya* or “Great Indonesia Party”) was founded in early 1936.
- 12 For many among the “native” elite at least, Dutch intransigence in this period was symbolized by the Dutch response to a 1936 petition by a leading representative of the *pangreh praja*, Soetardjo Hadikoesoemo. Soetardjo proposed a transition to Indies self-rule within a Dutch commonwealth, to take place after a ten-year period of tutelage. The Dutch reply, two long years in coming, constituted a flat rejection. A subsequent, sustained campaign for the granting of legislative powers to the Volksraad led by then *Parindra* leader Mohammad Thamrin met a similar fate. See, for example, Susan Abeyasekere, *One Hand Clapping: Indonesian Nationalists and the Dutch, 1939–1942* (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976).
- 13 The establishment of such a militia had been proposed by Indonesian leaders themselves during the First World War—at which time the Dutch had rejected it.
- 14 Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, p. 80.
- 15 Johar Nur, I. T., *Arsip Nasional Oral History Collection*, Jakarta; Interviewer: Drs. Yuwono Dwi Priyantono; Interview date: August 20, 1983; Cassette IV, Side A, transcript p. 4.

- 16 Harry Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese occupation, 1942–1945* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations).
- 17 Anwar Tjokroaminoto, “Sikap Diam (A Silent Attitude),” *Pemandangan*, March 25, 1942, p. 2.
- 18 Nur, I. T., Cassette IV, Side A, transcript pp. 3–4, 8.
- 19 Nur, I. T., Cassette IV, Side A, transcript pp. 6–7.
- 20 Nur, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, p. 9.
- 21 Gotō Ken’ichi, *Showa-ki Nihon to Indonnesia: 1930-nendai nanshin no ronri Nihon-kan no keifu* (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1986), p. 348.
- 22 Sudiran Wiryowijono, aged 16 in 1942, recalled that he and other people in his village in the Madiun residency in East Java “knew that Japan was a center of fabric manufacturing, and we expected that once Japan took control, fabric would be cheap.” Wiryowijono lived in the village of Cikokoh, Magetan, Madiun Residency. Sudiran Wiryowijono, Taped Interview, *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta; Interviewer: Drs. A. Sidhi Ibrahim Buchori SH; Interview date: December 10, 1975; Cassette I Side A. Bungo Fatimah, at the time a young housewife in the East Sumatran city of Teluk Kuantan, remembered her family and the local inhabitants in general welcoming the Japanese with happiness because people believed that with the Japanese arrival, “everything would be cheap.” Bungo Fatimah, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta; Interviewer: Dr. Nur Muhammad; Interview date: December 25, 1976; Cassette I Side A, p. 2.
- 23 N. Sutan Iskandar, “Berseokattjita sadja ta’ada goenanja,” *Pandji Poestaka*, April 25, 1942, pp. 80–82.
- 24 Diary entry for August 19, 1937, in Sjahrazad (Sutan Sjahrir), *Indonesische Overpeinzingen* (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1945), p. 160.
- 25 J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1938).
- 26 The term *bangsa* has no direct equivalent in English. It encompasses the English words “race,” “people,” and “nation.” The closest direct correspondence in a Western language is the Dutch and German word “*Volk*,” a correspondence that it suggests a common origin. Where it appears in Indonesian language texts—and it does quite frequently—I have attempted to translate it into the English word that it leans closest to in a given context. Where it seems most appropriate, I have also occasionally used the word *Volk* itself.
- 27 In the aftermath of a riot that targeted Chinese in the central Javanese town of Kudus in 1918, left-wing activist Semaoen offered this incisive social commentary:

Nowadays the life of the natives is worsening; they feel that they are getting poorer and poorer but they can see for themselves that other races (*bangsa*), [particularly] the Chinese, are getting richer. [The Chinese] show off their wealth and contrast it with the poverty of the natives.

The contrast between the poverty of the natives and the wealth of the other races caused the hatred of these natives toward the rich, of whom a large number are Chinese. The hatred of the poor natives toward their rich fellow natives disappears because they belong to the same race and same religion. What is left is only their hatred toward the rich Dutch and the rich Chinese. The hatred toward the Dutch is drowned because the Dutch are the rulers and they are strong, but the hatred toward the rich Chinese has no counter-balance.

Semaoen, cited in “Peroesoehan di Koedoes dan Hal Hal Jang Berhoeboengan Dengan Itoe, III” [the Riot in Koedoes and matters related to it, III], *Sin Po*, November 15, 1918, which is in turn cited and translated in Leo Suryadinata, *Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917–1942* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976)

- 28 See, for example, Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, chapter 3.
- 29 Leo Suryadinata, “Prewar Indonesian Nationalism and the Peranakan Chinese,” *Indonesia* 11 (April 1971), pp. 83–94.
- 30 Djoeli here used the term “Kling,” a derogatory term for people from South India, another “foreign” ethnic group prominent in the retail trades, though much smaller in number than the ethnic Chinese.
- 31 Text of *Radio Tokyo* broadcast, reprinted in *Pemandangan*, March 23, 1942, p. 1.
- 32 Anwar Tjokroaminoto, “Saringan,” in *Pemandangan*, April 4, 1942, p. 1. “Jewishness” (*jahoeidism*) was not capitalized.
- 33 The debate appeared in the pages of *Parindra*’s party newspaper *Soeara Umum* and the Indonesian Chinese Party (*Partai Tionghoa Indonesia*)’s *Sin Tit Po*.
- 34 Suryadinata, “Prewar Indonesian Nationalism.”
- 35 Kaneko Keizo report, cited in Bob Hering, *M.H. Thamrin and his Quest for Indonesian Nationhood, 1917–1941* (Jakarta: Yayasan Kabar Sekarang, 1996), p. 293.
- 36 Gōtō Ken’ichi, *Returning to Asia: Japan-Indonesia Relations, 1930–1942* (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1997), p. 380.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 364.
- 38 Kahin, *Nationalism*, p. 29.
- 39 Suryadinata, “Prewar Indonesian Nationalism,” p. 90.
- 40 Recent scholarship has revealed the racial and cultural discourse of Java as the historical product of a dialectic between contending political interests: the interests of the Dutch rulers in asserting and legitimizing their control as expressed in a Java-specific form of orientalism, on the one hand, and the interests of indigenous spokesmen, on the other, in asserting the existence of an autonomous identity or cultural space that could belie the fact of political subjugation. The weaving of the discourse was further propelled by overlapping interests in the suppression of Islam. Although the indigenous administrators (*pangreh praja*) were at least nominally Islamic, to the extent that Islam and its clerics represented an alternative, potentially resistant locus of social authority—a competing political force—it represented an enemy shared by both the Dutch and the Javanese *pangreh praja*. Doubly reproduced, elaborated, and reinforced in the language of both foreign colonizer and native elite, the discourse of Java attained, over time, the hegemonic status of a given, a natural fact. See Pemberton, *On the Subject of Java* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
- 41 The oft-cited turn-of-the-century letters of Raden Kartini, a young, Dutch-educated Javanese *priyayi* woman, reveal the beginnings of a discourse of native empowerment that integrated the discourse of Javanese-ness with the enlightenment values that pervaded the public and educational thinking of the late nineteenth-century Indies. Kartini combined an unshakable belief in the need for technological and cultural modernization and progress with a critique of Western practice that clearly failed to live up to these noble ideals. See Raden Adjeng Kartini, *Letters of a Javanese Princess*, translated by Agnes Louise Symmers and edited by Hildred Geertz (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964).
- 42 Specifically, Soetatmo painted a stark distinction between the “moral ‘upbringing’ (*opvoeding*) of older Javanese culture” versus the “Western” concept of “upbringing,”

which, he maintained, was “based solely on intellectual means.” See Takashi Shiraishi, “The Dispute between Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo: Pandita vs. Satria,” *Indonesia* 32 (1981), pp. 98–99. The *Boedi Oetomo* (“Noble Endeavor”) organization, founded by a handful of Western-educated lower *priyayi* medical students in Batavia in 1908 and often seen as forerunner of the Indonesian nationalist movement, offered a combination of discourses of awakening, uplift, and an interest in traditional culture. See Nagazumi Akira, *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Boedi Oetomo, 1908–1918* (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972). Of particular interest here are articles in *Boedi Oetomo*’s appropriately titled journal *Wederopbouw* (Reconstruction).

- 43 The Sriwijaya empire was centered in Sumatra, the Madjapahit in Java; neither in fact corresponded geographically to modern Indonesia as such. Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, chapter 1. On “native” explorations into “Indonesian” history in this period more generally, see Anthony Reid, “The Nationalist Quest for an Indonesian Past,” in Anthony Reid and David Marr, eds., *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979).
- 44 Leiden: Stenfort Kroese, 1934. In the late 1930s, the English colonial administrator James Furnivall revealed the hegemony of such notions in an influential study of the economy and society of the East Indies. Here Furnivall described the Indies as a “plural economy,” consisting of three racial communities separate in culture and in the economic sectors they inhabited, but united in economic inter-relationship. All three groups, he argued, had

adopted and, rightly or wrongly, are holding out capitalist principles as the norm of social life. With the Natives, as with Europeans and Chinese, economic values are emphasized more than in a homogenous western society, and far more than in a purely oriental “pre-capitalist” society.

(Furnivall, p. 457)

- 45 See, for example, Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, translated by Charles Francis Atkinson, 2 vols. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926–8).
- 46 For an example of this sort of thinking in Japanese popular culture in the China War years, see, for example, the opening sequence of the film *Yokusato banri* (沃里万里), 1940.
- 47 One passage from another of J.H. Boeke’s articles “Auto-activiteit naast autonomie,” for example, made such an impression on Mohammad Hatta that he cited it verbatim in a 1933 essay, and again in a 1944 report on the wartime “Putera” movement addressed to the Japanese commander, introducing it in the latter as “the clear and accurate picture provided by Professor Boeke,” which Hatta said he “took as his starting point” for devising economic policy and strategy. See Mohammad Hatta, *Report to the Gunseikan on One Year of Putera- March 9, 1943 to February 29, 1944*, translated by William Frederick as *The Putera Reports: Problems in Indonesian-Japanese Wartime Cooperation* (Ithaca: Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1971), p. 80, and Mohammad Hatta, *Kumpulan Karangan* (Jakarta: Penerbitan dan Balai Buku Indonesia, 1953), p. 262.
- 48 In one essay early in the Japanese occupation period, Sukarno wrote, “The Indonesia race, who once had the ‘soul of a lion,’ as explained by professor Veth in one of his books, this Indonesian race lost hope (*poetoas asa*). The Indonesian race became as if shot with a drug, and ‘like a thief in the night,’ a sense of ‘*kedjal*,’ a sense of apathy towards all suffering and all oppression, entered in the hearts of the Indonesian race. The Indonesian race began to be quiet—IT BEGAN TO GO TO SLEEP.” Sukarno,

- "Bangoenlah kembali!" (Awaken Again!), *Asia Raya*, November 6, 1942, p. 1. The reference is to Dutch Professor B. Veth, author of *Het leven in Nederlandsch-Indië* ("Life in Netherlands-India," Amsterdam: P.M. van Kampen en Zoon, third printing, 1900).
- 49 In 1927, Sukarno proposed that deliberations in the newly formed Union of Indonesian Political Associations (P.P.P.K.I.)—which included Sukarno's PNI party—should be conducted in the "Indonesian Way," i.e. by general consultation (*musjawarah*) followed by a unanimous, consensus decision (*mufakat*). This accorded with the "ancient custom of the archipelago" as currently still reflected, he maintained, in the village-level councils of elders. The Western system of majority rule was rejected as leading to "tyranny over minorities" and thus inappropriate to Indonesian culture. Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, chapter 3.
- 50 Mavis Rose, *Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1987), pp. 51, 54–55, and John Ingleson, *Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 1927–1934* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979).
- 51 Peter Hastings, "The Guide in Profile," in T. K. Tan, ed., *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia* (Brisbane: The Jacaranda Press, 1967), p. 11, and Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, p. 69.
- 52 Principally *Parindra's Soeara Oemoem* newspaper and the literary magazine *Pudjangga Baroe*. Some articles also appeared in the newspapers *Bintang Timoer*, *Pewartu Deli* (of Medan, North Sumatra), and *Wasita*. The essays were later compiled together by Achdiat K. Mihadja and published as *Polemik Keboedajaan* (The Culture Debate) (Jakarta: Perpustakaan Perguruan Kementerian P.P. dan K., 1949).
- 53 Poerbatjaraka, "Sambungan Zaman," reprinted in Mihadja, ed., *Polemik*, p. 31.
- 54 Adinegoro, "Kritik atas Kritik," reprinted in Mihadja, ed., *Polemik*, pp. 85–88.
- 55 Dr. Soetomo, "Perbedaan Levensvisie," reprinted in Mihadja, ed., *Polemik*, p. 71.
- 56 Sanoesi Pané, "Persatoean Indonesia," *Soeara Oemoem*, September 1935, reprinted in Mihadja, *Polemik*, pp. 21–22.
- 57 The "cultural basis here," Pané continued, was originally "one." Whatever regional differences that were now visible across the archipelago had been the result of local variation in the progress and tempo of cultural development of this unified basis in the intervening centuries. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- 58 Pané, "Persatoean Indonesia," p. 23. True, Pané noted, residents of "the East" also needed to "protect themselves and to come into conflict with nature," which indeed made possible cultural advancement at various levels. Yet despite variation in these levels, he continued,
- we may envision the highest level reached by all races of the East, albeit each in their own way. This highest level was attained in the loftiest spheres of culture in India and in Indonesia, that is the layer centered upon *kesunyatan*, mysticism: man, as one with nature, must renounce the desires of the body and purify the mind.
- (Echols/Shadily, *An Indonesian-English Dictionary*, p. 534, defines *kesunyatan* as "truth in a religious sense.")
- 59 In the following excerpt from a pioneering and influential essay, for example, Sukarno drew upon contemporary Indian nationalist discourses to suggest that the very essence of Asian nationalism—in contrast to that of the West—lay in the achievement of social unity and the embrace of one another's shared humanity whatever differences of opinion.

True nationalism, whose nationalism is not just a sort of copy or imitation of Western nationalism, but which appears from the sense of love of man and

mankind.... is one which avoids all narrow or small conceptions. Oh! What is the reason that many Indonesian nationalists' love of the race (*ketjintaan-bangsa*) turns to hate, when faced with Indonesians who are determinedly Islamic? What is the reason that this love turns to enmity, when it encounters Indonesians active as Marxists? Is there no place in their hearts for the nationalism of *Gopala Krishna Gokhate*, *Mahatma Gandhi*, or *Chita Ranjam Das*? ... Only true Eastern nationalism (*Nasionalisme ke-Timoeran*) is fit for embrace by true Eastern nationalists. European nationalism, a nationalism characterized by attack and counter-attack, a nationalism that seeks only its own interests, a traders' nationalism of profit and loss—nationalism of this sort will *surely* be defeated in the end, will *surely* perish.

(Sukarno, "Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme," in *Soeloeh Indonesia Moeda*, 1926, pp. 5–6. Italics in original)

- 60 See, for example, Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007).
- 61 These were principally from the Japanese navy, which—unlike the army, with its perennial fixation on the Asian continent and the Soviet threat—had a long history of interest in the *Nanpō* ("southern regions")
- 62 Cited in Gotō, *Shōwa-ki Nihon*, pp. 352, 364.
- 63 Ibid., pp. 351, 354–355.
- 64 While Sukarno's prediction dovetailed with those of the Comintern and Lenin's more general projections of an inevitable world-historical showdown between the imperial powers in his 1916 *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Mangkupradja credited Sukarno's foresight to a more down-to-earth source: "A book review of a work by an English admiral [who] guessed that there would be an outbreak of war in the Pacific because of the struggle for power between Japan and the USA" in "an English magazine—if I am not mistaken the *London News*." Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, "The Peta and my relations with the Japanese: A Correction of Sukarno's Autobiography," *Indonesia* 5 (April 1968), p. 112.
- 65 Gotō, *Shōwa-ki*, pp. 345–346.
- 66 See *ibid.*, pp. 351–362, and Peter Post, "The Formation of the Pribumi Business Elite in Indonesia, 1930s–1940s," in *Japan, Indonesia, and The War: Myths and Realities* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), p. 97. Post observes that "in Chinese business circles, Hatta's political motives received scant attention. To them he was 'The Merchant of Padang' [West Sumatra], a tool in the hands of the business cliques of Minangkabau and Palembang."
- 67 Mohammad Hatta, "*Rakjat Indonesia dengan Perang Pasifik (Habis)*," *Pemandangan*, December 23, 1941, p. 1.
- 68 Sjahrazad, *Indonesische Overpeinzingen*, pp. 100–101. What he is referring to with regard to autonomy for Korea at the time is unclear; some colonial Japanese policies in the 1920s and early 1930s allowed some Korean autonomy in the cultural and educational sphere, but repeated interwar calls for political autonomy were rejected as firmly as those of Indonesian nationalists in Java.
- 69 The highly educated son of a lower *priyayi* doctor who had amassed a fortune offering treatments that combined Western and local remedies, and invested the proceeds in real estate, ricefields, and a long-distance taxi service, Gatot was a model (if wealthier than average) member of the new *priyayi*. In a commentary reflective of his economic status, Gatot later recalled that when appointed secretary of the *Partindo* Party in 1931, "in order to meet household and party expenses, I finally sold my favorite cars."

- This and the following discussion are taken from Mangkupradja, "The PETA and my relations with the Japanese," pp. 105–134.
- 70 Achmad Subardjo, *Kesadaran Nasional: Sebuah Otobiografi* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1978), pp. 51, 73.
 - 71 Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, pp. 195–196.
 - 72 Nationalist ideologues maintained that Minobe's Western-style legal theorizing ignored the emperor's position at the center of the national polity or *kokutai*, as the eternal link between the people and the gods. See, for example, Frank O. Miller, *Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1965).
 - 73 I.N. Soebagijo, *Mr. Sudjono, Mendarat dengan Pasukan Jepang di Banten 1942* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), p. 128.
 - 74 Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, p. 206.
 - 75 Sir Rabindranath Tagore, *The Spirit of Japan: A Lecture by Sir Rabindranath Tagore Delivered for the Students of the Private Colleges of Tokyo and the Members of the Indo-Japanese Association, at the Keio Gijuku University* (Tokyo: Indo-Japanese Association, July 2, 1916), pp. 11–13.
 - 76 *Ibid.*, pp. 8–10.
 - 77 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
 - 78 These and subsequent citations from Subardjo's 1935 to 1936 dispatches are taken from Gotō Ken'ichi, *Shōwa-ki*, chapter 9.
 - 79 In their enthusiastic embrace of such notions, a number of Subardjo's Japanese hosts were even ready to "acknowledge Indonesians as their 'older brother.'" Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, p. 240.
 - 80 Griffis, William Elliot, *The Japanese Nation in Evolution: Steps in the Progress of a Great People* (New York, NY: T. Y. Cowell, 1907), chapter 2, cited in Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, pp. 208–209.
 - 81 Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, p. 209.
 - 82 *Ibid.*
 - 83 Imam Soepardi, "Ketika almarhoem Dr. Soetomo di Nippon," in *Asia Raya Satoe Tahoen: Nomor Peringatan* (Jakarta: Asia Raya Newspaper Company, 1943).
 - 84 Dr. Soetomo, dispatch dated March 22, 1936, cited in *ibid.*
 - 85 Dr. Soetomo, dispatch cited in *ibid.* Italics added for emphasis—Ed.
 - 86 Dr. Soetomo, dispatch dated April 20, 1936, cited in *ibid.*
 - 87 *Ibid.*
 - 88 Suryadinata, *Peranakan Chinese Politics*, p. 127.
 - 89 R. Soetomo in *Soeara Parindra*, May 1936, p. 12, cited in Gotō Ken'ichi, *Shōwaki Nihon to Indonesia*, pp. 435–436. (I believe that this was in fact *Soeara Oemoem* and not *Soeara Parindra*, to which I can find no other reference—Ed.)
 - 90 Cited in Hering, *M.H. Thamrin*, p. 288.
 - 91 George S. Kanahale, *The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence*, Ph.D. Diss., Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1967.
 - 92 Historically, *Minangkabau* traders and entrepreneurs were known for their business acumen, and as one of the few indigenous groups in the Indies that competed successfully with the ethnic Chinese in the economic realm.
 - 93 See Post, "The Formation of the Pribumi Business Elite."
 - 94 See Chapter 1, Part Two.
 - 95 Hering, *M.H. Thamrin*, p. 298.
 - 96 Cited and translated in *ibid.*, p. 281.
 - 97 Satō is briefly discussed in Chapter 1, Part Two.

- 98 *Buana Minggu* June 27, 1976, cited in Gotō, *Shōwa-ki*, p. 440, n. 51.
- 99 William Frederick, "Reflections in a Moving Stream: Indonesian Memories of the War and the Japanese," in Remco Raben, ed., *Representing the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia* (Zwolle: Waanders Publishers, 1999), p. 18.
- 100 "Students of our race who travel to Paris and Vienna are all treated without any prejudice. This they attribute to the influence of the Japanese empire in the eyes of the world," noted journalist Tjindarboemi, sometime editor of Surabaya's *Soeara Oemoem* newspaper, in his contribution to the debate. Yet he confirmed the fundamental image of Japan as an energetic Western imitator.

A race that imitates is not always small or lesser in people's eyes. This is proven by the Japanese empire ... The greatness of the Japanese empire has perhaps been realized in large measure through Japanese cleverness in carrying out the most up-to-date of imitations

(Tjindarboemi, "Sekali Lagi Sembojan Jang Tegas," reprinted in Mihardja, ed., *Polemik*, p. 58)

For his part, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana described Japan and its experience as so different from that of Indonesia as to make it "impossible" to use it as any sort of "model." Alisjahbana, "Synthese Antara 'Barat' dan 'Timur,'" pp. 96–97, reprinted in Mihardja, ed., *Polemik*.

- 101 Alongside the explicitly "anti-fascist" position of Pané's *Gerindo* party noted above, see, for example, Pané's commentaries on the China war as editor of the Jakarta's *Kebangoenan* Newspaper in 1937 to 1938, as well as the following earlier passage in Sanoesi Pané, "De Boodschap van India," *Timboel* 4:8–9 (1930), pp. 112–113.

Japan has secured a significant place among the great powers, but does not appear capable of bringing changes to the world political or economic structure; in fact, where the lighting of new paths and the opening of new perspectives is concerned, it has achieved little. The task of leading a searching mankind, of laying new social foundations in the light of the eternal, falls to India.

- 102 On this effort, see, for example, Abeyasekere, *One Hand Clapping*. Bob Hering makes a similar argument about Thamrin in particular and *Parindra* in general in *M.H. Thamrin*.
- 103 Srt. [pseud.], "Indonesia Bergelora!" Pengaroeh aliran2 Kebatinan (Indonesia Astir! Influences on Spiritual Trends), (part two of a two-part essay), *Asia Raya*, September 23, 1942, p. 1.

Chapter 3

- 1 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 23 and Shimizu Hitoshi, I. T., Nishijima Collection, Waseda University, Tokyo, Interviewer: Nishijima Shigetada; Interview date: November 13, 1956, p. 2.
- 2 Sakuramoto Tomio, *Bunkajintachi no daitōa sensō*, pp. 11–12 and Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 20, 22.
- 3 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 22, 361.
- 4 Kuroda Hidetoshi, *Gunsei* (Tokyo: Gakufū shoin, 1952), p. 74.
- 5 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 370–371.

- 6 Sakuramoto Tomio, *Bunkajintachi no daitōa sensō*, pp. 11–12, Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 20, 22, and Soebagijo, Ed., *Mr. Sudjono*, p. 167. *Senden butai* members were called up for service in the same way as regular military draftees. Their draft notices differed only in color—white instead of the usual red.
- 7 The standard definition of *gunzoku* is from Itō Takashi et al., ed., *Jiten: Shōwa senzenki no Nihon: seido to jittai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Hiroshi bunkan, 1990), p. 266.
- 8 Quoted in Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne no fashizumu*, p. 111.
- 9 Many in the Japanese command maintained (1) that the “thought war” and “culture war” were needless, (2) that given the general shortage of personnel, the military should not “waste” officers on special propaganda units, and (3) if there were to be propaganda units, the army shouldn’t be expected to pay for them. Funds were eventually found, though the units were also strongly encouraged to find “local” sources of funding. Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 23.
- 10 See, for example, Imamura Hitoshi, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Fuyō shobō, 1993), p. 384.
- 11 Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, *Japanese Military Administration of Indonesia*, Washington: US Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, Joint Publications Research Service, US Dept. of Commerce, 1963 an English translation of Ōkuma kinen shakai kagaku kenkyūjo, *Indonesia ni okeru Nihon gunsei no kenkyū*, (Tokyo: Kinokuniya shoten, 1959), pp. 106–107.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Before the invasion, the Japanese military estimated that it would take two to three months to subdue Java. Soebagijo, *Mr. Sudjono*, p. 173.
- 14 Shimizu Hitoshi, I. T., Nishijima Collection, p. 64.
- 15 Text of Malay-language speech broadcast on Radio Tokyo, published in *Pemandangan*, March 27, 1942, p. 1.
- 16 Ibid., p. 61.
- 17 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 142.
- 18 Gotō Ken’ichi, *Hi no umi*, pp. 142–143.
- 19 Ibid., p. 138.
- 20 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 24.
- 21 Ibid., p. 79. The precise number of civilian *bunkajin* in the propaganda squad is cited in Machida at 87. Military members numbered roughly one hundred, including eleven commissioned officers. Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 360.
- 22 This was Abe’s own description of his novels and his experience, as noted down by Mr. Dr. L.F. Jansen in his wartime diary. Mr. Dr. L.F. Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis: Dagboek van mr dr. L.F. Jansen, Batavia/Djakarta 1942–1945*, ed. G.J. Knapp (Franeker: Uitgeverij van Wijnen, 1988), pp. 20–21 (entry for July 21, 1942). On Abe as “liberal,” see, for example, Kimura Isshin, “‘Hito no hakken’ wo suru keiki ni: ‘Nampō chōyō sakka sōsho’ kangyō no igi,” on a publicity sheet released by the Tokyo publisher *Ryūkei shosha* on the occasion of the publication of *Nanpō chōyō sakka sōsho dai ichi ki Jawa hen*, a 15-volume reprinted set of wartime books and articles published by the *bunkajin* who served in Java, 1997. Norman Smith describes Tomoji as a “dissident Japanese intellectual” in “Regulating Chinese Women’s Sexuality during the Japanese Occupation of Manchuria, p. 51.
- 23 Kimura Isshin, “Author Profile,” in *Nanpō chōyō sakka sōsho, Jawa hen 13: Saitō Ryōsuke, Takeda Rintarō* (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1996), and Sakuramoto, *Bunkajintachi no daitōa sensō*, p. 45.
- 24 See, for example, Noda Utarō, “Kaisetsu,” in *Shōwa bungaku zenshū 52: Takeda Rintarō/Takami Jun* (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1955), pp. 171–173.

- 25 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 299.
- 26 Okazaki, cited in Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 269, n. 25. See also Kuroda, *Gunsei*, pp. 73–74.
- 27 Abe Yoshio, “*Gojū yonen wo furikaeru: kyō nao hansei no yōsu ga tonaru hatsugen mo*,” on publicity sheet released by the Tokyo publisher Ryūkei shosha on the occasion of the publication of *Nanpō chōyō sakka sōsho dai ichi ki Jawa hen*.
- 28 Tomizawa Uio, *Jawa bunka sen* (Tokyo: Nihon bunrinsha, 1943; reprint, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha (*Nanpō chōyō sakka sōsho, Jawa hen 14: Tomizawa Uio (1)*), 1996), p. 9.
- 29 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 29–30.
- 30 Ibid., pp. 36–38.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, p. 30.
- 33 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 334–335. Machida credits the “humanistic” Yokoyama with personally coming up with the idea for the poster.
- 34 Ibid. These were Machida’s words. Although I have been unable to locate a copy of the Japanese original, Netherlands Institute for War Documentation [hereafter NIOD] Indies Collection [hereafter IC] document no. 006.653 provides the following slightly different English translation of the “18 points.” (Note: There may have been some errors in translation, however, as suggested, for example, by the word “Buddhist” in the first point, which was probably “Muslim.” The reasoning behind point 17 is unclear. The need for points so basic as points 9 and 18 suggests an underlying assumption that Japanese troops used to the Chinese mainland were less than fully drilled on these principles.)
 1. When entering BUDDHIST temples, take care not to soil the steps with muddy feet.
 2. The natives detest pigs and dogs. Do not point with the left hand!
 3. Pay due respect to all religious rites observed by the natives.
 4. You should not criticize the native custom of sitting with legs crossed.
 5. If you see women taking a bath (“MANDI”), behave with due respect.
 6. Do not use indiscriminately expressions from the KORAN [*sic*].
 7. Take care not to trespass on or damage private property.
 8. Do not violate graves or burial places.
 9. Do not maltreat (by kicking or beating [*sic*]) the local population.
 10. When requisitioning goods do not omit to pay [*sic*] the owner fair compensation.
 11. The natives will take violent action against anyone committing robbery, arson, or rape. Anyone found guilty by court-martial of the last-named offence will be liable to fifteen years’ penal servitude.
 12. Always go about suitably dressed.
 13. Drunkenness is despised by Mohammedans. Remember to behave soberly in public.
 14. Natives wearing the “haji” (white headdress) are Mohammedans of rank.
 15. Have respect for the aged, and do not touch their hats.
 16. Do not defile ancient monuments and places of historic interest.
 17. Do not use water-closets of EUROPEAN pattern, but build separate latrines for your own use.
 18. When fighting is in progress, remember that those of the enemy who surrender are NOT to be shot. Such men will approach without arms or headgear, waving a piece of white cloth.
- 35 Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 298.
- 36 Ibid., pp. 295–297.

37 Boyle, *Japan and China at War*, pp. 46–47, 53, and Gotō Ken'ichi, *Hi no umi*, p. 142.

38 Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 295.

39 Ibid., pp. 297–298.

40 Crowley, “Intellectuals as Visionaries of the New Asian Order,” p. 324, and Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 297.

41 Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 297.

42 Hashikawa, “Japanese Perspectives,” p. 350.

43 Symbolic of this was a sharp rebuke that Shimizu received at this time from Keiō University professor Minota Muneyoshi, a close acquaintance from his student years, for daring to formulate a sentence regarding the emperor's position in Asia—by way of a paraphrase of his mentor General Ishiwara—in the conditional tense. “I had written ‘If the emperor is to be the leader of East Asia ...,’” recalled Shimizu in 1987.

“If?” [Minota] retorted in royal anger. “What do you mean *if*? How disrespectful!” I’ll never forget that ... But to the end, Ishiwara’s thinking was, that that we must do our best to work together with the [Chinese] people themselves ... then we would credit all the results to the emperor, and if they saw the light, if they revered the emperor as splendid, if the people thought of the emperor as their emperor or leader, fine—but for those who did not, forcing [the emperor] upon them as their leader, we could never sanction such a thing.

(Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 331)

44 Ibid., pp. 297–298, and Itō et al., *Jiten: Shōwa senzenki no Nihon*, pp. 226–227.

45 Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” pp. 297–298.

46 Ibid., p. 325.

47 Shimizu Hitoshi, I. T., Nishijima Collection, p. 77. Asano Akira writes that Shimizu studied Malay aboard the *Sakuramaru* for a mere three days. Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, p. 26.

48 Shimizu Hitoshi, I. T., Nishijima Collection, p. 77.

49 Wartime journalist and propagandist Jusuf Ronodipuro, for example, described Shimizu’s Indonesian as “very bad,” though in the estimation of fellow Japanese such as Lt. Col. Machida and the *bunkajin*—who themselves had little knowledge of the language—Shimizu’s language skills seemed “miraculously” good in light of the positive response of Indonesian listeners. Personal interview with Jusuf M. Ronodipuro at his home in Jakarta, July 5, 1994 and Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 65–66. In a 1987 presentation to Japanese scholars, while saying nothing about his pronunciation, Shimizu was not above making fun of his own Indonesian. He recalled being laughed at by Indonesians for saying “let us sleep together and eat together” (*sama-sama tidur, sama-sama makan*)—a direct translation of a common expression in Japanese meaning working hard together, but with a sexual connotation in Indonesian. “As a bit of nonsense, it was a hit,” he joked, “[but] I was really quite off the mark.” Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 322.

50 Gotō Ken'ichi, *Hi no umi*, p. 144.

51 Ibid., p. 140.

52 Kanokogi’s 1930s writings were collected in Kanokogi Kazunobu, *Sumera Ajia* (Tokyo: Dōbun shoin, 1937).

53 *Kadokawa kokugo daijiten* and *ibid.*, pp. 140–141.

54 See, for example, editorial on the appearance of the new *Unabara* newspaper, *Unabara*, April 3, 1942, p. 1.

55 Gotō Ken'ichi, *Hi no umi*, p. 141. Many navy officers held a longstanding interest in the idea of southward expansion or *nanshin*. This was in contrast to the army leadership,

which was concerned almost exclusively with the Soviet threat and sought to avoid possible confrontation with the United States. The army's gaze turned southward only after Japanese military setbacks against the Soviets at Nomonhan (1939–40) and, more concretely, the critical freezing of oil shipments to Japan by the United States and the Netherlands in July 1941. See, for example, Gotō Ken'ichi, *Returning to Asia*, and Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*.

- 56 Gotō Ken'ichi, *Hi no umi*, p. 141. In the busy days before the departure southward, meanwhile, the propaganda squad's commander Lt.Colonel Machida was himself treated by Kojima to a day-long personal seminar on the philosophy of world history. Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 366.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 32, 366.
- 59 Peter Post estimates the number of *toko Jepang* Japan in Java at their peak in the late 1930s to have numbered between seven to eight hundred. Personal conversation with Peter Post, December 1999. Another source puts the total number of resident Japanese in the whole of the Netherlands East Indies in the 1930s at more than five thousand. Ara Ken'ichi, *Jakarta yोकemae: Indonesia dokuristu ni kaketa hitotachi* (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1994), p. 144.
- 60 From the beginning of the twentieth century, as a reflection of Japan's stature as one of the imperial powers, all Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies enjoyed first-class social status equivalent to that of the "European races," putting them officially above both those classified as "Foreign Orientals" such as ethnic Chinese, and, at the bottom of the hierarchy, the "natives."
- 61 1934 figures for share of total imports to the Indies were 32.5 percent for Japan versus 13.3 percent for the Netherlands. In 1930, the corresponding figures were 11.6 percent for Japan versus 18.9 percent for the Netherlands. Gotō Ken'ichi, *Hi no umi*, p. 75.
- 62 Gotō Ken'ichi, *Hi no umi*, p. 116. As Ichiki himself later put it,

Most of the Japanese who have left the homeland to travel abroad have, to say the least, a strong national consciousness (*minzoku ishiki*). While those working for big firms are another matter, for a Japanese, the idea of simply going into business for one's self is not enough to fulfill one's hopes. In the end, if given a chance, you come to embrace the idea of stirring up the environment in which you find yourself.

(Ichiki Tatsuo, cited in Ichiki Tatsuo and Yoshizumi Tomegorō, "Indonesia wo kataru taidankai," *Shin Jawa* 2:1 (January 1945), p. 12)

- 63 See Gotō Ken'ichi, *Shōwa ki*, chapter 7, and Ichiki Tatsuo and Yoshizumi Tomegorō, "Indonesia wo kataru taidankai," pp. 9–10.
- 64 See Netherlands Information Bureau, *10 years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies* (New York, NY: Netherlands Information Bureau, 1942).
- 65 Nishijima Shigetada, *Shōgen Indonesia kakumei--aru nihonjin kakumei no hansei* (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu ōraisha, 1975). To the army's chagrin, Satō managed to circumvent the blacklist restriction by returning to Java as a civilian employee of the Navy Liaison Office (*Kaigun bukanfu*) in Batavia. He was joined there in late 1942 by Nishijima, who had by then been freed from detention in Australia as part of a prisoner exchange. Returning with the same group from Australia, Yoshizumi spent most of the occupation in the navy-occupied island of Celebes before returning to Java and also joining the Navy Liaison Office staff in late 1944. Throughout the

- occupation, these exceptional men of the liaison office retained their cordial relations with Indonesian nationalists, and just after the Japanese surrender, in characteristic defiance of army orders, they used their position to assist the Indonesian nationalist leadership in proclaiming independence. But their outsider status vis-à-vis the army meant spending the occupation itself in a frustratingly obscure role.
- 66 The Tokyo-based Japanese right-wing activist and Pan-Asianist Iwata Ainosuke was a long-time, fervent supporter of Japanese expansion in China and close associate of ultra-rightist Toyama Mitsuru, leader of the infamous Black Dragon Society (*Kokuryūkai*). Kubo was publisher of local Japanese-language business journal the *Nichiran shōgyō shimbun*. Gotō Ken'ichi, *Showa-ki Nihon to Indonnesia*, p. 237.
- 67 Gotō Ken'ichi, *Returning to Asia*, pp. 193, 210, 252. An explorer of ancient Buddhist sites in Central Asia, Ōtani was also honorary head of the Southern Languages School at Tokyo's Southern Development (*Kōnan*) Institute.
- 68 The *Taman Siswa* schools, whose stated aim was to “combat Dutch indoctrination” by reintroducing Java's masses to their “traditional culture” while also preparing them for life in the “modern world,” were first established in 1922 by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (formerly Suwardi Surjaningrat), one of the most influential figures of the *Sarekat Islam* movement. The techniques of the Montessori method—just coming into vogue in Europe—provided curricular inspiration. But above all, the *Taman Siswa* borrowed their shape from Rabindrath Tagore's *Shantiniketan* school, established in Bengal in 1901, an institution aiming to offer a blend of Indian and Western methods of education. See Ruth McVey, “Taman Siswa and the Indonesian National Awakening,” *Indonesia* 4 (October 1967), pp. 128–149.
- 69 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, p. 145.
- 70 Tsuchiya Kisō, “Hiroi shiya ni tatte hataraita beppan” in Jawa Beppan Kai, eds., *Purapatan Gambiru*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Private publication, 1987), p. 64.
- 71 Cartoonist Yokoyama Ryūichi, who had been “lying in bed for two or three days with an unexplained fever” at the time, later recalled that his fever “evaporated at the news,” replaced by a feeling of “mysterious vitality” that allowed him to share in a toast to the great victory with everyone aboard. Yokoyama Ryūichi, *Jakaruta ki* (Tokyo: Tōeisha, 1944), p. 9.
- 72 Ibid. pp. 48–49.
- 73 Iida Nobuo, “Saisho no hōsei,” *Unabara*, April 8, 1942, p. 2.
- 74 In later writings, Asano recalled his heartbreak over losing *Asia is One* that night. See Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, pp. 97–98.
- 75 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 51, 71, 192.
- 76 The official changing of the name of “Batavia” to “Jakarta” did not take place until late in 1942. For this reason, for references before this time, I use “Batavia” unless “Jakarta” (pre-1970 spelling: “Djakarta”) is explicitly used in the texts cited.

Chapter 4

- 1 Tomizawa Uio, *Hikari no Jawa* (Tokyo: Dōkōsha, 1944, reprinted in *Nampō chōyō sakka sōsho vol. 15: Tomizawa Uio (II)*, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1996), p. 29.
- 2 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, p. 30.
- 3 I have not been able to ascertain the Indonesian name for this village.
- 4 Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, pp. 25–26.
- 5 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 65–66.
- 6 Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, pp. 27–28.

- 7 Ibid., pp. 28–29.
- 8 Surprise at the strange appearance and pungent, sweaty smell of the Japanese soldiers—who had little opportunity to bathe during the invasion—is a common refrain in Indonesian accounts found, for example, in the Oral History Collection (*Koleksi Sejarah Lisan*) at the National Archives (*Arsip Nasional*) in Jakarta. Pramoedya Ananta Toer also remarked on this in my interview with him at his home on July 5, 1996.
- 9 Yokoyama Ryūichi, cited in Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 64.
- 10 Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, p. 30.
- 11 Kitahara Takeo, *Jawa jūgunki: Uki kuru* (Tokyo: Buntaisha, 1943, reprinted in *Nanpō chōyō sakka sōsho 11: Ōya Sōichi, Gunji Jirōmasa, Kitahara Takeo*, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1996), pp. 36–38.
- 12 Ōki Atsuo, *Yashi, risu, Jawa no ko* (Tokyo: Nambokusha, 1943, reprinted in *Nanpō chōyō sakka sōsho 9: Ōki Atsuo (I)*, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha), pp. 4–6, 13–14.
- 13 Ōe Kenji, *Jawa wo yuku hata* (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1943, reprinted in *Nanpō chōyō sakka sōsho, Jawa hen 6: Ōe Kenji (I)*, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1996), pp. 49–55.
- 14 Ibid., pp. 56–57.
- 15 Ibid., p. 50.
- 16 Machida even contended that the “emotions of that morning” represented a “force that gently inclined me toward slipping a bit away from the military’s aims and towards Indonesian independence” in his subsequent actions. Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 60–61.
- 17 The phrase Abe used for “Japan” was *Toyoashihara mizuho no kuni*, lit. “new lush field of reeds, land of vigorous rice plants.”
- 18 Abe Tomoji, *Hi no shima: Jawa/Bari Shima no ki* (Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1944, reprint Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1996), pp. 9, 64.
- 19 Ōe, *Jawa wo yuku hata*, pp. 43–45.
- 20 “*Bandon dayori*,” *Sekidōhō*, March 22, 1942, p. 1.
- 21 Ōe, *Jawa wo yuku hata*, p. 44.
- 22 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 260–261.
- 23 Takeda Rintarō, *Jawa sarasa* (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1944, reprint Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1996), pp. 49–50.
- 24 Ibid., pp. 50–51.
- 25 Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, pp. 33–34.
- 26 Ōe, *Jawa wo yuku hata*, p. 51.
- 27 Imamura Hitoshi, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, vol. I (Tokyo: Fuyō shobō, 1993), pp. 361–362.
- 28 See, for example, “Isi Podjok” column in *Berita Oemoem*, p. 4, March 13, 1942.
- 29 Ibid. pp. 362–363.
- 30 Ōe, *Jawa wo yuku hata*, p. 62. Prior to his service with the *Jawa sendenhan*, Ōe had extended experience as an army correspondent in North and Central China.
- 31 Ibid., p. 55.
- 32 General Imamura cited these figures in remarks to assembled journalists on March 17, 1942. *Sekidōhō*, March 18, 1942, p. 2.
- 33 The “save myself first” quotation is from Ōe Kenji, *Jawa wo yuku hata*.
- 34 *Sekidōhō*, March 9, 1942, p. 1, and Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 82–83.
- 35 Yoshimi, *Kusa no ne*, p. 154, Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 191, and Imamura, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, p. 363.
- 36 Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, p. 10. Entering Surabaya the same morning, the car carrying members of the East Java contingent of the *Sendenhan* was surrounded by a similarly enthusiastic throng. The translator stood on the roof of the car, held his sword high

- and cried “*hidup! hidup!*” (“long live...”) as Indonesians hailed them with the thumbs-up sign. Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 73. The situation was the same for the *Java Sendenhan* detachment of thirty *bunkajin* temporarily assigned to accompany the 25th Army occupying Palembang and southern Sumatra. “Sumatra is a huge island.... When we got Sumatra as an extra assignment,” in Tokyo, “I wanted to cry,” commented Machida. Spread out over a radius of approximately 300 kilometers, the initial propaganda work there was exhausting. But when “met by local regents and district heads bearing a spear or a sword” and “greeted by great throngs of thousands waiving the Japanese flag and the Indonesian independence flag,” the *bunkajin*, led by newspaper journalist Shida, “forgot their trials” (pp. 99, 107). Shida’s colleague, the 37-year-old novelist Gunji Jirōmasa, wrote that “the island people of Sumatra welcome us with a Japanese flag on their chests. They are reveling in being able to become Japanese.” Speaking figuratively of the local inhabitants, he proclaimed that “in Sumatra now, there are no longer any Dutch to be found” (Gunji Jirōmasa, “Sumatra yori kaerite,” *Unabara*, April 29, 1942, p. 2).
- 37 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 65–66.
- 38 Shimizu Hitoshi, I. T., Nishijima Collection, pp. 94–96.
- 39 Wada Tomokazu, “Ippei no yorokobi” (“One Soldier’s Joy”), *Unabara*, April 20, 1942, p. 2.
- 40 Ōe, *Jawa wo yuku hata*, p. 58.
- 41 *Parindra* documents, *Algemeen Secretarie* No. 2203, p. 5.
- 42 Tsuchiya Kisō, “Hiroi kishi ni tatte hataraita beppan,” *Purapatan gambiru* 2, p. 75.
- 43 Ōe, *Jawa wo yuku hata*, pp. 58–60.
- 44 The reference to the translators’ previous residence in the Indies is in *ibid.*, p. 82.
- 45 *Ibid.*, pp. 68–69.
- 46 “Wareira no shimei” (Author unknown), *Sekidōhō* March 12, 1942, p. 1.
- 47 *Sekidōhō*, March 18, 1942, p. 1.
- 48 *Sekidōhō*, March 9, 1942, p. 1.
- 49 In the *Arsip* I. T., Mr. Nur gives this date as March 5, but according to other sources, Japanese forces first entered Batavia only on the following next day. Nur, I. T., Interview date: August 20, 1983; Cassette IV, Side A, transcript p. 8. For the dating as March 6, see, for example, report on conditions in “Djakarta” on March 5, 6, and 7, in *Pemandangan* newspaper, March 19, 1942, p. 3.
- 50 *Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger*, the Royal Militia of the Netherlands Indies, whose rank-and-file included members of the indigenous population mainly from parts of the archipelago known for their loyalty to the Dutch, particularly from the majority Christian areas of Ambon in the far east, and Manado in the far north.
- 51 Nur, I. T., Interview date: August 20, 1983; Cassette IV, Side A, transcript p. 8.
- 52 Anonymous report on conditions in Batavia on March 5, 6, and 7, *Pemandangan*, March 9, 1942, p. 3. With celebrations marking both the birthday of the holy prophet Muhammad and the end of the holy fasting month, *Lebaran* is the greatest annual day of festivity for Indonesia’s Muslims.
- 53 Twang Peck-Yang, author of a study on the experience of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese in the 1940s, echoes the impression that the *perampokan* took on a “strong, spontaneous class character.” Twang Peck Yang, *The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence, 1940–1950* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 72.
- 54 “Pembantoe A. Kh.,” “Djakarta—Poerwakarta dalam 2 hari,” *Pemandangan*, April 3, 1942, p. 3. Things were apparently similar or even worse in some urban areas in Sumatra. In the context of a 1986 *Arsip Nasional* interview with A.M. Dudung, former

- head of a Batavia ward, interviewer Dr. A. Sidhi Ibrahim Buchori, who was in the West Sumatran city of Padang Pariaman in 1942, recalls the ethnic Chinese being burned out of their homes and shops in the city en masse, leaving to “never return” up to the present day (1986). A.M. Dudung, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Interviewer: Dr. A. Sidhi Ibrahim Buchori SH; Interview date: January 2, 1986; Cassette I, Side B, transcript p. 36.
- 55 “Pembantoe A. Kh.,” “Djakarta—Poerwakarta dalam 2 hari.”
- 56 Ibid.
- 57 Bang Bedjat (Anwar Tjokroaminoto), “Sambil Laloe” column, *Pemandangan*, March 9, 1942, p. 4.
- 58 Although General Imamura decided to house his troops outside of Batavia and forbid them from entering the city, various accounts make it clear that Japanese troops did at first apparently pass through the city. See, for example, the following Interview Transcripts from the *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection: Nur, p. 9; Dr. Sudjatmoko, Interviewer: Dr. Yuwono Dwi Priyantono; Interview date: January 11, 1989; Cassette II, Side B, transcript p. 60.
- 59 Nur, I. T., Cassette IV, Side A, transcript pp. 9–10.
- 60 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
- 61 In an article entitled “Bayonet Kontra Tjabe” (“Bayonet versus Hot-pepper”) which appeared on page four of the Batavia newspaper *Berita Oemoem* on March 12, 1942, an employee from the same newspaper recounted being nearly killed by an ignorant and suspicious Japanese sentry at the home of the former Dutch resident, all thanks to a hot pepper. The sentry discovered a hot pepper while searching the employee; the employee explained, using body language, that it was something to eat; the sentry then took a bite and, furious at the unexpected spitjiness of the *cabe*, threatened the employee with his bayonet. Fortunately for the employee, another, more knowledgeable Japanese appeared in time to cool things down.
- 62 Incidents of disrespectful handling of Indonesians by Allied soldiers in the weeks before the Dutch surrender, particularly of Indonesian women, were reported in Indonesian-language newspapers at the time. Not surprisingly, Japanese propagandists were eager to publicize this. See, for example, Sadoeslam, “Keadaan di Vorstenlanden dan sekitarnja,” *Pemandangan*, April 6, 1942 edition, p. 2. On the cover of the April 21, 1942 edition of *Unabara*, *Sendenhan* cartoonist Ono Saseo quoted a Batavia shopkeeper as thankful that Japanese soldiers were so “strong yet kind” in comparison to their “nasty and frightening” American and Australian counterparts.
- 63 Sudarpo, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta; Interviewer: Dr. Yuwono Dwi Priyantono; Interview date: January 11, 1988; Cassette V, Side B, transcript p. 24.
- 64 Personal interview with Pramoedya Ananta Toer in Jakarta, July 11, 1996.
- 65 Interview with Jusuf Ronodipuro.
- 66 Interview with Pramoedya.
- 67 Nakamura Kenkichi, *Seishun no ki*, cited in Inomata Yoshiki, *Nihon senryōka indoneshia tabigeijin no kiroku* (Tokyo: Mekon, 1996), p. 57.
- 68 Nur, I. T., Cassette IV, Side A, pp. 10–11.
- 69 Ibid., Cassette V, Side B, pp. 14, 15.
- 70 Nur, I. T., p. 14.
- 71 Imamura, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, p. 376.
- 72 Tomizawa Uio, as quoted by Three-A movement leader Samsuedin in a radio address on April 28, 1942, whose transcript appeared in *Asia Raya* the following day, p. 5.
- 73 *Sekidōhō* wall newspaper, March 9, 1942 edition.

- 74 Nur, I. T., pp. 14–15.
- 75 Dr. Sudjatmoko, I. T., Cassette II, Side B, p. 61.
- 76 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, pp. 22–23.
- 77 Benedict O’Gorman Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 415.
- 78 O.E. Engelen, et al., *Lahirnya Satu Bangsa Dan Negara* (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia Press, 1997), p. 2.
- 79 Dr. Sudjatmoko, I. T., Cassette II, Side B, pp. 57–58.
- 80 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V Side B, p. 23.
- 81 Sudarpo, personal interview in Jakarta, July 5, 1994, and Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript pp. 39–40.
- 82 Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, pp. 35–38.
- 83 Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 413.
- 84 Dr. Sudjatmoko, I. T., Cassette II, Side B, p. 61.
- 85 Two of the three candidates for the important position of foreign minister were, however, associated with the cooperator *Parindra* party: Mr. R. Sudjono, who had returned to the Indies with the invasion forces as an advisor to the *Gunseibu*, and Achmad Subardjo, who later claimed to have been included on the list without his knowledge. Here, unlike in the case of most of the other positions proposed, it seemed that prior and current close relations with Japan and the Japanese proved to be the trump. Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, p. 236.
- 86 NIOD IC no. 031608.
- 87 Sarli, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta; Interviewer: Dr. Yuwono Dwi Priyantono; Interview date: February 2, 1986; Cassette V, Side A, pp. 5–7.
- 88 The following is based on Martoatmodjo, I. T., *Arsip Nasional*, Interviewer: Wardiningsih; Interview date: January 8, 1979 onwards, Cassette III, Side B, pp. 99–111.
- 89 From other sources it appears that the Japanese may in fact have been seeking local prostitutes rather than upper-class women. See NIOD IC nos. 031611–612, a May 1942 Indonesian intelligence report which describes how a Japanese request for prostitutes in Surakarta was misinterpreted as a request for “good women” as it was passed along via a “Chinese” to the local Indonesian administrator.
- 90 Sukarno served as an intermediary in assembling local “prostitutes” while leading a similar sort of local administrative body in the West Sumatran city of Padang during the first months of the occupation. Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, pp. 163–164.
- 91 Mr. R.S. Budhayarto Martoatmodjo, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Interviewer: Wardiningsih; Interview date: February 21, 1979; Cassette III, Side B, pp. 101–106.
- 92 See *ibid.* and Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa*: Jakarta (1944. Reprint, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1986), p. 273.
- 93 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, p. 76.
- 94 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 85–86.
- 95 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, pp. 78–79.
- 96 Nakatani had translated the original Japanese text into Indonesian. Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 95.
- 97 *Ibid.*, pp. 95–97.
- 98 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, pp. 95–96.
- 99 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 203. For more on this story, see Chapter 6, “Asia Raya.”
- 100 For a representative non-cooperator view of *Parindra*, see, for example, Abdurrachman Baswedan, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta;

- Interviewer: Chaidir Anwar Markarim; Interview date: August 20, 1975; Cassette 13, Side A, p. 5.
- 101 Personal interview with Taniguchi Gorō in Tokyo, April 12, 1995. Sudjono, who had been teaching the Malay language in Tokyo since 1938, was attached as an advisor to the 16th Army's Military Government Unit (*Gunseibutai*, subsequently the Military Administration Department or *Gunseibu*) on the request of Taniguchi, a journalist and long-time Java resident also serving as an advisor in the same unit.
 - 102 Shimizu, cited in Kanahale, pp. 270–271, and D.H. Meyer, cited in Satō, p. 38.
 - 103 Those invited by Nakayama optimistically included Sukarno and Hatta, though both had yet to be located or released from Dutch captivity. “Kearah Indonesia Moelia,” *Berita Oemoem*, March 12, 1942, p. 1.
 - 104 Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, p. 208 and Gotō Ken'ichi, *Shōwaki*, p. 428.
 - 105 “Kearah Indonesia Moelia,” p. 1.
 - 106 The quote is from Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*, p. 32.
 - 107 Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, *Japanese Military Administration*, p. 343 and *Berita Oemoem*, March 10, 1942 edition, p. 1. The rumors were fed in part by positive reports from the Bandung newspaper *Tjahaja Timoer*. Backers of Abikoesno's proposal included Abikoesno's own *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (PSII, Indonesian Islamic Association Party) and other groups associated with the “non-cooperators” including Chaerul Saleh's student organization the PPPI.
 - 108 “Soeara Pers,” *Berita Oemoem*, March 10, 1942 edition, p. 2, and *Berita Oemoem*, March 14, 1942 edition, p. 1. It was also rumored that the Japanese had appointed “non-cooperator” A.K. Gani—then head of the *chian ijkai* (“Peacekeeping Committee”) in Palembang—as governor of Sumatra.
 - 109 *Berita Oemoem* newspaper, March 14, 1942 edition, p. 1.
 - 110 *Berita Oemoem*, March 13, 1942 edition, p. 1, and *Berita Oemoem*, “Kearah Indonesia moelia.”
 - 111 *Pemandangan*, March 14, 1942, p. 1.
 - 112 *Berita Oemoem*, March 14, 1942, p. 1.
 - 113 *Pemandangan*, March 14, 1942, p. 2.
 - 114 Javanese for a dried corn husk used as a cigarette wrapper.
 - 115 “Isi Podjok,” *Berita Oemoem*, March 13, 1942 edition, p. 4.
 - 116 Ibid.
 - 117 Shimizu, transcript of interview by Nishijima, pp. 121–122.
 - 118 Ibid., pp. 88–90.
 - 119 Referred to as *Buitenzorg* (lit. “Without Trouble”), Bogor was a favorite retreat for Dutch dignitaries.
 - 120 Shimizu, transcript of interview with Nishijima, p. 131.
 - 121 Ibid., pp. 131–136. While Shimizu here gives the impression that Samsuodin was selected to lead the new movement almost haphazardly, and chiefly as a result of Samsuodin's own initiative, Mohammad Tabrani, who resigned his position as editor of the *Pemandangan* newspaper in October 1940 to take a post in the Dutch intelligence bureau, later recalled: “As an employee of the intelligence bureau, I was aware of the various plans Japan had for the occupation of Indonesia. At that time, Japan was thinking of utilizing [Parindra's] Thamrin, Sukardjo Wirjopranoto and Samsuodin—not Bung Karno or Abang Hatta.” This might also explain Shimizu's apparent failure to consider Mohammad Yamin—more closely associated with the latter camp—as an alternative candidate to lead his movement. Gotō, *Shōwa-ki*, p. 427.
 - 122 Shigeru Sato appears to have been the first scholar to draw attention to the difference between these Japanese- and Malay-language slogans in his 1994 *War, Nationalism*,

- and Peasants. The use of the letter “A” itself had first been conceived by Jawa Sendenhan member Suisei while still aboard the *Sakura Maru* as it steamed toward Java. A comedian by trade, Matsui hit upon the notion of standing the “V” of the Allied “V for Victory” on its head, making instead an “A” for Asia. Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” pp. 299–300. Turning the “V” into an “A” also required drawing a bar across its middle, which Shimizu and his colleagues joked would “only make it stronger.” Shimizu, transcript of interview by Nishijima, p. 122.
- 123 For a discussion of postwar treatments of the Three-A, see Chapter 6, “All things to all Asians: The rise and fall of the Three-A movement.”
- 124 Shimizu, transcript of interview by Nishijima, pp. 121–124, 136.
- 125 Ibid., pp. 124–126.
- 126 Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, p. 268.
- 127 Parindra documents, *Algemeen Secretarie* No. 2203, “Lampiran,” pp. 5–6, and Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, p. 268.
- 128 Moriya is identified in Sato, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, p. 24. According to the Parindra-authored document on which this account is based, Moriya spoke “our language,” i.e. Indonesian, an indication that he, like his counterpart in Batavia Col. Nakayama, may have had some prewar residence experience in Indonesia. During their second meeting two days later, however, a translator was present. *Alg. Sec.* No. 2203, p. 6.
- 129 *Alg. Sec.* No. 2203, pp. 6, 8. Emphasis in the original.
- 130 Parindra documents, *Algemeen Secretarie* No. 2203, “Lampiran,” p. 7.
- 131 Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 224.
- 132 Hatta, “Rakyat Indonesia dengan Perang Pasifik.” Although Hatta did not indicate a source here, Mavis Rose notes that in a place in his memoirs, Hatta attributed these words to a defiant fellow *Minangkabau* leader, said to his Dutch captors after an anti-colonial incident in 1908. Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 88.
- 133 The Dutch authorities had held Hatta under a loose house arrest in Sukabumi since the beginning of February, after transferring him there from his previous exile on the island of Bandaneira. Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 88, and *Pemandangan*, March 24, 1942, p. 1.
- 134 Mohammad Hatta, *Memoir* (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1979), pp. 393, 400.
- 135 Miyoshi, “Jawa senryō gunsei kaikōroku,” *Kokusai mondai*, no. 6, p. 75.
- 136 Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 400.
- 137 Hatta, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 168.
- 138 Miyoshi, “Jawa senryō gunsei kaikōroku,” no. 6, p. 75.
- 139 Inspiration came from Madjid Oesman, a West Sumatran newspaper owner and friend of Nur’s uncle Mohammad Yaman. After receiving a degree from Tokyo’s Meiji University in the mid-1930s, Oesman had returned to West Sumatra with a Japanese wife. This, and the resulting fact that he was one of those rounded up and interned as a pro-Japanese by the Dutch in the days following Pearl Harbor, had made him somewhat of an instant celebrity. Ibid and “Madjid Oesman Soeami Isteri,” *Pandji Poestaka* magazine, April 25, 1942, pp. 89–90, and Gotō, *Shōwa-ki*, p. 355. Oesman returned to Padang in June 1942.
- 140 Nur, Djohar, I. T., Cassette IV, Side A, pp. 19–22.
- 141 Ibid., p. 22.
- 142 Nur did not elaborate further on the specifics of Hasan’s family connection to Thamrin.
- 143 Nur, I. T., Cassette IV, Side A, transcript p. 22.

- 144 Ibid., Cassette V, Side B, transcript p. 1. See also “Kota” section, *Asia Raya*, May 12, 1942, p. 2 and “Badan Informasi Pergerakan Tiga-A Selaloe dibandjiri orang,” *Asia Raya*, May 13, 1942, p. 2.
- 145 Nur’s Social Committee, now christened the “Three-A Information Committee” (*Badan Penerangan Three-A*) opened officially on March 20, 1942, a day after the start of the movement. Nur, I. T., Cassette IV, Side A, p. 23.

Chapter 5

- 1 Imamura, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, p. 380.
- 2 Nakayama Yasuto, “Ran-in no genkyo to sono dōkō,” *Gendai*, September 1941, cited in Gotō Ken’ichi, *Returning to Asia* (trans. of *Shōwa-ki*), pp. 104–105.
- 3 Imamura, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, pp. 380–381.
- 4 The “eight directions” refer to the four walls and four corners of a square. Source: *Kadokawa kokugo daijiten*.
- 5 Kitamura Tsunenobu, “*Senzen•senchū*” *yōgo monoshiri monogatari* (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 1995), pp. 54–55.
- 6 Shimizu Hitoshi, I. T., Nishijima Collection, pp. 63–69.
- 7 Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 299, and Imamura, *Kaikoroku*, vol. 1, pp. 381, 387.
- 8 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, pp. 94–95, and Shimizu Hitoshi, I. T., Nishijima Collection, p. 65.
- 9 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, pp. 91–92, 94–95.
- 10 Separate “bulletin” for subscribers to *Berita Oemoem*, n.d., which announces prepublication censorship to begin on March 16, 1942.
- 11 Taniguchi Gorō, “Jānaristo toshite mita Jawa gunsei,” in *Shōgenshū Nihonsenryōka Indonesia*, p. 277.
- 12 *Pandji Poestaka*, April 11, 1942.
- 13 *Pemandangan*, March 23, 1942, p. 4.
- 14 Balatentara Dai Nippon, “Oendang-Oendang No. 2,” dated March 8, 1942, in *Kan Pō*, “Nomor Istimewa,” pp. 7–9.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 *Pemandangan*, March 9, 1942, p. 4.
- 17 Ibid., p. 2.
- 18 C.f. Machida Keiji, “Shina jihen dai-go shūnen o mukaete,” *Unabara*, July 7, 1942, p. 2.
- 19 “W.” [most likely Winarno], “Kearah Indonesia moelia,” *Berita Oemoem* March 12, 1942, p. 1.
- 20 K.H. Mugni Sulaiman, an elementary school principal at the time, later described the following sequence of events:

It was lively for a while, there was really a lot of plundering, Chinese shops were broken into ... The Japanese were afraid to enter, because they were afraid there might be an enemy [inside], so we were made to go in first... break in.... [and] carry [things] away. Everyone who was made to go in took [things], if there wasn’t anything they’d go on to another grocery shop. So these evil people were also just normal people ... just going along with it (*ikut-ikutan*).

(K. H. Mugni Sulaiman, I. T., *Arsip Nasional Oral History Collection*, Interviewer: Dr. M. Dien Majid; Interview date: October 28, 1984. Cassette I, Side A, transcript p. 4)

- 21 *Pandji Poestaka*, April 18, 1942, pp. 65–66, and April 25, 1942, p. 102.
- 22 Inomata, *Nihon senryōka indonesia tabigeijin*, p. 56.
- 23 NIOD IC no. 031190.
- 24 NIOD IC nos. 036818–036824 and 038844.
- 25 The report from Cilacap, West Java appeared in *Kung Yung Pao*, March 18, 1942, cited in Yang, *The Chinese Business Elite*, p. 105.
- 26 Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, “Barisan Bekerja,” *Pemandangan*, March 21, 1942, p. 2.
- 27 *Pandji Poestaka*, April 18, 1942, pp. 65–66.
- 28 Interview with Pramoedya Ananta Toer.
- 29 Interview with Jusuf Ronodipuro.
- 30 On post-1945, see, for example, Anderson, *Java in a Time*.
- 31 “Kitasini” [possibly H.B. Jassin], “Pemandangan Dalam Negeri,” *Pandji Poestaka* April 18, 1942, pp. 42–43.
- 32 Soetardjo, “Membangoen Indonesia Baroe,” *Pemandangan*, March 18, 1942, p. 2.
- 33 *Pandji Poestaka*, April 11, 1942, p. 31.
- 34 *Pandji Poestaka*, April 25, 1942, p. 102, and “Pertemoean Pers di Bandoeng,” *Asia Raya*, May 28, 1942, p. 4.
- 35 Yamamoto Mōichirō, “Outline of Military Administration in Java” dated July 1946, NIOD IC no. 004861. Long before the Japanese forces had arrived, most of the remaining Japanese residents of the Indies had been shipped off to prison camps in Australia, thus denying the 16th Army this potential additional source of administrators. Even when the newly liberated staff of the Japanese consulates in Batavia and Surabaya were added to those who had accompanied the 16th Army, the total of available Japanese civilian officials remained less than three hundred. Satō, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, p. 22.
- 36 One by one, the banning of Dutch and English and the deeming of Japanese and “Malay” as official languages did occur at the provincial level, with Bogor leading the way on May 11, 1942. *Kan Pō (Berita Pemerintah)* “Nomor Istimewa” (Special Edition), March 1943. (Reprint, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1989), p. 33.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 The name change finally became official only on December 8, 1942. *Djawa Baroe*, January 1, 1943, pp. 12–13.
- 39 Jansen, *Gevangenis*, entry for July 28, 1942, p. 23.
- 40 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 213, 217.
- 41 “Shimauchi shōfūkei” section, *Unabara*, July 15, 1942, p. 2 and August 7, 1942, p. 2. According to eyewitnesses, the boxes were approximately 1m × 1m × 1m in size, and mounted several meters high on wooden poles. “Batavia after 7 months of Japanese administration,” NIOD IC nos. 030971 and 004746.
- 42 Winarno, “Kedoeoekan Pers Kita,” *Asia Raya*, August 14, 1942, p. 1.
- 43 *Pemandangan*, May 16, 1942, p. 2.
- 44 Numerous postwar Dutch, Indonesian, and Japanese sources critical of Japanese wartime actions nevertheless professed respect for the Christian-educated, “cosmopolitan” Imamura—who spent several years of his career as a military observer in England, other parts of Europe, and India—as a “model general” virtually beyond reproach. His transnational, mass appeal is perhaps best reflected in an anecdote related to me by Benedict Anderson in a personal conversation, 1993: On one of his visits to Jakarta in the early 1960s, Anderson inquired of an elderly stable master at the president’s palace as to whom, of all the dignitaries he had encountered in his many years of service, had most impressed him. To Anderson’s surprise, he responded without hesitation, “Imamura.”

- 45 See, for example, "Karena sikapnya sendiri," *Asia Raya*, May 13, 1942, p. 2, Winarno, "Pegawai Belanda," *Asia Raya*, July 17, 1942, p. 1 and follow-up article dated July 30, p. 1, and NIOD Indonesian intelligence reports such as IC 038875. *Pemandangan*, "Kota" ("City") section, March 21, 1942, p. 2.
- 46 Imamura, *Kaikoroku*, vol. 1, p. 381.
- 47 Eddy Hermawan, *Indonesia kakyō no ayumi*, 1995, cited in Inomata, *Nihon senryōka Indoneshia tabigeijin*, p. 60.
- 48 See, for example, Sutherland, *Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, and Kartini, *Letters*, pp. 58–60.
- 49 *Hadji* Moehammad Abdoelmuniam Inada, a Japanese Muslim and advisor of the Religious Affairs section of the military administration, noted this in an essay on Islam appearing in the Japanese-language *Unabara* newspaper in early September, 1942. Inada, "Kaikyō ni tsuite," *Unabara*, September 13, 1942, pp. 3–4.
- 50 Winarno, "Medjaga salah faham," *Asia Raya*, May 21, 1942, p. 1. This sense of paralysis was no doubt further encouraged by the terrible fate of the few who chose to reply to Japanese insults in kind. When an unemployed "native" named Satemin failed to bow when passing a sentry posted near the Java Bank in Surabaya on April 25, 1942, he was promptly scolded. A Japanese newspaper report said Satemin then displayed a "resistant attitude," to which the sentry responded by "merely striking" him—presumably in the head. The outraged Satemin then "violently assaulted" the sentry while striking another Japanese private in the face. Within a month, a regional military court had sentenced Satemin to death for this exchange. The Japanese newspaper report concluded with the assurance that Satemin's was thus far the only known case of a "native" perpetrating violence against a sentry or the like. "Ryūgen higo to bōkō no tsumi," *Unabara*, May 24, 1942, p. 2.
- 51 At this moment Satō wished he was back facing the "incomparable" adversaries of "China, the East's true stage of espionage and scheming." Satō Genji, *Jawa dokuchūki* ("Java prison notes") (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 1985), pp. 26–39.
- 52 Stanley Sandler, ed., *World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 501.
- 53 Miyoshi Shunkichirō, "Jawa senryō gunsei kaikō roku," *Kokusai mondai*, no. 5, pp. 64–65.
- 54 *Alg. Sec.* No. 2203, pp. 6, 8.
- 55 *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
- 56 Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, "Resident Blanda jg. bersikap boesoek," *Asia Raya*, August 25, 1942, p. 1.
- 57 See, for example, NIOD IC nos. 031605–630.
- 58 NIOD IC no. 036.772.
- 59 NIOD IC nos. 031611–613, part of a lengthy report on a "Tour of Central Java" by Soekarto, a member of Hatta's PNI party, which was submitted to Hatta's General Advisory Office in Batavia in early May 1942.
- 60 Sarli, I. T., Cassette V, Side A, transcript pp. 15–21.
- 61 Countless contemporary reports in the NIOD IC Maleische Stukken attest to these phenomena.
- 62 Takeda Rintarō (text) and Yokoyama Ryūichi (illustration), "Tabi dayori" series number 6, *Unabara*, May 27, 1942, p. 2.
- 63 Yatayama, cited in Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangelis*, pp. 8–9, entry dated June 15, 1942.
- 64 See, for example, Shimizu Nobuo, "Sekidōhō" editorial section, May 2, 1942, p. 1.
- 65 Imamura, *Kaisōroku*, p. 381.

- 66 Nakayama Yasuto, "Ran-in no genkyo to sono dôkô," cited in Gôtô, *Returning to Asia*, pp. 104–105.
- 67 Nakayama Yasuto, quoted in *Sekidôhō*, March 19, 1942, p. 2.
- 68 On *sumera* ideology, see Chapter 3, p. 61, and Chapter 5, pp. 117–118.
- 69 Shimizu Nobuo, "Genjûmin you sumera mitami tare," *Unabara*, May 13, 1942, p. 2.
- 70 While hoarding, weapons possession and a failure to stick to prewar prices was indeed commonplace, self-aggrandizement was hardly the only motivation; in the wake of the *perampokan* and knowledge of Japanese actions in Singapore, many ethnic Chinese were holding onto goods and weapons more out of a sense of self-preservation than for profiteering. Sympathy for their predicament from the "natives" and Japanese alike, however, was scant; which in turn only encouraged the ethnic Chinese to look to themselves first, compounding already sour relations.
- 71 The per-person registration fees were: "Chinese" and "other Asian" men: 100 yen, "Chinese" or "other Asian" women and children: 50 yen; "European" men: 150 yen, "European" women and children 80 yen. *Unabara*, April 12, 1942, p. 2.
- 72 "Tôroku ni miru shushusô: Monosugoi ôkeijin no konketsu burî; kakyô wa angai ni gacchiri shiteita," *Unabara*, June 2, 1942, p. 2.
- 73 *Oendang-oendang* No. 2., paragraphs 14 and 15, dated March 8, 1942, in *Kampô Nomor Istimewa* 3/1943, p. 8.
- 74 *Pandji Poestaka*, April 18, 1942, p. 65.
- 75 Kotani's first name was not provided.
- 76 "'Perwabi' Lahir Akan Menolong Pendoedoek: Samboetan Gembira dari Masjarakat," *Asia Raya*, June 8, 1942, p. 2.
- 77 "Tos." (Setijoso), "Menjamboet Rapat Anggauta 'Perwabi,'" Parts I and II, *Asia Raya*, June 12 and 13, 1942, both p. 2.
- 78 *Pemandangan*, April 2, 1942, p. 3.
- 79 On rice shortages in the wake of the Dutch surrender, see, for example, Shigeru Sato, "The Pangreh Praja in Java under Japanese military rule," in Post and Touwen-Bouwsma, eds., *Japan, Indonesia, and the War*, pp. 67–68.
- 80 "Jawa no saibai kigyô," *Unabara*, July 4, 1942, p. 2.
- 81 "Siaran Radio: Kewajiban pemoeda2 Indonesia," *Pemandangan*, April 7, 1942, p. 1.
- 82 "Soal Penganggoeran," *Pemandangan*, April 22, 1942, p. 1.
- 83 "Vribiljet boeat jang maoe poelang ke kampoeng," *Asia Raya*, April 29, 1942, p. 3.
- 84 "Mangedjar oentoeng, mendjadi boentoeng," *Asia Raya*, April 29, 1942, p. 3.
- 85 See, for example, "Uit de aantekeningen van een handelsman te Batavia," IC 004746/5229, cited in *Nederlands-Indie onder Japanse Bezetting*, p. 146.
- 86 *Pandji Poestaka*, April 25, 1942, p. 105. Starting at f 100, wages were fixed at one figure for all within each income bracket, at increments of 50 or 100 guilders. Those previously making f 151–200, for example, would now all receive f 141, and those previously making f 301–400 would now all receive f 263. The cuts were advertised as ranging between 5 percent at the low end (f 100–150 per month) to 20 percent at the high end (f 500 or more per month), but these percentages applied only to those at the bottom of each bracket. Thus someone previously making f 151 would now make f 141, a mild reduction of 7.5 percent; but someone previously making f 199 would now *also* make f 141, a reduction of 29 percent. The reductions did not apply to those making below f 100, however, meaning that those in less important positions did not suffer from the changes.
- 87 *Unabara*, April 21, 1942, p. 2.
- 88 Abe, *Hi no shima*, p. 71.
- 89 See, for example, Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 109–110.

- 90 In a 1939 essay, for example, Tomizawa himself had portrayed Chinese nationalism as an appropriate form of resistance against the West which, turned militantly against Japan, had now gone too far.

Before considering Asia as a whole, Chiang Kai-shek ... thought sooner about unifying China as one nation. That was alright, but as a means of unification he set up an imagined enemy nation, first England, but gradually switching over to Japan. This politician's ploy no doubt speeded the advance of China itself ... But the anti-Japanese spirit that Chiang achieved as a politician, having taken root among China's youth, began to take on a different shape ... and expanded spontaneously further and further, beyond Chiang's own thinking.

(Tomizawa, "Waga taishi hōsaku," p. 187)

- 91 "Sekidōhō" editorial section (Shimizu Nobuo), *Unabara*, July 2, 1942, p. 1.
- 92 Shimizu Nobuo, "Ajia-Taiheiyōken no fukkō" ("The rebirth of the Asia-Pacific Sphere"), *Sekidōhō*, March 27, 1942, p. 1. Emphasis added.
- 93 Those in this category and treated elsewhere in this study included Abe Tomoji, Takeda Rintarō, Yanagawa Munenari, and Nishijima Shigetada.
- 94 *Sekidōhō*, or "Equatorial News," began as a one-sided, single-page poster format "wall newspaper," its first edition appearing on the date of the Dutch surrender, March 9. A week later it began to appear occasionally in a two-sided or two-page newspaper format. Approximately one month after its founding, on April 3, its name was changed to *Unabara*, which appeared henceforth in a two-sided, one- or two- page newspaper format.
- 95 Editorial, *Unabara*, April 3, 1942, p. 1.
- 96 This and the following citations are from Machida Keiji, "Wareware no tatakai," *Unabara*, April 3, 1942, p. 1.
- 97 Maruzaki Yoshio, "Hanchō no omoide," in *Purapatan gambiiru*, vol. 2, p. 5.
- 98 This and the following Murakami citations are from Murakami Takaaki, "Dai tōa sen no igi wa Asia-Taiheiyō fukkō" ("The Aim of the Greater East Asia War is the Rebuilding of the Asia and the Pacific"), *Unabara*, April 3, 1942, p. 1. All highlights and quotation marks are in the original.
- 99 Discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
- 100 Ancient sources to which Murakami here referred included the appearance of the words "*Unabara wa shirase*" in the *Kojiki*, and the myths "the white rabbit and the crocodile" and "tool of the sea, tool of the mountains."
- 101 Ewald W. Schnitzer, "German Geopolitics Revisited," *Journal of Politics* 17:3 (August 1955), pp. 407–423.
- 102 Bekki Atsuhiko, cited in *Shōgenshū Nihon senryōka Indonesia*, pp. 359–360, 366.
- 103 Thus was "the sphere of co-prosperity" also a "sphere of shared sadness," added Bekki—both of which, he added, were properly part of a "true co-prosperity sphere."
- 104 While the latter two were both old and cold, he wrote, Japan and "this archipelago" were thus both hot and young. Thus in one fell swoop did Bekki relegate not only Europe but also China to the category of geological Other. His discussion meanwhile neatly avoided areas that might complicate the assertion, such as the presumably equally hot and young areas on the Eastern Pacific Rim, including those of the enemy Western United States.
- 105 Bekki Atsuhiko, "Chiseigaku kara mita unabara no kuni to hito 1," *Unabara*, June 12, 1942, p. 2.
- 106 Bekki Atsuhiko, "Chiseigaku kara mita unabara no kuni to hito 2," *Unabara*, June 13, 1942, p. 2.

- 107 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 274.
- 108 Hoesein Djajadiningrat as quoted in Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for October 19, 1942, p. 59.
- 109 See, for example, Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 273–276. In postwar Dutch interrogations, subsequent Propaganda Department leader Adachi Hisayoshi said of Bekki's "geo-politics": "Its influence was not great among Indonesians but was considerably great among Japanese in Java." NIOD IC no. 006375.
- 110 Abe complained that the Japanese imprisonment of Dutch scientists was "a stain on Japan's international reputation." Jansen, entry for July 21, 1942, pp. 20–22.
- 111 The following citations are from Abe Tomoji, "*Yami wo ou kōmei no tataikai* (The Battle of Light that Drives Away the Darkness)," *Unabara*, April 3 and 4, 1942, both p. 1.
- 112 Asano Akira, "San'a undō no tenkai," *Unabara*, April 3, 1942, p. 2.

Chapter 6

- 1 Andjar Asmara, "Samboetan kita terhadap Pembangoenan Keboedajaan Asia Raya," *Pemandangan*, April 4, 1942, p. 3.
- 2 H.B. Jassin, "Perasaan koerang harga diri, semangat boedak," *Pandji Poestaka*, April 18, 1942, pp. 38–40. The officer was listed as a certain Endō Jirō, the location the West Java town of Tasikmalaya.
- 3 H.B. Jassin, "Semangat Boesjido Dan Kita," *Pandji Poestaka*, April 11, 1942, p. 10.
- 4 "*Asia Raya*" in parentheses in original Ed.
- 5 Asmara, "Samboetan."
- 6 "Pemboeka Djalan," *Pandji Poestaka*, P. P, April 11, 1942, p. 1. Emphasis in the original. *Pandji Poestaka* was the weekly journal of *Balai Poestaka*, a publishing house originally founded by the Dutch colonial authorities in the "ethical policy" years of the 1910s. In 1923, Dr. A Rinkes, first secretary of *Balai Poestaka*, characterized its aim as producing "wholesome literature" and avoiding "dangerous" literature that might "stir people up." Its prewar publications included local stories, particularly in regional languages (*bahasa daerah*), as well as abridged versions of European classics and stories of Dutch heroism. Ajip Rosidi, *Ikhtisar Sejarah Sastra Indonesia* (Bandung: Binacipta, 1969), p. 19.
- 7 "Perubahan Zaman," *Pemandangan*, March 9, 1942, p. 2..
- 8 A. Rachman Djauhari, "Insjaflah!," *Pemandangan*, "Pikiran Pembatja" section, March 27, 1942, p. 4.
- 9 In contrast, Australia, with "neither the strength nor the will to defend itself," would no doubt soon fall to Japan as well—or so the author declared.
- 10 "Semangat Nippon," *Pemandangan*, March 24, 1942, p. 2.
- 11 Jassin, "Semangat Boesjido."
- 12 The description of Asmara Hadi's background is from *Orang Indonesia*, p. 280, Anderson, *Java in a Time*, p. 446, and "Ir. Soekarno Telah Tiba Dengan Kapal Bermotor Di Pasar Ikan," *Asia Raya*, July 10, 1942.
- 13 *Satriya* is an alternative form of *kesatria* or *kesatrijan*, the warrior hero of the *wayang* discussed in Chapter 2, Part Two.
- 14 Asmara Hadi ("H.R."), "Pendidikan Bushido atau Satriya," *Pemandangan*, April 9, 1942, p. 6.
- 15 This and subsequent citations are from Soetardjo, text of speech to the Indonesian Sport Federation (Ikatan Sport Indonesia), *Pemandangan*, April 21, 1942, p. 2.
- 16 I have come across no other reference to this practice.

- 17 Soepardjo, "Pergoeroean di Nippon," *Pandji Poestaka*, April 18, 1942, p. 42. Soepardjo's approval of this model of "women's education" mirrored that of Nohara, who, in his introduction to *Japan zooals Het Is*, was at pains to refute images of modernized, westernized Japanese woman—and indeed that of a modernized, westernized Japan itself—as a merely a superficial coating atop a solid core of unchanging, ancient Japaneseness, with Japanese women as its prime repository. "The two faces of Japan?—The second face was and is only a mask, no thicker than a layer of make-up. Japan has always had but one face," proclaimed Nohara. Despite magazine marketing images of Japanese girls in the latest Western fashions playing the latest Western sports, Nohara noted confidently, in reality "at most only one in a hundred" Japanese women wore Western clothes, and those who did so were frowned upon: "We are as a whole not particularly proud of the European-dressed 'modern girls.'" "Indeed," he admitted, "young Japanese girls partake in sport, because we to want to breed a cleaner, more strapping, larger and stronger female sex in Japan, but they do so," he assured readers, "within reasonable limits ... and with a particular concern for what is appropriate." Nohara Komakichi, *Japan Zooals Het Is* (Amsterdam: Nederlandsche Keurboekkerij, 1936), pp. 13, 16.
- 18 Soepardjo, "Pergoeroean di Nippon," p. 42.
- 19 Noersinah Soepardo, "Wanita Nippon," *Pandji Poestaka*, April 25, 1942, pp. 97–98.
- 20 Njonja Soedjono, "Wanita Nippon: Penghidoepan Sederhana," *Asia Raya*, September 5, 1942, p. 3.
- 21 Njonja Soedjono, "Poeteri Matahari Terbit," *Asia Raya*, July 20, 1942, p. 2.
- 22 "Badan perwakilan peladjar-peladjar Indonesia," *Pemandangan*, April 9, 1942, p. 3.
- 23 Sudjatmoko, I. T., Cassette II, Side B, p. 63.
- 24 The term *hadji* refers to Muslims who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca, a source of high prestige among fellow Muslims.
- 25 Bang Bedjat (Anwar Tjokroaminoto), "Isi Podjok" column, *Pemandangan*, April 2, 1942, p. 3. The time change was announced as "The End of Java Time" in *Sekidōhō*, March 29, 1942, p. 1.
- 26 "Oran-oran wa kō miteiru (This is how the *orang-orang* see it)," *Unabara*, May 9, 1942, p. 2. "Orang-orang" is the Indonesian plural form for "person."
- 27 Engelen et al., *Lahirnya Satu Bangsa dan Negara*, p. 24.
- 28 "Semangat militer," *Asia Raya*, August 29, 1942, p. 3.
- 29 "Nippon ryūkō," *Unabara*, April 9, 1942, p. 2.
- 30 Takeda Rintarō and Yokoyama Ryūichi, "Gaisen no imon sendentai," *Unabara*, June 10, 1942, p. 2.
- 31 See, for example, *Pemandangan*, March 12, 1942, p. 2, whose text read: "The Key to the Japanese Door: Immediate courses in the Japanese language, 2 hours per week, 3 rupiah per month, Gang Arab 31, Sawah Besar Batavia."
- 32 *Unabara*, April 16, 1942, p. 2.
- 33 *Pemandangan*, April 14, 1942, p. 4.
- 34 Van Hinloopen Labberton (1874–1961) was a prominent theosophist and Javanologist, who also happened to be one of those behind the 1918 conference on Javanese Cultural Development discussed in Chapter 2, Part Two.
- 35 Sanoesi Pané, "Bahasa Djepang dan keloearga bahasa Austronesia," *Pemandangan*, March 12, 1942, p. 2 and March 14, 1942, p. 2.
- 36 Bafagih, "Mengembangkan bahasa Nippon," *Pemandangan*, April 18, 1942, p. 2.
- 37 Colonel Machida also recalled Ki Hadjar Dewanatarā's *Taman Siswa* schools as another of the *Chihaya* school's inspirations. If so, this might be traceable to

Sendenhan translators Ichiki Tatsuo and Nakatani Yoshio, the latter of whom had personally attended such a school to learn Indonesian in the late 1930s. Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 268–269.

- 38 L.J. Brugmans, ed., *Nederlandsch Indië onder Japanse bezetting 1942-1945* (Franeker: T. Wever z.j., 1960), p. 193, and *Kadokawa kokugo daijiten*, (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1982), p. 1333.
- 39 Machida lists “Kawakami Hirofumi, Akatsuka Tokio and others” as Japanese instructors. Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 108, 268–269. Some numbered among the group of twenty former students from Shimizu’s *Sumera gakujuku*. See Wakabayashi Teruyuki, “Indonesia dokuritsu no uta: Tokubetsu seinentai senki (3),” in *Bogōru tsūshin/Kabar Bogor V* (Tokorozawa: Peta kankeishakai jimukyoku, July 1984), p. 180. *Unabara* contains an interview with “Sutani,” aged twenty-six, *Cihaya* school teacher and wife of its “director,” a certain “Agus” (cited below). “Oran-oran wa kō miteiru.”
- 40 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 268–269.
- 41 *Pemandangan*, May 16, 1942, p. 2, and *Asia Raya*, May 20, 1942, p. 2.
- 42 *Unabara*, May 14, 1942, p. 2.
- 43 “Oran-oran wa kō miteiru.”
- 44 *Unabara*, June 4, 1942, p. 2.
- 45 “Shimauchi shōfukei,” *Unabara*, July 14, 1942, p. 2.
- 46 Hitoshi Shimizu, “Shutchō shoken,” *Unabara*, June 4, 1942, p. 2.
- 47 “Nippon-Indonesia,” *Pemandangan*, March 12, 1942, p. 2.
- 48 Jansen, *Half-gevangenis*, p. 2.
- 49 Soetardjo, text of speech to the Indonesian Sport Federation (Ikatan Sport Indonesia), *Pemandangan*, April 21, 1942, p. 2.
- 50 Clobboth is a Javanese-derived word for a dried corn-husk used as a cigarette wrapper.
- 51 Clobboth (Winarno), “Toekang Tiroe,” *Isi Podjok* column, *Asia Raya*, May 13, 1942, p. 2.
- 52 “Purinsen Paruku wo tatekai no keikaku,” *Unabara*, June 20, 1942, p. 2.
- 53 “Poetera’ dan ‘Ratoe Asia,” *Asia Raya*, October 2, 1942, p. 2.
- 54 “Orang Indonesia Dan Orang Nippon bekerdja bersama-sama mengadakan tonil,” *Asia Raya*, June 20, 1942, p. 2.
- 55 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 249.
- 56 “Seorang Pro Nippon,” *Asia Raya*, June 22, 1942, p. 2.
- 57 A.A. [Andjar Asmara], “Roeangan Kesenian: ‘Poetera Asia,’” *Asia Raya*, August 31, 1942, p. 2.
- 58 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, pp. 99–100. As a further reflection of this (imagined) intimacy, Tomizawa here recalled addressing Alatas with the Japanese *omae*, an intimate if somewhat vulgar term usually reserved for close associates or family.
- 59 *Ibid.*, pp. 105–106.
- 60 *Ibid.*, pp. 112–113.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 141.
- 62 Shimizu, interview with Nishijima, pp. 116–117.
- 63 *Ibid.*, pp. 109–110.
- 64 Both were well-known Batavia department stores selling Western-made goods and catering to the colonial elite.
- 65 Clobboth (Winarno), “Djanganlah ketjil hati” (Don’t give up), *Isi Podjok* column, *Asia Raya*, May 22, 1942, p. 2.
- 66 Tomizawa, *Jawa bunka sen*, pp. 133–134.
- 67 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 68 Clobboth [Winarno], “Poesing” (“Headache”), *Asia Raya*, June 1, 1942, p. 2.

69 It should, however, be noted that in this era, most members of Java's Western-educated social elite, including most of *Asia Raya's* staff and readers, were not particularly strict in their religious observances.

70 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 57, 378.

71 The lyrics read as follows:

Since ancient times
 These golden isles' name renowned
 Rich fields, a great nation
 Our homeland Indonesia ...
 The fertility of its fields inestimable
 Its popular prosperity unbounded
 A lovely, beautiful nation
 Indonesia, heirloom of our inheritance ...
 Remember the era of Modjopahit
 Remember the era of Sriwidjaja
 Glorious in its history
 The great People (*bangsa*) of Indonesia
 Long live, long live, Indonesia!

(*Pandji Poestaka*, "Samboet-menjamboet" and "Hidoep Indonesia,"
 April 11, 1942, p. 17)

72 Gotō Ken'ichi writes of Ichiki at this time:

rather than seeking interaction with the *bunkajin* drafted from Tokyo, whose disposition somehow differed [from his own], Ichiki preferred to freely associate with the Indonesian acquaintances he had known since long before the war, while towards the censorial duties at the Indonesian-language newspapers assigned to him by the *Sendenhan*, he showed almost no interest.

(*Hi no umi*, p. 131)

73 This and the subsequent citation are from a personal interview with Rosihan Anwar at his home in Jakarta on August 24, 1994. The interview was conducted in English, with occasional Indonesian, Dutch, and Japanese interjections.

74 Details on the rules of censorship were published in *Asia Raya* on May 13, 1942, p. 2.

75 A.B. Lapien and J.R. Chaniago, eds., *Di bawah pendudukan Jepang: kenangan empat puluh dua orang yang mengalaminya* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional, 1989), p. 76.

76 Odji [Winarno], "Hodoka berlebaran," Sambil Laloe section, *Asia Raya*, October 31, 1942, p. 3.

77 Sanoesi Pané, "Keboedajaan Asia Raya," *Asia Raya*, April 29, 1942, p. 3.

78 Sanoesi Pané, "Kesalahan Marxisme kasar," *Asia Raya*, May 7, 1942, p. 3.

79 Social problems introduced by corrupting Western influences, he noted in another essay, could be seen in Dutch educational policies that emphasized only cleverness and ignored spiritual education. "Character, love of society, deep sentiments—these were ignored" (Sanoesi Pané, "Pengadjaran," *Asia Raya*, May 21, 1942, p. 3). In another essay Pané added that alongside an essential Western inattention to matters of the spirit, this oversight was also motivated by a fear that spiritual learning would only strengthen the spirit of Indonesian opposition to imperialism (Sanoesi Pané, "Keboedajaan daerah dan Asia Raya," *Asia Raya*, May 14, 1942, p. 3).

80 "Setoeroenan dan sebangsa," *Asia Raya*, May 13, 1942, p. 3.

- 81 Jansen made this observation in a diary entry dated March 3, 1943. The direct inspiration was a Japanese-language article by Pané entitled “I am full of gratitude” that appeared in that day’s *Jawa shimbun*—the successor of *Unabara*—in which Pané “called upon the Indonesian population to stand behind Japanese war efforts as a member of the Greater East Asian family, out of gratitude to the Japanese army, which has cured the land of the chronic illness of the colonial past.” Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, p. 148.
- 82 For more detail on Sanoesi Pané, see Ethan Mark, “‘Asia’s’ Transwar Lineage: Nationalism, Marxism, and ‘Greater Asia’ in an Indonesian Inflection,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 65:3 (August 2006), pp. 461–493.
- 83 This and the following citations are from, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, “Lebih loeas lagi,” *Pemandangan*, May 19, 1942, p. 1.
- 84 Winarno, “Kesadaran Bangsa,” *Asia Raya*, May 20, 1942, p. 1.
- 85 Winarno, “Soepaja ingat dan waspada,” *Asia Raya*, May 15, 1942, p. 1. The Dutch word *barensweën* appeared as is in the original Indonesian text.
- 86 Cloboth [Winarno], “Isi podjok: Minderwaardigheidscomplex,” *Asia Raya*, May 16, 1942, p. 2.
- 87 Winarno, “Pendidikan Bangsa,” *Asia Raya*, May 28, 1942, p. 1.
- 88 Asmara Hadi, “Manoesia Baru,” *Asia Raya*, June 10, 1942, p. 3.
- 89 Asmara Hadi, “Statis dan dinamis,” *Asia Raya*, June 8, 1942, p. 3.
- 90 Ichiki Tatsuo, “Dokuritsu to gengo: Indoneshia-go no susumubeki michi,” *Shin Jawa* 1:2 (December 1944), p. 50.
- 91 Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, “Barat Moendoer, Timur Madjoe,” *Asia Raya*, April 19, 1942, p. 3..
- 92 Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, “Nippon-Indonesia: Doea Sedjoli,” part two of two installments, *Asia Raya*, July 19, 1942, p. 1.
- 93 See, for example, the introductory text of *bunkajin* Kitahara Takeo’s first Japanese lesson in *Asia Raya*, in which he claims that “so long as there are no Indonesians who can speak Japanese, then relations between Japan and Indonesia will always remain difficult.” Kitahara Takeo, “Peladjaran bahasa Nippon,” *Asia Raya*, April 29, 1942, p. 5.
- 94 See, for example, Pembesar Balatentara Dai Nippon, “Oendang-Oendang No. 16: Tentang pengawasan badan-badan pengemoeman dan penerangan dan penilikan pengemoeman dan penerangan,” dated May 25, 1942, in *Kan Pō*, Nomor Istimewa, p. 16, and in *Osamu Kanpō dai ichi gō* (Jakarta: Jawa gunseikanbu, December 15, 1942), p. 5 (Reprint, Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1989). The Japanese term *unabara*, whose meaning of “wide ocean” hardly corresponded to that of “Indonesia,” never attained regular usage, and outside occasional ideological essays from *bunkajin*, seldom appeared either in Indonesian or in Japanese-language official documents.
- 95 Winarno, “Menoedjoe *Asia Raya*,” *Asia Raya*, April 29, 1942, p. 3.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 Winarno was at the same time careful to end on a more optimistic note, pointing to the fact that the local “police forces, as we reported yesterday, will be made up entirely of people of the Indonesian race” as a clear indication that this process of entrustment had “already begun.” Winarno, “Kemenangan Nippon II,” *Asia Raya*, June 11, 1942, p. 1.
- 98 Shimizu, interview by Nishijima, pp. 72, 74, 140.
- 99 Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, *Japanese Military Administration*, pp. 336–337. Principle author of the study was the prewar Indies resident Nishijima Shigetada, to whom we were introduced in Chapter 3.. One of the few Japanese to

- remain in Java in the last weeks before Pearl Harbor, Nishijima had been arrested and shipped to Australia by the Dutch following the outbreak of the Pacific War. A subsequent prisoner exchange, however, made it possible for him to return to Java in July 1942. He thus personally witnessed the last months of the Three-A movement. See Nishijima, *Shōgen*.
- 100 Mohammad Hatta, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta; Interviewer: Taufik Abdullah; Interview date: May 17, 1975; Cassette IV, Side A, transcript p. 169.
 - 101 Miyoshi Shunkichirō, "Jawa senryō gunsei kaikoroku (6)," *Kokusai Mondai*, October 1965, p. 72. In Japanese, the term "ding-dong party" (*chindon'ya*) refers to noisy groups traditionally hired to make publicity for newly-opened shops.
 - 102 Asano Akira, "San'a undō no tenkai."
 - 103 "-kun" is a Japanese suffix indicating that the addressee is a (young) male familiar with and/or of lower status than the speaker.
 - 104 Kitahara Takeo, "Peladjaran bahasa Nippon" column nos. 14 through 19, *Asia Raya*, May 15–22, 1942, p. 3.
 - 105 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 159.
 - 106 Machida Keiji, "Shisō to jikkō," *Unabara*, April 24, 1942.
 - 107 Fukuzawa Yūkichi (1835–1901) was the leading light of Japan's early Meiji period bourgeois-liberal enlightenment.
 - 108 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 154–155.
 - 109 Shimizu, "Minshū senbu hitosuji ni," pp. 327–328. Shimizu was referring to the comments of occupation veteran, subsequent Military Government Political Affairs Section chief and Shimizu associate Saitō Shizuo, who listed Shimizu's "devotion and experience" as "one reason" for the movement's early, quick expansion. "Not only did Shimizu have genius qualities as a popular organizer, but he also carried on the special attributes of [earlier Japanese] overseas enlightenment projects, also drawing upon Manchuria's *Kyōwakai*, and the North China *Shin min hui*." Saitō Shizuo, *Watashi no gunseiki* (Tokyo: Jawa gunsei kangyōkai, 1977), p. 113. Saitō was not alone in these sorts of conclusions. In a section of his Ph.D. thesis discussing the Three-A movement, Dutch historian Rodney De Bruin wrote: "According to the Japanese concept of the corporative state, the population was to be grouped into corporations so much as possible." Rodney de Bruin, *Indonesië: De laatste etappe naar de vrijheid, 1942–1945* (Amsterdam: Royal Institute of War Documentation, 1982), p. 66. More recently, while acknowledging a greater *Parindra* role in the shaping of the Three-A, historian Shigeru Satō wrote, "The Triple A Movement was clearly not a propaganda movement to counter the Allied V Movement. It became a movement heading toward a mass social organisation resembling the total mobilisation movements in Japan, covering a wide range of activities, except politics, in both urban and rural areas." Satō, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, p. 46.
 - 110 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 203–204.
 - 111 Moerdjani Woerjaningrat and Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, "Parindra Melangkah ke Asia Raya," *Asia Raya*, May 20, 1942, p. 1.
 - 112 Asano Akira, "Parindora no ryōshu," in *Jawa kantei yowa*, pp. 82, 84.
 - 113 The figure for the number of Three-A branches is from Samsøedin, address to "Leaders of the *Rakjat*" in Batavia, June 10, 1942, NIOD IC no. 030724.
 - 114 Poetjoek Pimpinan Pergerakan "Tiga A," "Instroeksi-Instroeksi," dated June 18, 1942, NIOD IC nos. 030727–735.
 - 115 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, p. 18, diary entry for July 11, 1942.
 - 116 "Pemoeda Asia Raya," *Asia Raya*, June 10, 1942, p. 2.

- 117 These included, for example, Setiadi Kartohadikusumo, son of the prominent native administrator leader Soetardjo Kartohadikusumo. As the former remembered it in a later interview, his father considered his participation in the 1930s as a matter of obligation, "not a matter of choice." Setiadi Kartohadikusuma, I. T., *Arsip Nasional Oral History Collection*, Jakarta. Interviewer: Eri Muchtar; Interview date: August 12, 1986; Cassette I, Side A, transcript p. 8.
- 118 Former scout (and father-in-law of the author) Soeratman Dharmaperwira, personal interview, Heemstede, Netherlands, October 11, 2001.
- 119 S.J. Sondakh, I.T., *Arsip Nasional Oral History Collection*, Jakarta. Interviewer: Fendy E.W. Parengkuan; Interview date: November 1, 1982; Cassette I, Side B, transcript p. 19. "Our group" seems to be a reference to the prewar youth group of which Sondakh was a member, the "Church Youth." The person named is apparently one of the following three: Samidjo Mangoenwirono, M. Moenadi, and H.P.L. Tobing, all of whom were listed as leaders of the "Techniek" section of the BPAR. As the last of these is a common name in the *Toba Batak* region of Sumatra, and since many from this area are Christian, H.P.L. Tobing seems the most likely of the three.
- 120 Instructors included Dr. Abu Hanifah, Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, and Dr. Imam Slamet Sudibyo. A complete list of names of the *Pemoeda Indonesia Raya*'s instructors and a summary of its curriculum appear in NIOD IC nos. 006570–571.
- 121 In his newspaper essay introducing the concept, Soekardjo called attention to his own statements at a speech in Surakarta in 1938, in which he referred to the period of economic malaise of 1930–7 as having had one bright spot: a "crisis-benefit" (*crisiswinst*) in the form of youth who were thus compelled to put down their "pens and pencils" and have a go at work in the fields for the first time, an experience of spiritual and mental toughening-up (*gemblengan*) that these pampered youth, he said, in fact sorely needed. Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, "Barisan Bekeraja: Menggembleng Semangat Pemoeda," Parts I and II, *Asia Raya*, August 11 and 12, 1942, both p. 2.
- 122 Shimizu, transcript of interview with Nishijima, pp. 138–139.
- 123 The Arabic title *hadji* (in contemporary Indonesian spelling *haji*) refers to one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca. There is no evidence that Hitoshi Shimizu ever made such a pilgrimage.
- 124 Harsono Tjokroaminoto, I. T., *Arsip Nasional*, Cassette 25, Side B, transcript p. 480.
- 125 M. Hazboellah, "Tjorak ke-Islaman. Islam Dohir dan Bathin," *Pemandangan*, April 16, 1942, p. 3.
- 126 The PSSI was the 1930s follower of the earlier *Sarekat Islam* party. Harry J. Benda, "Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945," *Pacific Affairs* 28:4 (December 1955), p. 355, says that this was the case for both the PSII and the *Partai Islam Indonesia* or PSI. The order for the banning of the PSII was issued on May 9; Benda dates the corresponding order for the PSI to May 20. See "Kota" section, *Asia Raya*, May 12, 1942, p. 2, and Benda below. As Benda points out, whereas the nationalist parties were never formally banned, the Japanese explicitly banned these Muslim parties by name. It may be that there were those in the military administration who felt it necessary to do this in order to prevent the possibility that these groups, if interpreted as religious rather than political organizations, might fall through the loophole of the March 20 order. Benda put this another way: He saw this as a sign that the Japanese "would not tolerate the—in their eyes—unholy wedding of Islam and politics." Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, pp. 111–112.
- 127 *Sekidōhō*, April 1, 1942, p. 1.
- 128 Shimizu, transcript of interview with Nishijima, pp. 72–73.

- 129 Nor, for that matter, is it certain that all of the ethnically Chinese delegates present could even understand “Pekingese,” although most of them probably did. I owe this information to Dr. Peter Keppy.
- 130 *Sekidōhō*, April 1, 1942, p. 1.
- 131 As Shimizu put it, “The Three-A Movement didn’t need money, so I put most of that money into *Asia Raya*.” Shimizu, transcript of interview with Nishijima, pp. 117–118. The *Asia Raya* newspaper is extensively discussed above. On the figure of 30,000 yen: At a later point in the same interview (transcript p. 119), Nishijima incorrectly restates this figure to Shimizu, not as 30,000, but as 300,000. Shimizu then obligingly repeats the latter figure. I assume, however, that Nishijima was in error and that the original figure of 30,000 yen which Shimizu himself produces on page 74—already a massive sum of money by 1942 standards—is the correct one. Shimizu, transcript of interview by Nishijima, p. 74.
- 132 *Asia Raya*, April 29, 1942, p. 4. The Indonesian text read, “Alangkah manisnja dipandang mata, Anak Asia bersapatoe Bata, Akan menoedjoe Asia Raya.” This Bata advertisement also caught the eye of Sato Shigeru, who reprinted it in full in his *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, p. 40. It should be noted, however, that most newspaper advertising in this period remained of a far simpler, unpoliticized sort, and that while local advertisers occasionally cited the Three-A and other slogans in their texts on special occasions such as this, Bata’s advertisement appears to have been virtually unique in its bold, brazen attempt to manipulate the Asian theme to its own advantage. Indeed—perhaps because of a boldness viewed as excessive—the advertisement appeared only once.
- 133 Samsoedin, text of speech, “Tanggal 8 dan Pergerakan Tiga A” (“The Date of the 8th and the Three-A Movement”), *Asia Raya*, May 13, 1942, p. 2.
- 134 NIOD IC no. 036.771.
- 135 Samsoedin, text of speech, “Tanggal 8 dan Pergerakan Tiga A,” *Asia Raya*, May 13, 1942, p. 2.
- 136 Soetardjo’s employment of Dutch words in both cases, to illustrate both positive and negative examples, is reflective of the great level of comfort he and so many other members of Java’s elite felt in the Dutch language, continuing to use it despite negative associations, and even at the risk of Japanese displeasure.
- 137 Soetardjo, “Persatoean Bangsa Asia,” text of radio address published in *Pemandangan*, April 22, 1942, p. 2.
- 138 *Sonchō* was the new equivalent to an Assistant Wedana under the Dutch system, administrator of an “Onderdistrict.”
- 139 NIOD IC no. 036772.
- 140 “Pergerakan tiga A di Soekaboemi,” *Pemandangan*, April 25, 1942, p. 1.
- 141 “Tiga A di Bogor,” *Asia Raya*, May 2, 1942, p. 5.
- 142 Poetjoek Pimpinan Pergerakan “Tiga A,” “Instroeksi-Instroeksi.”
- 143 The cite is from Samsoedin’s introductory radio speech delivered on April 21, 1942: “Pidato Poetjoek Pimpinan Pergerakan ‘Tiga A’ Didepan Radio Djakarta Pada Tg. 21 April 2602 [1942] Oleh Mr. R. Samsoedin.” NIOD IC nos. 030711–715.
- 144 Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, p. 27.
- 145 *Ibid.*, pp. 97–102, Saitō, *Watashi no gunseiki*, p. 76, and Hatta, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 171. Nio Joe Lan, one of several *peranakan* journalists interned at the time, detailed his bitter experiences beginning with these arrests in Nio Joe Lan, *Dalam Tawanan Djepang: Penoeotoran pengidoepan interneeran pada djeman pendoeoekan Djepang* (Jakarta-Kota: Lotus Co., 1946). He numbered the ethnic Chinese arrestees in the Batavia area in the three days of April 26–28, 1942, at p. 136.

- 146 Shimizu noted that “although the Indonesians heard about [the arrests of ethnic Chinese], at the time of the *tenchōsetsu*, they celebrated in an unprecedented way.” Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, p. 100.
- 147 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 158.
- 148 Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, p. 142.
- 149 Ibid., pp. 146–148.
- 150 Ibid.
- 151 This was the assessment of *Beppan* Captain Yanagawa Motoshige cited in Kanahele, *The Japanese Occupation*, p. 49.
- 152 NIOD “De Weerd” collection, nos. 006.903-909, interrogation of Nishimura Otoshi.
- 153 NIOD “De Weerd” collection, nos. 006.914-915, interrogation of Saito Shizuo.
- 154 Togashi Takeomi, *Togashi Takeomi-shi intabyū kiroku*, Tokyo: “Tokutei kenkyū bunka masatsu” series, Interviewer: Shiraishi Takashi; Interview date: November 13, 1978, p. 33.
- 155 Shimizu, transcript of interview by Nishijima, p. 168.
- 156 In a 1975 interview, Hatta said he “could see that the Military Administration was not too happy about” the Three-A movement, but did not say exactly when this became clear. Hatta, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Cassette VI, Side B, transcript p. 188.
- 157 See Chapter 9, “Standing still.”
- 158 See, for example, complaints filed from the town of Kroja in Central Java, dated June 23, 1942, to the effect that “three requests” to the local *sonchō* for the establishment of a Three-A branch there had been turned down. NIOD IC no. 032302.
- 159 Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, pp. 151–152, NIOD IC no. 036785, and Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 163.
- 160 Sato, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, pp. 46–47. *Asia Raya* did report the setup of at least one *Three A* branch in East Java, in the Bodjonegoro residency near the border with Central Java, on June 14. “Bodjonegoro: Gerakan ‘A.A.A.’,” *Asia Raya*, June 25, 1942, p. 4. Kanahele, *The Japanese Occupation*, p. 217, note no. 40, reported the establishment of a branch in Probolinggo residency a “one curious anomaly,” but I have located no record on the existence of such a branch. Kanahele’s statement may have been based upon a confusion with the branch established in the similarly-named Central Java residency of Poerbalingga.
- 161 See Chapter 4, “A Reunion of Strangers. George Kanahele writes: “... the *Tiga A*’s near absence in east Java was attributable to the opposition of the authorities of the 48th Division who were responsible for the administration of East Java.” This from a personal interview with Colonel Kuriya of the 48th Division. Kanahele, *The Japanese Occupation*, p. 271, note no. 39.
- 162 As *Sendenhan* chief Machida later wrote,

At that time, the *Sendenhan* was under the Army Staff Section (*Sambōbu*), and thus fell under the direct jurisdiction of the Military Commander (*Gunshireikan*). As such, the Military Government Section was an utter stranger, and no matter how we may have diverged from the Military Government Section’s agenda, that was up to me, and the Military Government Section had no right to say anything to me about it. If I did something wrong, it was up to the Military Commander to deal with me.

(Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 159)

- 163 In a statement he dated to July 1942, Shimizu Hitoshi later recalled Imamura offering him the following strong words of encouragement:

With earnestness and dedication, you have done a very good job of going among the people, and thanks to you, the public order situation is extremely favorable, and the structure of cooperation is also good. Please carry on all the more.

Thus, Shimizu continued,

when some ignorant Lt. Colonel or Colonel, or someone on the Brigadier General level, or an administrative official or chief administrative official would say something, I'd reply with "this is what the Military Commander said." When we'd say something, we'd use the Military Commander as a shield, so they couldn't lay a finger on us ... In that sense, Commander Imamura was truly like a god in Indonesia. Precisely in this, people would say he was a savior, and it encouraged a general sense that Commander Imamura would be the one to truly liberate Indonesia.

(Shimizu, "Minshū senbu hitosuji ni," pp. 306–307)

- 164 One exception to this picture appears in the succinct but positive assessment on the Cianjur branch of the Three-A later provided by its chairman Gatot Mangkupradja, an early Sukarno associate who maintained close contacts with shopkeeper Togashi Takeomi and other local Japanese after a favorable visit to Japan in 1934. In a 1963 interview, George Kanahale described Mangkupradja as saying that "in his area the Three-A functioned largely as a social welfare organization. He also declares that it was popular among local Indonesians since they stood the most to benefit." See note number 45 in Kanahale, *The Japanese Occupation*, p. 272.
- 165 The following citations are from E. Soegandi and S. Waloejo, "Raport Penjelidikan di Soekaboemi," date July 19, 1942, NIOD IC nos. 036773–777. For reports of similar events and concerns in other regencies, see, for example, "Keadaan Indramajoe," in West Java, dated September 15, 1942, NIOD IC nos. 036792–796, and on the situation at the Krawang branch near Batavia, dated November 1, 1942, NIOD IC 031189.
- 166 Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, pp. 274–275. From December, 1942, Soegandi took a position as a local employee of the Japanese *Dōmei* wire service.
- 167 See, for example, NIOD IC nos. 031425–427, 031434, 031446, 031470, 031525, 031531, 031533, 031543, 0370133–134.
- 168 For example, when it came time for the Three-A to distribute much-needed coconut oil, Soegandi wrote, members of the management board began by distributing it "amongst themselves." As another example: a "native" cooperative association called the Indonesian People's Cooperative (*Koperasi Rakjat Indonesia* or KRI) was formed in Sukabumi, Bogor, and the surrounding area on May 1, 1942, and within only a month and a half, it had expanded into an organization with ninety-seven branches and over ten thousand members. Aiming to stimulate the "native" economy and produce and provide rice, tapioca, and cassava at affordable prices, it was precisely the sort of organization that the Three-A was supposed to take an interest in supporting, and a late June *Asia Raya* report also described it as having good relations with local native officials ("Soekaboemi: Semangat rakjat oentoek berkorporasi," *Asia Raya*, June 24, 1942, p. 4). But Soegandi described a much bleaker situation. When the Three-A came into the coconut oil, Soegandi wrote, the KRI was given only five cans, while the neighborhood where many members of the management board happened to reside was "flooded with coconut oil." In a separate incident, the local regent was said to have received four hundred cans of coconut oil for distribution, of which two hundred

- were made available to Chinese traders and two hundred to their “native” counterpart organization, the Unity of Indonesian Traders (*Persatoean Dagang Indonesia*, or *Perdis*) now associated with the Three-A. These were to be distributed among retailers “as fairly as possible. But it is clear that the attitude of ‘*Perdis*’ is to seek its own advantage,” wrote Soegandi, “to the point that the K.R.I., which operates some 150 shops, and has 15,000 members, only received 7 cans from ‘*Perdis*’ and 7 cans from the Chinese.”
- 169 “Keadaan dalam Daerah Kaboepaten Poerbolingo Dengan Sepintas Laloe,” dated October 22, 1942, NIOD IC nos. 036805–814.
- 170 NIOD IC nos. 036797–804.
- 171 Report to Subardjo’s office from postal official and former *Parindra* member Abdoel Karim, NIOD IC no. 038897.
- 172 NIOD IC no. 031828, dated November 23, 1942.
- 173 A new law was struck in mid-October, 1942, with the appearance of widespread rumors of a *kenpeitai* investigation of Three-A leader Samsloedin, reportedly in connection with the disappearance of between 7,000 and 30,000 guilders from the Three-A treasury (the former figure is from *ibid.*, the latter from Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for October 16, 1942, p. 55). On October 23, reports of Samsloedin’s disappearance received a flat denial from *Asia Raya*’s Winarno, who insisted that he was still “coming to work” as usual. But similar rumors continued to circulate well into November (*ibid.* and Odji Cloboth (Winarno), “Moeloernja lidah,” *Asia Raya*, October 23, 1942, p. 2). While these rumors appear in the end to have been untrue, they nevertheless represented a “measurement of how much trust [Samsloedin] retains among the people” (NIOD IC no. 031818, dated December 12, 1942).

Chapter 7

- 1 In mid-February, on the eve of the Japanese invasion of Sumatra, the Dutch authorities, fearing that the Japanese might make dangerous propaganda use of Sukarno, had him moved from exile in Bengkulu, South Sumatra, to the western port city of Padang. In the subsequent confusion and panic that ensued as the 25th Army landed there, however—and with the boat originally meant to transport him out of the Indies lying at the bottom of the harbor—Sukarno’s Dutch captors had abandoned him to his fate. Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, p. 153. Some two months transpired before the authorities in Java managed to locate Sukarno. See *Asia Raya*, May 1, 1942, p. 2.
- 2 Imamura, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikōroku*, p. 396.
- 3 Shimizu, interview with Nishijima, p. 166.
- 4 See, for example, Hering, *M.H. Thamrin*.
- 5 Winarno, “Sekitar Ir. Soekarno,” *Asia Raya*, July 11, 1942, p. 1.
- 6 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for July 11, 1942, p. 18. Jansen wrote that Sukarno’s “friend Hatta made sure that his arrival was known, so thousands of people came to *Pasar Ikan* to welcome him, just as thousands escorted the *volks-hero* Soekarno to the station when he was to be interned.” There is no separate indication, however, that the crowd at *Pasar Ikan* was on a scale anything close to this.
- 7 “Ir. Soekarno Telah Tiba Dengan Kapal Bermotor Di Pasar Ikan.”
- 8 Revealing the tilt of his autobiographical narrative, Sukarno described his account of the Japanese occupation as an attempt to “explain” his wartime actions to an “outside world that does not understand. They think Sukarno was a collaborator.” To name just one of many instances of distortion and retrospectively self-awarded foresight,

Sukarno insisted that he always knew the Japanese would lose the war, and pursued his strategy accordingly. But as discussed below, testimonies to the contrary are too numerous to doubt. For more on Sukarno's bending of the truth in his autobiography, see, for example, Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, "The Peta and My Relations with the Japanese: A Correction of Sukarno's Autobiography," George Kanahele suggested the possibility of Sukarno's borrowing from Imamura's memoirs in *Japanese Occupation*, p. 276, endnote no. 82.

9 Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, p. 175.

10 This is a combination of two similar Imamura texts, in which the earlier text is taken as a guideline: Imamura's 1946 prison memoirs translated into English under the title "A Tapir in Prison," NIOD IC no. 002460, p. 124, and *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, p. 397. For his part, Sukarno described this critical exchange with Imamura as follows:

"May I ask what plans has the Dai Nippon Teikoku Government for Indonesia?" Imamura, answered, "I am only the Chief Commander of an expedition army. His Excellency The Emperor alone decides whether your country will be granted autonomy on a high degree under the aegis of His government or whether it will gain freedom as a constituent state in a federation with Japan or whether it becomes a totally independent, sovereign state. I can issue no promise of precisely what form your liberty will take. Such decisions will not come to the foreground before the end of the war. However, we are conversant with your aims and your terms and they coincide with our own."

(Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, p. 175)

11 Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, p. 176.

12 Imamura, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, p. 398.

13 Ibid.

14 Miyoshi, cited in *ibid.*, p. 410.

15 Imamura, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, p. 398.

16 Imamura Hitoshi, "Apa Sebabnja Belanda Kalah," *Asia Raya*, June 22, 1942, p. 1. This was the text of Imamura's statements to the Tokyo *Asahi* newspaper's correspondent in Batavia, statements thus apparently intended for a Japanese audience and not necessarily intended for local publication. They were first published in Tokyo on June 20, and then made available on the *Dōmei* wire service, finding their way into *Asia Raya* two days later.

17 See, for example, NIOD IC no. 031775, an anonymous nationalist intelligence report dated June 1942.

18 Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, pp. 176–177.

19 Imamura, *Imamura Hitoshi kaikoroku*, p. 398.

20 Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, p. 171.

21 Ibid., p. 173.

22 Ibid., pp. 173–174.

23 Ibid., pp. 156–157.

24 Kanahele, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 54, based on a 1964 interview with Hatta.

25 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for July 11, 1942, p. 18.

26 Ibid. The reference is to the imperial wartime dating system, with the mythical founding of Japan as its starting point.

27 Shimizu, "Minshū senbu hitosuji ni," p. 302.

28 Ibid., pp. 302–303, 322–323. Note: In this interview, Shimizu dated Sukarno's submission of the blueprints to "around the 25th." When pressed by an interviewer as to

which month he was referring, he responded “I think it was April.” Since Sukarno only arrived in Java in early July 1942, I am therefore assuming that Shimizu meant July 25.

29 Ibid., pp. 302–303.

30 Ibid., p. 303.

31 Hatta, *Memoir*, p. 415.

32 The students were the aforementioned Sudarpo Sastrosatomo and Sudjatmoko, and the details come from the previously cited interview with the latter by the Jakarta National Archives. Dr. Sudjatmoko did not specifically date the conversation with Sukarno on this subject, but given that the Jakarta Medical College reopened in March 1943, we may assume a date at least as late as this. According to Sudjatmoko, he and Sudarpo obtained information about the content of allied broadcasts via a colleague named Dr. Sutomo Tjondronegoro (who they called “Mas Pang”) who was in turn in contact with an Indian worker in the overseas broadcasting service named Charles Tambu (also incidentally an associate of Mr. Dr. L.F. Jansen). When they transmitted to Sukarno Allied claims of victories and vast economic superiority, Sukarno was said to have contended that this was nonsense. After achieving victory in Australia, Sukarno insisted, Japan would attain peace in the Pacific on its terms. Dr. Sudjatmoko, I. T., Cassette II, Side B, transcript pp. 63–68 and Cassette III, Side A, transcript pp. 5–6.

33 Hatta, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 179, and Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette VIII, Side A, transcript p. 12.

34 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, I. T., *Arsip Nasional Oral History Collection*, Jakarta, Interviewer: J.R. Chaniago, Cassette I, Side A; Interview date: May 1, 1979; Cassette I, Side A transcript p. 4. Background on Mr. Prawiranegara is from this interview and Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, p. 121.

35 Ibid.

36 On June 24, 1942, all radio owners in Java were compelled to bring these to the Japanese authorities, who proceeded to tape and seal their tuning dials in such a way as to make it impossible to tune in to Allied broadcasts. Any evidence of tampering with this special seal (*segel*) would be answered with severe penalties, including death. See *Asia Raya*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

37 This testimony is provided in former Jakarta Medical College student Dr. Sudjatmoko, I. T., Cassette III, Side A, transcript p. 9.

38 Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 324.

39 Nur, I. T., Cassette V, Side A, transcript pp. 2–5.

40 One may note here the similarity of phrasing to that of Hadi above—clearly this essay, written several weeks before that of Hadi, had exerted a major influence upon Sukarno’s son-in-law’s prose.

41 This and the subsequent citations are from Sukarno, “‘Djiwa Ksatria’ dan ‘Djiwa Boedak’: Bedanja ‘Herrengeist’ dan ‘Sklavengeist,’” in *Asia Raya Memperingati Enam Boelan Balatentara Dai Nippon Melindoengi Indonesia* (Batavia: Asia Raya Company, 1942). Emphasis in the original.

42 The *garuda* is a mythical bird appearing in both Indian and *wayang* sagas, mounted by the god Vishnu, who would subsequently appear in the official seal of the Indonesian Republic.

43 Sukarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography*, pp. 158–159.

44 Sukarno, “‘Djiwa Ksatria’ dan ‘Djiwa Boedak.’”

45 This and the subsequent citations are from Sukarno, “‘Djiwa Ksatria’ dan ‘Djiwa Boedak.’”

- 46 “Poesat Kesenian Indonesia: Akan melangsoengkan pertoeendjoekan pada 8 Desember 2602” and Darmawidjaja, “Badan Poesat Keboedajaan Indonesia,” *Asia Raya*, October 7, 1942, pp. 2, 3. Members of the preparatory board included *Asia Raya*’s Winarno, writers Andjar Asmara, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, and Armijn Pané (brother of Sanoesi, and editor-in-chief of the *Pandji Poestaka* arts and culture magazine), the leading painter Basoeeki Abdullah, and songwriter R. Koesbini. Other advisory board members included *Taman Siswa* founder Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Muslim leader Kiyai Hadji Mas Mansoer.
- 47 “Komisi bahasa Indonesia,” *Asia Raya*, October 20, 1942, p. 2.
- 48 On Ichiki’s arguments for the encouragement of Indonesian, see Chapter 5, “*Asia Raya*.”
- 49 “Kotoba mo yutaka na shima he! Indoneshiago seibi ni iinkai setchi,” *Unabara*, October 22, 1942, p. 2.
- 50 “Komisi bahasa Indonesia,” and Odji Cloboth, “Komisi bahasa,” *Asia Raya*, October 20, 1942, p. 2.
- 51 Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, *Japanese Military Administration*, p. 108. A project involving the investigation of “traditional customs” had also been conducted at the outset of Japan’s colonization of Taiwan at the end of the nineteenth century.
- 52 Okazaki Seisaburō, “Notification on the Establishment of the Old Customs System Investigation Committee,” dated September 24, 1942, in Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, *Japanese Military Administration*, *op. cit.*, pp. 584–585.
- 53 *Asia Raya*, November 10, 1942, p. 1.
- 54 Hayashi was former head of the *Nanyō kyōkai*, a public-private prewar body concerned with the study of the southern areas. Other Japanese members included Katajima Kenjirō, a former official of the Ministry of Colonies, Adachi Katsukiyo, new head of the Department of Justice, and two former bank directors with several prewar years’ residence in Batavia, one of whom now headed the Jakarta city Department of Education. *Asia Raya*, November 10, 1942, p. 1.
- 55 As the *Sendenhan*’s geographer and scholar of ancient Javanese culture Bekki Atsuhiko later noted, “on the Japanese side of the committee ... they were all non-*bunkajin* types ... state-level officials and the like were selected.” Bekki Atsuhiko, cited in *Shōgenshū Nihon senryōka Indonnesia*, p. 396.
- 56 Miyoshi, cited in Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, *Japanese Military Administration*, p. 410.
- 57 *Kyūkan seido chōsa I’inkai jiroku* (Minutes of the Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs Commission Meeting), *dai ikkai* (first meeting), November 28, 1942, (n.p.: Toda Kaneichi, 1995) p. 6.
- 58 *Ibid.*, proceedings of November 28, 1942, p. 13.
- 59 *Ibid.*, pp. 15–18.
- 60 Nur, I. T., Cassette V, Side A, transcript pp. 5, 6. Both Benedict Anderson (*Java in a Time*, p. 446) and George Kanahale (*Japanese Occupation*, p. 158) date the founding of the *Asrama Angkatan Baroe* to early 1943, but testimony from Johar Nur and documents of the time confirm a start sometime between July and September 1942. See, for example, NIOD IC no. 031834, dated October 21, 1942. This earlier chronology is critical to understanding the atmosphere of the *Asrama*.
- 61 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript p. 39.
- 62 Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 309.
- 63 Anderson, *Java in a Time*, pp. 427–428, 446.
- 64 Maruto Nitimiharjo, I. T., in software format, *Arsip Nasional Oral History Collection*, Interviewer: J.R. Chaniago; Interview date: April 23, 1979; Cassette I, Side B.

- 65 Nur, I. T., Cassette IV, Side B, transcript pp. 26–27.
- 66 Ibid., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 6.
- 67 Anderson, *Java in a Time*, p. 426.
- 68 Ibid., Cassette V, Side A, transcript p. 7.
- 69 Ibid., p. 5, 6. Nur provided no further specifics on the scheduling either by week or by day, though from the amount of regular hours he described, and the presumable difficulty for the nationalist prominents on the teaching staff to find time for such a project—one must assume that a great proportion of this schedule was taken up with language classes in both Indonesian and Japanese.
- 70 Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, pp. 18–19 and Nur, I. T., Cassette V, Side A, transcript p. 6.
- 71 Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, p. 258 and Nur, I. T., Cassette V, Side A, transcript p. 6.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 Nur, I. T., Cassette V, Side A, transcript pp. 6–7. Hendroningrat was himself receiving military training at the Youth Training Center, an informal project led by Wakabayashi Teruyuki, a former student of *Unabara* editor Shimizu Nobuo. The Youth Training Center will receive attention in a forthcoming study on the origins, history, and legacies of the Japanese wartime training of Indonesian youth as “Defenders of the Homeland” (*Pembela Tanah Air*, or *PETA*).
- 74 Nur, I. T., Cassette V, Side A, transcript p. 13.
- 75 Ibid., Side B, pp. 14, 15.
- 76 Ibid., pp. 15, 16. Unfortunately, the interviewer cut Nur off here in mid-sentence, asking a question on a different subject.
- 77 Ibid., Side A, p. 9 and Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 4.
- 78 NIOD IC no. 036944 (“Huur van Betjak namen eigenaar Djakarta,” undated but judging from the date of the materials around it, apparently either sometime in 1942 or 1943) listed up names and addresses of 31 *Becak* owners in Batavia/Jakarta. The average owner possessed between 10 and 20 *becak*, with 11 owners having less than 10, 4 owning between 20–30, and 3 between 30–40. Of the 31 owners on the list, 26 had Chinese names. The operators who rented from these owners paid them between Rp. 1.20 and Rp. 1.50 per day, or, for a half-day, roughly Rp. 0.75 (daytime) or Rp. 0.50 (nighttime). Writing on life in Batavia “after 7 months of Japanese administration” in October 1942, an unnamed Dutch observer noted that *becak* use had recently “quite significantly increased.” NIOD IC no. 030971.
- 79 Further illustrating his distaste for the *becak*, Nur pointed with pride to the fact that *becak* had never been allowed in his home city of Padang, West Sumatra. Nur, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript p. 19.
- 80 Nur, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript pp. 18–19.
- 81 On the *Pemoeda Asia Raya*, see Chapter 6, “All things to all Asians.”
- 82 Nur, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 4. Strikingly, Nur concludes this statement with the words: “the *Pemoeda Asia* that were under the direct leadership of Japan.” As noted in Chapter 6, “All things to all Asians,” this was not the case. Indeed as discussed in Chapter 8, it was this *lack of control* over the *Pemoeda Asia Raya* as well as the *Asrama*-associated youth groups that made *all of them* the subject of *Gunseibu* discontent and eventual dissolution. While the *Pemoeda Asia Raya* was a *pribumi* project, however, in relative terms it may be said—as Nur implies—that its leaders and membership were in general less politicized, and perhaps more naively pro-Japanese, than those of the *Barisan Banteng*.
- 83 Sukarno, “Marilah melangkah ke zaman baroe,” text of a radio speech delivered on December 5, 1942 and published in *Asia Raya Lembaran Istimewa*, December 7, 1942, p. 2.

- 84 “Poentjak perajaan Pembangoenan Asia Raya,” *Asia Raya*, December 9, 1942, p. 2.
 85 Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, p. 461.
 86 *Asia Raya*, December 11, 1942, p. 1, and March 10, 1943, p. 1.
 87 An Indonesian language intelligence report on responses to the first meeting of Sukarno, Hatta, Dewantoro, and Mansoer at the end of October—the meeting that led to the formation of the “Four Leafed-Clover”—revealed that “those from *Parindra* find it extremely regrettable that Mr. Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, who is ready and capable to struggle for his homeland, has been left aside” (NIOD IC no. 031832). Another report dated just days before Sukarno’s above announcement of *Poetera* said rumor had it that Soekardjo had invited the members of the “Four Leaf-Clover” to a private meeting to “settle various issues,” and had here issued a “firm request” that he be included “in one line” with them (NIOD IC no. 031818, dated December 4, 1942).
 88 Both Soekardjo and Samsuodin were subsequently included in a seven-man group intended to assist the Four Leaf-Clover in their planning for *Poetera*, but appear to have been of little consequence here.
 89 “Perajaan Pembangoenan ASIA RAYA: Disamboet dengan Hari Pemoeda dan Hari Iboe; Kewadajiban dalam menjoesoen masjarakat baroe; Tenaga pemoeda perloe sekali oentoeik Organisasi Ra’jat!” *Asia Raya*, December 7, 1942, p. 2.
 90 Nur, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 5. An *Asia Raya* reporter on hand paid special attention to the gay procession of the *Barisan Becak*:

Some 360 *becak* decorated with foliage in shapes that depicted the spirit of the *becak* drivers—in the shapes of boats, airplanes, tanks etc.—had already gathered at Ampioen Alley. From there they traversed Pegangsaan Timoer, Tjikini, Menteng, English Church Road, Prapatan, Senen, Waterlooplein South, Willemslaan, and Gambir North, West, and South, on their way to entering Ikada field. All along the way, the line of *becaks* drew people’s attention. When they arrived at the field, a jury decided whose *becak* was the best-decorated. This was followed by a competition in *becak* maneuvering, in which it turned out there were those among the youth quite skilled in handling their *becaks* with preciseness as they avoided dangerous obstacles.

(“Perajaan Pembangoenan ASIA RAYA”)

- 91 Ibid. and “Daftar perajaan Pembangoenan ASIA RAJA,” *Asia Raya Lembaran Extra*, December 5, 1942, p. 1.
 92 Nur, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 5.
 93 Sukarno, as cited in “Perajaan Pembangoenan ASIA RAYA,” p. 2.

Chapter 8

- 1 Abe Tomoji, “Dai kokumin,” *Sekidōhō*, March 28, 1942, p. 1. The words “magnificent nation” and “magnificent army” were retained in their English form, and spelled out in *katakana*.
 2 Shimizu Nobuo, “Sekidōhō,” editorial column, *Unabara*, May 22, 1942, p. 1.
 3 Cited in Machida Keiji, “Chōōn pū” column, *Unabara*, June 6, 1942, p. 1.
 4 L. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, vol. 11b (’S-Gravenhage: Staatsuitgeverij, 1985), p. 247.

- 5 The figure of two thousand returning residents is a conjecture based upon Miyoshi Shunkichirō's estimation, cited in Kanahele, that as many as four thousand former residents returned to the Indies archipelago as a whole. According to official Japanese statistics of September 1, 1945, there were 23,242 civilian *gunzoku* in Java. Kanahele, *Japanese Occupation*, pp. 59, 278. Units making up the original invasion forces were sent to Guadalcanal and Timor to the east, Sumatra and Burma to the west. Ibid., p. 65, and Morimoto Takeshi, *Jawa bōei giyūgunshi* (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1992), p. 25.
- 6 Nishijima, *Shōgen*, pp. 126–127.
- 7 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 314.
- 8 Ibid., pp. 139–140.
- 9 A cartoon appearing in the January 1, 1943 edition of the *Java Shimbun* made light of this contrast.
- 10 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entries for June 5 and 8, 1942, pp. 2–3, 5–6.
- 11 Former Java *Beppan* intelligence unit member Nakajima Masachika recalled that the *ianjo* were usually established on streets behind the main roads, so as not to attract too much attention. Personal interview with Nakajima Masachika, August 8, 1995.
- 12 Machida employed numerous Indonesian terms in his memoirs, and asserted a deep similarity between the Japanese and Indonesian languages, a similarity he maintained made Indonesian easy for Japanese to learn. Yet here, as elsewhere, his use of Indonesian was littered with errors in basic spelling and/or grammar: “*Nyonan-nonan*” should be “*nyonya-nyonya*” (referring to women in general) or “*nona-nona*” (which the Echols/Shadily Indonesian-English dictionary describes as: “1. miss, unmarried European, Ch, or Westernized well-to-do Indonesian girl in Western dress; 2. term of address for such women”).
- 13 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 373.
- 14 Personal interview with Nakajima Masachika, August 8, 1995.
- 15 Ibid. Nakajima said that like those in China, most of the Japanese *ianfu* hailed from impoverished areas of Tōhoku and Kyūshū.
- 16 Wakabayashi Teruyuki, “Indonesia dokuritsu no uta: Tokubetsu seinentai senki (3),” in *Bogōru tsūshin/Kabar Bogor V* (Tokorozawa: Peta kankeishakai jimukyoku, July 1984), p. 7.
- 17 Shiotani Iwami, “Senji Jawa nikki (II)” in *Nampō bunka* 11/1985, cited in Inomata, *Nihon senryōka Indoneshia tabigeijin*, p. 64.
- 18 See, for example, Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II*, trans. Suzanne O’Brien (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002).
- 19 Imamura, *Kaisoroku*, p. 327.
- 20 Imamura described his involvement with the *ianjo* in China on two fronts. First, ordering the establishment of an *ianjo* where his troops were barracked, after being informed to his surprise by the *kenpeitai* that his troops were the most frequent customers of another new *ianjo*, even though it was 8 kilometers distant from the barracks. Second, intervening in a dispute over a ticket system at the *ianjo* that had been monopolized by officers. Each ticket was good for a half hour of “service”; officers were reported to be buying and using several at a time, thus keeping the women to themselves for longer periods, while enlisted men went empty handed. Following the advice of several disgruntled underlings, Imamura ruled that officers and soldiers alike would henceforth be allowed to use only one ticket per day. Actions such as these that helped confirm Imamura’s reputation as a “soldier’s general.” That his decision meant the unpleasant prospect of many more partners

- per day for the sex slaves does not seem to have disturbed Imamura's calculations. Imamura, *Kaikoroku*, vol. 1, pp. 326–328.
- 21 Konoe shidan figures are from Saitō, *Watashi no gunseiki*, p. 11. Saitō described the *Konoe shidan* as “very much different in many ways” from the rank-and-file Japanese soldiery.
 - 22 “Zadankai: netchi eisei wo kataru,” *Unabara*, October 25, 1942, pp. 3–4.
 - 23 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 139–141.
 - 24 *Ibid.*, p. 373.
 - 25 *Ibid.*, p. 326.
 - 26 Machida Keiji, “Jawa bunkajin kaku tatakaeri,” *Shūkan bunshun*, August 15, 1960, cited in Inomata, *Nihonsenryōka Indonnesia Tabigeijin*, p. 61.
 - 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 373–374.
 - 28 *Ibid.*, p. 61.
 - 29 Entry dated September 3, 1942 in Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, p. 36.
 - 30 Personal interview with former *Beppan* member Nakajima Masachika, August 8, 1995. See also description of a comfort station with exclusively caucasian Dutch comfort women established next door to a Dutch women's prison camp in Semarang in Hibino Hideo, “Nampō ni ikiru otoko (6),” *Yūai dayori* 171 (July 1991), pp. 21–22.
 - 31 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, p. 207.
 - 32 NIOD IC no. 032310, dated September 1, 1943.
 - 33 Hibino Hideo, “Nampō ni ikiru otoko (6),” p. 22, and personal interview with Nakajima Masachika, August 8, 1995.
 - 34 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 251. On the incident, Machida cited Yasuda Kiyoo's unpublished diary from the time.
 - 35 NIOD IC no. 037029, report from Batavia to Achmad Subardjo dated April 28, 1942.
 - 36 “Oran-oran wa kō miteiru.
 - 37 Jusuf Ronodipuro, personal interview, and B.M. Diah, “Penindjauan Oemoem: ‘Kewadjiban koelit poetih’ alias Kapitalism,” *Pemandangan*, May 19, 1942, p. 4.
 - 38 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for August 16, 1942, p. 27.
 - 39 *Ibid.*, entry for September 11, 1942, p. 39. The references are to Mrs. Henriette Arnoldine Loudon-Snouck Hurgronje, daughter of a former foreign minister, and Mrs. Alberta Diederika van Mook-Maureau, wife of the former lieutenant governor-general and wartime minister of colonies Hubertus Johannes van Mook. Both were among several elite Dutch women arrested in the summer of 1942. See Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, pp. 32, 389.
 - 40 In order to complete the pun, the author borrowed the second character from “drunkard” (酔漢, *suikan*) and substituted it for the second character in the standard word for “gentleman” (粹人, *suijin*) making 粹漢 (*suikan*, lit. gentleman).
 - 41 Namio Ikeru, “Dessui, hōka, kōin,” *Unabara*, August 16, 1942, p. 3.
 - 42 Yoshizumi and Ichiki, as cited in Yoshizumi and Ichiki, “Indonesia wo kataru taidankai,” p. 12.
 - 43 “Rapport Penjelidikan di Soekaboemi,” NIOD IC nos. 036773–777. NIOD IC nos. 031605–630 dated May 5, 1942 included an accusation against the local Chinese citizen's organization in Central Java (CBO) for answering a Japanese request for “prostitutes” by supplying “good girls” instead, and credited the nationalist committee BRI for “straightening out” the misunderstanding.
 - 44 NIOD IC nos. 036785–788.
 - 45 “Uit de aantekeningen van een handelsman te Batavia,” NIOD IC no. 004746.
 - 46 NIOD IC no. 032316, dated September 15, 1943.
 - 47 Odji Cloboth [Winarno], *Djangan Sedih* (Don't Be Sad), *Asia Raya*, November 11, 1942, p. 3.

- 48 Kurasawa Aiko, Shiraishi Takashi, et al., eds., *Intabyū kiroku: Tokutei kenkyū bunka masatsu (Nihon to Ajia) 4* (Tokyo: Konoe Yoshiaki, 1978), pp. 15–28.
- 49 The author illustrated this claim with the specific case of a certain Phang Tjeng Jam, who allegedly passed 10 percent of all of his sales along to a certain Mr. Ito.
- 50 NIOD IC no. 032309, dated August 27, 1942.
- 51 Hibino Hideo, “Nampō ni ikiru otoko (6),” p. 23.
- 52 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 139–141.
- 53 Report from travels in Central and East Java, dated August 1944, NIOD IC nos. 031753–767.
- 54 Hibino Hideo, “Nampō ni ikiru otoko (6),” p. 23.
- 55 “Batabia ni nōmin dōjō tanjō,” *Unabara*, October 24, 1942, p. 2.
- 56 “Koersoes pertanian: Memboetoehi 200 murid,” *Asia Raya*, October 20, 1942, p. 2.
- 57 This and the following citations are from “Jūgun kisha zadankai: Jawa sakusen no inshō,” parts one through five, *Unabara*, April 15–19, 1942, all p. 2.
- 58 Ōya Sōichi here agreed that there were many among the “Annamese” who exhibited “a Chinese sort of attitude,” only out for maximum profit with minimum input. Indonesian servants, in contrast, somehow managed to support themselves, along with “a family of seven,” on an average salary of just 10 yen per month, yet never complained or asked for more.
- 59 Matsui subsequently conceded that not all Indonesians spoke or thought as the servants did, with members of the Indonesian intelligentsia that he had encountered, including men of letters and journalists, representing a distinct exception. “So it is not that none of them are intelligent,” he concluded, “but that they have not had any intelligence training.” In reply Ōya skeptically wondered aloud if philosophers could exist in such a hot climate. To check, he suggested assembling a group of Indonesian intellectuals together for an intelligence test, to be conducted via a translator.
- 60 Personal interview with Ibu Saina, Jakarta, July 24, 1994.
- 61 Shimizu Nobuo, “Sekidōhō,” editorial column, *Unabara*, May 14, 1942, p.1.
- 62 Asano, *Jawa kantei yowa*, pp. 108–109.
- 63 The campaign appeared in *Unabara* between September 8 and October 2, 1942.
- 64 Personal interview with Nakajima Masachika, August 8, 1995.
- 65 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for November 4, 1942, pp. 66–67.
- 66 NIOD IC no. 032561, dated December 13, 1942.
- 67 Otto Iskandar Dinata, in “Koetipan Pembijtaraan Rapat Kyūkan Seido Chōsa Iinkai,” NIOD IC no. 036532, dated April 26, 1943.
- 68 Rather than being set at the beginning in a negotiation between customer and client, the fare paid was now left to Japanese discretion at the end of the ride, based upon a different and unfamiliar measure—abstract minutes as opposed to concrete distance. This was all the more confusing given the graduated scale: *becak* drivers were officially to receive 5 sen for the first five minutes, 2.5 sen for the second and third five minutes, and 2 sen for each subsequent five minutes, plus 2.5 minutes for every five minutes of waiting time. See *Unabara*, May 14, 1942, p. 2. Further changes and regulations were issued on May 19, and again on June 4, 1942. Similar innovations were pursued in Java’s second-largest city, Surabaya, much to the dismay of that city’s *becak* drivers. See Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, pp. 111–113.
- 69 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for September 24, 1942, p. 44.
- 70 The official named was the regent of Ciamis.
- 71 “Pertemoean Pers di Bandoeng: Bangsa Indonesia Mengerti akan maksoed Tentara Nippon,” May 28, 1942, p. 4.

- 72 Matsui Iwane, paraphrased in Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for October 18, 1942, p. 56.
- 73 Yamamoto Mōichirō, "Outline of Military Administration in Java" dated July 1946, NIOD IC no. 004861.
- 74 NIOD IC no. 031775, a report from an anonymous Indonesian nationalist informant for the *Beppan* intelligence unit.
- 75 Ibid. On the mayorships, see Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 61.
- 76 Satō, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, pp. 19, 28.
- 77 The *Sōmubu kikakuka* "was charged with (1) basic matters in the rule of the occupied areas, (2) formulation and changes in the mobilization plans of materials, funds, labor, and transportation; in addition, countermeasures for (3) hostile nationals, (4) the native population, (5) the overseas Chinese, and (6) Japanese residents, (7) administrative inspection, (8) propaganda and enlightenment, (9) comprehensive investigation of the occupied areas, (10) establishment of trade and price policies, and (11) establishment of the policies of property-custody of hostile nations." Ōkuma kinen shakai kagaku kenkyūjo, *Indoneshia ni okeru*, p. 136.
- 78 Okazaki, cited in Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 283.
- 79 Shimizu, "Minshū senbu hitosuji ni," p. 299 and Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 278, n. 7. Yamamoto's rejection of the hardline approach, at least in principle, is on display in a lengthy journal article for a local Japanese audience published in October 1944. Here, on both moral and practical grounds, Yamamoto argued forcibly in favor of the need for "righteous government" as opposed to "rule by force." Yamamoto Mōichirō, "Gunsei jūdōan," *Shin Jawa* 1:1 (October 1944), pp. 2–11.
- 80 Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 283, n. 46.
- 81 Profiles of the new *shūchōkan* appeared in *Asia Raya* between December 23 and 30, 1942.
- 82 *Okuma Memorial Science Institute, Japanese Military Administration*.
- 83 "Het bestuur van Java tijdens de Japansche besetting," NEFIS report dated November 17, 1945, p. 3.
- 84 Winarno, "Selamat bekerdja!" *Asia Raya*, August 31, 1942, p. 2. Ogura was "not strict enough," concluded his friend Leo Jansen. "He allowed his officials to speak Dutch. He's been replaced by a military [officer], who is called 'your Excellency.'" Jansen, *In Deze Halve gevangenis*, entry for September 7, 1942, p. 37.
- 85 Yoshizumi Tomegorō as cited in Yoshizumi and Ichiki, "Indonesia wo kataru taidankai," pp. 10–11.
- 86 Matsui was described in a contemporary source as an independent-minded, autocratic official inclined to belittle the native officials serving under him while at the same time showing unusual respect for the abilities of the Dutch officials still on his staff. Indeed Matsui's tendency to go his own way, along with his undue respect for the enemy—at least from the standpoint of some in the Batavia command—eventually contributed to a demotion of sorts, to the post of governor of the state of Priangan. Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for October 19, 1942, pp. 56–57.
- 87 Miyoshi Shunkichirō, "Jawa senryō gunsei kaikoroku," no. 6, p. 70.
- 88 Satō, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, p. 27.
- 89 Miyoshi Shunkichirō, "Jawa senryō gunsei kaikoroku," no. 6, pp. 70–71.
- 90 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 164.
- 91 Ibid., p. 271.
- 92 Unabara, September 12, 1942, p. 1, Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 222, and *Asia Raya*, October 1, 1942, p. 1.

- 93 In the same period, of the remaining two major Japanese newspaper companies, the *Mainichi* was assigned to the Philippines, and the *Yomiuri* to Burma. Newspapers in Malaya, Sumatra, and northern Borneo came under the direction of the *Dōmei* wire services. *Asia Raya*, December 9, 1942, p. 1.
- 94 *Okuma Memorial Science Institute, Japanese Military Administration*. p. 257.
- 95 *Ibid.*, pp. 628–629.
- 96 In a running feud with Iijima over this and other editorials, Suzuki was said to have argued, “we say what we want to say, and write what we want to write, and if the military chases after us, then so be it, we get chased together to Korea or wherever—is that not the way to do it?” Asahi shimbunshashi henshūshitsu, *Honsha no nampō shoshimbun keiei* (Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1970), pp. 19–22.
- 97 Nishijima Shigetada, cited in Nakatani Yoshio et al., “Indonesia chishikisō to seinensō wo kataru,” *Shin Jawa* 2:5 (May 1945), p. 30.
- 98 Asahi shimbunshashi henshūshitsu, *Honsha no nampō shoshimbun keiei*, p. 22.
- 99 Winarno, “Kata Pendahoeloean,” *Asia Raya Satoe Tahoen Nomor Peringatan*, April 29, 1943.
- 100 The first two-page edition appeared on March 2, 1943.
- 101 Personal interview with Rosihan Anwar.
- 102 Asahi shimbunshashi henshūshitsu, *Honsha no nampō shoshimbun keiei*, pp. 8, 21.
- 103 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 149–150.
- 104 *Ibid.*, p. 137.
- 105 Plagued from early on by ill health, Asano Akira had left early, in August 1942. Most of the others, including Tomizawa Uio, Abe Tomoji, and Shimizu Nobuo, returned to Japan in December.
- 106 Abe Tomoji, *Hi no shima*, pp. 2–3, 13.
- 107 *Ibid.*, pp. 31–33.
- 108 Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, pp. 207–212, 221–222.
- 109 Miyoshi Shunkichirō, cited in Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 73.
- 110 Miyoshi, “Jawa senryō kaikoroku,” no. 8, p. 70.
- 111 *Asia Raya*, February 1, 1943, p. 1.
- 112 Anonymous nationalist informant in NIOD IC no. 029680, dated February 2, 1943, cited in Brugmans, *Nederlandsch Indië*, pp. 554–555.
- 113 Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, pp. 75–76.
- 114 Mohammad Hatta as cited in “Pendekar Asia,” text of speech given on December 8, 1942 and published in *Asia Raya*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.
- 115 Nishijima, *Shōgen*, p. 156.
- 116 *Ibid.*, pp. 156–157.
- 117 *Ibid.*, pp. 126–127.
- 118 Maeda had served a variety of assignments throughout Asia and Europe, including the position of naval attaché in Nazi Germany. He had also accompanied the ill-fated Japanese trade delegation to Batavia in 1940.
- 119 The establishment of the *bukanfu* was based upon the provisions of the formal agreement between the army and navy in November 1941, which mandated a two-tiered system of consultation and coordination in each new area to be occupied, with, in each case, one of the two services to be in a primary, and the other in a secondary position of authority. The aim of this agreement was to reduce the chance that inter-service rivalry—which had often been intense in the years leading up to war—would lead to dangerous fragmentation and competition between the occupied areas. Accordingly, the navy was made second-in-command in army-controlled Java,

- Sumatra, Malaya, and the Philippines, with the army in second position in the navy-controlled outer islands of Borneo, Celebes, and New Guinea. *Ibid.*, pp. 128–130.
- 120 Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, p. 245.
- 121 For the Overseas Chinese section of the *bukanfu*'s research department, too, Maeda personally selected men such as Kobayashi Yoshitada, a former researcher for the Manchurian Railway Company who had numbered among a number of scholars earlier associated with the socialist "Laborers and Peasants faction" (*Rônôha*) who were arrested for alleged contacts with the Comintern in the "People's Front Incident" of 1937 and 1938. Nishijima, *Shôgen*, pp. 127–132.
- 122 *Ibid.*, pp. 131–132, 161.
- 123 *Ibid.*, pp. 130–134.
- 124 Statements from Hoesein Djajadiningrat cited in Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entries for July 9 and September 9, 1942, pp. 16, 38.
- 125 *Ibid.*, entry for October 19, 1942, pp. 56–57.
- 126 William H. Frederick, introduction to Mohammad Hatta, *The Poetera Reports*; p. 12.
- 127 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for October 19, 1942, p. 59.
- 128 These views are discussed in detail in Chapter 9, "Clinging to Asia."
- 129 *Ibid.*, entry for January 31, 1943, p. 122.
- 130 *Ibid.*, entry for December 12, 1942, p. 93.
- 131 *Ibid.*, entry for November 4, 1942, p. 67.

Chapter 9

- 1 Sukarno, "'Poetera' Mebangoenkan Kembali: Pedang Samoerai menebang imperialisme Barat," text of radio speech as cited in *Asia Raya*, March 9, 1943, p. 1.
- 2 "Pedato Ir. Soekarno Pemimping Besar 'Poetara,'" text of Soekarno speech at Gambir on March 9, 1943, as cited in *Soeara Asia*, March 13, 1943.
- 3 Mohammad Hatta, "Pengharapan saya, gerakan ra'jat dapat memimpin ra'jat," *Asia Raya*, March 9, 1943, p. 1, and statements at the Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs as cited in Hatta, *The Poetera Reports*, p. 86.
- 4 Ki Hadjar Dewantara, as cited in "Pertjakapan dengan Ki Hadjar Dewantara," *Asia Raya*, March 9, 1943, p. 1.
- 5 Kiyai Hadji Mas Mansoer, "Allah mentakdirkan tentara Nippon dating ke Indonesia," *Asia Raya*, March 9, 1943, p. 1.
- 6 H.R. Moehammad Adnan and Wondoamiseno, as cited in "Doenia Islam dalam soesoenan baroe," *Asia Raya*, March 9, 1943, p. 2.
- 7 "Berita Pemerintah: Pemobekaan Djakarta Ika-Daigakoe," *Asia Raya*, March 9, 1942, p.1.
- 8 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangenis*, entry for March 10, 1943, p. 166.
- 9 "Peratoeran Besar 'Poesat Tenaga Ra'jat,'" *Asia Raya*, March 11, 1943, p. 1.
- 10 Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, "Indoestrie Indonesia: Melontjati tingkatan kapitalisme," *Asia Raya*, June 24, 1943, p.1.
- 11 Hatta, *Poetera Reports*, pp. 30–31.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 82.
- 13 Miyoshi, "Jawa senryô gunsei kaikoroku," no. 8, p. 70, and Beppan report dated March 24, 1943, NIOD IC no. 005798.
- 14 *Kampô*, vol. 18 (May 1943), pp. 9–23, and Kanahele, *Japanese Occupation*, pp. 81–82.
- 15 de Jong, *Koninkrijk*, p. 249.

- 16 “Pedato Ir. Soekarno Pemimping Besar ‘Poetara,’ text of Soekarno speech at Gambir on March 9, 1943, as cited in *Soeara Asia*, March 13, 1943.
- 17 Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, pp. 224, 238–240.
- 18 Hatta, *The Putera Reports*, pp. 31–33, 37.
- 19 Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, pp. 253–254, 260–261. Sutardjo and his *pangreh pradja* faction, recalled Shimizu, had in mind the ultimate restoration of Java as a monarchy, an idea also supported by many within the *Gunseikanbu*.
- 20 Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, pp. 224, 238–240.
- 21 Hatta, *The Poetera Reports*, p. 60.
- 22 Ibid., pp. 98–99.
- 23 Ibid., p. 45.
- 24 Ibid., p. 53.
- 25 Ibid., pp. 59–60.
- 26 Under the title *Poesat Kesenian Indonesia* or “Indonesian Center for the Arts.”
- 27 Machida, *Tatakau*, pp. 296–298.
- 28 Shimizu Hitoshi as cited in “Rapat Besar wakil² kalangan kesenian Indonesia,” *Asia Raya*, March 6, 1942, p. 2.
- 29 Hatta, *The Poetera Reports*, pp. 60–61.
- 30 Ibid., p. 62, and *Orang Jang Terkemoeke*, p. 461.
- 31 Jansen, *In Deze Halve Gevangelis*, entry for May 10, 1943, pp. 219–220. Emphasis in the original.
- 32 Ibid., p. 221.
- 33 Nur, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 7.
- 34 Ibid., p. 12.
- 35 Ibid., pp. 9.
- 36 *Beppan* report, Jakarta, dated March 24, 1943, NIOD IC no. 005798.
- 37 NIOD IC no. 032289, dated October 8, 1943. Sukarni had only a middle-school-level (*MULO*) education. Anderson, *Java in a Time*, p. 446.
- 38 *Kan Pō (Beritah Pemerintah)* 21 (June 1943), pp. 9, 10. One testimony to the *Seinendan* curriculum in practice appears in the postwar account of a village-level *Seinendan* trainer named Martodihardjo, who, along with four hundred other local officials and notables pressed into service, underwent an “extremely harsh” six-month course at the *Seinendan* training center in Madiun, East Java. The training regimen, he said, consisted of forming ranks, agriculture, sport, and sumo wrestling, “with the point being disciplined.” There was only one Japanese supervisor on the staff. Martodihardjo recalled no political or intellectual content to speak of. Trainees were simply told that their mission was to “maintain order in the village” (*menentramkan desa*). Perhaps for lack of trained staff, the language training part of the program does not appear to have been much put into practice. Martodihardjo, Recorded interview, *Arsip Nasional Oral History Collection*, Jakarta, Interviewer: Suhardjo Hatamas; Interview date: December 5, 1975. Cassette I, Side A.
- 39 Nur, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 10.
- 40 Jansen, *In Deze halve Gevangelis*, entry for May 12, 1943, p. 225. Emphasis in the original.
- 41 Nur, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript pp. 7–9.
- 42 O.E. Engelen et al., *Lahirnya Satu Bangsa*, p. 7. The students with past nationalist or other political histories included Hasan Basri, Achmad Dipodilogo, Tilam, and Ny. Aidit.
- 43 On this debate, see Chapter 4, “Turned Tables.”
- 44 Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonnesia*, p. 258.

- 45 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript pp. 26–28.
- 46 According to Gunseikanbu, *Orang Indonesia*, p. 286, after the occupation began, Koerdi worked only as a farmer.
- 47 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript pp. 28, 29.
- 48 Ibid., pp. 31–32.
- 49 Achmad Dipodilogo, Interview recording, *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta, Interviewer and date unlisted, 1986, Cassette I, Side A.
- 50 Nur, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 15 and Side B, transcript p. 16.
- 51 Dr. Tadjuludin, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Interviewer: J.R. Chaniago; Interview date: October 17, 1978, Cassette I, Side A.
- 52 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript p. 37.
- 53 O.E. Engelen et al., *Lahirnya Satu Bangsa*, pp. 24–25.
- 54 Ibid., p. 26.
- 55 *Jawa nenkan* (Jakarta: Jawa Shimbunsha, 1944, reprint, Tokyo: Biblio, 1973), pp. 40–41, and *Kam pō*, vol. 26, pp. 8–9.
- 56 O.E. Engelen et al., *Lahirnya Satu Bangsa*, pp. 25–30.
- 57 Johar Nur's former *Asrama* colleague Chaerul Saleh was an intimate associate of the students, and his failure to take a position on the strike aroused irritation and suspicion among them.
- 58 See, for example, Sukarno's statement of thanks in reply to the Tōjō declaration in Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, *Japanese Military Administration* p. 360. Similar statements were made by other nationalist leaders, including Kiyai Hadji Mas Mansoer.
- 59 Ibid., p. 363.
- 60 de Jong, *Koninkrijk*, p. 53.
- 61 Yamashita Tetsuo, "Chūō sangi'in to seiji sanyo," *Shin Jawa* 1:1 (October 1944), pp. 20–26.
- 62 Editorial, *Jawa Shimbun*, September 3, 1943.
- 63 Ben-Ami Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 23.
- 64 Okuma Kinen, *Indonesia ni okeru*, pp. 313–315.
- 65 NIOD IC nos. 031753–767.
- 66 Martodihardjo, Recorded interview.
- 67 These were the words of Tatang (b. 1926), a young factory employee in Central Java during the occupation, in a personal interview in 1994. Asked if he remembered instances of Indonesians who worked for the Japanese, such as police, trying to help other Indonesians during the occupation, Tatang said he could not remember any. More generally he pronounced that once in a position of authority, "Indonesians don't care about those below them." Personal interview with Pak Tatang, Jakarta, July 2, 1994. The socialist Tan Malaka used the phrase "more Japanese than the Japanese" to describe the occupation period behavior of local Indonesian officials in volume two of his *Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara* (Jakarta: Widaya, 1948), p. 157.
- 68 Partosentono, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Interviewer: Suhardjo Hatmosuprobo; Interview date: December 6, 1975. Cassette I, Side B, transcript pp. 38–42.
- 69 Satō, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, pp. 30–31.
- 70 Partosentono, I. T., Cassette I, Side B, transcript pp. 42–49.
- 71 Partosentono suggested that the gap between these two prices was roughly 20 percent, although much greater gaps were reported in wartime sources in other areas. See, for example, a report from impoverished Pati state in Central Java, dated September 1944, NIOD IC no. 031771, which lists black market prices not just of

rice, but a variety of staples including tofu, beef, fish, green beans, and coconut oil, all four to five times higher than their official 1942–3 prices.

- 72 On these sorts of issues, see, for example, Satō Shigeru's excellent *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, p. 114. Satō writes, "the lower reach of the bureaucracy, village officials, usually constituted the largest rice surplus producing group in the village. As blackmarket prices for rice became higher than the official ones after 1943, the village officials often tried to fill the quotas with other villagers' rice and blackmarketed their own, often in collusion with Chinese rice dealers." On p. 132, Satō further cites the following example from Malang residency, next door to that of Partosentono:

Several times at the village head's residence the investigator witnessed women, holding their infants and baskets, imploring the village head for some rice. In sharp contrast, large farmers made huge profits out of the situation. Within the whole of the Malang residency, the amount delivered to the government in 1943 was no more than 26 per cent of the production in 1940. Most of the paddy was clearly blackmarketed.

- 73 Vivid accounts of this sort can be found, for example, in Benedict O'Gorman Anderson, "The Problem of Rice," *Indonesia* 2 (October 1966), pp. 77–123.
- 74 Partosentono, I. T., Cassette I, Side B, transcript pp. 50–54.
- 75 See, for example, Ch.O. van der Plas, "Third Report on Conditions in the Netherlands Indies," Brisbane, December 23, 1944, p. 2, Departement van Marine, agenda no. 26/1/ ZG, 1945, Centraal Archief Depot, cited in Satō, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, p. 33.
- 76 See Satō, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, p. 135.
- 77 Partosentono recalled the *rōmusha* from his village being sent to such places as Subang, West Java, and Sumatra.
- 78 *Ibid.*, pp. 54–56, 62.
- 79 For details on the Indramayu rebellions, see, for example, Kurasawa Aiko, *Nihon senryōka no Jawa nōson hen'yō* (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 1992), pp. 486–504.
- 80 See, for example, NIOD IC no. 031771.
- 81 A.M. Dudung, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta, Interviewer: Dr. A. Sidhi Ibrahim Buchori SH; Interview date: February 1, 1986. Cassette I, Side A, transcript p. 15.
- 82 *Ibid.*, Cassette I, Side A, transcript pp. 15–16, and Cassette II, Side A, transcript pp. 51–52, 57.
- 83 "Fragment uit het dagboek van een ondergedoken Nederlander," NIOD IC no. 011627.
- 84 Personal interview with Ibu Saina, Jakarta, July 24, 1994.
- 85 Nishijima had Subardjo set up in his own office within the *Kaigun bukanfu*, which he called the "Subardjo organ" (*Subardjo kikan*). The "Subardjo organ" was officially dedicated to geographical study, but in practice—with a self-appointed, all-"native" staff and Japanese contact only through Nishijima, with whom he also conducted field research—Subardjo spent much of his time on the same sorts of tasks he had pursued in the Hatta office before his arrest: compiling and producing reports that might encourage the improvement of Japanese policies with regard to the "native" population, and which might "have success in inducing Admiral Maeda to consider the true power of our nationalism." Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, pp. 244–246. See also Nishijima, *Shōgen*, pp. 135, 157–158.
- 86 Subardjo, *Kesadaran*, pp. 245–246, 254.
- 87 At the end of the war, even the youthful followers of Sutan Sjahrir, among the most politically well-informed and ultimately among the most staunchly anti-Japanese of

- Indonesia's intellectuals, had to be convinced that Japan's loss was not their own loss. "We all expected in general that Japan would win the war ... if Japan lost, we felt we would all lose," recalled Hamid Algadri in a 1986 interview. Algadri, Hamid, I. T., *Arsip Nasional*, Jakarta, Interviewer: Dr. A. Syamsurizal; Interview date: October 16, 1986; Cassette 10, Side B, p. 30.
- 88 Discussion of "the Women of Japan" appears in Chapter 6, "The Japan fashion."
- 89 Ny. Dr. Soepardjo, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta, Interviewer: Dr. Suhartono; Interview date: April 12, 1975; Cassette I, Side A, transcript pp. 15, 17.
- 90 Hadipranoto remembered the amount as 15 rupiah, but did not specify the time period involved.
- 91 Soejono Hadipranoto, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta, Interviewer: Dr. Ery Muchtar; Interview date: December 4, 1986. Cassette II, Side B, transcript pp. 35–40.
- 92 Ibid., Cassette II, Side B, transcript p. 33, and Cassette IV, Side A, transcript pp. 68–71.
- 93 "Rombongan pertama Barisan Roomusha dibawah pimpinan Ir. Soekarno Berangkat ke 'Medan Perjdoeangan,'" as reported by *Dōmei* in *Soeara Asia*, September 6, 1944, p. 1.
- 94 Chief of the *Sendenbu* at this time was Major Adachi Hisayoshi.
- 95 "Rombongan pertama," *Soeara Asia*.
- 96 Hatta, *The Putera Reports*, pp. 65–66. Putera is the post-1970 spelling for Poetera.
- 97 This is the central argument proposed by Shigeru Satō in *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*.
- 98 Back in May 1942, a preliminary policy statement from the short-lived "Association for the Advancement of the People's Economy" (*Perhimpoeanan Oentoek Memadjoekan Ekonomi Rakyat* or "POBER"), an elite developmental think-tank led by Hatta and staffed by Indonesian experts, had already reflected the common opinion that the cause of "native" economic uplift required movement towards a controlled, "nationalized" economy, at least at the macro level—and, presumably, a corresponding weakening of non-"native" power.
1. Large industries important to national interests should be nationalized or at least come under national direction.
 2. The working of the economy should be directed towards the needs of the public, rather than self-profit.
 3. To private initiative will be allowed the making of roads and the construction of buildings, but if these should later grow in size, they must be lined up and organized into cooperatives for the public interest.
- "Rapat Penting Oentoek menjoesoen dan mengatoer perekonomian bangsa Indonesia," "Kota" section, *Asia Raya*, May 11, 1942, p. 2.
- 99 Hatta, *Putera Reports*, p. 67.
- 100 R. Achmad, "Kesan Perdjalan Keliling Didaerah Tjirebon, Indramajoe dan Pemanoean pada tanggal 23–31 Agustus 2604," NIOD IC no. 031668.
- 101 "Oesoel-oesoel tentang penjerahan padi," *Kan Pō*, no. 55 (November 1944), pp. 15–16.
- 102 R. Achmad, "Kesan Perdjalan," NIOD IC nos. 031666–668.
- 103 Ibid.
- 104 Ibid., no. 031667.
- 105 Kanahele, *Japanese Occupation*, pp. 161–162. On the navy's "reservation" regarding New Guinea, see "On the Subject of the Independence of the East Indies," dated

September 2, 1944, in Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, *Japanese Military Administration*, p. 642.

- 106 Saipan's fall disrupted communications and transport with the southern regions, and opened Japan to attack by Allied B-29s. It was the fall of Saipan—and disputes over the question of pursuing peace negotiations with the Allies in its wake—that led to the dissolution of the Tōjō cabinet. See Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 169.
- 107 Anonymous handwritten notes on a postwar interrogation with Nishijima Shigetada, NIOD IC no. 059821. Hayashi's views on this subject are corroborated in "A Plan Concerning the Rule of Java," a memorandum he authored in March 1944, and apparently submitted to the Tokyo authorities. Here Hayashi drew attention to Java's declining material conditions and rising popular discontent, as well as Java's relatively high "standard of culture," to advise in favor of promising independence to Java—if not necessarily to the entire former East Indies—as a means of securing continued local support in an increasingly hostile and demanding situation. But Hayashi attached a large qualifier.

Even if we should grant independence to Java, it is necessary to educate the populace. This would require a considerable number of years; and in this preparatory period, the dissemination of the Japanese language would surpass that of the Malayan language; and it would be also possible to let the younger generation be the second Japanese race in the South, with the Japanese spirit; as a matter of fact they can form a powerful friendly nation under our guidance.

(Hayashi, "A Plan Concerning the Rule of Java," dated March 20, 1944, in *ibid.*, pp. 631–633)

- 108 *Ibid.*, and Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 283, no. 48.
- 109 See commentary on Shimizu's position from Nishijima Shigetada, as cited in "Notes on a women's meeting in Jakarta," dated November 9, 1944, NIOD IC no. 016146.
- 110 Okuma Kinen, *Indonesia ni okeru*, p. 315.
- 111 "Bendera Kebangsaan Indonesia, Merah-Poetih dan Lagoe Indonesia Raya Disjahkan Pemerintah Balatentara Dai Nippon," *Soeara Asia*, September 9, 1944, p. 1.
- 112 For evidence to the effect that "the Japanese clearly expected the Sanyo Kaigi to provide more substantial advice" than in the *Chūō sangi'in*, see Satō, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, pp. 138–139.
- 113 Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, pp. 169–170.
- 114 At the behest of the Java's Muslim leadership, the *Hizboellah*, a similar force under separate Muslim command, was also established in December, 1944.
- 115 *Ibid.*, pp. 154, 166–167.
- 116 Shimizu, Interview with Nishijima, pp. 273–275.
- 117 Anderson, *Java in a Time*, pp. 29–30, and Kanahale, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 167.
- 118 "Desas-desoes tentang oeroesan Pemoeda," NIOD IC no. 031783.
- 119 "Pelantikan Barisan Pelopor Djawa Hookoo Kai," *Asia Raya*, September 28, 1944, p. 2.
- 120 Sukarno, "Kepoatoesan Mosi," *Kan Po*, no. 55 (November 1944), pp. 16–17.
- 121 A.M. Dudung, I. T., Cassette I, Side B, pp. 22–23.
- 122 Izumi Shinjirō, personal interview at his home in Kyōto, May 17, 1995.
- 123 Nur, I. T., Cassette VII, Side A, transcript pp. 2–3.
- 124 *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 5. Nur recalled hearing of two Japanese atrocities in the outer islands, both of which indeed occurred, from Indonesian acquaintances: the slaughter of

- some 1,300 inhabitants during the Lhok Seumawe uprising in Aceh, North Sumatra, and a *kenpeitai*-led campaign of executions of roughly 2,000 upper-class Indonesians in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, on suspicion of collusion with the Allies.
- 125 Maeda, from a 1962 interview cited in Anderson, *Java in a Time*, p. 44.
- 126 Ibid., p. 8.
- 127 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript pp. 39–40.
- 128 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette V, Side B, transcript p. 33, and Cassette VI, Side A, transcript p. 11.
- 129 Achmad, “Kesan Perjalanan.”
- 130 Officials often substituted the expression *gotong-royong* for the Japanese term for corvée labor, *kinrō hōshi*. Nationalist intelligence reports as early as late 1942 also noted that due to corruption and mismanagement, cooperatives established by local notables in the name of *gotong-royong* were arousing popular suspicion. See, for example, “Report from Kabupaten Poerbolingo,” NIOD IC nos. 036805–814. But both during and after the war, the ambivalences thus aroused by the expression *gotong-royong* among the lower classes seem to have remained largely invisible to the nation-building elite, who continued to cling to it as a uniquely indigenous form of socialism and class unity. At the All-Java Conference of Indonesian Businessmen held in late July 1945, for example, “the principle speaker was Hatta who called for a socialist type of economy based on the spirit of *gotong-royong*.” Peter Post, “The Formation of the Pribumi Business Elite,” p. 107.
- 131 Sjarif Thayeb, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Jakarta, Cassette I, Side B, transcript p. 20.
- 132 Hatta, as cited in a 1965 interview in Kanahele, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 189.
- 133 *Kan Pō*, no. 62 (March 1945), p. 42.
- 134 Sjarif Thayeb, I. T., Cassette I, Side B, p. 20.
- 135 Nur, I. T., Cassette VII, Side A, transcript p. 24.
- 136 Ibid., pp. 9–13.
- 137 Ibid., pp. 13, 14, and Side B, transcript p. 15. See also G. Pakpahan, *1261 hari di bawah Sinar Matahari Terbit, 6 Maret 2602–17 Agustus 2605*, second printing (Jakarta: Marintah Djaya, 1979), p. 150.
- 138 See Teuku Raja Cut Rachman, I. T., *Arsip Nasional* Oral History Collection, Interviewer: Dr. M. Dien Madjid, Interview date: October 29, 1984, Cassette I, Side A, transcript p. 13.
- 139 Nur, I. T., Cassette VII, Side A, transcript p. 12.
- 140 See, for example, NIOD IC no. 059397, in which a postwar Dutch interrogator wrote, “some in the Gunseikanbu staff, such as H. SHIMIZU, yield to none in their ‘love’ to the Indonesians, it seems.”
- 141 Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 161.
- 142 Shimizu, “Minshū senbu hitosuji ni,” p. 310.
- 143 Sudarpo, I. T., Cassette VI, Side A, transcript pp. 8–10, and Cassette VII, Side A, pp. 9–10.
- 144 As such, more than twenty years later, Lt. Col. Machida still numbered *Jawa sarasa* among his favorite books. Machida, *Tatakau*, p. 298.
- 145 *Ketōjin*, lit. “hairy people” a highly derogatory term for whites in common usage at the height of the Pacific War. On mutual racism and its extremes in the Pacific War see, for example, John Dower, *War Without Mercy* (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1987).
- 146 Takeda, *Jawa sarasa*, pp. 1–2.
- 147 Ibid., pp. 3, 23.
- 148 Ibid., pp. 18–23, 86.

- 149 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
- 150 Ibid., pp. 25, 79–82.
- 151 Ibid., pp. 19–21.
- 152 Takeda Rintarō, “Keimin bunka shidōsho,” *Jawa baroe*, May 1, 1943.
- 153 Takeda, *Jawa sarasa*, pp. 3–4, 88.
- 154 Ibid., pp. 9–11.
- 155 Ibid., pp. 38–39.
- 156 For variations on this theme in other times and places, see, for example, Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1994).
- 157 Takeda, *Jawa sarasa*, pp. 39–40.
- 158 Ibid., pp. 41–42.
- 159 Ibid., pp. 92–93.
- 160 Yoshizumi Tomegorō, as cited in Yoshizumi and Ichiki, “Indonesia wo kataru,” p. 13.
- 161 Yoshizumi and Ichiki, “Indonesia wo kataru,” pp. 14, 18.
- 162 Ibid., p. 16.
- 163 Ibid., pp. 13, 19.
- 164 Ibid., pp. 19–20.
- 165 Ichiki and Nishijima as cited in Yanagawa Munenari et al., “Indonesia chishikisō to seinsenō wo kataru,” pp. 24, 28.
- 166 Nakatani Yoshio, as cited in *ibid.*, p. 29.
- 167 Ibid., pp. 29–31.
- 168 Ibid., p. 29.

Conclusion

- 1 President Megawati Sukarnoputri as cited in Radio Nederland *Warta Berita*, August 12, 2001.
- 2 “Ruthlessly impartial” was prominent former Peta trainee Kemal Idris’ description of Lieutenant Yanagawa as quoted in Anderson, *Java in a Time*, p. 23. Yanagawa and his interactions with Indonesians will receive attention in a separate forthcoming monograph provisionally entitled *Anticolonial Fascism: Japan and the Making of Cold War Indonesia*.
- 3 Achmad Subardjo, as cited in Nishijima, *Shōgen*, p. 152. Emphasis added.
- 4 “What Went Wrong?” is the title of an essay by Edwin O. Reischauer in *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan*, pp. 489–510.
- 5 See, for example, John Dower’s excellent *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II* (London: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press, 1999).
- 6 Maruyama juxtaposed this as “a striking contrast to the situation in Nazi Germany, which, for all its emotionalism and illogicality, did in fact possess an orthodox, systematic *Weltanschauung* (Worldview) expressed in books like *Mein Kampf* and *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*.” Maruyama, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism,” p. 1.
- 7 Mas Slamet, *Tipoe Moeslihat Djepang*, ed. Mara Agoes (Batavia: s.n., 1946).
- 8 For a consideration of this issue with relation to Oral History in Suharto’s Indonesia, see Ethan Mark, “Suharto’s New Order Remembers Japan’s New Order,” in Remco Raben, ed., *Representing the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*, pp. 72–84.
- 9 As journalist John Gunther—an eyewitness to the rise of European fascism as the *Herald Tribune*’s Berlin correspondent in the early 1930s, who visited and analyzed developments in Japan and its imperial outposts in 1937 and 1938—observed,

“the conventional Marxist definition of Fascism is that it is the last stand of private monopoly capitalism against social revolution. I do not find this definition very satisfactory, since it ignores the considerable revolutionary element in Fascism. It ignores the fact that Fascism borrows heavily from Marxism, and makes a pretense at least of establishing a social order in which some of the extravagances of capitalism are curtailed.” Gunther, *Inside Asia*, p. 63.

- 10 Ogura Kazuo, “Asia fukken no tame ni,” *Chūō kōron*, July 1993, pp. 60–73.
- 11 Arnold Mononutu, preface to Sukarno, “The Birth of Pantjasila: The Five Principles of the Indonesian State, President Sukarno’s Speech” (Djakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1950).
- 12 Kanahele, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 200.
- 13 Sukarno, “Birth of Pantjasila,” p. 13.
- 14 Kanahele, *Japanese Occupation*, p. 200.
- 15 Sukarno, “Birth of Pantjasila,” pp. 21–23.
- 16 See Chapter 5, “*Unabara*: Riding Asia’s tide.”
- 17 Sukarno, “Birth of Pantjasila,” pp. 26–28.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

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Konoe Yoshiaki

Glossary of persons reappearing in the text

(Asterixes indicate persons occupying a prominent place in the narrative)

***Abe Tomoji** Novelist attached to Java propaganda squad

Abikoesho (Tjokrosoesho) “Non-cooperator” nationalist, submitted ill-fated petition to the Military Administration Department for independent Indonesian government in early March, 1942

Adam Malik Prewar Gerindo party member and founder of the Antara nationalist wire service, Java Propaganda squad and *Dōmei* wire service employee, student at the New Generation Residence Hall. Postwar Indonesian Foreign Minister

Aidit, D.N. Wartime Propaganda squad clerk, student at the New Generation Residence Hall, postwar leader of the Indonesian Communist Party

(**Abdullah bin Salim**) **Alatas** Leading businessman and lone Arab appointee to prewar Volksraad. Business director of *Asia Raya* newspaper. Associate of Tomizawa Uio

***Asano Akira** Writer and social commentator attached to Java propaganda squad

Asmara Hadi Secretary and son-in-law to Sukarno, a *Pemandangan* newspaper editor, and *Asia Raya* newspaper cultural columnist from June 1942

***Bekki Atsuhiko** Geographer attached to the Java propaganda squad, expert in “Geopolitics”

Dewantara, Ki Hadjar Javanese and nationalist cultural activist/educator, founder of the *Taman Siswa* schools, co-leader of Sukarno’s *Poetera*

***Djajadiningrat, Prof. Dr. Hoesein** Leiden-educated upper *priyayi* advisor to the Netherlands Indies Department of Internal Affairs, wartime advisor to and later chief of Java Military Administration Department of Religious Affairs, member of the Commission for the Investigation of Ancient Customs, the Indonesian Language Commission, and the Central Advisory Council

Harada Yoshikazu 16th Army Deputy Chief of Staff, concurrent chief of the Military Administration Department

***Hatta, Mohammad** Most prominent “non-cooperator” nationalist behind Sukarno, 1920s-1950s, Leiden graduate, head of the autonomous General Advisory Office set up within the Military Government

***Ichiki Tatsuo** Java propaganda squad interpreter, prewar Indies resident, editor-in-chief of the *Asia Raya* newspaper, later *Pradjoerit* magazine editor and publisher

Iida Nobuo Musical composer attached to Java propaganda squad

***Imamura Hitoshi (Gen.)** 16th Army Commander-in-Chief, Java, 1941-Nov. 1942

Jansen, Dr. Leo F. Dutch employee of Japanese Overseas Radio Service

Jassin, H.B. Assistant editor of *Pandji Poestaka* magazine, leading student of Indonesian literature

Kitahara Takeo Novelist attached to Java propaganda squad

***Machida Keiji (Lt. Col.)** Commander, Java propaganda squad

***Miyoshi Shunkichirō** Prewar Batavia consul and wartime translator and advisor for the Java Military Administration Department, associate of Mohammad Hatta

***Nakatani Yoshio** Interpreter attached to Java propaganda squad, prewar Indies resident

- ***Nakayama Yasuto** Head of the General Affairs Section of the Military Administration Department, army attaché to the prewar Japanese trade delegation in Batavia
- ***Nishijima Shigetada** Navy Liaison office researcher, prewar Indies resident
- ***Nur, Johar** Jakarta Agricultural college student from Sumatra. Employee of the Three-A Information Office, student at the New Generation Residence Hall, and later at the Jakarta Medical College
- ***Ōe Kenji** Novelist attached to the Java propaganda squad
- Oesman, Madjid** Sumatran nationalist and newspaper owner, graduate of Tokyo's Meiji University, married to a Japanese, mentor of Johar Nur
- Ōki Atsuo** Poet attached to the Java propaganda squad
- Ono Saseo** One of two cartoonists attached to the Java propaganda squad
- Ōya Sōichi** Journalist and popular social commentator attached to Java propaganda squad
- ***Pané, Sanoesi** Poet, playwright, historian, founding editor of *Asia Raya*'s Culture section, prewar co-founder of left-wing nationalist Gerindo party
- Saleh, Chaerul** Sumatran student nationalist, prewar chair of the Federation of Indonesian Students, Java Propaganda squad employee, leader of the New Generation Residence Hall.
- Samsoedin, Raden** Parindra party member, chairman of the Three-A Movement
- Sarli** B.R.I. nationalist committee chairman in central Java, associate of Mohammad Hatta
- Satō Nobuhide** Navy Liaison Office Research Unit Chief, associate of Nishijima Shigetada and Achmad Subardjo
- Sjahrir, Sutan** First generation nationalist, socialist, outspokenly "anti-fascist" Leiden-educated associate of Mohammad Hatta. Formally recuperating from tuberculosis in the West Java countryside during the occupation, he remained in quiet contact with Hatta and an important influence upon a circle of students including Sudarpo and Sudjatmoko
- ***Shimizu Hitoshi** Propagandist, military-civilian liaison, attached to Java propaganda squad
- ***Shimizu Nobuo** Greater Asia Theorist and *Unabara* newspaper editor-in-chief, attached to Java propaganda squad
- ***Soekardjo (Wirjopranoto)** Parindra party chairman from 1941, honorary director and subsequently general director of the *Asia Raya* newspaper
- ***Soetardjo (Hadikoesoemo)** Leading member of Java's civil service, author of 1936 "Soetardjo Petition"
- Soetomo (Dr.)** Founder and first leader of Parindra party (d. 1938)
- ***Subardjo, Achmad** First-generation nationalist, Leiden graduate, research section chief of Mohammad Hatta's General Advisory Office within the Java Military Administration, later researcher for the Navy Liaison Office. Prewar Tokyo resident, associate of Nishijima Shigetada
- ***Sudarpo** Batavia/Jakarta Medical College student, prewar follower of Mohammad Hatta
- Sudjatmoko** Batavia/Jakarta Medical College student, associate of Sudarpo
- Sudjono, R.** Leiden-educated lawyer, advisor to 16th Army Military Government Department, Indonesian language instructor in prewar Tokyo, a relative of Achmad Subardjo
- Sukarni** Java propaganda squad and *Dōmei* wire services employee, student at the New Generation Residence Hall. Later a secretary in the *Seinendan* Central Office
- ***Sukarno** Indonesia's pre-eminent nationalist leader from the 1920s-1960s
- ***Takeda Rintarō** Writer attached to Java propaganda squad

Taniguchi Gorō Pre-war editor of Java's Japanese-language daily the *Jawa nippō*, correspondent for Japan's Asahi newspaper, wartime advisor and interpreter for the Military Administration Department. From early 1943, director of the Java Newspaper Association.

Thamrin, Mohammad Immediate prewar leader of Parindra party (d. 1941)

***Tjokroaminoto, Anwar** Islamic nationalist, *Pemandangan* editor, later *Asia Raya* assistant editor, a cousin of Sukarno and son of *Sarekat Islam* leader Umar Said Tjokroaminoto

***Tomizawa Uio** Novelist attached to Java propaganda squad

***Winarno (Hendranoto)** Journalist and social commentator, editor of Parindra party's *Berita Oemoem* and political editor of the *Asia Raya* newspaper

Yamin, Mohammad Nationalist political and literary figure, prewar co-founder (with fellow Sumatran Sanoesi Pane) of left-wing nationalist *Gerindo* party, a mentor of Johar Nur

Yokuyama Ryūichi One of two cartoonists attached to the Java propaganda squad

***Yoshizumi Tomegorō** Navy Liaison office researcher/interpreter, prewar Indies resident

Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute Columbia University

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