Introduction

History of Xinjiang Region

Curated By

Unlearning Capitalism

A curated directory of educational resources for radical political education focused on building a better world beyond capitalism.

About this Collection

About this Collection

Over the past few decades, much has been written in western media about supposed human rights abuses in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region involving charges of forced labor, slavery, and genocide.  

But are these charges accurate? This collection provides many detailed and credible reports, articles, interviews and ground-level videos examining the situation from a variety of sources, both Chinese and not. In doing so, it makes clear the nature of the accusations are politically motived and stem from a complex history that includes violent separatist extremism, western destabilization efforts, economic interests and much more.

While recognizing the sensitive nature of the discourse surrounding this issue, the resources contained in this collection will provide a comprehensive education on the subject in order to cut through the prevalent media narrative on Xinjiang.

Read this collection online: https://unlearn.capital/collections/history-of-xinjiang-region

10 articles · 2 podcasts · 4 videos

This ebook is about 137 pages long.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

1. The Idea of the 'Uyghur Genocide' and the Realities of Xinjiang

27 pages

https://monthlyreview.org/articles/the-idea-of-the-uyghur-genocide-and-the-realities-of-xinjiang/

Monthly Review

By Vijay Prashad; Tings Chak

Traces how the 'Uyghur genocide' narrative emerged in Western media while presenting China's development and poverty alleviation efforts in Xinjiang.

2. Xinjiang: A Report and Resource Compilation

69 pages

https://www.qiaocollective.com/education/xinjiang

Qiao Collective (桥)

This compilation provides critical resources and context challenging Western narratives of genocide in Xinjiang as part of the U.S.-led geopolitical confrontation with China.

3. The Xinjiang Genocide Allegations Are Unjustified

4 pages

https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/apfjc5yg352d554k2ar2wwwkk8ryw9

Dr. Jeffrey D. Sachs

US President Joe Biden's administration has doubled down on the claim that China is mounting a genocide against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. But it has offered no proof, and unless it can, the State Department should withdraw the charge and support a UN-based investigation of the situation in Xinjiang.

4. The US-Imposed Hybrid War on China

5 pages

https://thetricontinental.org/red-alert-9-china/

The Tricontinental

The United States is imposing a hybrid war on China through economic sanctions and military pressure, as China develops technological self-sufficiency and global partnerships to resist American dominance.

5. Who is Adrian Zenz?: US State Department accusation of China ‘genocide’ relied on data abuse and baseless claims by far-right ideologue

12 pages

https://thegrayzone.com/2021/02/18/us-media-reports-chinese-genocide-relied-on-fraudulent-far-right-researcher/

The Grayzone

By Gareth Porter and Max Blumenthal

The Trump and Biden administrations have relied on the work of a right-wing religious extremist, Adrian Zenz, for their “genocide” accusation against China. A close review of Zenz’s research reveals flagrant data abuse and outright falsehoods.

6. China Is Not Committing Genocide in Xinjiang

5 pages

https://thegeopolitics.com/china-is-not-committing-genocide-in-xinjiang/

The Geopolitics

By Iveta Cherneva

The genocide narrative against China in Xinjiang misuses a high legal standard to describe systematic human rights violations, since the intent to destroy the Uighurs as a group is absent; the US uses the accusation for Cold War purposes while accepting zero Uighur refugees.

7. The National Endowment for Democracy in US Hegemonism and Imperialism

3 pages

https://radicaldesai.substack.com/p/the-national-endowment-for-democracy

Dr. Radhika Desai

By Radhika Desai

Classified as a GONGO funded by the State Department, the NED was launched in 1983 after Church Committee investigations. In 2025, China topped targets with $13 million; in 2024, Russia led with $16 million.

8. Arab League's visit to Xinjiang rejects Western accusations of ethnic genocide, religious persecution

2 pages

https://peoplesdaily.pdnews.cn/china/er/30001378149

People's Daily

By Global Times

A delegation from the Arab League visited Xinjiang and rejected Western allegations of ethnic genocide and religious persecution, citing evidence of regional stability, cultural preservation, and economic development.

9. Slanders about China's treatment of Uyghurs are aimed at bolstering the military-industrial complex

1 page

https://socialistchina.org/2021/12/21/slanders-about-chinas-treatment-of-uyghurs-are-aimed-at-bolstering-the-military-industrial-complex/

Friends of Socialist China

Carlos Martinez claims US accusations against China's treatment of Uyghurs aim to strengthen the military-industrial complex.

10. Is China Committing Genocide? Behind the US Government's Propaganda Campaign

9 pages

https://www.mintpressnews.com/china-uighur-genocide-behind-us-government-propaganda/276085/

Mint Press News

By Dan Cohen

Article examines how Western genocide accusations against China rely on discredited research and serve geopolitical interests.

Other Resources

Other Resources

This collection also includes other media types such as books, videos, podcasts, and more.

Podcasts

Demystifying Xinjiang and the 'Uyghur Genocide' Narrative

https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/intlsolidarity/episodes/Demystifying-Xinjiang-and-the-Uyghur-Genocide-Narrative-w-Carl-Zha-e3b2l6d

Journal of International Solidarity

By Carl Zha

Carl Zha discusses his recent trip to Xinjiang, examining tourism's economic role, development initiatives, and challenging Western narratives about Uyghur rights.

China, U.S. Imperialism, and the New Cold War

https://revolutionaryleftradio.libsyn.com/cold-war-ii

Rev Left Radio

By Danny Haiphong

Danny Haiphong analyzes China's rise, U.S. imperial aggression toward China, and the propaganda campaigns fueling a new Cold War.

Videos

Are The Uyghurs Oppressed? R2R Reports From Xinjiang

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4SHak9_vJgw

Reason2Resist with Dimitri Lascaris

By Dimitri Lascaris

A correspondent visits Urumqi to observe daily life and challenge Western claims of oppression against the Uyghur minority in China.

Young British communist visits Xinjiang: "Not at all what Western media says"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXcB-paqVpY

Resource Not Added

By Amar

A young British communist activist travels to Xinjiang in April 2026 to independently assess the region, concluding that his on-the-ground observations fundamentally contradict the negative narratives perpetuated by Western mainstream media.

US Coerces UN Human Rights Chief Following Xinjiang China Visit

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vtA_dKjb4F0

The New Atlas

Argues that the US government is pressuring the UN human rights chief to reject her findings from a visit to Xinjiang, comparing current tactics against China to the disinformation campaigns used prior to the Iraq War.

Is Xinjiang's Culture Being Erased?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyzT5ndFvyM

Resource Not Added

By Mimi Zhu

A personal travel account describing a visit to Xinjiang with local friends, highlighting the beauty of the region's culture and daily life while addressing questions about cultural preservation.

The Idea of the 'Uyghur Genocide' and the Realities of Xinjiang

History of Xinjiang Region — The Idea of the 'Uyghur Genocide' and the Realities of Xinjiang

The Idea of the 'Uyghur Genocide' and the Realities of Xinjiang

Article 1 of 10

Monthly Review

By Vijay Prashad; Tings Chak

Originally published at https://monthlyreview.org/articles/the-idea-of-the-uyghur-genocide-and-the-realities-of-xinjiang/

Image courtesy of the Qiao Collective. See “Xinjiang: A Report and Resource Compilation.”

Image (above) courtesy of the Qiao Collective, modified for Monthly Review. See “Xinjiang: A Report and Resource Compilation,” qiaocollective.com.

Vijay Prashad (Santiago, Chile) and Tings Chak (Beijing, China) work at Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, where Prashad is director and Chak is the co-coordinator of its Asia office. They are both editors of the international edition of Wenhua Zongheng.

When They Began to Say Genocide

In March 2017, the Jamestown Foundation (Washington DC) published a three thousand-word report on “Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State” written by Adrian Zenz and James Leibold.¹ A few months later, the same writers published another report, this one slightly longer at nearly five thousand words, with the more aggressive title, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang.”² At that time, there was not much interest in these stories. Zenz came from the Victims of Communism Foundation, a nonprofit organization set up by the U.S. Congress in 1993 and funded by various right-wing sources, including the Heritage Foundation. Leibold is a professor of Chinese history at La Trobe University (Australia), but is also a senior fellow at the Australian government-funded Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The texts by Zenz and Leibold were seen initially as the work of ideological right-wing scholars with an axe to grind, rather than with evidence of any interest to anyone. These seemed more like fringe Cold War texts rather than anything serious.

The following year, in May 2018, the Associated Press’s Gerry Shih published a story after interviewing several Kazakhs in Almaty, Kazakhstan, about experiences that they claim they had in Xinjiang.³ Shih’s story, “China’s Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution,” was the first in a Western corporate journal to report on a phenomenon that would later become almost household news in the Global North and in some parts of the Global South. A month before Shih published his report, the co-chairs of the Congressional Executive Commission on China, then Senator (and now Secretary of State) Marco Rubio and Representative Chris Smith, released a letter that made three important accusations against the Chinese government:

That the Chinese government had begun a “crackdown” in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

That “as many as 500,000 to a million people are or have been detained in what are being called ‘political education centers,’ the largest mass incarceration of a minority population in the world today.”

That “Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the XUAR have been subjected to arbitrary arrest, egregious restrictions on religious practice and culture, and a digitized surveillance system so pervasive that every aspect of daily life is monitored.”⁴

These three accusations became foundational for a media campaign that followed, in which Zenz became an “expert” on the XUAR and on this “crackdown.”⁵ It is important to point out that behind Zenz is a cohort of Uyghur exiles who live in the Washington DC area and work for the U.S. intelligence community through the media (three of the main figures involved in this network are Shohret Hoshur, Omer Kanat, and Rushan Abbas—all three of whom are with the U.S. government’s Radio Free Asia). Exiles such as Kanat and Abbas founded the Uyghur American Association, the Uyghur Human Rights Project, and the World Uyghur Congress with U.S. government funds. Zenz drew from these sources, as well as from Istiqal, a media outlet run by Uyghur exiles in Turkey. By the second half of 2018, it had become established wisdom that China was running “internment camps” for a million Uyghurs (as Lily Kuo’s article in the Guardian put it in October), and that there was a “Muslim Gulag” in Xinjiang (as Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov wrote for Reuters in November).⁶ At that time, there was no use of the word genocide. That word, with all the legal weight of the UN Convention Against Genocide (1948), requires clarity and rationale.

When addressing accusations of such gravity, it is worth examining what the UN Convention on Genocide actually requires. According to Article II of the 1948 Convention, genocide means “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting “conditions of life calculated to bring about…physical destruction”; imposing measures to prevent births; or forcibly transferring children from the group to another group. The drafters of the 1948 Convention explicitly rejected including “cultural genocide” after extensive debate, a term often deployed in Xinjiang discussions that does not have standing in international law. Intent (dolus specialis)—the specific determination to physically destroy a group—is the most difficult element to prove and must be demonstrated, not merely alleged.

In June 2019, Asiye Abdulaheb, a woman from Xinjiang who had been living in the Netherlands for a decade, received a digital file containing what she was told were leaked Chinese government documents.⁷ She posted a picture of one of the documents on X and was immediately contacted by Zenz and by Rian Thum, who teaches Chinese history in Manchester. Zenz asked for the documents and told Abdulaheb to delete her tweet. These documents became the “China Cables” and the “Karakax List,” which provided Zenz with the materials to write his reports on Xinjiang.⁸ The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, which published the China Cables, said it “does not comment on sources.”⁹ It did not matter that there was nothing beyond four documents leaked to a woman in the Netherlands who believed she got them because she can read Mandarin, and that there was no real corroboration of these documents beyond the word of Uyghur exiles who worked for the U.S. government and scholars such as Zenz, who had already begun to build a narrative of gulags and digitalized surveillance. At the time of writing, there has been no information about where these digital documents came from and none about whether they are authentic. (Western media organizations claimed that they did an internal verification, but no forensic authentication report has been released to the public.)

In June 2020, Zenz went further with another Jamestown report. A word on the Jamestown Foundation: founded in 1984 with the support of CIA director William J. Casey, it was established to assist defectors from the USSR and the eastern bloc and to use the knowledge of defectors in the Cold War. After the USSR collapsed, the Jamestown Foundation pivoted to provide expertise on counterterrorism and on Chinese Communism for, among other entities, the U.S. government, founding the China Brief in 2001. Zenz’s reports must be read in this context. His 2020 report is called “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang.”¹⁰ Early into the report, Zenz lists the allegations he makes against the Chinese government and then says, “these findings provide the strongest evidence yet that Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang meet one of the genocide criteria” in the UN Convention.¹¹ The word “genocide” had arrived, and it then gets used in journalistic accounts that cite this report.

On January 19, 2021, almost four years after Zenz’s first report, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, after listing the accusations made by Zenz and others (for instance, one million civilians incarcerated, forced sterilizations, and forced labor), said that the Chinese government “has committed genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.”¹² Other countries, such as Canada, followed with this use of the term genocide.¹³

What is rarely mentioned in Western reports is the international support China has received on its Xinjiang policies. In July 2019, ambassadors from thirty-seven countries sent a joint letter to the President of the UN Human Rights Council commending China’s “remarkable achievements in the field of human rights” and noting that “safety and security has returned to Xinjiang” with “not a single terrorist attack in Xinjiang” in three consecutive years. The signatories included Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates as well as others from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.¹⁴ By June 2021, this number had grown to sixty-nine countries issuing a statement in defense of China’s policies, with twenty-eight of these being members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), founded in 1969 to bring Muslim-majority countries into conversation with each other.¹⁵ This organization itself, after sending delegations to Xinjiang, issued a report in March 2019 praising China for “providing care to its Muslim citizens.”¹⁶ This support from Muslim-majority nations stands in sharp contrast to accusations from countries with much smaller Muslim populations, or even with long histories of illegal violence against Muslim-majority countries (such as the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq and Iran).

When Central Asia Became a Threat

Edges of old empires always pose a problem to the center because they are far away, and often in terrain that is inhospitable to easy conquest given the state of military technology and statecraft (including communications and travel). Borders in the premodern era were often undefined, and frequently therefore found in deserts and in high mountain ranges or in thick forests, areas where the demarcation of terrain is harder to manage. It is also where rebels often fled and hid from the large armies of the plains, whose strength was often in frontal combat rather than in the guerrilla warfare possible in areas that are not flat. Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia: these defined the outer reaches of the various old empires of China, whether the successive dynasties of the Eastern Han, the Tang, the Yuan, the Ming, and the Qing. From the earliest known written records, there is evidence from these imperial dynasties with their scrupulous documentation that areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet belonged to them, but at the same time, people in the outer reaches had other ideas. These sometimes overlapped with the ideas of the center (agreeing that they were indeed part of the same polity) and at other times dismissed the ideas of the center (maintaining that they were a separate polity, or at least not incorporable). Indeed, Chinese political thought is not rooted in fixed territory but in a more abstract idea of belonging. Tianxia (天下) means “all under Heaven,” which does not equate to a fixed territory but a moral order, so that the emperor traditionally ruled over a people who accepted the imperial authority due to its virtue. At least, that is the theory, although the sword was often wielded to ensure that imperial authority was obeyed. To abstract from the long and complex history of places such as China, India, Mali, or Great Zimbabwe and to assume that these histories can be rendered based on modern ideas of land and property is to negate the different ways in which rulers understood the land and the people who lived on that land.¹⁷

From at least 60 BCE, however, the Western Han Dynasty established the Western Regions Frontier Command and began to claim the entire flatland of Xinjiang as part of its territory. Subsequently, all empires from the Eastern Han to the Qing had documents that suggested their rule over those lands. But it was only during the Kangxi emperor period (1708–1718) that the first territorial surveys were conducted, with the first maps—still with fuzzy borders—developed in that period. The maps had a practical purpose: how far troops could march, or where the river systems are. It was only with the defeat of the Dzungar Khanate between 1755 and 1759 that mapping took on a more cadastral purpose, now delineating the territory controlled by the empire and centralizing taxation systems—with the territory becoming a fiscal imagination. It is in this period that Xinjiang becomes cartographically part of China, and then in 1884, during the Qing Dynasty, established as a province.¹⁸

The history laid out here is obviously only a sketch, since the literature is vast, stretching back centuries and beyond our command to interpret. Regardless of the view one has on the claims over the vast territory known now as Xinjiang, one thing is clear, however, and that is what is called “East Turkestan” is not an ancient term but a term that was used by nineteenth-century European geographers—such as the German scholars Alexander von Humboldt and Ferdinand von Richthofen, as well as the Russian scholar Wilhelm Barthold—to delineate Turkic-speaking peoples who were separated into a western district (controlled by Russia) and an eastern district (considered a rather wild place).¹⁹ That being said, there were secession movements that emerged in the twentieth century and that began to use the term “East Turkestan” to describe an area that comprises sections of Kazakhstan and Xinjiang.

In 1975, Yusupbek Mukhlisi (also known as Modan Mukhlisi), who was living in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, set up the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan to start a secessionist movement in Xinjiang. Mukhlisi, born in 1920, participated enthusiastically in the Second East Turkestan Republic (1944–1946).²⁰ A Soviet-brokered agreement led to the incorporation of this republic into China, with a joint government formed between the leaders of the Second East Turkestan Republic and the Republic of China. The governor of Xinjiang was Zhang Zhizhong, a general in the Chinese nationalist forces who would later become a senior Communist official. During his tenure, Zhang encouraged the development of Uyghur culture. In 1947, he was succeeded by the pan-Turkic and anti-Communist leader, Masud Sabri. The Chinese Civil War enfolded Xinjiang, whose nationalist military leader Tao Zhiyue defected to the Communists and brought Xinjiang into the People’s Republic. Mukhlisi, distraught, spent the next decade in the towns and cities of the Taklamakan Desert to learn about Uyghur culture and life.²¹ In Kazakhstan, by the 1970s, he became an instrument in the Sino-Soviet dispute, setting up the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan to agitate for secession.

The fall of the USSR provided Mukhlisi with new momentum, since the United States, which had been averse to his anti-China propaganda during the Cold War, had developed new ears in the post-Cold War environment. In 1996, Mukhlisi went to the United States to plead his case before Cold Warriors in the U.S. Congress who had developed an affection for the strategy of using Islamist violence as a weapon to bring down their adversaries (they felt that it was their work with the mujahideen in Afghanistan that had brought down the USSR, and that now groups such as those led by Mukhlisi would bring down the People’s Republic of China). In late 1996, Mukhlisi announced that his group would start an armed struggle within China. When in February 1997, bombs exploded on three buses in Ürümqi (the capital city of XUAR), killing nine and injuring sixty-eight, Mukhlisi took responsibility. Then, in March of that year, a bus in Beijing was bombed, and once more Mukhlisi said that his group had done it. It is now largely forgotten, but Mukhlisi’s group in Almaty began to issue press releases about demography (the size of the Uyghur population and the rate of Han migration into Xinjiang) and about Chinese state violence (numbers of executions and detentions of Uyghurs)—presaging the kind of information released to Abdulaheb in 2019.²²

With the collapse of the USSR, the Central Asian states experienced a torrential transition, with several of these states drawn into the kind of politics afflicting Afghanistan.²³ In 1996, the Taliban rode into Kabul and set aside the old mujahideen factions.²⁴ At the same time, the influence of the Taliban—now established in Afghanistan with all the institutions of state—traveled far afield. Across the region, Taliban-like groups emerged to afflict their societies with violence. Two of the most important of these were the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (founded in 1998) and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (founded in 1990 and one of the major players in the Tajik Civil War of 1993–1997).²⁵ It was in this foul soup that two Uyghur exiles (Hasan Mahsum and Memetuhut Memetrozi) met in an Islamist camp in Pakistan in late 1997 and founded the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Their goal was to create East Turkestan in Xinjiang and to convert it into an Islamic state. In the period between 1997 and 2001, ETIM recruited a handful of fighters and trained them in Taliban and al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan alongside a few fighters from groups such as the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO, established in Turkey in 1997). In 1998, the Chinese government accused ETLO of being behind arson attacks in Ürümqi, and, the following year, the government of Turkey arrested ETLO members in Istanbul for attacking a Chinese national in the city. Meanwhile, the Chinese government accused ETIM of blowing up a warehouse at the Ürümqi train station in May 1998, bombing civilians in Hotan in southern Xinjiang in March 1999, and bombing civilians in Xinhezhen in the northern part of Xinjiang in June 1999. These incidents, according to the United Nations, resulted in the death of 140 people and injured 371 others. These were among the thousands of attacks that were launched in Xinjiang from 1990 to the end of 2016, killing large numbers of innocent people and hundreds of police officers and causing immeasurable damage to property, according to a 2019 white paper that provides the most comprehensive accounting of the incidents.²⁶ These attacks may or may not have been done directly by ETIM, whose actual existence in or near Xinjiang became mysterious after the United States attacked Afghanistan and detained several Uyghur fighters in Guantánamo. However, new groups, such as the Turkestan Islamic Party, continued to emerge.

Among the most significant, yet underreported aspects of Xinjiang’s terrorism crisis, were the systematic assassinations of Islamic religious leaders and scholars who opposed extremism—Mullah Abulizi (1993), Akemusidike Aji (1996), Aronghan Aji (1996), Mullah Younusi Sidike (1997), Abulizi Aji (1998), Abdurehim Damaolla (2013), and Juma Tayir (2014). The assassination of Tayir is particularly significant.²⁷ He was not only the imam of Id Kah Mosque (Kashgar)—China’s largest mosque—but he was targeted specifically because he had consistently condemned terrorism and received threatening letters for doing so. Today, his son, Memet Jume, serves as imam at that same mosque.

The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the offshoot groups threatening Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China led to discussions among these countries about how to contain the problem posed by the government in Kabul. In June 2001, the governments of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in China to found the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).²⁸ The main reason for the formation of the SCO was to find a method to tackle the terrorism and drug trafficking associated, in their view, with the uncertainties in Afghanistan. The problem, they agreed, was the “three evils” of Islamism, separatism, and terrorism. The early Chinese response to the problems being posed in XUAR should be seen through this lens. But before the SCO could develop its own strategy, the events of 9/11 shifted the focus away from politics toward war. The United States by its action sidelined the SCO, subordinated the Central Asian states to its aims (taking over the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan and the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, for instance), and began to bomb Afghanistan. In September 2002, both the U.S. Treasury Department and the United Nations designated the ETIM as a terrorist organization.²⁹ Mahsum of ETIM was killed by Pakistani troops in 2003 near the Afghan border when they raided an al-Qaeda hideout. Much of the fighting capacity of ETIM was degraded, and many of its hardened fighters either went to prison (Memetrozi in China) or to Syria after 2011, where they regrouped in Idlib.³⁰

The attacks by ETIM and associated groups intensified in the years after 2002, despite the death of its founder and the repression in Turkey and in Central Asia. In 2007, Chinese security forces uncovered evidence of an ETIM training camp near Kashgar, raided it and killed eighteen suspected militants. The following year, at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Interpol warned that it had uncovered evidence of possible suicide bombings at the games. The Chinese state also announced it had foiled several plots (including in Kashgar, which did, however, see a grenade attack at a police post that same year that killed fourteen police officers). Over the next few years, a regular series of attacks took place, but each of them sporadic—2011 in Kashgar, 2012 in Yecheng (twenty-four killed), and 2013 in Beijing (five killed).

To explain what was happening in XUAR, the Chinese government released two substantial white papers—the first in 2003 and the second in 2009—both going over the history of the province and both detailing the attacks by ETIM and other groups. In the first decade of the 2000s, the general approach by the Chinese government was to treat this problem as one of a security issue and to deal with it through a law-and-order approach. By the end of the decade, it became clear that this was not sufficient, since the problem in Xinjiang was deeper and had to do with deficiencies in the Chinese development paradigm as well as in the policy of cultural integration. It was not enough to raid ETIM camps and arrest ETIM operatives. ETIM, it began to be understood, operated in a social and cultural context that partly welcomed its presence and resented that of distant Beijing. For instance, on July 5, 2009, a group of young Uyghurs in Ürümqi marched in protest against the killing of two Uyghur migrants in a southern Chinese factory after alleged sexual assaults on two women.³¹ It is unclear what happened, but a terrible conflict went on in Ürümqi and there were casualties of Han Chinese in the city. This kind of incident, which had also taken place in Tibet, alerted authorities that it was insufficient to simply see this as terrorism.³² There was a social problem that needed a much wider assessment and solution.

How to deal with that wider social and cultural dilemma, not only in Xinjiang but equally in Tibet and other western reaches of China, became an enduring issue.

Go West

In the late 1990s, during the last few years of General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s leadership, two problems began to be discussed in the upper levels of the Communist Party of China (CPC). First, the widened inequality between the coastal regions of China’s east and the inland regions that had not benefited from the Reform and Opening Up period was a concern. Second, ethnic unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang had been met by security measures, but this was not sufficient. A series of monk-led protests in Lhasa, Tibet, between September 1987 and March 1989 was shut down by martial law in 1989, while the ETIM and other groups faced counterterrorism tactics from the Chinese security state. In March 2000, the National People’s Congress announced the Great Western Development (Xibu Da Kaifa) that was to accelerate economic and political integration of the western regions, including Tibet and Xinjiang but also Yunnan, Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Guangxi. This policy was institutionalized in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), with funds set aside for infrastructural development. The CPC had evaluated the problem of unrest in places such as Tibet and Xinjiang and by 2000 had concluded that the problem was not to be seen merely as a security issue, but as one of economic development.

The amount of money invested in the western region between 2000 and 2017 is staggering: ¥6.85 trillion (or $1.04 trillion), most of it invested in Xinjiang, which is the area’s largest province. This capital went toward infrastructure and fixed-asset investment, building up the province through railways, airports, roads, industrialization, and mechanization of agriculture. XUAR gradually began to be integrated into the eastern province’s dynamism. According to the Xinjiang Statistical Bureau and the National Bureau of Statistics (Xinjiang Survey Team), household income data, and the 2025 white paper, in 2000 the per capita disposable income was ¥5,645 for urban residents and ¥1,618 for rural residents; by 2017, the per capita disposable income rose for urban residents to ¥30,775 and for rural residents to ¥11,045, growing to ¥42,820 and ¥19,427 by 2024, respectively. From 2012 to 2024, GDP in Xinjiang increased from ¥749.95 billion to over ¥2.05 trillion—exceeding ¥2 trillion for the first time. In terms of infrastructure, railway mileage doubled, reaching all prefectures and 80 percent of rural counties; civil air routes expanded to include twenty-five international destinations in seventeen countries; electric transmission lines were widely expanded; and all towns were connected to 5G and all villages with broadband. From the 1950s to 2024, the life expectancy of a person in Xinjiang grew from 30 years to 77 years.³³

In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the One Belt, One Road in a speech in Kazakhstan. The idea was to extend the new “Go West” policy, which integrated western China with the east and moved to build infrastructure that would go through Central Asia and West Asia to Europe. This would eventually become the Belt and Road Initiative, with Xinjiang as the “core area” (héxīn qū) of the entire project.³⁴ Xi linked “Go West” and the Belt and Road Initiative with two other important initiatives: a new ethnic policy and the poverty eradication campaign.

Regarding Belt and Road connectivity: since the eradication of extreme poverty in the region, Xinjiang has been positioned as the core of Eurasian connectivity, specifically through the Silk Road Economic Belt. As part of this integration, 19 ports and 119 bilateral transport routes have been established—over half of the national total of freight trains passing through Xinjiang in 2024—with Xinjiang becoming a key node in the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Among other important initiatives are the pilot free trade zone established in October 2023, the green belt built around Taklamakan Desert, the longest sand-blocking barrier in the world, and major boosts to tourism, reaching over 300 million tourist visits in 2024.³⁵

In terms of ethnic policy, after the Eighteenth CPC Congress in 2012, when Xi was elected as the General Secretary, he began to speak about the importance of national unity and integration of all peoples of China. At the Central Work Conference on Ethnic Affairs in September 2014, he gave a speech where he emphasized national identity rather than group-specific identity, but at the same time specified that he did not mean assimilation but only integration. Minorities must retain their culture, but at the same time they must be integrated into the Chinese Revolution. For the Communist Party, this meant more Han and minority cadres must mix and get to know each other. For the broader society, it meant more use of Mandarin for education alongside minority languages.

With the goal of poverty eradication in mind, Xi launched the Targeted Poverty Alleviation campaign in 2013. CPC cadre and government officials began to do baseline surveys and household registrations. Official surveys found that between 2.6 million and 3 million people—concentrated principally in the southern prefectures such as Aksu, Hotan, Kashgar, and Kizilsu—lived below China’s national poverty line. Between 2014 and 2020, the state deployed an intensive mix of fiscal transfers, infrastructure construction, household replacement, education subsidies, health care coverage, and employment-based poverty reduction. Since 2012, the central government has allocated more than ¥4 trillion in transfer payments to Xinjiang.³⁶ Over 70 percent of Xinjiang’s public spending has been directed to livelihood-related areas. Labor transfer and vocational training programs were key to this process, which is why there was large-scale rural relocation into newly built settlements with improved access to services. Since 2012, over 450,000 new urban jobs have been created each year, keeping registered urban unemployment under 4 percent. Xinjiang also participated in the “paired assistance” program, in which the eastern provinces invested hundreds of billions of yuan in the west. By 2020, the Chinese government declared that all registered poor households and counties in Xinjiang had been lifted out of extreme poverty, with most of this due to substantial increases in rural incomes and universal access to basic services (including broadband Internet and education for all children). Unlike earlier “Go West” strategies, which focused on macroeconomic growth, poverty alleviation operated at the household level and was explicitly linked to social stability, with development framed as a means of reducing perceived risks of unrest and extremism.³⁷

The most complex component of the entire process was the relocation schemes to bring dispersed villages into combined townships to better provide services and to draw workers to industrial parks and factories to ensure better incomes than what was available from hardscrabble rural farms. This scheme was a crucial part of the poverty eradication program across China and not just in the XUAR. It is never clear with this scale of development whether everyone finds themselves willing to relocate even if the living facilities and work opportunities are better. There will always be people who are disgruntled and resent the entire project. Millions of people received vocational training and experienced their pathway out of poverty through their own employment income. Whether this is experienced as repression or not is an important issue that the Chinese intellectuals and authorities do not seem to take lightly.³⁸ But it should be remembered that the scale of transformation is so vast that it is impossible to manage expectations and aspirations evenly.

The most important element in the whole debate arising over the attacks emanating from aspects of Islamism-secessionism-terrorism in Xinjiang was that Chinese authorities declined to go down the same path as Russia in its two wars in Chechnya from 1994 to 2009. Nor did China proceed along the lines of the U.S. “War on Terror” against Afghanistan and Iraq, with its entire panoply of “black sites” with torture and murder as routine (from Abu Ghraib in Iraq to Guantánamo in Cuba). According to Brown University’s Costs of War Project:

An estimated over 940,000 people were killed by direct post-9/11 war violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan between 2001–2023. Of these, more than 432,000 were civilians. The number of people wounded or ill as a result of the conflicts is far higher, as is the number of civilians who died “indirectly,” as a result of wars’ destruction of economies, healthcare systems, infrastructure and the environment. An estimated 3.6–3.8 million people died indirectly in post-9/11 war zones, bringing the total death toll to at least 4.5–4.7 million and counting.³⁹

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan told BBC in 2004 that the U.S. attack on Iraq was illegal, and yet there was no sanction at all on the U.S. government or on its war planners, and there was no use of the word genocide to describe any of these wars. The United States and its European allies insisted that any war death of civilians was merely “collateral damage” and the “consequences of warfare,” not a deliberate act of killing. When NATO was asked to confirm targeting information in Libya, its lawyer, Peter Olson, argued that “NATO incidents” do not violate the law and that any report state “that NATO did not deliberately target civilians and did not commit war crimes in Libya.” That was in 2012. Five years later, Zenz and Leibold began to document what Zenz was to soon call a genocide, not in Iraq (where over a million civilians have been killed) but in China (where Zenz does not allege any mass killing of civilians).

By 2017, when Zenz and Leibold published their two pieces at the Jamestown Foundation website, the Chinese government opened a region-wide system of Vocational Education and Training Centers. What do the reports by Zenz argue took place in these centers? Mandarin instruction, legal education, vocational training, and political training (which Zenz calls “indoctrination”). After a few main Western media outlets reported on these centers, the Chinese government acknowledged their existence and said that they were indeed for vocational training and for “counter-extremism through education”; the authorities denied that these were detention centers. By 2019, after a year or so of being operational, these institutions were downsized and converted into formal vocational education and schools (zhiye jiaoyu peixun) for employment skills training (jiuye jineng peixun) and industrial worker training (chanye gongren peixun). The courts in Xinjiang have sentenced several people to prison for different terms between 2014 and 2019 based on the evidence of their participation in these violent activities, but there is nothing at the level of the half a million political prisoners alleged by Radio Free Asia.

Documentation about the training centers in Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019, when they were operational, is contested. Chinese government sources have their own limitations, since they would—in the best of circumstances—be self-justifying. Reports by Western governments and foundations such as Jamestown are even more limited because they are designed to undermine the Chinese government and to inflame secessionist feeling within the border regions of China (whether it be Xinjiang or Tibet) and to malign the reputation of China globally (but particularly amongst the two billion Muslims around the world). Methods that use satellite imagery and leaked documents must be taken very carefully, since satellite imagery reveals infrastructure but not lived experience, and leaked documents are prone to be faked in this day and age of sophisticated hybrid war technologies. Testimonies by exiles are interesting but anecdotal and often heightened by the antimigrant and antirefugee policies in the West. (If a population can suggest that it is a victim of communism, it has a higher chance of attaining refugee status.)

There is no evidence of a policy of physical annihilation of the Uyghur peoples by the Chinese government, unlike say, direct evidence of extermination by the Israeli government against the occupied Palestinian people. There are no mass graves and no accusations of systematic killing—the hallmarks of a genocide. Even the worst description of the camps in Xinjiang shows them to be coercive but not exterminatory.

Of Mosques and Men

Early into the campaign against China, scholars such as Zenz began to accuse the government not of genocide per se, but of “cultural genocide”—namely, the crime of erasing the cultural world of a people.⁴⁰ Two accusations should be taken seriously: first, that there is a population decline amongst the Uyghurs and second, that there is an attack on mosques in China. According to the 2020 Chinese national census, the Uyghur population in Xinjiang grew from 10 million to 11.6 million, an increase of 1.6 million over the past decade. The data offered in the census show that the Uyghur population grew at 1.67 percent per year from 2000 to 2020, a growth rate double that of other ethnic minorities in China.⁴¹ With the poverty eradication program in full swing, it should be expected that this growth rate will not be maintained as families with higher incomes often choose not to have many children, and so it will be likely that the growth rate will decline. This is a normal process in human history known as the demographic transition. By 2020, poverty rates had fallen sharply in XUAR, Uyghur life expectancy has increased, and overall data on education and health has improved modestly but certainly improved. On the issue of attacks on mosques, there is very interesting data. According to the last official Chinese government source (the State Council white paper of 2016), there are 24,800 venues for religious activities in Xinjiang (and out of those, 24,400 mosques); this compares to fewer than 2,000 mosques in the 1980s. Leibold’s Strategic Policy Institute released a report in 2020 saying that 16,000 mosques had been damaged or destroyed, with only 15,500 still standing. This report was based largely on analysis of satellite imagery. Since the Australian report is largely without details, it is difficult to go mosque by mosque to verify its claims.

However, there is another interesting demographic detail that should be considered. There are 813,000 Muslims in Australia, and there are around 600 mosques in the country, which means that there is a mosque for 1,355 Australian Muslims.⁴² The Muslim population in XUAR is roughly 13 million (11.6 million Uyghurs), and, using 2020 data, with 24,400 mosques. This means that there is a mosque for every 533 Muslims, and, with the alleged reduction to 15,500, there is a mosque for every 839 Muslims.⁴³ In both cases, the density of mosques in China’s XUAR is greater than in Australia, and in Australia there have been a spate of attacks against mosques, as well as campaigns to prevent mosques being opened (the most famous being the Bendigo and Ballarat mosques in the state of Victoria). No report about these atrocities came from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. In the United States, in constrast, attacks against mosques and prevention of the building of mosques have become normal, with elected officials on the record with statements against Muslims and particularly against Islam in the United States. No report about these atrocities has come from the Jamestown Foundation.

Wang Hui, who teaches at Tsinghua University, has argued that ethnic governance in China since the Reform and Opening period of 1978 has undergone a process of “depoliticization,” in which ethnic relations have been recast as problems of administration, development, and security.⁴⁴ Political questions that involve historical difference, institutional pluralism, equality, and trust amongst peoples have been set aside. For Wang, ethnic relations cannot be reduced to technical problems — to poverty, insufficient integration, or extremism. Structural inequalities are obscured by this approach, which fails to see the political implications involved in ethnic relations: dialogue is necessary to build trust in a diverse country, and ethnic unity cannot be secured through technocratic management but only through recognition of cultural difference and substantive equality. This is a fundamental point, namely, that even though the development strategy has lifted millions of Chinese minority groups out of poverty, the lack of understanding and the lack of trust across populations must be dealt with politically. What this will come to mean in practice is not easy to imagine.

Xinjiang: A Report and Resource Compilation

History of Xinjiang Region — Xinjiang: A Report and Resource Compilation

Xinjiang: A Report and Resource Compilation

Article 2 of 10

Qiao Collective (桥)

Originally published at https://www.qiaocollective.com/education/xinjiang

Based on a handful of think tank reports and witness testimonies, Western governments have levied false allegations of genocide and slavery in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. A closer look makes clear that the politicization of China’s anti-terrorism policies in Xinjiang is another front of the U.S.-led hybrid war on China.

This resource compilation provides a starting point for critical inquiry into the historical context and international response to China’s policies in Xinjiang, providing a counter-perspective to misinformation that abounds in mainstream coverage of the autonomous region.

Table of Contents

Introduction and Summary

Timeline of Events

1989-2016

Formation of the World Uyghur Congress (1989-2006)

Violence and Unrest (2009-2016)

Chinese Anti-Terrorism Policy and Context (2012-2016)

2017-present

The Seeds of Controversy (2017-Aug 2018)

Entrenching the Narratives (Aug 2018-Jan 2020)

U.S. Politicization and Pandemic Fallout (Jan 2020-Jan 2021)

Declarations of Genocide and Pushback (Jan 2021-Present)

On the Nature of Unsubstantiated Allegations

Resources

Overview

Chinese Perspectives on the Problem of Terrorism

Geopolitical Context

Poverty Alleviation and Economic Development in Xinjiang

Overview of Chinese Minority/Religious Policies

The Misinformation Industrial Complex

Views from Xinjiang: People, Cultures, and History

Xinjiang Responds

Reference Pages

Attacks on Xinjiang

The Xinjiang Controversy at the United Nations

Xinjiang Responds

1. Introduction and Summary

In the mid-2010s, China launched far-reaching de-radicalization and economic development programs in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Before then, few casual Western observers were even aware of the province’s existence, which makes up 17% of China’s land and whose population consists of 65% ethnic minority peoples. Fewer still could speak to the autonomous region's complex political, cultural, and religious history as well as to its complex legacies as a crossroads between diverse peoples over many centuries.

However, since 2018, Western media and state officials have put Chinese government policy in Xinjiang under intense scrutiny, citing just a handful of think tank reports and witness testimonies to lodge charges of forced labor, slavery, and genocide.       

Having saturated Western media, these charges are difficult to systematically refute. The situation on the ground is complex, and there are limits to what we can know. While we recognize that there are aspects of PRC policy in Xinjiang to critique, these critiques should be debated and resolved on Chinese terms and in Chinese dialogues, and not be used as crude ammunition in the U.S.-led geopolitical assault on China. Based on the history of Western atrocity propaganda, its funding sources, and the poor quality of the ‘research’ being pushed, we are skeptical that the U.S.—having engaged in two decades of perpetual war in Muslim-majority nations—has any legitimate moral interest or grounds on which to defend Muslim religious rights in Xinjiang. 

Moreover, given the history of PRC ethnic and religious minority policy, and the reports from first-hand delegations to Xinjiang from countries and organizations including Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Thailand, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and even the World Bank, neither genocide nor slavery accurately describe the realities of Xinjiang. It is not a coincidence that these accusations have ramped up during a period of unprecedented Western antagonism towards China. Instead, these unfounded claims serve primarily to build consensus for conflict, intervention, and war with China. 

The effectiveness of Western propaganda lies in its ability to render unthinkable any critique or alternative—to monopolize the production of knowledge and truth itself. In this context, it is important to note that the U.S. and its allies are in the minority when it comes to its critiques of Chinese policy in Xinjiang. At two separate convenings of the UN Human Rights Council in 2019 and 2020, letters condemning Chinese conduct in Xinjiang were outvoted, 22-50 and 27-46. The 46th Human Rights Council Session in March 2021 saw no joint statements condemning Chinese policy in Xinjiang while a joint statement in support garnered the signatures of 64 countries, with more than 80 countries supporting the Chinese position. Many of those standing in support of Chinese policy in Xinjiang are Muslim-majority nations and/or nations that have waged campaigns against extremism on their own soil, including Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan, and Nigeria. On the issue of Xinjiang, the clear break in consensus between the Global South and the U.S. bloc suggests that Western critiques of Xinjiang are primarily politically motivated. 

These resources are preceded by a timeline that focuses on the events preceding China’s Xinjiang de-radicalization program, the international responses it provoked, and other relevant contexts.       

This resource list is intended only for initial inquiry into the immediate controversy over China’s de-radicalization program in Xinjiang. In the spirit of seeking truth from facts, this resource does not offer definitive answers, nor is it comprehensive in scope. It aims only to be a starting point for critical inquiry, and we urge readers to seek a diversity of sources and form their own opinions. A more complete and nuanced view requires further study into the region’s history, China’s policies towards ethnic and religious minorities, and ongoing geopolitical developments.

Note: There are several ways to spell “Uygur” in English, including “Uygur,” “Uighur” and “Uyghur.” “Uyghur” is perhaps the most common in international settings, although “Uygur” is the official romanization by the Chinese government. We will use “Uyghur” in accordance with the common spelling in Western dialogue, except when referring specifically to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

Similarly, the common Western spelling of “Kazakh” and “Kyrgyz” differs from the Chinese government’s official romanizations of “Kazak” and “Kirgiz.” We will similarly use the common Western spelling.

2. Timeline of Events

a. 1989-2016

From 1990-2016, China considered the terrorism problem to be particularly severe in Xinjiang. It is a period marked by immense difficulty and upheaval for China, unilateral U.S. military action throughout West Asia, and rapid Chinese economic growth.

i. Formation of the World Uyghur Congress (1989-2006)

1989 June 4 – The Tiananmen June 4th Incident, born of contradictions from market reform, inflamed by Gorbachev’s perestroika, and combined with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its fall on December 26, 1991, sparks a generational crisis in China. A wave of disillusioned students and upwardly-mobile young people leave China for the U.S. and other Western nations, with some receiving lavish attention and platforms as ‘dissidents’ who serve a strategic interest for U.S. ambitions vis-a-vis China.

Some of the most prominent Uyghur diaspora activist leaders today are as follows: Erkin Alptekin, Rushan Abbas, Dolkun Isa, Rebiya Kadeer, Omer Kanat, and Nury Turkel. Of these six, four arrived in the West on or after 1989 (Abbas 1989; Isa 1994; Turkel 1995; Kadeer 2005, as the cause célèbre of Turkel). Alptekin left around 1949 as part of the Guomindang’s defeat and Kanat left in 1971.  

1990 April 5 – Baren Township Riots, considered the first terrorist attack of a phase lasting till 2016 during which terrorism was considered a severe problem in Xinjiang. This is also the first attack China has attributed to the then East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), now Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) (ETIM/TIP). (see White Paper: The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang)

1996 November – The World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) is established in Germany, with Omer Kanat and Dolkun Isa playing important roles. Both of them still hold high positions (Chairman of the Executive Committee and President, respectively) in the WUYC’s successor organization, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). Kanat apparently left China in 1971 to Afghanistan, then to Turkey in 1979, before moving to the United States in 1999; Isa left China in 1994. Kanat has served as the Senior Editor of Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Service from 1999 to 2009.

1998 April – The Uyghur American Association (UAA) is founded. One of the people who played an important rule in its founding is Rushan Abbas, who would serve as Vice President for the UAA for two terms while also reporting for Radio Free Asia. Abbas arrived in the United States in 1989 and co-founded the United States’ first Uyghur association, the Uyghur Overseas Student and Scholars Association, in 1993.

Abbas would later serve the United States at Guantanamo as a linguist and a translator. This has caused some netizens to doubt her legitimacy to speak on human rights issues.

2001 June 15 – In the inaugural meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China identified the “three evils” (the Chinese term 三股势力 is more akin to the “three forces” or “three influences”) of extremism (极端主义), separatism (分裂主义), and terrorism (恐怖主义). It has since applied this framework to the terrorism problem in Xinjiang. (see The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism)

2001 September 11 – The 9/11 attacks claim the lives of 2,977 people (excluding the perpetrators). In response, the United States begins to wage the “War on Terror” and engaged itself in combat in at least 24 countries. This war has displaced anywhere between 37 to 59 million, according to a recent report (September 2020) from Brown University. This report also notes that 801,000 have died as a direct result from combat, but “indirect deaths” may reach up to 3.1 million after a war that has lasted almost two decades. 

2002 September 11 – The United Nations registers the ETIM/TIP as a terrorist organization at the request of the governments of Afghanistan, China, Kyrgyzstan, and the United States. The United States Department of State had previously designated the ETIM/TIP under E.O. 13224 prohibiting transactions with “Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism” on September 3rd, 2002, but would only formally designate the ETIM/TIP as a terrorist organization on April 29th, 2004, although this was never reflected on the Department of State’s website in 16 years.

2003 December 15 – China designates the ETIM/TIP, the WUYC, and two other organizations as terrorist organizations.

2004 April 16 – The WUC is founded in Munich, merging the East Turkestan National Congress and the WUYC. Its inaugural president is Erkin Alptekin, the son of Isa Yusuf Alptekin, a Guomindang affiliate who was virulently anti-communist (to the point that he largely opposed the Soviet-backed Second East Turkistan Republic) and violently opposed marriage between Hans and Uyghurs. Isa Alptekin remained active in Turkey after the Communist victory in China. 

Presumably around the same time, the Uyghur American Association founded the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) with a supporting grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The UHRP was co-founded by Nury Turkel, who arrived in the United States in 1995 and was appointed to be a commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom on May 26, 2020.

The NED has since boasted on May 29, 2020 that it “has awarded $8,758,300 to Uyghur groups since 2004, serving as the only institutional funder for Uyghur advocacy and human rights organizations.”

Erkin Alptekin himself is a longtime affiliate of the CIA, helping the CIA to build up “network of contacts with the Uighur separatist elements” in the 1970s and 1980s, and enjoying close relations with the 14th Dalai Lama. (see Raman, Bahukutumbi. “US & Terrorism in Xinjiang.” South Asia Analysis Group (Paper no. 499) (2002).)

Later, on September 14, 2004, the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile was founded and established in Washington, D.C.

2006 November 26 – Rebiya Kadeer is elected president of the WUC. Kadeer was sentenced to 8 years in prison for providing state information to foreign entities in 2000. This was after a career as a business owner, Vice-Chairwoman of the Xinjiang Federation of Industry and Commerce, Vice-Chairwoman of the Xinjiang Association of Women Entrepreneurs, and as a member of the 8th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. She was given leave on March 17th, 2005 to seek medical treatment in the United States on condition that she not engage in any subversive activities abroad.

ii. Violence and Unrest (2009-2016)

The extent of terrorist violence in China during this period is not well known in the West. There were many attacks between 1990 and 2016 and not all of the information is yet available. A compilation of publicly-known attacks has been collected here. Some high-profile attacks are as follows:

2009 July 5 – The Urumqi Riots, 197 killed, 1700 wounded. Chinese investigations allege that the riots were enflamed by foreign entities such as the WUC to undermine regional stability and unity. As an aside, due to Facebook’s failure to provide information to the Chinese government following the attacks, Western social media was banned from China.

2013 October 28 – Tiananmen Attack, 5 killed, 40 wounded. Usmen Hasan, along with his mother and wife, drives a jeep through a crowd at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square before setting the vehicle on fire. Authorities find “extremist religious content” and a jihadi flag in the remains of the vehicle.

2014 March 1 – Kunming Train Station Attack, 31 killed, 141 wounded. Eight attackers burst into the city’s rail station, stabbing people at random before police arrive at the scene. Officials identify the leader of the group as Abdurehim Kurban, and state that insignias and flags worn by the attackers point to political involvement as “East Turkestan” separatists. The international community, including U.S. State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki, joins China in denouncing the attack as an act of terrorism. 

2014 May 22 – Urumqi Attack, 39 killed and 94 injured as attackers drive two cars into a crowded marketplace and throw explosives towards surrounding buildings.

2014 July 30 – Assassination of Imam Juma Tahir at the Id Kah Mosque after morning prayers. Juma Tahir was the practicing imam of Id Kah, China’s largest mosque, as well as a deputy to the National People's Congress and vice president of the China Islamic Association. Juma Tahir had called for peace and stability amidst rising violence in the region. (see also)

iii. Chinese Anti-Terrorism Policy and International Context (2012-2016)

2012 October 30 – Chinese officials announce that since May 2012, ETIM/TIP has been participating in the Syrian Civil War, which had started in early 2011. (Later Anadolu Agency report from 2014)

2014 May 25 – The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region issues a notification on “Striking Hard Against Terrorist Activities Within the Confines of the Law,” indicating a turn of attention towards the problem of terrorism in Xinjiang.

For an example of news coverage on Xinjiang’s society after this notification but before the De-radicalization Regulations of 2017, see Daily Sabah, “Uighurs do not face harsh oppression, Anadolu Agency reporters claim.” Daily Sabah, July 8, 2015. (based off “Anadolu Ajansı Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'ne Gitti: Oruç Yasağı Bildirimi Yok.” Haberler, July 8, 2015 [Turkish language])

2015 – A “Turkish passport plot” (see Global Times report) is exposed in which Turkey provided false passports to Chinese nationals in third countries (usually Thailand & Malaysia) for passage to Turkey.

2015 January 1 – Shohrat Zakir, a CPC cadre of Uygur nationality, assumes his current position of Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. He additionally remains the Deputy Party Secretary of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, a position he has held since December 2014, and Secretary of the Party Group of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, a position he has held since December 2013. This is in culmination of a decades-long career serving the CPC and Xinjiang, including serving on the Party Standing Committee of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) from December 2005 to June 2011.

2015 May 29 – China receives a loan from the World Bank on the “Xinjiang Technical and Vocational Education and Training Project,” a five-year project lasting until April 30, 2020. It is the “fourth technical and vocational education and training project that the World Bank has supported in China since 2007.” This loan would be reviewed by the World Bank later on November 11, 2019. On March 31, 2019, it was reported that 113,880 students had enrolled in schools funded by this project, of which 40,413 were women and 65,015 were minorities.

2015 July – Thailand repatriates 109 Chinese nationals allegedly en route to Turkey to join terrorist groups in Syria. A few weeks later on August 17, 2015, terrorists detonated a bomb in Bangkok, claiming 20 lives. 2 Chinese nationals of the Uyghur nationality were charged. The prevailing theory is that it was in retaliation for the repatriation.

Mid-2015 – The ETIM/TIP becomes settled in Idlib Province, Syria, particularly in the city of Jisr al-Shughur, near the border with Turkey. The ETIM/TIP occupation of Jisr al-Shughur is marked by “changing demographics” (p. 15) and sectarian violence.

2015 October – France begins operating “de-radicalization programs.” It would seem these programs have since garnered mostly criticism from the public, but mainstream Western discourse has not accused France of cultural genocide.

While France’s de-radicalization program largely attracted controversy, programs like Denmark’s preceding France’s mostly went unnoticed, even being praised as a “groundbreaking de-radicalization program focused on providing opportunity to reintegrate versus punishment.”

A year later in October 2016, the United Kingdom began the “Desistance and Disengagement Programme” aimed at “address[ing] the root causes of terrorism, build resilience, and contribute towards the deradicalisation of individuals.”

New York Times reported on Kazakhstan’s de-radicalization program on August 10, 2019.

2015 December 27 – The 12th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passes the “Anti-Terrorism Law” (Chinese-language text), the first of its kind in the country.

2016 July 29 – The 12th Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region passes the “Xinjiang Implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Law,” adapting the Anti-Terrorism Law to Xinjiang’s regional context.

2016 – Chen Quanguo is appointed the Party Secretary of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the First Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (The First Commissar of XPCC is always held by the Party Secretary of Xinjiang). As his previous tenure from 2011 to 2016 was as the Party Secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region, Western NGOs cite Chen’s influence for alleged increase in human rights abuses in Xinjiang. A year later in 2017, Chen would be appointed a seat in the Politburo while retaining his two posts.

2016 December 23 – Adrian Zenz begins his career pivot to Xinjiang after a brief focus on Tibetan language and culture (and born-again Christian writings) with a Foreign Affairs article about Xinjiang’s police and surveillance apparatus.

b. 2017-Present

The waning of the severity of extremist violence in Xinjiang by 2017 coincided with elevated antagonisms in the U.S.-China relationship. The Trump Administration’s inaugural National Security Strategy document identified China as a strategic threat to U.S. power, setting the stage for ongoing trade, tech, and ideological attacks on China. During this time, the U.S. raised the issue of Xinjiang in international bodies and federal legislation as part of its efforts to isolate China on the world stage.

i. The Seeds of Controversy (2017-Aug 2018)

2017 March 6 – President Donald Trump signs Executive Order 13780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” or “Travel Ban 2.0,” superseding EO 13769 issued on January 27, 2017. It originally banned the entry of citizens from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—all Muslim-majority countries. This was all done quickly after President Trump assumed his post on January 20, 2017, after fervently advocating a “Muslim Ban” during his candidacy (see J. Sotomayor’s dissent in Trump v. Hawaii). 

2017 March 14 – Zenz joins the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief and continues his pivot to Xinjiang, initially focusing on the securitization of Xinjiang. (2017-3-14 Article, 2017-9-21 Article, 2018-3-12 Article) Interestingly, Adrian Zenz’s March 14th, 2017 article was considered a “fair assessment,” if biased, by Ian Goodrum, writer and digital editor for China Daily, indicating that there may have been a time Adrian Zenz did not feel as clearly “led by God” on a mission against China, as he indicated on May 21, 2019.

2017 March 29 – The 12th Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region passes the “Xinjiang De-radicalization Regulations” (Chinese-language text). Contemporary mainstream media’s focused criticisms on the “ban on long beards, veils” (Al-Jazeera) articulated in Article 9 of the original Regulations and not on Article 14, which outlined education and psychological counseling as part of de-radicalization work. 

See Cui, Jia & Gao, Bo, “Islamic institutes step up training to fight extremism.” Xinhua. March 30, 2015, for an earlier instance of education as de-radicalization work.

2017 May 11 – Syrian ambassador tells China that up to 5000 ethnic Uyghurs were fighting in various militant groups in Syria.

2017 June 1 – China releases the white paper “Human Rights in Xinjiang - Development and Progress.”

2017 August 1 – WUC begins activism and writing on “internment camps,” citing April and May as the first months of detainment of Uyghur citizens. Sporadic reporting include: 

September 10, 2017 Human Rights Watch report alleging “thousands” of detainees. Interestingly, Human Rights Watch reported that “State media in Xinjiang, including the Xinjiang Daily, have reported on these facilities,” which would seem to contradict Reuters’ later 2018 headline that the facilities were “secret.” 

January 22, 2018 Radio Free Asia report claims “around 120,000” detainees based on information provided by an anonymous source from Chasa Township (possibly 恰萨美其特乡)

February 28, 2018 Foreign Policy article by a “Special Correspondent” on “A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag.”

March 13, 2018 Newsweek Japan article (Japanese-language) by Naoko Mizutani (Japanese researcher previously barred from China for her support of Rebiya Kadeer) reporting “890,000 or more” detainees based on an unverified “leak” by Istiqlal TV (Uyghur-language, “leaked information” at 3:14), a Turkey-based media platform advocating for separatism from China. Also runs the English-language Turkistan Times.

As an aside, Rebiya Kadeer has also previously visited the Yasukuni Shrine on May 14th, 2012. The Yasukuni Shrine honors, among others, 1068 war criminals, including 14 Class A war criminals, as ruled by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

2017 September – Presumably around this time, Rushan Abbas founds the Campaign for Uyghurs.

On November 12, 2017, Dolkun Isa takes Rebiya Kadeer’s place as President of the World Uyghur Congress. Although Kadeer said, “It is time for the younger generation to take up the leadership role at the WUC,” Isa seems to have been involved in diaspora Uyghur organizations longer than she has, at least overtly (since at least 1996 for Isa and since at least 2005 for Kadeer). 

Similarly, Omer Kanat sometime in 2017 took up both the Chairman of the World Uyghur Congress Executive Committee and Director of the Uyghur Human Rights Project.

2018 April 26 – Mike Pompeo, former Director of the CIA and notoriously proud of lying, cheating, and stealing, assumes office as Secretary of State, heralding a new era of rapidly deteriorating U.S.-China relations.

Prior to assuming the post of the United States’ foremost diplomat, Pompeo had a long and distinguished history of being a relentless Islamophobe. Among other instances, he declared that “silence [in condemning the 2013 Boston bombings] has made these Islamic leaders across America potentially complicit.”

2018 May 15 – Zenz starts to fix his eyes on Xinjiang’s de-radicalization program and criticizes education as de-radicalization work authorized by Article 14 of the Xinjiang De-radicalization Regulations. Between “several hundred thousand and just over one million” detainees are “estimate[d]” from “information from various sources...”, citing specifically Naoko Mizutani’s Newsweek Japan article.

2018 May 29 – The United States Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom releases the 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom. Its report on China raises concerns that “human rights groups and others reported hundreds of thousands of Uighur Muslims… forcibly sent to re-education camps...”

2018 August 3 – Chinese Human Rights Defenders publishes a report “China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs & Other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re-education Programs.” This is the report taking eight anonymous interviewees and extrapolating 1 million incarcerated (or even up to 3 million) from their unverified statements.

ii. Entrenching the Narratives (Aug 2018-Jan 2020)

2018 August 10 – Meeting of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. It is here that Gay McDougall alleged concentration camps, forcing the controversy over the de-radicalization program in general, and the vocational centers in particular, into wide public discourse for the first time. (press release, 2018-8-13)

Reuters on the same day erroneously reported it as “U.N. says it has credible reports that China holds million Uighurs in secret camps.” Most news outlets failed to clarify that the UN CERD—let alone a sole committee member thereof—cannot speak for the UN; Gay McDougall said she had credible reports but failed to cite them.

Grayzone rebuttal by Ben Norton & Ajit Singh

The Press release actually reads: “Committee Experts, in the dialogue that followed, congratulated China for creating extraordinary prosperity and lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, including in the eight multi-ethnic provinces and regions, but remain concerned over the growing inequality, particularly for ethnic minorities who continued to disproportionately experience poverty… A great source of concern was racial discrimination in the context of laws fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism, particularly against Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic minorities.” (As it turns out, Gay McDougall was both the only American at the meeting and the only person at the meeting to bring up "internment camps")

2018 August 20 – While being interviewed by Max Blumenthal from the Grayzone, Omer Kanat admits that the “one million” figure was from “Western media estimates.” 

2018 September 6 – Adrian Zenz publishes “Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude: China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang” in the Central Asian Survey, a peer-reviewed article version of Zenz’s May 15, 2018 report. In it, Zenz clarifies the sources for his estimate of “approx. 1,060,000”: Naoko Mizutani's Newsweek Japan article and Radio Free Asia.

2018 October 9 – The 13th Standing Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region People’s Congress amends the “Xinjiang De-radicalization Regulations” (amended Chinese text here) to expressly outline vocational education as a central strategy for de-radicalization work (Global Times report, SCMP report) (Relevant changes: Article 14 amended; Articles 17, 21, 33 added).

It is important to note that vocational education is not unique to Xinjiang. For instance, the Ministry of Education reported in 2015 that 7.25 million adult students were undergoing non-academic degree higher education, while the Ministry reported in 2018 that 11.3 million students were registered in vocational colleges. The white paper “Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang” provides further that from 2014 to 2019 “Xinjiang provided training sessions [vocational education] to an average of 1.29 million urban and rural workers [annually], of which 451,400 were in southern Xinjiang.” This 1.29 million figure here is for all vocational education, not just persons who undergo vocational education as a part of the de-radicalization program.

2018 November 1 – The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) publishes “Mapping Xinjiang’s ‘re-education’ camps,” a report analyzing satellite imagery. Mainly, ASPI analyzes “28 facilities,” but alleges 181 (Agence France-Presse) or “as many as 1,200” (Adrian Zenz) such facilities, although an examination of their cited sources reveals no evidentiary basis for such allegations. (Note: ASPI is primarily funded by the Australian government and maintains strong funding relationships with weapons manufacturers such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin)

2018 November 15 – China releases the white paper “Cultural Protection and Development in Xinjiang.”

2018 December 19 – Relying on ASPI personnel and witnesses, AP condemns Hetian Taida Apparel for using “forced labor” due to its public association with a vocational training program, which AP insinuated were “concentration camps.” The Hetian Taida Apparel ordeal is the birth of the “forced labor” allegations in the current controversy. 

2018 December 28-30 – Diplomats from 12 countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Thailand, and Kuwait) visit Xinjiang. Pakistani diplomat Mumtaz Zahra Baloch reported that the delegation was given full and open access to three vocational centers and that she “did not find any instance of forced labor or cultural and religious repression” during her tours of the region.

2019 January 6 – Reuters visit Xinjiang.

2019 January 9-16 – A media group of 12 representatives from 6 countries (Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) visit Xinjiang.

2019 January 22 – The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation announces its one-week-long visit to China. This is presumably the visit on which the later OIC resolution is based.

2019 January 25-31 – A media delegation from Egypt visits Xinjiang.

2019 January 29 – A European Union delegation visits Xinjiang.

2019 February 16-19 – Senior diplomats from the permanent missions of eight countries to the United Nations Office at Geneva visit Xinjiang.

2019 February 22-27 – A group of 11 journalists from Indonesia and Malaysia, as part of the ASEAN Elites China Tour 2019, visit Xinjiang.

2019 February 25-27 – Around 200 representatives of 50 political parties from nearly 30 countries visit Urumqi Xinjiang for a meeting aimed at showcasing China’s ethnic policy in Xinjiang.

2019 February 28-March 2 – Diplomats from Myanmar, Algeria, Morocco, Vietnam, Hungary, Greece, Singapore and the mission of the League of Arab States visit Xinjiang.

2019 March 1-2 – 46th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Resolutions on Muslim Communities and Muslim Minorities in the Non-OIC Member States (OIC/CFM-46/2019/MM/RES/FINAL), ¶20 of Resolution No.1/46-MM [pg.5] (“... commends the efforts of the People’s Republic of China in providing care to its Muslim citizens...”).

2019 March 18 – China releases the white paper “The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang.” A transfer employment program for 100,000 people was mentioned and would presumably be the object of consternation in the ASPI report of March 2020 alleging slavery.

CGTN summary with some infographics

2019 March 25 – The European Union rejects China’s offer of Xinjiang tour, but says it is open to one later. The EU would sit on its rain check for 539 days before once again demanding “independent” investigations into Xinjiang on September 14, 2020, despite the nearly 1,000 personnel from diplomatic, media, and academic circles who were invited to visit Xinjiang in 2019. 

2019 March 27-29 – Milan Bacevic, Serbian Ambassador to China, and Selim Belortaja, Albanian Ambassador to China, visit Xinjiang.

2019 May 7 – NPR releases its report on its visit to a vocational center.

2019 May 10 – Val Thompson, founder and publisher of International Focus Magazine - Houston, writes on his experiences visiting Xinjiang. He states that in his group of media visitors were journalists from “Afghanistan, Egypt, Belgium, Bangladesh, Belarus, Jordan, Japan, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, India, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, UAE, USA, Switzerland, and a Geneva Delegation.”

2019 June 15 – Under Secretary-General of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office Vladimir Voronkov visits Xinjiang and reaches a “broad consensus” with China on the issue of counter-terrorism.

2019 June 18 – BBC’s visit to a vocational center.

See also Sun, Feiyang, “Breaking down the BBC's visit to Hotan, Xinjiang.” Medium. July 18, 2019.

2019 June 18-21 – Diplomats from 14 countries (including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Laos, Malaysia, Nigeria, Serbia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Togo) and a representative from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation based in Geneva visit Xinjiang.

2019 July 8, 12 – 41st Session of the Human Rights Council. Two joint letters took opposing views of China’s conduct in Xinjiang. For a summary of discussion of Xinjiang in United Nations fora, see our summary.

A/HRC/41/G/11 [criticizing] - Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom [22]

A/HRC/41/G/17 [supporting] - Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of), Kuwait, Laos, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe [50]

2019 July 12 – Adrian Zenz pushes the “forced labor” angle with his paper, “Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” which would not get peer-reviewed until its publication in the Journal of Political Risk (a journal with a long history of involvement with U.S. military and intelligence) on December 10, 2019. Zenz relies on scaremongering about China’s poverty alleviation programs and pair assistance programs (whereby a richer province gives monetary and other material aid to poorer provinces, manifesting in factories or educational support) to draw foregone conclusions of forced labor. One such poverty alleviation workshop mentioned in Zenz’s report can be seen in this vlogger’s video.

2019 July 14-22 – Journalists from 24 countries including India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, and Uzbekistan visit Xinjiang.

One of the journalists on this trip was Tunç Akkoç, General Manager of Turkey’s Aydınlık Daily (newspaper of Turkey’s Vatan Partisi). His report published on Xinhua is as follows. (2019-8-11)

Aydınlık Daily and Vatan Partisi have since rebuked the United States’ position in the controversy (Aydınlık 2020-2-21, Vatan Partisi’s statement reported in Aydınlık 2020-9-10 [Turkish language]).

2019 July 21 – China releases the white paper “Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang.”

2019 August 17 – China releases the white paper “Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang” (this is the white paper that states that “No terrorist incidents have occurred in Xinjiang for nearly three years since the education and training started.”). 

2019 August 17-23 – A media group from 16 countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates visit Xinjiang.

2019 August 19-21 – Diplomats from Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bahrain and Nigeria visit Xinjiang.

2019 August 28-September 1 – Diplomats from Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe visit Xinjiang.

2019 August 29 – ABC’s visit to the vocational centers.

2019 September 9-12 – Diplomats from 16 African countries (including Burundi, Djibouti, Uganda, Lesotho, Sudan and Zimbabwe) and the African Union visit Xinjiang.

2019 October 17 – Amy K. Lehr & Mariefaye Bechrakis from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) publish “Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains.” Noticeably, in the interceding 10 months since the Hetian Taida Apparel report, the researchers do not have another “‘smoking gun’ for forced labor in Xinjiang,” and are left with witness testimonies and Zenzian logic that vocational training and rural poverty alleviation carries “a significant risk that in many cases the detainees and rural poor are not participating by choice,” without anything to back up that assertion.

Global Times 10/25 rebuttal

2019 October 29 – 74th Session of the General Assembly, Third Committee (A/C.3/74/SR.37). For a summary of discussion of Xinjiang in United Nations fora, see our summary.

Total 24 countries and the European Union criticized China’s position on Xinjiang

¶41 - United Kingdom joint statement on behalf of itself, Albania, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United States

Criticized in individual capacity: European Union (¶58), Turkey (¶45)

Total 57 countries supported China’s position on Xinjiang

¶40 - Belarus joint statement on behalf of itself, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of), Laos, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Togo, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Supported in individual capacity: Ethiopia (¶72), Kyrgyzstan (¶59), Saudi Arabia (¶75 - note: qualified support)

2019 November – Sometime in November, Former Deputy Speaker of the Indonesian House of Representatives Fahri Hamzah led a delegation to visit Xinjiang.

2019 November 11 – World Bank releases a statement regarding its visit to Xinjiang concerning the vocational centers, finding no aberrations.

2019 November 16 – New York Times publishes a story about “leaked documents” concerning Xinjiang. These documents had strange grammatical errors and have been disavowed as false.

2019 December 5 – CGTN releases two specials about terrorism in Xinjiang, with footage never released to the public before, including footage of the above-mentioned attacks. They were made available to YouTube on December 11th. 

2019 December 9 – Xinhua reports that students “participating in education and training programs of standard spoken and written Chinese, understanding of the law, vocational skills and deradicalization at vocational education and training centers” have all graduated.

By the end of 2019 – 

Nearly 1,000 personnel from diplomatic, media, and academic circles were invited to visit Xinjiang in 2019. 

Xinjiang received more than 200 million tourists in 2019, up 41.6% from 2018’s 150 million.

From 2014 to 2019, nearly 2,923,200 residents of Xinjiang constituting 737,000 households were lifted out of poverty, dropping the poverty rate from 2013’s 19.4% to 1.24%. (original Chinese editorial, English summary) 645,000 were lifted out of poverty in 2019 alone. Xinjiang must still lift another 165,000 people out of poverty to meet China’s 2020 goals for poverty alleviation. (see CGTN report)

iii. U.S. Politicization and Pandemic Fallout (Jan 2020-Jan 2021)

2020 January 23 – Having confirmed human-to-human transmission of COVID-19 in tandem with the World Health Organization, China locks down Wuhan City and later the entire Hubei Province. While still pushing the Xinjiang issue, Western media became fixated on the pandemic response, seizing on human suffering to push a political and often racist agenda.

2020 February – Adrian Zenz publishes a report about the “Karakax List” in the Journal of Political Risk, supposedly a leaked document from 2017 provided by the Uyghur Human Rights Project proving collection of information about 3,000 Uyghurs and detention of 311 of them in Karakax (Moyu) County.

Global Times’ 2/18, 2/20, and 2/23 rebuttals.

2020 March 1 – ASPI publishes “Uyghurs for sale,” a report alleging forced labor (and, notably, “slavery”) of Uyghur people around China. This seems to be scrutinizing the transfer employment program from an earlier Chinese white paper. It also builds on the material previously pushed by Adrian Zenz and CSIS. 

2020 March 26 Grayzone rebuttal by Ajit Singh. Global Times 3/1, 3/16 rebuttals.

2020 April 4 – China holds a national mourning ceremony for the victims and first responders of COVID-19. China’s ability to contain COVID comes in sharp contrast to the United States, which declared a state of emergency on March 13th and has since watched its situation worsen significantly. The United States accelerates escalation of tensions with China.

2020 June 17 – President Trump signs the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act into law, ending a process started after it was first passed as a bill by the Senate on September 11, 2019.

2020 June 18 – CGTN releases another special about terrorism in Xinjiang, Tianshan: Still Standing. 

2020 June 29 – Adrian Zenz publishes a report alleging mass sterilization of Uyghur people through the Jamestown Foundation. This report has a blatant mathematical error. 

Global Times rebuttal (2020-7-3), Global Times infographic (2020-9-7), Rebuttal by Dr. Lin Fangfei of Xinjiang University (2020-9-14) (CGTN summary)), Rebuttal by the Southwest University of Political Science & Law (summary) (2020-9-16)

2020 July – 44th UN Human Rights Council meeting, in which two joint statements took opposing sides as to China's conduct in Xinjiang. For a summary of discussion of Xinjiang in United Nations fora, see our summary.

[criticizing] (2020-6-30) – United Kingdom on behalf of itself, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland [27]

[supporting] (2020-7-1) – Belarus on behalf of itself, Bahrain, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of), Laos, Lesotho, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Togo, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe [46]

The criticizing statement also attacked China’s sovereignty on Hong Kong, leading to a same-day joint statement on Hong Kong made by Cuba on behalf of 53 countries.

2020 July 6 – The Washington Post editorial board publishes the opinion piece, “What’s happening in Xinjiang is genocide,” marking the rapid escalation of allegations. The opinion references “new evidence” of forced sterilizations, but cites only Adrian Zenz’s June 2020 report for the Jamestown Foundation and an Associated Press “investigative report” which similarly relies on Zenz’s research.

2020 July 16 – An Urumqi resident is found to be an asymptomatic carrier of COVID-19 (Chinese source), leading to an identified COVID-19 cluster in Urumqi, Xinjiang, which had until then seen minimal cases since January 25. However, China’s efforts to combat COVID in Xinjiang go largely unreported.

As an aside, photos from February 19, 2020 show doctors, police, and border guards on horseback on snowy Kurte (Ku’erte) Plains (near the border with Mongolia), Fuyun County, Altay Prefecture, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Business Insider and People’s Daily Wechat Post). This demonstrates the extent of China’s COVID response, as officials made sure every person was provided for, in this case agro-pastoral citizens in border regions. 

2020 July 24 – In response to the United States ordering the Chinese Consulate in Houston to close, China ordered the United States Consulate in Chengdu to close. Radio Free Asia among others speculated that this would stymie United States intelligence gathering on Xinjiang.

2020 July 30 – Amy K. Lehr of CSIS publishes a brief “Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Toward a Shared Agenda.” Particularly noticeable about this brief is its emphasis on the XPCC, with assertions cited backed up by sources from Radio Free Asia, Uyghur Human Rights Project, and Citizen Power Initiatives for China (an otherwise opaque organization based in Brookline, Massachusetts founded by Yang Jianli, a self-described “Tiananmen survivor”). Footnote 33 cites Bao Yajun’s article on the XPCC but misrepresents the source, which does not mention labor camps as Lehr asserts.

2020 July 31 – The United States imposes Global Magnitsky sanctions on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps over accusations that it is connected to human rights abuses against minorities in Xinjiang. The sanctions include Chen Quanguo, the first Politburo member to be sanctioned by the United States. 

2020 July 30 and August 7 – Coda Story—a self-described counterweight to Russian and Chinese “disinformation” funded by the U.S. and EU—runs two pieces seeking to undermine The Grayzone, Jerry Grey, and Carl Zha, some of the few Western sources to contradict the mainstream media narrative on Xinjiang. 

The Grayzone’s rebuttal by Ben Norton (8/18).

2020 August 15-16 – Carl Zha and Daniel Dumbrill both release interviews held with Arslan Hidayat, an activist noted for spreading many lies about Xinjiang by faking captions and taking Douyin and other videos out of context on social media (see this Twitter thread, which also exposes similar lies made by CJ Werlemen, who would shortly afterwards write an article alleging 9 million incarcerated in Xinjiang). Among other happenings, Hidayat admits to putting fake captions on videos he posts as well as to having no hard evidence for his claims, instead relying on mainstream media and “scholars” like Adrian Zenz. Hidayat also displays a seeming ignorance of the general contours of Xinjiang history and its people.

2020 August 17 – Radio Free Asia reports that Xinjiang hospital kills babies, relying on witnesses and Adrian Zenz’s mathematically suspect June 29 report.

2020 August 24 – CJ Werlemen at Byline Times reports “evidence that up to nine million Uyghurs are unaccounted for and allegations Chinese authorities plan to kill, incarcerate or convert the whole population.” His only source is Dr. Erkin Sidick, President of the Uyghur Projects Foundation and senior advisor to the World Uyghur Congress, who left China in the late 1980s and whose own sources are ever reliable anonymous Chinese government sources. The report also cites Zenz's mathematically suspect June 29, 2020 report and the NYT’s November 16, 2019 grammatically wanting “leaks” to back up Dr. Sidick’s otherwise baseless allegations. Near the end of the article, Dr. Sidick decides to liberally tamper with the statistics to prove his own foregone conclusions.

2020 August 25 – CGTN releases a documentary collecting the experiences of students of the vocational centers, Lies and truth: Vocational education and training in Xinjiang.

2020 August 27 – Buzzfeed, backed by ASPI and Open Technology Fund (part of the U.S. Agency for Global Media, which runs Radio Free Asia, and a key supporter of 2019 Hong Kong riots) among others, pushes a two-part report relying satellite imagery, blanked-out images on Baidu Maps which are otherwise common occurrences, and witness testimony to further the Western narrative on Xinjiang. One such “camp” is in actuality an apartment complex with a five-star rating.

2020 September 2 – After about a month and a half, the COVID-19 cluster in Xinjiang is contained and Urumqi’s lockdown is lifted.

2020 September 9 – The U.S. State Department creates a new page just for propagandizing “CCP”’s atrocities in Xinjiang, in addition to releasing a short condemnatory video. Neither add anything new. The webpage relies on “recent, documented evidence” for “forced population control,” presumably Adrian Zenz’s mathematically suspect June 29 report; “NGO estimates and media reports” for “forced labor,” presumably ASPI’s and CSIS’ scare pieces; and unsubstantiated nonsense such as “CCP target[ing]... Uyghur language and Uyghur music.”

2020 September 14 – The United States restricts cotton and apparel imports from Xinjiang, citing “forced labor.” Both cotton and apparel industries are important to poverty alleviation and economic development in Xinjiang.

2020 September 15 – China agrees to and will arrange for European Union diplomats in China to visit Xinjiang.

2020 September 17 – China releases the white paper “Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang.” Some actors have twisted the white paper’s statistics (“Every year from 2014 to 2019 Xinjiang provided training sessions to an average of 1.29 million urban and rural workers, of which 451,400 were in southern Xinjiang”) to allege that China admitted to interning “8 million” into camps (presumably 1.29 x 6 = 7.74 for the headlining “8 million”). It bears repeating that this figure includes normal vocational education as well as those educated in institutions funded by the 2015 World Bank project. To date, the Chinese government has not released a figure on the number of people who have undergone vocational education as part of its de-radicalization program.

The relevant statistics in the original Chinese reads as follow: 据统计，2014年至2019年，全疆年均培训城乡各类劳动者128.8万人次，其中，南疆地区年均培训45.14万人次。

2020 September 22 – The U.S. Congress passes the “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,” authorizing sanctions on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and any other Xinjiang entity as determined by the discretion of the Department of Commerce. It expressly targets China’s poverty alleviation and pair-assistance programs designed to develop Xinjiang and bring residents out of absolute poverty. For more about the genocidal impact of U.S. sanctions as a form of economic warfare primarily targeting civilians, see Robin Davis, Onyesonwu Chatoyer, & Nancy Wright, “Sanctions Kill: The Devastating Human Cost of Sanctions,” Hood Communist (blog), March 26, 2020.

2020 September 23 – ASPI launches a “Xinjiang Data Project” (reportedly mapping “380 sites of suspected re-education camps, detention centres and prisons that have been built or expanded since 2017”) with an accompanying report on “Cultural erasure.” The former in particular has been heavily criticized online for designating common schools and offices as concentration camps and listing the renovated Keriya Aitika Mosque as demolished.

2020 October 6 - 75th Session of the General Assembly, Third Committee, General Debate (Official Summary Records of the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Meetings (SR.3, 5, and 6 respectively). For a summary of discussion of Xinjiang in United Nations fora, see our summary.

Total 39 countries on a joint statement delivered by Germany criticizing China on Xinjiang and Hong Kong on behalf of itself and Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (SR.3 ¶11)

Total 45 countries on a joint statement delivered by Cuba supporting China on Xinjiang (SR.3 ¶15) (see release by the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations)

Angola, Bahrain, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of), Laos, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Total 54 countries on a joint statement delivered by Pakistan supporting China on Hong Kong (SR.3 ¶14) (see release by the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “nearly 70 countries backed China at the General Debate of the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly” “on its stance and policies on Hong Kong and Xinjiang-related issues.” The final count appears to be 67 countries.

“Kuwait made a joint statement on behalf of three Gulf states [Oman and Qatar], opposing politicization of human rights issues and interference in others’ internal affairs with the pretext of human rights.” (SR.3 ¶16) (see release by the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic to the United Nations)

Singapore separately opposed the politicization of human rights, and the “practice of some Member States of issuing joint statements to target the policies of other countries and interfere in their internal affairs.” (SR.3 ¶32)

South Africa (SR.3 ¶25), Ethiopia (SR.3 ¶57), Chad (SR.5 ¶29), the Maldives (SR.5 ¶104), Papua New Guinea (SR.6 ¶36), Kyrgyzstan (SR.6 ¶43), and Tajikistan (SR.6 ¶118) separately criticized the politicization of human rights against China and called for respect of China’s sovereignty in human rights discussions.

Burkina Faso (SR.6 ¶29) separately supported China’s policies in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

2020 October 19-22 - Diplomatic envoys posted in China from 20 Arab states and the Arab League visit Xinjiang.

2020 October 24 - A resident of Shufu (Konaxahar) County, Kashgar Prefecture is found to be an asymptomatic carrier of COVID-19, leading to an identified cluster in Kashgar Prefecture. The prefecture was locked down, and by October 27th (3 days afterwards), the prefecture’s entire population of 4.74 million residents had been tested. Western news media coverage is muted, similar to its treatment of the Urumqi cluster. According to 2019 data from the Statistic Bureau of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 92.6% of the prefecture’s population is Uyghur, and another 1.4% is of a minority nationality other than Uyghur, for a total of 94% of Kashgar Prefecture’s population belonging to minority nationalities.

2020 November 3 - The Islamic Association of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region issues a “Report on Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang” via Tianshan Net.

2020 November 5 - Secretary Pompeo quietly revokes the designation of the ETIM/TIP as a terrorist organization on October 20th, 2020. The announcement was published on November 5th, 2020 and with little attention.

2020 November 14 - Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region announces the end of absolute poverty, delisting the last 10 counties from the list of impoverished counties by official standards (for individuals, stable income, safe housing, and access to education, clean water, and health care). The 10 counties were Yarkant (Shache), Kargilik (Yecheng), Payzawat (Jiashi), Yengisar (Yingjisha), Karakax (Moyu), Guma (Pishan), Lop (Luopu), Qira (Cele), Keriya (Yutian), and Akto (Aketao) counties. (official release).

2020 November 20 - Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region reports no new COVID cases. The Kashgar COVID outbreak is defeated in a month.

2020 December 14 - The International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor announces in response to a communication sent to the ICC on July 6th, 2020 by the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile that it will not proceed to investigate China for alleged genocide and crimes against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. While the Office of the Prosecutor declined to make any findings on “genocide, crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty, torture, enforced sterilisation and other inhumane acts”, due to lack of jurisdiction, it remarked that alleged crimes of “forcible transfer or deportation” of persons from Tajikistan and Cambodia to China were not substantiated enough to warrant an investigation (see report, pp. 18-20).

2021 January 8 - The United States via the Solar Energy Industries Association targets Xinjiang’s solar energy sector, using the pretext of unproven forced labor to force supply chains away from Xinjiang. Xinjiang is a world leader in the solar energy industry and the sector is an engine for poverty alleviation. Western media is quick to legitimize this decoupling and virtual sanctioning, which threatens to isolate and impoverish Xinjiang’s people.

2021 January 12 - The United Kingdom announces actions intended to isolate and impoverish Xinjiang in the name of human rights.

2021 January 13 - In the United States’ continued effort to impoverish Xinjiang, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol announces it will “detain cotton products and tomato products produced in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” citing “forced labor.” Acting DHS Deputy Secretary Ken Cuccinelli stated that “DHS will not tolerate forced labor of any kind in U.S. supply chains,” an ironic statement from a government readily tolerating exploitative prison labor.

iv. Declarations of Genocide and Pushback (Jan 2021-Present)

2021 January 19 - On the last day of the Trump administration, Secretary of State Pompeo labels China’s de-radicalization and economic development programs in Xinjiang as “genocide” and “crimes against humanity,” seemingly unaware of China’s extensive pandemic relief efforts serving the very people of Xinjiang supposedly facing “genocide” as opposed to the United States’ mass death disproportionately burdening indigenous and people of color brought about by negligent policies.

Biden’s Secretary of State pick Tony Blinken concurred with Pompeo’s assessment during his confirmation hearing, dispelling any doubts as to the continuing imperialist ambitions and Balkanization fantasies the United States still possesses vis-a-vis China.

Pompeo’s allegations inspire many people of Xinjiang to submit written and video responses rebuking Pompeo’s accusations.

2021 January 26 - Mainichi reports that a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan reported to a meeting of the foreign affairs division of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party that it did not agree the situation in Xinjiang constituted “genocide”. In response to a member of LDP calling the assessment “weak”, the official asserted that “Retrogressive ‘criticisms’ of human rights are not effective. It is more proper to cooperate with the relevant countries.” This is a surprising break from the United States line on the part of Japan, which has been otherwise a consistent critic of China’s Xinjiang policies and an eager participant in the U.S. “QUAD”. (See Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s response)

2021 February 3 - China's Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva and the Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region jointly held a webinar concerning Xinjiang. Diplomats from 50 countries as well as officials from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN human rights experts participated.

2021 February 19 - Foreign Policy reports that the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Legal Advisor finds insufficient evidence to sustain a charge of genocide against China in its policies in Xinjiang. It however maintains “crimes against humanity”. This report awaits official corroboration and correspondence. If the Office of the Legal Advisor did indeed held such, its advice was ignored on March 30 with the publication of the State Department’s 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

2021 February 22 - The United Kingdom demands “urgent and unfettered” access to Xinjiang on the opening day of the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council despite BBC’s previous free access to Xinjiang.

On the same day, Canada’s House of Commons, led by the opposition Conservative Party, voted 266-0 to label China’s policies in Xinjiang as genocide, although Prime Minister Trudeau and his Cabinet abstained from the vote.

2021 February 22 - The International Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and the CPC Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional Committee co-hosted the virtual event "Stories of CPC" Thematic Briefing on Xinjiang in Urumqi. A total of over 310 leaders and prominent personages representing more than 190 political parties and organizations from 80 plus countries, among which over 100 are from Islamic countries, attended the event.

2021 February 25 - The Dutch parliament, led by a lawmaker from the D-66 Party, declares China’s policies in Xinjiang as genocide, although like in Canada, Dutch government ministers distanced themselves from the designation, and the Prime Minister’s VVD Party voted against the resolution.

2021 February 26 - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China reveals that it has made multiple invitations and arrangements to European Union officials to visit Xinjiang, but that the European Union has been postponing any visits.

2021 March 8 - The Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in collaboration with the Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights publishes a report alleging that China’s policies in Xinjiang amounted to genocide under international law. The report presented no new information past what Adrian Zenz had already pushed and was written and compiled by highly partisan actors affiliated with government agencies like the U.S. State Department, despite the report’s claims to “independent inquiry.”

See the Grayzone’s rebuttal (2021/3/17)

2021 March 10 - The Grand National Assembly of Turkey led by the ruling party, the AKP, rejects a motion by the İYİ Party to label China’s policies in Xinjiang as genocide, continuing the political trend of opposition parties attempting to label China’s policies as genocide while being opposed by ruling parties.

2021 March 12 - 64 countries join a joint statement made by Cuba at the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council in support of China’s policies in Xinjiang (official document pending, statement given at the session). For a summary of discussion of Xinjiang in United Nations fora, see our summary.

Near the conclusion of the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council on March 24th, 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi reports that more than 80 countries supported China’s position on Xinjiang in the Human Rights Council.

2021 March 15 - The Australian Senate defeats a motion to label China’s policies in Xinjiang as genocide. Australia’s ruling party, the Liberal Party, played a key role in defeating the motion, echoing parliamentary dynamics in Canada, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

2021 March 22 - The United States, European Union, Canada, and United Kingdom announce sanctions on a total of four Chinese officials in connection with alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang. In response, China sanctions ten individuals from the European Parliament and European legislatures and four European entities for disseminating disinformation, undermining Chinese-European ties, and interfering in China’s domestic affairs. Of the ten individuals sanctioned, four of them are co-chairs of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) (Reinhard Butikofer, Miriam Lexmann, Samuel Cogolati, Dovile Sakaliene of the Seimas). Adrian Zenz was also sanctioned.

On March 26, China announces sanctions against nine UK individuals and four UK entities in retaliation. Of the nine individuals sanctioned, five are members of IPAC, including the two British co-chairs of IPAC.

On March 27, China announces sanctions against two U.S. individuals, a Canadian individual, and a Canadian entity.

2021 March 24 - Chinese social media digs up a statement from clothing retailer H&M declaring the cessation of cotton sourcing from Xinjiang, citing forced labor charges, in compliance with a October 21st, 2020 announcement by the Better Cotton Initiative to cease all field-level activities in Xinjiang, following BCI’s sudden March 2020 decision to refuse licensing of Xinjiang’s cotton (this announcement was edited and restated in March 2021 and posted to its Wechat account on March 1, 2021). It is worth noting that BCI is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, among other Western governmental organs. This causes two high-profile Chinese celebrities to cut ties with H&M.

Subsequently, many Chinese celebrities cut ties with brands such as Adidas, Nike, and UNIQLO and rallied Chinese netizens into boycotting these brands for discriminating against Xinjiang workers. This boycott is supported by Chinese apps deplatforming H&M.

See the responses of local Xinjiang residents Patima Ablimit, Hayrigul Abla, and Ahmatjan Mamut to the brands’ boycotting of Xinjiang’s cotton. See other responses to charges of forced labor in the cotton industry here and here.

In the midst of this controversy, Skechers’ statement is noticeable for its rejection of ASPI’s charges of forced labor among China’s minority nationalities as verified by its regular announced and unannounced audits of its Chinese supplier.

BCI’s China office has found no evidence of “forced labor” from 2013 to 2020. The sudden suspension of cooperation between BCI and Xinjiang’s cotton sector may be due to U.S. government pressure, as evidenced by a July 2020 U.S. government lawsuit made against BCI shortly after the July 2020 establishment of the U.S. Cotton Trust Protocol by the Department of Agriculture. (see Reuters report)

BCI’s main website has since removed the October 21st, 2020 announcement.

2021 March 30 - The State Department publishes its 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. In its China report, the State Department maintains former Secretary Pompeo’s allegations that “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” were committed in Xinjiang.

2021 March 30 - April 2 - A delegation of more than 30 diplomats from 21 countries, including Iran, Nepal, Russia, the Maldives, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, and Pakistan, visit Xinjiang. The delegation includes the Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

2021 April 2 - CGTN releases a documentary about more complex fields in the fight against Terrorism in Xinjiang, The War in the Shadows: Challenges of Fighting Terrorism in Xinjiang.

2021 April 22 - The United Kingdom's parliament passes a non-binding resolution labelling China's policies in Xinjiang as genocide. The United Kingdom joins the United States, Netherlands, and Australia in labeling China's policies in Xinjiang as genocide.

2021 June 13 - The United States fails to persuade the G7 to forcefully label China's policies in Xinjiang as "forced labor" in the G7's joint communiqué. The G7's split as regards to China forced the shutdown of the internet to the meeting room, with the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada insisting on a hardline anti-China line against France, Germany, and Italy maintaining their policy independence.

2021 June 14 - China's seventh census conducted in November 2020 reveals that Xinjiang's population grew 18.52% to 25.85 million people from 21.81 million recorded in the sixth census conducted in 2010. Of the 25.85 million, Han made up 10.92 million (42.24%) and minority nationalities made up 14.93 million (57.76%), of which Uyghurs made up 11.62 million (44.96%). The population of minority nationalities increased 14.27% (1.87 million) from 2010, of which the Uyghur population increased 16.2% (1.62 million) from 2010. The Han population increased 24.9%, or 2.17 million, from 2010, of which 1.95 million were migrants from other provinces.

2021 June 22 - 47th Human Rights Council at Geneva. For a summary of discussion of Xinjiang in United Nations fora, see here. Notably, Israel under the new government of Naftali Bennett joined the joint statement condemning China.

A total of 44 countries joined a joint statement delivered by Canada condemning China's policies in Xinjiang:

Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States

Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina have since withdrawn their signatures from the condemnatory joint statement, bringing the total down to 42.

A total of 69 countries joined a joint statement delivered by Belarus supporting China's position:

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Korea (Democratic People's Republic of), Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

In addition to the 68 signers of the joint statement in support of China's position on Xinjiang, more than 20 other countries supported China's position in individual capacities, including Azerbaijan, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Maldives, South Africa, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, and the Arab Group (the 22 countries comprising the Arab League).

2021 July 13 - Following June 23-24 Department of Commerce and Department of Homeland Security actions against Chinese companies in the solar industry, the US Department of State releases an updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, among the highlighted updates of which is "information on forced labor in the Xinjiang silicon and polysilicon supply chain and the prevalence of inputs sourced from Xinjiang," indicating that the Biden Administration will continue to prioritize Cold War competition with China over climate cooperation.

2021 September 21 - In his address to the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, President Biden condemns China on Xinjiang, accusing China of "targeting and oppression of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities", marking an escalation in the use and politicization of unsubstantiated allegations of human rights violations while claiming not to seek a new Cold War or divide the world into rigid blocs.

2021 September 24 - Pakistan delivers a joint statement on behalf of 65 countries supporting China's position on Xinjiang at the 48th session of the Human Rights Council. All together, nearly 100 countries expressed support for China's position. There does not appear to be an opposing joint statement.

2021 September 26 - China releases the white paper "Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data.”

2021 October 21 - Discussion at the Third Committee of the 76th session of the General Assembly.

43 countries issued a joint statement condemning China's position on Xinjiang, including Turkey and the Western camp's first African supporter, Eswatini.

In response, Cuba made a joint statement on behalf of 62 countries supporting China's position on Xinjiang. All together, more than 80 countries supported China's position.

This marks the third year the Western camp has attempted to weaponize allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang against China at the United Nations General Assembly. China's Ambassador to the UN Zhang Jun has responded to these efforts strongly this year, including exercising the Right to Reply at the General Debate of the Third Committee on October 4, 2021 and delivering rebuking remarks on October 21. The Permanent Mission of China to the UN also released a fact sheet outlining human rights violations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on October 21.

2021 December 6 - White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki announces a "diplomatic boycott" of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics and Paralympic Games, citing "ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses." Countries that have joined the boycott for express political reasons include Australia, United Kingdom, Canada (December 8), Estonia (December 13), and Belgium (December 14). Lithuania had prior declared a boycott on December 3. While Japan has not formally declared a boycott, it has announced on December 11 that it would not send diplomatic personnel.

Macron on December 9 remarked that a "diplomatic boycott" was "insignificant and merely symbolic," making a European Union boycott unlikely.

2021 December 9 - The Uyghur Tribunal renders a judgment finding that China committed torture of Uyghurs, crimes against humanity, and genocide, not by killings but by "imposing measures to prevent births". The Tribunal overwhelmingly relied on anecdotal testimonials and the findings of Western scholars. The Uyghur Tribunal was conceived in June 2020 when President of the WUC Dolkun Isa formally requested that UK's Sir Geoffrey Nice establish an "independent people's tribunal", and launched on 3 September 2020. It is not a body authorized by international law.

2021 December 10 - The U.S. Department of Treasury imposes sanctions on "perpetrators of serious human rights abuses." Among the Chinese individuals and entities sanctioned are Shohrat Zakir, who served as Chairman of Xinjiang, Erkin Tuniyaz, acting Chairman of Xinjiang, and SenseTime Group Limited, accused of developing facial recognition programs targeting minorities for surveillance purposes.

2021 December 23 - The President of the United States signs the "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act" into law (see White House and State Department press releases). This ends a process begun on March 11, 2020 when Congress first introduced the Act.

The Act is intended to "ban imports from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) of the People’s Republic of China and imposes sanctions on foreign individuals responsible for forced labor in the region" with an eye towards "rallying allies and partners to take joint action to ensure all global supply chains are free from the use of forced labor, including from Xinjiang."

The Act gives the United States a blank check to presume that all products from Xinjiang are made with forced labor. It allows US Customs to refuse all Xinjiang-sourced products unless the importer of the products complies with US guidance. This demonstrates that the Act is aimed at forcibly cutting business ties between China and the world, and at expelling China from global supply chains.

2022 January 20 - The French National Assembly passes a non-binding resolution declaring China's policies in Xinjiang as "genocide." It joins a group of exclusively Western countries including the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2022 March 7 - China and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights arrange for a visit by High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet to visit Xinjiang in May (see Chinese Mission to Geneva's statement and UN High Commissioner for Human Right's statement).

2022 May 28 - UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet concludes her six-day visit (beginning May 23) to China and releases a statement. Among other places she visited, High Commissioner Bachelet spent two days visiting Urumqi and Kashgar in Xinjiang, including visits to cotton fields, Kashgar prison and the Kashgar Experimental School, a former vocational center. High Commissioner Bachelet additionally reported that she met with senior officials from Xinjiang, local ethnic minority residents, academics, religious leaders, inmates, and former vocational center trainees. High Commissioner Bachelet asserted that all these meetings were "unsupervised and organized by us."

Regarding Xinjiang, although High Commissioner Bachelet expressed concerns over China's counter-terrorism and deradicalization policies, she did not echo Western allegations of "genocide" or "forced labor."

See also: Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu briefs the media on the visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to China

2022 June 14 - 50th Human Rights Council Session.

A total of 47 countries joined a joint statement delivered by the Netherlands condemning China's policies in Xinjiang:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Eswatini, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

A total of 69 countries joined a joint statement delivered by Cuba supporting China's position:

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Korea (Democratic People's Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, UAE, Uganda, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

2022 August 31 - The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights releases an OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China, with an attached Response by the Permanent Mission of China to Geneva. The OHCHR did not enjoy a mandate by the UN Human Rights Council in drafting this "assessment", among other procedural and methodological flaws such as one-sided citations that privileged ASPI and other hostile Western-based actors over China's people and civil society, including those living and based in Xinjiang. While the assessment offered no definitive finding on "crimes against humanity", "genocide", or "forced labor", it did accuse China of "serious human rights violations". This inflammatory and accusative language is inconsistent with the constructive spirit of former High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet's statement after her May visit to China. Given the flaws and context of the assessment, it is highly likely that the OHCHR has politicized its work in regards to China in violation of its own mandate, and will alienate the Global South in the process. See "The Flaws in the 'Assessment' Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on China" by Alfred de Zayas and "Bachelet’s 'Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang' Risks Discrediting the OHCHR and Politicizing the Human Rights Regime" by Casey Ho-yuk Wan.

2022 September 9 - In response to the OHCHR's politicized and flawed assessment, Ambassador Chen Xu, Permanent Representative of China to Geneva, tells the media that the OHCHR has "closed the door of cooperation" by releasing the assessment.

2022 September 13 - 51st Human Rights Council Session. A total of 28 countries join a joint statement by China criticizing the OHCHR for its "assessment" of Xinjiang.

Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Comoros, Cuba, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Iran, Korea (Democratic People's Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Syria, UAE, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe

2022 September 26 - 51st Human Rights Council Session. A total of 68 countries joined a joint statement by Pakistan supporting China's position in Xinjiang. No condemnatory joint statement was given in response.

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Congo (Republic of), Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, DPRK, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leona, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, UAE, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

2022 October 6 - 51st Human Rights Council Session. A U.S./Western-sponsored Human Rights Council draft decision, A/HRC/51/L.6, is rejected by the Human Rights Council. A/HRC/51/L.6 sought to capitalize on the OHCHR's politicized and flawed "assessment" by introducing Xinjiang, China as a topic of debate at the 52nd Human Rights Council Session in February 2023. A/HRC/51/L.6 would have legitimized the Western campaign to slander China on Xinjiang in the UN's human rights system.

17 voted for: Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Honduras, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, Paraguay, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Somalia, the United Kingdom, the United States

19 voted against: Bolivia, Cameroon, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Eritrea, Gabon, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Senegal, Sudan, UAE, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.

11 abstained: Argentina, Armenia, Benin, Brazil, Gambia, India, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Ukraine

2022 October 31 - 77th UN General Assembly, Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues).

A total of 50 countries joined a joint statement delivered by Canada condemning China's policies in Xinjiang:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Eswatini, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States

A total of 66 countries joined a joint statement delivered by Cuba supporting China's position:

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe

2023 October 18 - 78th UN General Assembly, Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues).

A total of 51 countries joined a joint statement delivered by the United Kingdom condemning China's policies in Xinjiang. Especially notable was the renewed appearance of Israel on the list at a time when numerous international legal experts agreed it was executing a “textbook case of genocide” against Palestinians in Gaza.

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuvalu, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States

A total of 72 countries joined a joint statement delivered by Pakistan supporting China's position:

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe

2025 November 21 - 80th UN General Assembly, Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues).

A mere 15 countries joined the United States’ “Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in China” which repeated allegations of arbitrary detention, forced labor, and religious persecution in Xinjiang:

Albania, Australia, Czechia, Estonia, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Palau, Paraguay, San Marino, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States

A record-breaking 85 countries joined China’s competing “Joint Statement Opposing the Politicization of Human Rights”:

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela , Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

As of February 2022, in the roughly three-and-a-half year period since the end of 2018, more than 2,000 people from over 100 countries and regions, including officials from international organizations, diplomats, journalists and religious leaders, have visited Xinjiang.

c. On the Nature of Unsubstantiated Allegations

The World Uyghur Congress began conducting activism based on the allegation of Xinjiang “concentration camps” in August 2017, four months after the promulgation of the Xinjiang De-radicalization Regulations. The controversy entered mainstream Western discourse a year later in August 2018 with Gay McDougall’s unsubstantiated claims at the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 

In the interceding time, claims of concentration camps, cultural genocide, demographic genocide, slavery, and mass sterilization have saturated media and political discourse. The evidentiary weakness of these rapidly escalating claims is evinced by the shifting numbers of alleged detainees, which has ebbed and flowed from 120,000 on the low end to up to 9 million out of a Uyghur population of roughly 12 million (2019).

While Western media often paints Xinjiang as a black box, Xinjiang has in fact never been closed or restricted to outside visitors until the outbreak of COVID-19 in January 2020 (unlike Tibet Autonomous Region, which requires most foreigners to acquire special permits to visit). Indeed despite the nearly 1,000 visits by outside observers and 200 million tourists to Xinjiang in 2019, no convincing photo or video evidence has emerged of supposed genocide in Xinjiang, much less the complete absence of any recent refugee crisis originating from Xinjiang.

Photos and videos fallaciously used to prove, show, or insinuate either concentration camps or slave labor of Xinjiang people include:

An April 14, 2017 de-radicalization public talk at Luopu County Reform & Correction Centre (explanatory Twitter thread).

An August 12, 2017 arrest of pyramid fraudsters in Bijie, Guizhou (explanatory Twitter thread)

A video uploaded on September 17, 2019 appearing to show a routine prisoner transfer in what looks to be Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, with vests printed “Kashgar Detention House (喀什看守所).” (see Global Times, 2020-7-22, in response to the re-emergence of the video in summer 2020 and BBC’s confrontation of Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom Liu Xiaoming using the video on 2020-7-19) Detention Houses are otherwise normal infrastructure in today’s China. (see this Zhihu answer for one person’s experience staying 37 days in a Detention House, and this post about the work of a police personnel tasked to a Detention House) [Chinese language]

A December 21, 2019 transportation of suspected fraud criminals from Shanghai to Taiyuan by Taiyuan police (explanatory Twitter thread).

A stock photo of a Chilean shoe factory from 2010 (Reddit post)

Satellite imagery of assorted buildings in China, some of which are normal prisons and at least one of which is a 5-star apartment complex.

In some extreme cases, videos from other countries entirely (video was from Indonesia - part of what is being said is “ampun, pak, gak lagi” - have mercy, I won’t do it again), videos from a Taiwanese BDSM club, or edited and pixelated photos to try to push the narrative. 

It is clear that the burden of evidence for disproving allegations of slavery and genocide in Xinjiang has been set far higher than the burden of evidence for lodging these allegations in the first place. With the popular imagination saturated with images of alleged atrocities, it is difficult to argue for any course of U.S. action other than sanctions, isolation, and intervention. Such is the nature, by intent, of atrocity propaganda as it has been wielded to justify U.S. imperial adventurism. If nothing else, the context and evidence provided in this timeline should make clear that spurious claims based on weak evidence have been wielded unilaterally by the U.S. and its allies to spurn China despite broad international approval for Chinese policy in Xinjiang.

3. Resources

a. Overview

These readings are general overviews of Xinjiang in general and the current controversy in particular. They can act as effective one-stop resources for those seeking a quick summary.  

Abunimah, Ali. “How How Muslim group Emgage serves the American empire,” The Electronic Intifada, March 17, 2021.

Ali Abunimah casts doubt on the evidentiary grounds of “genocide” in Xinjiang while analyzing how Muslim diaspora groups are co-opted for U.S. imperial interests, tied also with failure to embrace solidarity with the Palestinian struggle.

Ang, Matthias & Wong, Kayla. Different media report differently on controversial Xinjiang re-education camps in China. Read them all.”, Mothership, July 21, 2019.

Ang and Wong offer an even-handed survey of the biases and conflicting diagnoses of different news reports on the Xinjiang controversy. The authors don’t try to take a side but advocate seeking a diversity of sources. 

Berletic, Brian. "Behind the 'Uyghur Tribunal', US govt-backed separatist theater to escalate conflict with China." The Grayzone. October 17, 2021.

A focused look at the actors and sponsors of the Uyghur Tribunal, exposing the true goal of the tribunal as escalating a new cold war and promoting separatism in a geopolitical rival of the West.

James, Jaq. "The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Uyghurs for Sale Report: Scholarly Analysis or Strategic Disinformation?" CO-WEST-PRO Consultancy. January 2022.

This report by independent author Jaq James, a law student at the Australian National University at the time of writing, examines ASPI's "Uyghurs for sale" report from a legal and evidentiary perspective. James weighs ASPI's allegations against the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Labour Organization's Indicators of Forced Labor of 2012. James concludes that ASPI's allegations neither rises to the level of violations of Uyghur's rights under international law nor survives scrutiny due to lack of evidentiary substance. James also concludes that ASPI's strategic disinformation has potentially deprived Uyghurs of the right to work provided for by international law and interferes with China's legal obligation to provide employment opportunities to Uyghurs.

Kanthan, Chris. “Xinjiang and Uyghurs – What You’re Not Being Told,” World Affairs Blog (blog).

A quick collection of facts about key cultural, historical, and political aspects of Xinjiang.

“Notes on China-Uighur Controversies: An Ever Increasing Collection of Notes, Links, Sources, & Observations”

A well-sourced and extensive ongoing Google Document written by a leftist in critical evaluation of the Xinjiang controversy.

Singh, Ajit & Max Blumenthal. “China detaining millions of Uyghurs? Serious problems with claims by US-backed NGO and far-reach researcher ‘led by God’ against Beijing.” The Grayzone. December 21, 2019.

A rather thorough examination of the handful of sources from which claims of ‘millions’ in concentration camps has been uncritically adopted by mainstream media. The argument focuses on the personal records and financial ties of frequently-cited ‘experts’ such as Adrian Zenz. 

Singh, Ajit. “‘Wipe out China!’ US-funded Uyghur activists train as gun-toting foot soldiers for empire.” The Grayzone. March 31, 2021.

Taking a March 21st, 2021 Uyghur American Association-backed disruption of a gathering against Anti-Asian hate in Washington D.C. as a starting point, Ajit Singh traces the linkage of co-opted diaspora with far-right, Islamophobic actors in furtherance of Sinophobia and U.S. imperialist aggression against China.

“The Number of Uyghurs Has Tripled - The U.S. Calls It A Genocide - Propaganda Fails To Explain It.” Moon of Alabama. January 21, 2021.

This post examines mainstream Western media reports chiefly from Reuters and the New York Times to expose inconsistencies in the narratives being pushed, including a report claiming both discrimination against minorities in employment and coerced labor of minorities.

Wu Qina. “Six Focal Points to View the True Xinjiang; How Can Beijing Break Through Charges of ‘Genocide.’” DW News. April 21, 2021. [English translation]

Wide-ranging interview with Wu Qina, a professor of history at National Taiwan University, addressing the 20th century history of Islam and pan-Turkic nationalism in Xinjiang, as well as issues surrounding educational modernization and gender equality. Also touches extensively on the transformations of the reform and opening up period, with their often-contradictory effects on the region’s labor market, ethnic demography, migration patterns, and overall position in the political economy of China and Central Asia.

Zhao, He. “Xinjiang: Facts vs. Fiction.” Medium. November 16, 2019.

This is perhaps the quickest yet comprehensive read on Xinjiang generally and the current controversy in particular. 

b. Chinese Perspectives on the Problem of Terrorism

These sources document the scope and extent of the recent history of terrorism in China, which received little attention in the Western press. These sources also highlight official Chinese perspectives on how to resolve the problem as peacefully as possible. China’s stated policies of economic development and poverty alleviation are key pathways towards improving social stability and tackling some of the root causes that foment violence—an approach that stands in stark contrast to the tactics employed during the U.S. so-called “War on Terror.” 

It is important to note that Western reports and figures have failed to differentiate between generalized vocational education in Xinjiang—which is an aspect of poverty alleviation programs throughout China—and vocational education as part of targeted de-radicalization programs.

CGTN. “Fighting terrorism in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 50:01. December 11, 2019.

CW: Violence. This documentary in particular is notable for releasing previously unreleased footage of terrorist attacks as well as extensive interviews with a wide variety of people including victims, former terrorists, religious authorities, locals, and police. [some of the interviewees speak in Uyghur]

CGTN. “The Black Hand – ETIM and Terrorism in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 29:06. December 11, 2019.

CW: Violence. This documentary shares some footage with the above, but otherwise is a shorter film focused more on the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM/TIP), its links to al- Qaeda, and the international nature of the threat it poses. [some of the interviewees speak in Uyghur]

CGTN. “Tianshan: Still Standing - Memories of fighting terrorism in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 57:52. June 18, 2020.

CW: Violence. This documentary revisits the lingering impacts of terrorism in today’s Xinjiang. Some highlights include the revisiting of Dilqemer’s story from the “Fighting terrorism” documentary; interviews with police and locals such as Memet Jume, son of former Id Kah imam Jume Tahir assassinated in 2014, and Muhpira Rahman, a female People’s Armed Police member; and exclusive looks at Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County and the Chinese-Afghan border. [some of the interviewees speak in Uyghur; the interviewee Memetrehim Ibrahim speaks in Sarikoli] 

CGTN. “Lies and truth: Vocational education and training in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 35:08. August 25, 2020.

CW: Violence. This documentary focuses on vocational centers and their students. There is some overlap with the “Embracing a New Life” mini-series (see below), particularly in the stories of the painter Ablizkari Ubul and dancer Aqida Arslan. Has a short section near the end containing comments by international observers to Xinjiang. [some of the interviewees speak in Uyghur]

CGTN. “The War in the Shadows: Challenges of Fighting Terrorism in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 55:12. April 2, 2021.

CW: Violence. This documentary sheds a light on the details of China’s counter-terrorism policy in Xinjiang. Unlike the previous documentaries, this documentary conducts extensive interviews with convicted people who share their stories and perspectives. It thus delves more into the grit of the struggle in Xinjiang.

“Why are western media silent on China’s documentaries on Xinjiang?” CGTN. December 9, 2019. (Based on Tong, Li. “CGTN发“大尺度”新疆反恐纪录片，西方媒体却沉默了.” Guancha. December 9, 2019.)

From a Chinese perspective, this article questions why Western voices which claim to value human rights have not paid heed to issues of violence and terrorism directed against civilians in Xinjiang and beyond. 

“Joint Letter to Mike Pompeo, From Scholars and Religious Personnel in Xinjiang.” Tianshan Net. July 19, 2019.

A letter from about 100 scholars and religious personnel in Xinjiang rebuking comments made by Secretary Pompeo.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang. 2019. 

A white paper concerning the broader strategy against terrorism undertaken in Xinjiang.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang. 2019.

A white paper focusing specifically on the vocational centers and their operations.

Sha, Yuan. “China’s contribution to the international counter-terrorism cause.” CGTN. September 26, 2019.

Paraphrasing remarks made by Wang Yi at the UN - clearly identifying poverty as a root cause of terrorism.

Ed. Xiang, Bo. “Full transcript: Interview with Xinjiang government chief on counterterrorism, vocational education and training in Xinjiang.” Xinhua. October 16, 2018. 

Xinhua interview with Shohrat Zakir, Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, concerning the roots of terrorism, poverty alleviation and education as solution, and the vocational centers.

c. Geopolitical Context

These sources place the current controversy in light of geopolitical interests. In particular, the Belt and Road Initiative, a massive Chinese-led multi-national infrastructure project that has drawn ire as a threat to U.S. unipolarity, runs through Xinjiang as a strategic region connecting China to North and West Asia.

While the U.S. has long recognized that its naval supremacy in the South China Sea could effectively “strangle” China’s economy in the event of hot war, Xinjiang in particular and the Belt and Road Initiative in general provide an overland route for Chinese trade which undermines U.S. military supremacy. As such, these sources contextualize the Xinjiang controversy amidst broader U.S. efforts to contain and isolate China.

Al-Ghadhawi, Abdullah. “Uighur Jihadists in Syria.” Center for Global Policy. March 18, 2020.

A short article about the circumstances surrounding ethnic Uyghur fighters in Syria.

Azam, Azhar. “BRI is instrumental to realizing 'no poverty' vision.” CGTN. October 18, 2019.

A short article making clear BRI’s role in Xinjiang’s poverty alleviation as well as its potential for poverty alleviation in other countries.

Bhadrakumar, M.K. “US lacerates China’s Uighur wound.” Indian Punchline (blog). March 28, 2019.

Indian Punchline is a blog run by M.K. Bhadrakumar, a retired career diplomat of India. This blogpost—slightly dated now given the evolution of the controversy—properly examines the Xinjiang controversy in the U.S.’s strategic calculus.

Fuller, Graham E. & S. Frederick Starr. “The Xinjiang Problem.” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. 2003.

An interesting dated report on the then situation in Xinjiang, written by a former Vice-chair of the National Intelligence Council and CIA Station Chief in Kabul. Not only a primer on some of the longer-term background of the issue through the lenses of the United States (and a light on the severity of the terrorism issue), but also a window into a prior time in which a prominent United States thinker urged cooperation with China to defeat terrorism and to avoid over-politicizing the issue in the hopes of greater global stability. 

Gunaratna, Rohan. “Salafism in China and its Jihadist-Takfiri strains.” Al Mesbar Studies & Research Center. January 18, 2018.

A short report on Salafism in China and the connection of some of its more extremist strands to terrorist activities over time.

Novák, Izak. “The War on China.” Izak Novák (blog). April 17, 2020.

A general overview essay about the longstanding decades-long strategy of the United States against China. Importantly, it discusses the Belt and Road Initiative as a strategy to break out of U.S. encirclement, hegemonism, and imperialism, and Xinjiang’s central importance to the BRI.

Prashad, Vijay. “Trade and tensions between the U.S. and China.” Monthly Review. August 3, 2020.

Only a small part of this article is about Xinjiang, but it places the Western fixation on it into proper context in advancing Western “political and commercial ends.”

Ron Paul Liberty Report. “'What is the Empire’s Strategy?' - Col. Lawrence Wilkerson Speech at Ron Paul Institute Media & War Conference.” YouTube video, 26:10. August 22, 2018. 

One former U.S. military official’s insider perspective as to why the United States is in Afghanistan. He asserts it “has nothing to do with fighting terrorism” and more to do with establishing military control over a territory of strategic interest to Chinese trade routes. Time stamp starting at 20:55 is included in the link. 

d. Poverty Alleviation and Economic Development in Xinjiang

These sources describe a small slice of Xinjiang’s poverty alleviation efforts and economic development initiatives, while exploring the real and concrete impacts these programs have on the lives of ordinary people.

“Animal husbandry helping to drive up incomes.” CGTN. May 7, 2020.

“China's Xinjiang generates 260 bln kWh clean electricity.” Xinhua. August 8, 2020.

Xinjiang is quickly becoming a hub for green energy production and distribution. This short note and video offers a small glimpse into the greening of Xinjiang and China.

“E-commerce development boosts farm produce sales.” CGTN. May 6, 2020.

Voices from the Frontline: China’s War on Poverty. Film. Directed by Peter Getzels. The Kuhn Foundation & PBS Socal, 2020. [available on Youtube]

A documentary hosted by Robert Lawrence Kuhn offering an insightful look into the war against absolute poverty. The documentary not only provides an on-the-ground look at the procedures and effects of poverty alleviation efforts as well as their often imperfect executions, but also shines a light on the workings of the Communist Party of China, including mobilization, promotion, corruption, monitoring, and discipline. Kuhn travels to Hainan, Gansu, Guizhou, Xinjiang, and Sichuan, gaining a rare and balanced insight into Chinese society and policies. Ironically, some of the entities involved in poverty alleviation in Xinjiang, such as the one highlighted by the documentary, are the very entities being sanctioned and boycotted by U.S. legislation and private brands such as H&M. [the interviewees speak in a wide variety of local dialects and accents; the Xinjiang interviewees except for Murzabek Tapi speak in Kazakh]

First aired on May 11 and 12 of 2020, and despite its award-winning status, the documentary was quickly taken down barely a week after release on May 20, citing “editorial standards.” Kuhn called it “a shame” that PBS removed his film from its platform due to “extraneous internal political matters in the United States.”

Jie, Shan. “Xinjiang scores victories in the war on poverty.” Global Times. December 18, 2019.

A very short and succinct article with small snippets of human stories concerning poverty alleviation in Xinjiang.

“Labor transfer program boosts employment.” CGTN. May 8, 2020.

“Localized factories lift Xinjiang locals out of poverty.” CGTN. May 8, 2020.

Lu, Yin & Zhang Xinyuan. “Xinjiang’s millennial entrepreneurs make the most of the Internet age.” Global Times. July 4, 2016.

An older article from 2016 about new Xinjiang entrepreneurs harnessing both the power of the internet and the increasing interconnectivity of Xinjiang to the world via the Belt and Road Initiative.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang. 2020.

This white paper provides an overview of the employment and labor in Xinjiang, providing statistics, giving personal anecdotes, and highlighting labor laws and the efforts being made to improve them, in the context of poverty alleviation programs.

“Trans-regional job offers help Xinjiang farmers shake off poverty.” CGTN. May 3, 2020.

“Villagers get access to clean water as projects continue.” CGTN. May 2, 2020.

“Wellness of people in remote areas safeguarded.” CGTN. May 4, 2020.

Ed. Yang, Yi. “China highlights support to Xinjiang through pairing assistance.” Xinhua. July 16, 2019.

Pairing assistance is a common practice in the People’s Republic whereas richer provinces and localities directly send aid, expertise, and cadres to poorer provinces and localities in order to help them develop. This is a short article about the visit of a senior Party official Wang Yang to Xinjiang and the re-emphasizing of this program. 

e. Overview of Chinese Minority/Religious Policies

These sources provide a quick overview of China’s policies towards minority nationalities and religion, with some focus on efforts with relevance to Xinjiang and Islam. 

Beech, Hannah. “If China is Anti-Islam, Why are These Chinese Muslims Enjoying a Faith Revival?” Time. August 12, 2014.

A relatively honest Western media attempt to look at Islam in China before the current 2018 controversy. The author notes that thriving Hui Muslim communities in China have also been targeted by terrorist attacks.

CCTV. “Students’ Daily Life [sic] at Xinjiang Islamic Institute in Northwest China.” YouTube video, 2:19. June 19, 2016.

This is a short video showing daily life at an Islamic educational institute in China.

Kasim, Muhabbat (Muhabaiti Hasimu). “新世纪新疆双语教学：七大变化，三点建议.” China Minzu Cultural Resources. September 20, 2018. (reprinted from Zhongguo Minzu Bao (China Ethnic News), August 13, 2010, 6)

A Uyghur scholar of bilingual education and Turkic languages reflects on the changing situation of bilingual education in Xinjiang, noticing seven changes from her personal experience and leaving three recommendations for the future. Of particular note, it was not until the recent decade that Chinese language was taught to minority children starting in the first grade (previously it started in the fourth grade). [Chinese language]

Li, Qian. “Chinese government goes to great lengths to help Muslims go on the hajj.” Global Times. August 14, 2017.

Documents Chinese state programs to offer support for those who want to go on hajj pilgrimage.

Lim, Louisa. “Female Imams Blaze Trail Among China’s Muslims.” NPR. July 21, 2010. 

Documents the unique Chinese Muslim tradition of women-led mosques. The article ends with a curious line: “And so it appears the future of female imams in China is threatened — not by the state, not by resistance from inside Islam, but by the forces of market economics.” This seems to reflect the shifting and inconsistent media agenda on China: from ‘ruthlessly capitalist’ forces stymying Chinese state efforts to preserve minority cultures and religious practices to godless Communist entity seeking to wipe out Islam.

Liu, Xin. “Xinjiang Muslims welcome govt’s efforts on hajj journeys.” Global Times. August 2, 2019.

A more recent article detailing the governmental measures offering support for rural Xinjiang Muslims who wish to go on hajj pilgrimage.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China. 1999. 

Although dated, many of the policies described in this paper are still in effect today.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups. 2009.

Like the above, a dry read, but full of data that demonstrates the efforts of the government in minority policies – Qiao recommends drawing attention to the passages in the white paper addressing tax exemption programs (Section V), minority languages, and intangible heritage (Section VI).

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Freedom of Religious Belief in Xinjiang. 2016.

A white paper devoted to the progress of ensuring religious freedom in Xinjiang, although written shortly before the controversial 2017 de-radicalization regulations.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Cultural Protection and Development in Xinjiang. 2018.

A white paper devoted specifically to cultural policies in Xinjiang, with special considerations for the minority nationalities of Xinjiang.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China. 2019. 

A white paper about China’s progress on human rights issues. Section V is devoted to minority policies.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Respecting and Protecting the Rights of All Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang. 2021.

A white paper about the protection of rights in Xinjiang specifically. Xinjiang's policies and systems advancing civil, political, economic, cultural, social rights, the rights of women and children, and freedom of religion are covered in depth.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data. 2021.

A white paper focused on the population and demographics of Xinjiang in the years leading up to 2021.

“Why does China have women-only mosques.” BBC. February 23, 2016. 

An article which shows that as late as 2016, there was some attempt by the West to understand Islam in China on its own terms, even by the world’s largest “public broadcasting company.”

Zhang, Hui. “China bans anti-Islam words on social media.” Global Times. September 21, 2017. 

China’s infamous censoring apparatus actively tries to censor Islamophobic hate speech on social media.

“新疆维吾尔自治区计划2020年全面普及双语教育.” Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang. October 6, 2010. 

A simple news report from 2010 that explains the plans of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to have widespread bilingual education in the autonomous region by 2020. [Chinese language]

新疆维吾尔自治区人口与计划生育条例 [Xinjiang Population and Family Planning Regulations] (promulgated by the People’s Congress of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, November 28, 2002) (made available on the website of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Health & Hygiene Commission) (current law, rev’d July 28, 2017) (previous version, rev’d June 3, 2010, available on the website 51labour)

This is the statute currently governing Xinjiang’s family planning. Particular attention should be placed on the general rule articulated in Article 15, pre and post-2017: [Chinese language]

Pre-2017: Couples of urban Han residents can have one child, and couples of ethnic minority residents can have two children. Couples of Han farmers and herdsmen can have two children, and couples of ethnic farmers and herdsmen can have three children.

Post-2017: Couples of urban residents can have two children, and couples of rural residents can have three children.

f. The Misinformation Industrial Complex

These sources provide some general context as to the bias and agenda of Western non-state actors, particularly mainstream media and NGOs, which often act in concert with Western imperialist state agendas rather than a check on them. 

In particular, these sources highlight the historic uses of “atrocity propaganda,” through which the U.S. has galvanized public opinion for war and intervention through misrepresentations and outright lies vis-a-vis ‘humanitarian concerns.’ In particular, the wars in Iraq and intervention in Syria provide a historical warning for how mainstream media and research institutes amplify State Department ambitions. 

Bruton, F. Brinley & Tony Brown. “U.S. targets Chinese Uighur militants as well as Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” NBC News. February 8, 2018.

Addresses U.S. aerial bombing campaigns in Afghanistan, painting the U.S. bombing of ethnic Uyghur terrorist camps in Afghanistan as good, even natural. At the same time, the article paints these same actors as repressed freedom fighters in China’s domestic context—clear instances of double standards that speak to U.S. geopolitical interests in the region.  

Butt, Ahsan I. “Why did Bush go to war with Iraq?” Al Jazeera. March 19, 2019. 

One more exploration of the now infamous lies that built consensus for American intervention in Iraq, a war that has directly led to a disastrous humanitarian crisis.

Fisk, Robert. “Bashar al-Assad, Syria, and the truth about chemical weapons.” Independent. December 8, 2012.

An article about the history of Western allegations of atrocities committed in the Middle East in the leadup to war and intervention.

Ignatius, David. “Innocence Abroad: The New World of Spyless Coups.” The Washington Post. September 22, 1991.

This article quotes from the horse’s mouth the role of the National Endowment for Democracy as the “sugar daddy of overt operations” for State Department anti-communist and regime change agendas. The admission of NED intent to undermine ‘enemy nations’ should call into serious question why the NED funds groups as diverse as the World Uyghur Congress to the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions.  

McIntyre, Jamie. “Meet ETIM, the terrorist group the US just bombed in Afghanistan.” Washington Examiner. February 10, 2018.

This article from the right-wing Washington Examiner cites Pentagon officials designating the East Turkistan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group of security concern to U.S. ambitions in the Middle East—a label which speaks to the double standard of Western media when it comes to ETIM/TIP as a threat to U.S. interests or a cudgel to be wielded against China.  

“Noble Peace Laureates Slam Human Rights Watch's Refusal to Cut Ties to U.S. Government.” Alternet. July 6, 2014.

An older open letter expressing concern over Human Rights Watch’s “revolving door” with the United States government, causing it to overlook the U.S.’s own abysmal human rights record and subjecting the organization to partisan politics.

Norton, Ben. “Twitter spreads paid US gov't propaganda while falsely claiming it bans state media ads.” The Grayzone. August 10, 2020.

While focused on Twitter and its pushing of American governmental agenda, this article has a helpful section on the U.S. Agency for Global Media, and demonstrates clearly how the agency and its constituent platforms including Radio Free Asia are nothing more than “soft-power arm[s] of the US government,” a context that should be taken into mind when consuming its contents.

O’Neill, Brendan. “The missing people-shredder.” The Guardian. February 24, 2004. 

A retrospective inquiry finds the sensationalist accounts of Saddam Hussein’s "people shredder" circulated by Western media in the leadup to the Iraq war were never substantiated. 

“Sinophobia Inc: Understanding the Anti-China Industrial Complex.” Qiao Collective. September 3, 2020.

An in-depth review of the financial ties of prominent China think tanks such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute reveals a deep conflict of interest: many such institutes are funded by Western state entities and the same weapons manufacturers now cutting record arms deals to equip the anti-China “Pivot to Asia.” Many of the aforementioned think tanks have promulgated serious allegations with regards to Xinjiang.

Singh, Ajit. “Inside the World Uyghur Congress.” The Grayzone. March 5, 2020.

An extensively-sourced and medium-length exploration of the World Uyghur Congress, a focal organization from which many of the other organizations advocating East Turkistan independence branches off, and its shady connections with U.S. regime changers and Turkish far-right actors.

Sheridan, Tommy. “Syria and Chemical Weapons – Secrets and Convenient Lies.” Sputnik. May 31, 2019.

An article outlining the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and how it was manipulated to serve consensus-building for war against Assad.

Sun, Feiyang. “Letters to the Editor: The Case of the Keriya Aitika Mosque.” CGTN. July 7, 2020.

This is an editorial briefly discussing the “case” of the Keriya Aitika Mosque, in which it was claimed that the mosque was demolished and insinuated that the People’s Republic was engaging in mass demolition of places of worship, but it turned out to be renovation work for the historic mosque.

“The Propaganda Multiplier.” Swiss Policy Research. March 2019.

This article does not talk about Xinjiang, but about the general procedures of “international news coverage” and why stories appearing consistently across “major” and “respectable” news sources is not in fact a strong indicator that it is credible. The current media structure is highly susceptible to misinformation, and in fact government agencies are very involved.

Witness to War. “Former CIA Agent John Stockwell Talks about How the CIA Worked in Vietnam and Elsewhere.” YouTube video, 15:12. September 29, 2017.

This video is an interview of a former CIA officer (field case officer) John Stockwell, who speaks about the CIA’s close ties with the news media and journalists, the feeding of “pure raw false propaganda… creating illusions of Communists eating babies for breakfast,” and the particular process through which United States intelligence comes to shape and mold narratives around the world.

Xiong, Jack. “The Fake News in 1990 That Propelled the US into the First Gulf War.” Citizen Truth. May 7, 2018.

A somewhat recent article that explores the background of the “Nayirah testimony,” arguably the first instance of atrocity propaganda in the then new world order of American unilateralism. 

Zhang, Chi. “One Uighur Man’s Journey Goes Viral.” Foreign Policy. May 14, 2014.

An interesting look at a contemporary account of Xinjiang’s society at the height of the period between 2009 and 2014 when the problem of terrorism was particularly severe in Xinjiang. Not only does this article explore the perspective of an actual Uyghur person living in China, but this article, in tandem with other articles on this list dealing with female imams and Islamic revival in China, shows how drastically the media agenda on China has changed since 2014. This article ultimately provides an even-handed and frank look at a snapshot of Xinjiang before the current controversy of 2018. 

g. Views from Xinjiang: People, Cultures, and History

These are miscellaneous sources covering contemporary Xinjiang, Xinjiang’s diverse people and cultures, Xinjiang’s modern and ancient history, and the little-understood, even within China, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). 

Xinjiang’s Diverse People, Cultures, and Experiences

《第一次的离别》(《تۇنجى ئايرىلىش》, A First Farewell). Film. Directed by Wang Lina. Tencent Pictures, 2020.

A Uyghur-language film that opened at #1 in the post-lockdown Chinese box office. Directly and movingly addresses the complexities and contradictions of bilingual education, modernization, and poverty alleviation initiatives through the eyes of children in rural Xinjiang. Now streaming on Amazon Prime and Kanopy (subscription free with most public library cards).

“Domestic film 'A First Farewell' wins hearts, box office.” China Daily. August 4, 2020.

Kuipers, Richard, “Film Review: ‘A First Farewell’.” Variety. March 17, 2019.

“Speak Out 恕我直言 Ep5:劳道.” YouTube video. January 27, 2022.

Short documentary on a rising generation of Uyghur hip-hop artists who have attained regional and even national success by rapping in their native language and incorporating traditional Uyghur instruments like the tembor. [Rap in Uyghur, interviews in Mandarin with Chinese and English subtitles]

Xinjiang is a powerhouse in the Chinese hip-hop scene. The documentary Iron Mic (2017), on China’s premier battle rap tournament, features the Hui Muslim rapper Majun 马俊 (2010 champion) and the Uyghur rapper 艾热 (2014 runner-up), both hailing from the region. [Mandarin with Chinese and English subtitles]

Aire 艾热 went on to square off against fellow Uyghur rapper Nawukere 那吾克热 in the final of the 2018 season of The Rap of China, beating out a dozen mostly Han competitors.

安妮古丽. “191.新疆叼羊比賽見過嗎？哈薩克族馬背上的熱血競技，現場燃爆了！” YouTube video, 4:43. August 16, 2019.

CW: Animal harm. Anniguli is a Uyghur woman living in Xinjiang who mostly vlogs about her everyday life. Here she spectates Kazakhs participating in the sport, buzkashi. Buzkashi is a traditional Central Asian sport that often involves playing polo with a sheep carcass while on horseback. [Chinese language, some Kazakh can be heard]

安妮古丽. “新疆零下20°怎麼出門？維吾爾美女有妙招，你覺得這樣有效果嗎？” YouTube video, 3:55. May 23, 2019. 

This is Anniguli’s most popular video to date. Here she mostly remarks on how cold it got in Urumqi. [Chinese language, some Uyghur can be heard accompanying the pedestrian crossing signal]

CCTV. “Our Stories of the Past 40 Years” Series

A series of personal stories told by individual members of China’s nationalities, in celebration of 40 years of Reform and Opening Up. The stories told by members of minority nationalities that take place in Xinjiang (or are told by a member of a minority nationality who consider Xinjiang their homeland) are:

“Our story - the Daur nationality.” YouTube video, 2:17. December 20, 2018. [Inner Mongolia]

“Our story - the Hui nationality.” YouTube video, 3:02. December 12, 2018. [Ningxia]

“Our story - the Kazak nationality.” YouTube video, 3:00. December 26, 2018.

“Our story- Khalkhas: guard borderline to protect our own home.” YouTube video, 2:47. December 4, 2018.

The nationality represented here is not Khalkha but Kyrgyz.

The interviewee Burmahan Moldo (Burumahan Maoleduo) speaks in Kyrgyz. Burmahan later received the national honor of “Model of the People” and was personally recognized by President Xi Jinping.

“Our story - the Manchu nationality.” YouTube video, 2:29. December 22, 2018. [Liaoning]

“Our story - the Mongol nationality.” YouTube video, 2:53. December 11, 2018. [Inner Mongolia; the interviewee Hurcabater (Hurichabate’er) speaks in Mongolian]

“Our story - the Russian nationality.” YouTube video, 2:22. December 27, 2018.

“Our story - the Tajik nationality.” YouTube video, 2:44. December 10, 2018. 

“Our story - the Tatar nationality.” YouTube video, 2:49. December 22, 2018.

“Our story: Uygur nationality.” YouTube video, 2:51. December 7, 2018.

“Our story - the Uzbek nationality.” YouTube video, 2:24. December 14, 2018.

“Our story - the Xibe nationality.” YouTube video, 2:35. December 21, 2018. [Liaoning]

CCTV中国中央电视台. “[2019非遗公开课]《十二木卡姆》 表演：莎车县十二木卡姆民间艺术团.” YouTube video, 2:39. June 7, 2019.

Muqam is a rich Uyghur musical tradition well-known across China. It was among the first four intangible heritages registered by China to the UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2008, alongside Guqin, Kunqu Opera, and Mongolian Long Song (Urtiin Duu). This video is a short performance of Muqam as well as traditional Uyghur dance.

CGTN. Amazing Xinjiang Series

This CGTN playlist contains a number of Xinjiang-focused videos on various topics and localities, largely low-key and laidback content. 

CGTN. “Assignment Asia Episode 75: Transforming lives and building bridges in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 25:16. November 5, 2017.

This video from before the 2018 controversy covers many aspects of developmental work in Xinjiang, including education, labor transfer, grassroots governmental work, and living standards for people finding employment outside Xinjiang. The footage does not shy away from showing the difficulties and adjustments people in Xinjiang face as they go through changes in their lives. [Uyghur spoken in some scenes]

CGTN. “Beyond the Mountains: Life in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 1:20:11. April 15, 2021.

This documentary briefly interviews ordinary people of Xinjiang and their lives and perspectives. In total, 26 people are interviewed, including students, migrant workers, young entrepreneurs, scientists, monks, and farmers.

CGTN. “Dolan Muqam music tradition thrives among local Uygurs.” YouTube video, 4:04. August 16, 2017.

This video provides a quick overview of Muqam as well as over a distinct rural tradition within Muqam.

CGTN. Eid al-Fitr Series

A short series of documentaries focusing on the celebration of Eid al-Fitr, commemorating the end of the holy month Ramadan, in China. Notably, having been released in July 2017, it was released during a time after the De-radicalization Regulations were passed but before the World Uyghur Congress began campaigning on “internment camps.”

“Happy reunion during Eid al-Fitr in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 10:29. July 8, 2017.

“Muslims in Xinjiang show piety during Eid.” YouTube video, 7:32. July 10, 2017.

“Over 40 years of friendship between Han and Uygur family.” YouTube video, 11:37. July 9, 2017. [the interviewee Karim Turdi speaks in Uyghur]

“The flavor of Eid al-Fitr in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 8:12. July 10, 2017.

“The rhythm of Eid al-Fitr in NW China’s Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 8:22. July 8, 2017. [the interviewees speak and sing in Uyghur]

CGTN. “Epic of Manas: The history of Kirgiz in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 1:15. May 22, 2018.

The Epic of Manas is a Kyrgyz epic poem traditionally passed down orally. The storytelling of Manas was registered by China in UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2009. This video provides a quick overview of the tradition of Manas storytelling in China.

CGTN. “Looking China: Akyns song that brings happiness.” YouTube video, 9:33. January 23, 2017. 

This video is a collection of Akyns (song-like recitative improvisation accompanied by dombra) performed by Kazakh musician Jiahnur Ohas, overlaid by scenes of Xinjiang’s Kazakh regions. [songs are sung in Kazakh language]

CGTN. “Looking China: Xibe ethnic group in Xinjiang.” YouTube video, 11:59. Jan 22, 2017.

This video is a slice-of-life feature of a young Xibe girl living in Xinjiang, entirely narrated in the Xibe language, a relative of the Manchu language.

CGTN. “Modern designs revive traditional craft and industry.” YouTube video, 4:25. October 6, 2016. 

This serves both as an introduction to “atlas silk,” a characteristic material in traditional Central Asian clothing, as well as a short look at fashion designer Alim Adil’s hope to introduce atlas more into modern clothing. 

CGTN. “The everlasting spirit of the Kazaks on grasslands.” YouTube video, 5:04. May 22, 2019.

This is a look at the life of a nomadic Kazakh family, including worries and concerns for the future, displaying the still wide experiences of modern life in Xinjiang, much less China today.

CGTN. “Travelogue with Tajik people: Modern life in Xinjiang's rocky mountains.” YouTube video, 29:19. June 27, 2016.

This is an older documentary of a Chinese-British diaspora CGTN host spending time in a rural Tajik village. It does a good job of showing the developmental difficulties as well as unique features of high-altitude mountain valley life. 

CHINA LIVE. “帕米尔高原上牦牛叼羊比赛 / Buzkashi with Yaks on the Chinese Pamir.” YouTube video, 2:57. March 20, 2016. 

CW: Animal harm. Buzkashi is a traditional Central Asian sport that often involves playing polo with a sheep carcass while on horseback. The Tajiks of Xinjiang are distinguished by their playing of buzkashi while mounted on yaks. 

Guangming Online. “Fascinating China” Series

This series was made in celebration of 70 years of the People’s Republic of China and focuses on the intangible cultural heritages of China’s 56 nationalities. These short episodes exploring the heritages of minority nationalities who consider modern-day Xinjiang their homeland are as follow. NOTE: Guangming Online is in the process of reloading their videos onto Youtube. Some videos from this series might be missing from Youtube. As such, links to Guangming’s own website where these videos can be viewed will also be provided (Chinese-language site).

“Fascinating China EP01: The Mongolian Ethnic Group and Its Gesar Epic Tradition.” YouTube video, 3:13. August 6, 2019. (Guangming) [Inner Mongolia]

The Epic of King Gesar is an epic cycle originating in Tibet but finding wide expression across Central Asia. It was registered by China in UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2009. 

“Fascinating China EP02: A Typical Mutton Cooking Technique in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.” YouTube video, 3:11. September 28, 2020. (Guangming) [Ningxia]

“Fascinating China EP07: Kyrgyz, An Ethnic Group Closely Related to Falcons.” YouTube video, 3:00. September 28, 2020. (Guangming) [the interviewee Khurmash Khutman speaks in Kyrgyz]

“Fascinating China EP12: Uygur Dawaz, A Challengeable Sport and Traditional Chinese Art.” YouTube video, 3:05. September 28, 2020. (Guangming)

“Fascinating China EP17: Manchu Embroidery, Vivid Record of Life.” YouTube video, 2:57. September 28, 2020. (Guangming) [Heilongjiang]

“Fascinating China EP19: Daur Hanika.” YouTube video, 2:11. September 28, 2020. (Guangming) [Inner Mongolia]

“Fascinating China EP36: Tatar Saban Festival.” YouTube video, 2:39. September 29, 2020. (Guangming) [The interviewee Zeytuna Karimova also participated in CCTV’s “Our Stories of the Past 40 Years” series]

“Fascinating China EP38: Xibe, an Ethnic Group of Bow and Arrow.” YouTube video, 2:44. September 12, 2019. (Guangming)

“Fascinating China EP40: Dombra Art of Kazakh Ethnic Group.” YouTube video, 2:22. September 14, 2019. (Guangming)

“Fascinating China EP43: Delicacy of the Russian Ethnic Group.” YouTube video, 2:47. September 28, 2020. (Guangming) [Inner Mongolia]

“Fascinating China EP44: Ashula and Yalla.” YouTube video, 2:31. September 29, 2020. (Guangming) [the interviewee Mansur Zakir speaks in Uzbek]

“Fascinating China EP49: Costume of the Tajik Ethnic Group.” YouTube video, 2:52. September 29, 2020. (Guangming) [the interviewee Gulnisa Islamhan speaks in Sarikoli]

Looking China Official Channel. “Manas 玛纳斯.” YouTube video, 9:28. August 24, 2016.

This video provides a more detailed look at the tradition of Manas in China and the scholarly efforts dedicated to researching the Epic of Manas further and preserving it. In particular, the role of the Manas Research Center in Xinjiang Normal University is explored.

New China TV. “Xinjiang Rediscovered” series.

This is a series of more mundane experiences: average residents of Xinjiang who talk about their lives, experiences, and hopes for the future.

Rhymoi Music. "Musical Map of China" series.

A series of recordings of folk songs and music from all over China and from all of China's people. Recording sessions are viewable on Youtube. The albums featuring music and songs from Xinjiang include:

Hui Folk Songs

Kazak Folk Music

Kazak Folk Songs

Kirgiz Folk Music

Tajik Folk Music

Tajik Folk Songs

Tatar Folk Songs

Uygur Folk Music

Uygur Folk Songs

Xibe Folk Songs

“xinjiang china.” YouTube channel.

This YouTube channel periodically shares videos of Xinjiang, its people and its places. Particularly recommended are:

A short film series called 《我的家乡更美好》, or “Better Hometown, Better Life.” It is a series interviewing several students of Shanghai University of Traditional Chinese Medicine who are minority youth from Xinjiang, who talk about their experiences in Xinjiang and in university as well as go back to their hometowns to see how much they have developed. Some are only in Chinese. [Chinese source here]

7 videos currently available about people who have studied at the vocational centers, as part of a series called 《拥抱新生活》or “Embracing a New Life.” [Chinese source here, although the videos on this site are now unavailable]

Xinzhao Li 李馨曌. “新疆 塔什库尔干塔吉克族 "Through The Unknown Tashkurgan".” YouTube video, 8:28. January 3, 2020. 

This is a short overview of a photographer’s extended stay in Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County, and her experiences as the locality and its people changed and grew.

Xinjiang’s History

Dickens, Mark. “The Soviets in Xinjiang: 1911-1949.” 1990.

An older but excellent overview of the complexities of Soviet involvement in Xinjiang, as well as the Republican history of the region before 1949.

Grousset, René. Walford, Naomi, trans. Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1970.

A classic historical text on Central Asia with an emphasis on nomadic empires. It covers broader Central Asia beyond Xinjiang, but also summarizes Xinjiang history up to the Qing Dynasty’s defeat of the Khoja Uprising in 1759.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. History and Development of Xinjiang. 2003.

An official Chinese document concerning the history of Xinjiang that explores some historical events in detail, providing a broad overview of the history of the region, including the role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. It also covers progress in development in Xinjiang up to 2003.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang. 2019. 

An official Chinese document concerning the history of Xinjiang. While it does paint in broad strokes, it provides a quick overview of the history of the region.

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

Bao, Yajun (包雅钧). “The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: An Insider’s Perspective.” Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper Series (BSG-WP-2018/023)  (2018). 

One of the few English-language scholarly reports—more of a summary—on the XPCC. Nonetheless, an interesting perspective from a scholar who studied the XPCC on behalf of the Central Organization Department of the CPC (Central Compilation and Translation Bureau 中央编译局) during a restive period in Xinjiang’s history.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. 2014. 

A white paper on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) that gives an overview of the XPCC, its history, and its operations. The XPCC as a sort of “government within a government” plays an important if little understood role in Xinjiang.

h. Xinjiang Responds

On the last day of the Trump administration, Secretary of State Pompeo labeled China’s de-radicalization and economic development programs in Xinjiang as “genocide” and “crimes against humanity.” His accusations angered many Chinese citizens of Xinjiang, inspiring them to submit written and video responses rebuking Pompeo. Many of these were compiled by Tianshan Net and reveal a unity of Xinjiang residents, from government officials to rural villagers, from elderly family heads to young students, and from artists to religious leaders, in rejecting the United States’ imperialist aggression. See Tianshan’s compilation here.

Around 900 videos on Youtube have been compiled of Xinjiang citizens’ responses to Pompeo’s allegations. Some of them overlap with the video responses listed in the compilation. Other channels include hai cham and Uyghur Story.

The Xinjiang Genocide Allegations Are Unjustified

History of Xinjiang Region — The Xinjiang Genocide Allegations Are Unjustified

The Xinjiang Genocide Allegations Are Unjustified

Article 3 of 10

Dr. Jeffrey D. Sachs

Originally published at https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/apfjc5yg352d554k2ar2wwwkk8ryw9

US President Joe Biden's administration has doubled down on the claim that China is mounting a genocide against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. But it has offered no proof, and unless it can, the State Department should withdraw the charge and support a UN-based investigation of the situation in Xinjiang.

Jeffrey D. Sachs

NEW YORK/LONDON – The US government needlessly escalated its rhetoric against China by claiming that a genocide is being mounted against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. Such a grave charge matters, as genocide is rightly considered “the crime of crimes.” Many pundits are now calling for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, dubbing them the “Genocide Olympics.”

The genocide charge was made on the final day of Donald Trump’s administration by then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, who made no secret of his belief in lying as a tool of US foreign policy. Now President Joe Biden’s administration has doubled down on Pompeo’s flimsy claim, even though the State Department’s own top lawyers reportedly share our skepticism regarding the charge.

This year’s State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices(HRP) follows Pompeo in accusing China of genocide in Xinjiang. Because the HRP never uses the term other than once in the report’s preface and again in the executive summary of the China chapter, readers are left to guess about the evidence. Much of the report deals with issues like freedom of expression, refugee protection, and free elections, which have scant bearing on the genocide charge.

There are credible charges of human rights abuses against Uighurs, but those do not per se constitute genocide. And we must understand the context of the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang, which had essentially the same motivation as America’s foray into the Middle East and Central Asia after the September 2001 attacks: to stop the terrorism of militant Islamic groups.

As the Hong Kong-based businessman and writer Weijian Shan has recounted, China experienced repeated terrorist attacks in Xinjiang during the same years that America’s flawed response to 9/11 led to repeated US violations of international law and massive bloodshed. Indeed, until late 2020, the US classified the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group, battled Uighur fighters in Afghanistan, and held many as prisoners. In July 2020, the United Nations noted the presence of thousands of Uighur fighters in Afghanistan and Syria.   

The charge of genocide should never be made lightly. Inappropriate use of the term may escalate geopolitical and military tensions and devalue the historical memory of genocides such as the Holocaust, thereby hindering the ability to prevent future genocides. It behooves the US government to make any charge of genocide responsibly, which it has failed to do here.    

Genocide is defined under international law by the UN Genocide Convention (1948). Subsequent judicial decisions have clarified its meaning. Most countries, including the United States, have incorporated the Convention’s definition into their domestic legislation without any significant alteration. In the past few decades, the leading UN courts have confirmed that the definition requires proof to a very high standard of the intentional physical destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.

The definition specifies that one of five acts must be perpetrated. Obviously, killing tops the list. The State Department’s report on China says there were “numerous reports” of killings, but that “few or no details were available,” and cites only one case – that of a Uighur man detained since 2017 who died of natural causes, according to the authorities. The report doesn’t even explain why the official explanation should be questioned.

Technically, genocide can be proven even without evidence that people were killed. But because courts require proof of intent to destroy the group physically, it is hard to make the case in the absence of proof of large-scale killings. This is especially true when there is no direct evidence of genocidal intent, for example in the form of policy statements, but merely circumstantial evidence, what international courts refer to as a “pattern of conduct.”

International courts have repeatedly said that where genocide charges are based only upon inferences drawn from a pattern of conduct, alternative explanations must be ruled out definitively. That’s why the International Court of Justice rejected in 2015 the genocide charge against Serbia and the counter-charge against Croatia, despite evidence of brutal ethnic cleansing in Croatia.

So, what else might constitute evidence of genocide in China? The State Department report refers to mass internment of perhaps one million Uighurs. If proven, that would constitute a gross violation of human rights; but, again, it is not evidence, per se, of intent to exterminate. 

Another of the five recognized acts of genocide is “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” The State Department report refers to China’s notoriously aggressive birth-control policies. Until recently, China strictly enforced its one-child policy on the majority of its population but was more liberal toward ethnic minorities, including the Uighur.

Today, the one-child policy is no longer applied to the majority Han Chinese, but stricter measures have been imposed on Xinjiang’s Muslim minority, whose families are traditionally larger than China’s average. Still, Xinjiang records a positive overall population growth rate, with the Uighur population growing faster than the non-Uighur population in Xinjiang during 2010-18.

The genocide charge is being fueled by “studies” like the Newlines Institute report that recently made global headlines. Newlines is described as a “non-partisan” Washington, DC-based think tank. On closer inspection, it appears to be a project of a tiny Virginia-based university with 153 students, eight full-time faculty, and an apparently conservative policy agenda. Other leading human rights organizations have refrained from using the term. 

UN experts are rightly calling for the UN to investigate the situation in Xinjiang. China’s government, for its part, has recently stated that it would welcome a UN mission to Xinjiang based on “exchanges and cooperation,” not on “guilty before proven.” 

Unless the State Department can substantiate the genocide accusation, it should withdraw the charge. It should also support a UN-led investigation of the situation in Xinjiang. The work of the UN, and notably of UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs, is essential to promote the letter and spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

https://prosyn.org/SQX2VwM?referral=c50051

The US-Imposed Hybrid War on China

History of Xinjiang Region — The US-Imposed Hybrid War on China

The US-Imposed Hybrid War on China

Article 4 of 10

The Tricontinental

Originally published at https://thetricontinental.org/red-alert-9-china/

Is the United States trying to impose a war on China?

For the past several decades, the US has conducted a trade war against China. There are two key issues that worry the United States: first, a trade imbalance that benefits China, and, second, the growth of the Chinese technology sector. Techniques that the US has used against China include: pressuring China to revalue its currency against the dollar, pressuring China to prevent ‘piracy’ on intellectual property in order to slow down its domestic intellectual property developments, and pressuring China to slow down or cease its Belt and Road Initiative.

The US has now begun a war against the Chinese economy. The attempt to isolate Huawei and ZTE from their suppliers and their markets will have a debilitating impact on the growth potential of the Chinese economy. The US has sanctioned roughly 152 companies that make chips and other products for Huawei and ZTE. Increased bans – through the US government’s Clean Network initiative – would prevent US companies from using Chinese cloud services and undersea cables, and it would ban Chinese apps from appearing on app stores. The US government has increased pressure on other countries to join in this campaign.

The US government has increased its military pressure along the eastern rim of China. This includes the 2017 revival of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), the creation of the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy (its key document from 2020 is called ‘Regain the Advantage’), and the development of a range of new weaponry, including cyberweapons. This military power has come alongside hostile rhetoric against China, with attention focused on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, and the depiction of the coronavirus pandemic as a ‘China virus’. Evidence is not as important here as the use of older racist and anti-Communist ideas to demonise China.

Why is the US increasing its pressure against China?

China’s technological advances could result in a generational advantage over the West. China’s scientific and technological developments came because of the country’s investment in higher education and in its ability to transfer technology from firms that entered the country to manufacture goods. In 2018, Chinese scholars for the first time published more scientific articles than their colleagues in the US, and Chinese firms filed more patent applications than US firms. Chinese tech firms have now produced products that appear to be ahead of US, European, and Japanese products. Examples for this include 5G, BeiDou (a better mapping technology than GPS), high-speed trains, and robots.

Faced with US pressure, China has crafted an independent trade and development agenda. Since the world financial crisis, China began diversifying its economy from reliance upon the US and European markets to build up its own internal market and to increase engagement with the Global South. The immediate projects that developed included the Belt and Road Initiative, the String of Pearls Initiative, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum. The Chinese government has also begun to pay more attention to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These moves come alongside a remarkable poverty eradication programme.

Currently, China is highly dependent on imported energy – such as gas from ASEAN nations, Australia, and Qatar. The China-Russia 6000kms ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline will bring 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas, a substantial increase to meet the demands for the 90 billion cubic meters consumed by China. In 2014, Russia’s multinational energy corporation Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation signed a $400 billion for a thirty-year deal.

Increasingly, China has attempted to build institutions outside of Western-controlled trade and development architecture, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (founded in 2014). As part of this, China has committed to de-dollarisation; China has proposed to hold its reserves and to conduct trade in currencies other than the US dollar. This is a long-term but inevitable development, and one that threatens the overall role of the Wall Street-Dollar complex. China’s cooperation with Russia is most advanced in this arena, with about 50% of Russia-China trade conducted in roubles and yuan (Russia owns about 25% of the global yuan reserves). Both Russia and China are divesting themselves of their dollar reserves. In January 2020, Russia sold $101 billion, or 50%, of its dollar reserves and moved $44 billion into Euros and $44 billion into yuan. The yuan, however, represents only 2% of global currency reserves.

Against the eastward expansion of NATO and the emergence of the Quad, China and Russia have crafted a military and diplomatic Eurasian security bloc. This is evident in the arms deals and the military exercises, but also in diplomatic coordination. For example, Russian and Chinese foreign ministry spokespersons Maria Zakharova and Hua

Chunying said in late July that they would join efforts in combatting the information war against China and Russia. Chinese diplomats have taken a more forthright attitude in their statements; they have been dubbed the ‘wolf warrior diplomats’, an allusion to a popular film where a Chinese soldier from an elite Wolf Warrior troop defeats a group of terrorists led by an ex-US Navy Seal.

Clearly, the US has found that Chinese leadership has been unwilling to go the Gorbachev road – namely, to surrender the Chinese model to the will of the United States. There is no possibility that the Communist Party of China will dissolve itself. The Chinese middle class – possible fodder for a ‘colour revolution’ – does not have any appetite to overthrow the government. It is content with the direction of the government and sees that its government has improved living standards and has been able – unlike Western governments – to tackle the Coronavirus pandemic (as we write about in a series on ‘CoronaShock’). A Harvard University study shows that the government led by the Communist Party of China has increased its approval from 2003 to 2016, largely because of the social welfare programmes and the fight against corruption pushed by both the Communist Party of China and by the Chinese government. The overall approval stands at 93%.

What contradictions does the US war project face?

Chinese economic developments – such as the country’s capacity to outspend the US in development aid to outbid Western firms in trade deals – has produced alliances between China and key capitalist sectors in countries that have otherwise been secure US allies. Examples of this are amongst sections of the capitalist class in the Philippines and Sri Lanka, where Chinese investment has been welcomed.

The Chinese state has intensified its intervention in the tech sector inside China, with a $14 billion private and public fund to support tech developments. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) – China’s top chip company – had an initial public offering (IPO) in Shanghai which netted $7. 5 billion. As a consequence of such funds and its own scientific developments, China will soon be able to bypass the US chip firms.

China’s economic capacity continues to exert pressure on fragments of capital in different countries. For instance, Australian mining companies rely upon China to buy iron ore from Australia. These companies lobby Canberra not to take too hostile a position against China. Roughly one third of Australia’s total exports go to China; these include soy, barley, meat, fruits, gas, and the raw minerals. The Australian government is forced to acknowledge these concerns, even though it has a longer-term perspective than the short-term profit concerns of the mining conglomerates. China has already hedged its bets, increasing purchases of soy and meat from Argentina and Brazil, and it will likely buy more mined goods from Brazil (Brazil’s Vale is using massive ships to carry mined goods to China).

The US military is stretched thin between the conflicts in Venezuela and Iran, and now in China. The US Navy has had four secretaries in a year, part of the chaos in the Trump administration. As a consequence, the US Navy has complained about the lack of ability to handle so many theatres of war at the same time. China has developed sophisticated defence mechanisms, such as cyber warfare techniques that have the ability to shut down US communications, starting with their satellites, and such as their Dongfeng missiles, which are capable of hitting the US navy ships that are in the South China Sea.

Who is Adrian Zenz?: US State Department accusation of China ‘genocide’ relied on data abuse and baseless claims by far-right ideologue

History of Xinjiang Region — Who is Adrian Zenz?: US State Department accusation of China ‘genocide’ relied on data abuse and baseless claims by far-right ideologue

Who is Adrian Zenz?: US State Department accusation of China ‘genocide’ relied on data abuse and baseless claims by far-right ideologue

Article 5 of 10

The Grayzone

By Gareth Porter and Max Blumenthal

Originally published at https://thegrayzone.com/2021/02/18/us-media-reports-chinese-genocide-relied-on-fraudulent-far-right-researcher/

The Trump and Biden administrations have relied on the work of a right-wing religious extremist, Adrian Zenz, for their “genocide” accusation against China. A close review of Zenz’s research reveals flagrant data abuse and outright falsehoods.

Both President Joe Biden and his Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have endorsed former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s last-minute accusation of “genocide” against the Muslim Uyghur population in China’s Xinjiang province. But an investigation of published work by the researcher Pompeo relied on to level his genocide allegation reveals a pattern of data abuse and fraudulent assertions that substantially undermines the incendiary charge.

The US government’s accusation of genocide against China stems from a single source: a June 2020 paper by Adrian Zenz, a right-wing German researcher affiliated with the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation and neoconservative Jamestown Foundation in Washington, DC.

Articles by the Associated Press, CNN, and BBC also relied on Zenz’s article to claim that plunging Uyghur birth rates and the application of birth control measures in Uyghur counties of the Xinjiang region were proof of a policy of “demographic genocide.”

Just days after the publication of Zenz’s paper, Pompeo issued a statement denouncing China’s alleged policy of “forced sterilization, forced abortion, and coercive family planning,” personally crediting “Adrian Zenz’s shocking revelations.”

Biden backed the genocide charge last August when it first appeared in a flurry of media reports. His campaign spokesman told Politico, “The unspeakable oppression that Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have suffered at the hands of China’s authoritarian government is genocide and Joe Biden stands against it in the strongest terms.” Blinken, for his part, declared at his first press conference as secretary of state that he agreed genocide has been committed against the Uyghurs.

While Zenz’s employers describe him as “one of the world’s leading scholars on People’s Republic of China government policies towards the country’s western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang,” he is, in fact, a far-right Christian fundamentalist who has said he is “led by God” against China’s government, deplores homosexuality and gender equality, and has taught exclusively in evangelical theological institutions.

Lyle Goldstein, a China specialist and research professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department of the Naval War College, told The Grayzone that Zenz’s labeling of the Chinese approach to the Uyghurs as “demographic genocide” is “ridiculous to the point of being insulting to those who lost relatives in the Holocaust.”

Goldstein said the Chinese approach to Xinjiang “is a more repressive posture than we would like, but it sure isn’t genocide.”

Moreover, a careful review of Zenz’s research shows that his assertion of genocide is contradicted by flagrant data abuse, fraudulent claims, cherry-picking of source material, and propagandistic misrepresentations.

Genocide or equal treatment in family planning policy?

In Adrian Zenz’s 2020 paper for the Jamestown Foundation, he boasted that his findings “provide the strongest evidence yet that Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang meet one of the genocide criteria cited in the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”

Zenz was referring Article 2 (d) of that Convention: “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” But Article II qualifies the relevant acts as those “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”

“Preventing births” by itself cannot be evidence of alleged genocide without evidence of intent to destroy the group in question. Otherwise, any birth control program provided to an ethnic group would be prima facie evidence of a policy of genocide against the group.

Zenz argued that population control measures applied to Uyghurs could be branded as “genocidal” because population growth rates fell by 84 percent in the two largest Uyghur prefectures between 2015 and 2018, and declined further in several minority regions in 2019. But more complete statistics that Zenz cited in his report, and data that he conveniently omitted, contradicted his conclusion.

Zenz provided statistics revealing that between 2005 and 2015, Uyghur population growth in Xinjiang was 2.6 times higher than that of Han Chinese in the Xinjiang region. (The chart displayed in his report is below).

Both official Chinese figures and Zenz agree that the Uyghur population in Xinjiang increased significantly between 2010 and 2018.

Zenz’s figures shows an increase in Uyghur population from 10.1 million to 11.8 million from 2010 to 2018, while Chinese government figures demonstrate an even larger increase from 10.1 to 12.7 million. That means the Uyghur population in Xinjiang grew by a staggering 25.04 percent.

Zenz shows the Han Chinese population rising from 8.5 to 9.8 million during the eight-year period, while Chinese government figures show a smaller increase in Han population from 8.8 million to 9 million.

Both the rapid surge in Uyghur population growth rates and the increased margin of the Uyghur majority over the Han population of Xinjiang in recent years are the result of the one-child policy imposed on Han Chinese couples by the Chinese government in 1979.

According to China specialist Martin King Whyte, the one-child policy was accompanied by a long-term pattern of abuses in its implementation, including “intrusive menstrual monitoring, coerced sterilizations and abortions, staggering monetary fines for ‘over-quota’ births, smashing of furniture and housing of those who resist and withholding registration for babies born outside the plan.”

Uyghur families, however, were exempted from the one child policy. Urban Uyghur couples were allowed to have two children, and rural Uyghur couples three. In practice, moreover, rural Uyghurs often had large families, with as many as nine or ten children in some cases, as even Zenz acknowledged.  

In 2015, the Chinese government announced a relaxation of the decades-long one-child limit on urban Han couples, allowing urban couples to have two children and rural families to have three. In Xinjiang, where birthrates routinely exceeded previously established limits, local officials urged the equal application of family planning policy between Han and Uyghur couples.

In July 2017, Xinjiang’s regional government ended the exemption on the old child limits for Uyghurs. Uyghur couples were thus expected to follow the same limitations recently imposed on Han couples: two children in urban areas and three in rural regions.

As the Chinese government has freely acknowledged, a 5 percent decrease in the birth rate in Xinjiang between 2017 and 2018 was the result of the equal enforcement of family planning policy across ethnic lines.

While eliding this point, Zenz also overlooked the fact that China’s overall birthrate has fallen precipitously in recent years across the demographic spectrum as the population ages and contraceptives become more widely available through programs like the government’s annual free distribution of one billion condoms. For example, in the city of Guangzhou, which is far from Xinjiang, the rate of newborn babies has plunged to its lowest point in a decade.

Cherry-picking and distorting source material, framing free healthcare as genocide

Also in 2017, China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission announced a $5.2 billion healthcare investment in Xinjiang, stating its intention to strengthen a brittle health infrastructure in impoverished, rural areas of the region. 

According to Chinese government statistics, maternal and infant mortality rates in Xinjiang were nearly halved by 2018, while average life expectancy rose as a result of increased public health investments. A 2019 study by Lancet described China’s improvement of maternal health and infant mortality reduction as a “remarkable success story.” Another study that year by the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences arrived at a similar conclusion. How these positive health indicators could serve as proof of genocide was left unexplained by Zenz, who simply omitted the numbers from his report. 

Throughout his paper, Zenz framed the expansion of public healthcare services in Xinjiang as evidence of a genocide in the making. For example, Zenz pointed to a photograph of Uyghur residents of rural regions of Xinjiang receiving medical consultation at a free health clinic as part of an “effort to enforce the thorough implementation of increasing intrusive birth control efforts.”

However, the photograph depicted an elderly couple who were far too old to have children, and was dated May 2017 – months before the Chinese government announced an end to the child limit exemption for Uyghurs.

According to the original source of the photograph, an article in China News, it depicted a regiment from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps deploying to a rural province as part of the government’s poverty eradication program. There, the doctors “measured blood pressure, electrocardiogram, blood sugar, height and weight for poor villagers who came to see the doctor for free… More than 200 poor people were diagnosed and treated, and more than 100 common drugs were distributed on the spot.”

At another point in his paper, Zenz cited an August 2019 document from Xinjiang’s Wenquan County government office as evidence of “greater pressure to implement intrusive birth control methods.” He referred to a single mention of 468 “birth control surgeries,” which could alternately be translated as “family planning operations,” but provided no evidence that the operations were coercive. Revealingly, Zenz omitted the next line, which expressed satisfaction with a birth rate of 8.11 percent.

Zenz proceeded to ignore the rest of the document, which touted the increased provision of free mental health services, polio vaccinations and AIDS prevention treatment as well as poverty alleviation measures and the construction of new hospitals and medical clinics for the population of Xinjiang.

How did a massive investment to improve the health of previously neglected rural communities fit within the framework of a policy of genocide? Once again, Zenz avoided the issue entirely.

Inventing statistics, spinning tales to frame the official enemy

Among Zenz’s “major findings” was the claim that “80 percent of all net added IUD placements in China… were performed in Xinjiang, despite the fact that the region only makes up 1.8 percent of the nation’s population.”

According to the 2019 China Health Statistics Yearbook published by the National Health Commission – the original source of Zenz’s claim – the number of new IUD insertion procedures in Xinjiang in 2018 accounted for only 8.7 percent of China’s total. So Zenz’s “major finding” appeared to be off by a factor of 10, a staggering error that substantially undermined the explosive quality of his argument.

The relevant sections of the statistical yearbook Zenz relied on was translated by a native Chinese speaker and are displayed below. A full translation of the chart can be viewed here, and an archive of the entire statistical yearbook is here.

When Zenz attempted to defend himself against accusations of cooking statistics on birth control surgeries in Xinjiang, he ultimately cast further doubt on the quality of his research. Responding to a Chinese academic critic, he claimed that he had calculated Xinjiang’s 239,457 new net IUD insertions (devices added minus those removed) as 80% of the national total in 2018.

However, Henan province registered 206,281 new net IUD insertions, or 69%, in 2018. Hebei, meanwhile, registered 61%, amounting to a total of 210% of national net insertions. These numbers only make sense when calculated alongside provinces like Jiangsu and Yunnan that had more removals (-60% and -54%, respectively) than total national net insertions. By relying on such a bizarre metric, Zenz appeared to have attempted a cynical statistical sleight of hand to paint Xinjiang as a hotbed of birth control surgery.

In perhaps the most unintentionally absurd assertion in an article filled with them, Zenz asserted that the Chinese government inserted between 800 and 1400 IUDs per capita each year in Xinjiang. Which meant that each woman in the province would have had to have undergone anywhere from 4 to 8 IUD surgeries every day. With so much time spent on the operating table every day, it’s a wonder that anyone in Xinjiang could find time to work, or eat.

Wait what? Zenz claims 800+ IUDs placed *per capita* per year, which must be about 1,600 IUDs per female per year, and even more per females at birth age per year? pic.twitter.com/8mvwJRO6xb

— MonkeyKing (@abovetheclouds) September 22, 2020

Elsewhere in his paper, the daffy data diver asserted that 73.5 percent of married women of childbearing age in Xinjiang’s Kuqa County had IUDs fitted between 2017 and 2018. In a footnote, Zenz claimed, “This data comes from a cache of over 25,000 local government files obtained by the author in 2019.” The article he provided as accompaniment, however, was written by himself for the Jamestown Foundation and contained no data on IUD operations in Kuqa County.

Zenz attempted to pad his shaky statistics with dramatic testimony from US-based Uyghur exiles who have been cultivated by the US State Department. The narratives of these exiles have been vehemently challenged by family members in Xinjiang, as well as by vocational center graduates and local doctors, who produced official hospital documents purporting to disprove their allegations.

In his paper, Zenz cited a September 2019 article in the US government-run outlet Radio Free Asia, containing testimony by a US-based exile, Tursunay Ziyawudun, who claimed she was forcibly sterilized and physically tortured in a Chinese internment center.

However, in February 2020, Ziyawudun changed her story entirely, telling Buzzfeed: “I wasn’t beaten or abused. The hardest part was mental. It’s something I can’t explain — you suffer mentally. Being kept someplace and forced to stay there for no reason.”

Ziyawudun changed her story again after being relocated to the US and cultivated by the US government-funded Uyghur Human Rights Project. This February, she told the BBC and CNN that she was gang raped by guards in an internment camp. The BBC report relied on none other than Zenz as its expert voice on China’s supposed policy of “systematic rape.”

Zenz’s propagandistic framing, cherry-picking of original source materials, and cooking of statistics fit a pattern of misrepresentation on display in a December 2019 paper he authored for a NATO-linked publication alleging a Chinese policy to force members of the Uyghur minority into “slave labor.”

As Ajit Singh reported for The Grayzone, Zenz painted an article about a government program providing Uyghur women with free childcare as evidence of forced family separation – a “shocking example of this ‘liberation’ of women from their children,” he called it. Zenz conveniently omitted a quote in the article from a Uyghur woman who said the free childcare “solved [her] problem, now there are people who take care of my children, I can in peace go to work… very convenient.”

Because Zenz’s papers are published by a neoconservative think tank that has functioned as a US intelligence cut-out, they are not peer reviewed by credentialed academics. But they do not appear to have undergone much fact-checking either. This has left Zenz exposed to embarrassing scrutiny from the internet, and forced him to edit out errors after questioning from random Twitter users:

For the last report published by Zenz before this, it took me five minutes to find a glaring error, of which I informed him. Got blocked after I made it public. pic.twitter.com/gdBvygJ2kJ

— MonkeyKing (@abovetheclouds) December 16, 2020

While it’s hard to understand how Zenz has gotten away with so much statistical malpractice, a look at his background helps explain his ideological motivations, and provides important context on his negative focus on the application of birth control. He is an anti-abortion, anti-feminist Christian fundamentalist captivated by End Times theology, and has said that god has led him on a mission against the Chinese government.

An anti-gay, anti-abortion Christianist dedicated “led by god” against China

The BBC based its June 2020 report alleging “forc[ed] birth control to suppress population” on Zenz’s work, referring to him as a “China scholar” without mentioning his employment by right-wing institutions in Washington or his own hyper-ideological views.

Like the BBC, an AP report relied entirely on an advance copy of Zenz’s paper, but provided no background and whitewashed his right-wing politics or institutional affiliations. A CNN story published a month later and a CNN follow-up in September 2020 on alleged Chinese forced sterilizations in Xinjiang also relied on Zenz without mentioning his political background.

As The Grayzone has reported, Zenz is a far right Christian fundamentalist who claims to have been “led by god’ to defeat the Communist Party of China. While he is almost invariably touted in Western media as a leading scholar on China, he described himself in 2015 as “a lecturer in empirical research methods at a Christian university.” As late as 2018, in fact, Zenz was listed as a faculty member of the European School of Culture and Theology at Columbia International University in Korntal, Germany.

Zenz’s first published book, “Worthy to Escape: Why all believers will not be raptured before the Tribulation,” he and his co-author, Marlos Sias, urged Christian believers to subject unruly children to “scriptural spanking,” condemned homosexuality as “one of the four empires of the beast,” and argued that Jews who refuse to convert to evangelical Christianity during the End Times would either be “wipe[d] out” or “refined” in a “fiery furnace.”

Adrian Zenz, the primary source of western media reports on Uyghur "concentration camps", is a German anti-Semite who believes Jews that refuse to convert to Christianity will be "wiped out" and put into a "fiery furnace".https://t.co/4iMObYmEzC pic.twitter.com/Unc7rvprCN

— Dan Cohen (@dancohen3000) August 10, 2020

In the End Times tome, Zenz predicted that the coming fall of capitalism would bring to power the Antichrist within a “few decades.” He identified the force that “will usher the Antichrist into power” as “the economic and financial fall of ‘Babylon,’ with ‘Babylon’ symbolically representing the world’s global economic system (capitalism).”

Like other born-again evangelicals, Zenz is also fiercely anti-abortion and opposed to gender equality. “Another important God-given authority structure that Satan is attacking through the postmodern spirit is that of gender authority structures,” Zenz wrote. “Through notions of gender equality […] the enemy is undermining God’s unique but different role assignments for men and women.”

Zenz currently serves as a fellow at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, a Washington DC-based right-wing lobbying front born out of the National Captive Nations Committee. The latter group was founded by Ukrainian nationalist Lev Dobriansky to stifle any efforts at diplomacy with the Soviet Union. Its co-chairman, Yaroslav Stetsko, was a leader of the OUN-B militia that fought alongside Nazi Germany during its occupation of Ukraine in World War II.

In April 2020, Zenz’s employer listed all global deaths from Covid-19 as “victims of communism,” blaming each of them on the Chinese government.

Victims Of Communism Memorial Foundation Adds Global Coronavirus Deaths To Its Tally Of Historical Victims Of Communism #CCPCoverup https://t.co/h7tMrp16Wq https://t.co/P88k9YmM9o

— Victims of Communism (@VoCommunism) April 11, 2020

Zenz is also employed by the Jamestown Foundation, a neoconservative think tank in Washington DC founded as the outcome of efforts by Ronald Reagan’s CIA Director, William J. Casey, to establish an extra-governmental channel to pay Soviet dissidents. In the past, Jamestown leadership has spearheaded lobbying efforts to support separatism in Chechnya.

In their apparent zeal for escalation with China, mainstream Western outlets like the AP, BBC and CNN have accepted Zenz’s dubious research as absolute fact, while ignoring his background as a religious extremist who is ideologically committed to regime change in Beijing. If Biden and Blinken formally adopt the Trump administration’s “genocide” designation, they will have effectively endorsed Zenz’s shoddy and propagandistic research as well. 

The genocide accusation may appeal to the Biden administration as a useful geopolitical cudgel, as well as a defense against right-wing Republic attacks painting the new president as “soft on China.” But it will only strengthen the hand of hardliners determined to provoke a dangerous and potentially catastrophic confrontation with a fellow nuclear-armed power. 

“The United States has set out to vilify China,” former US Deputy Chief of Mission in Beijing and Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman told The Grayzone, and the accusation of Uyghur genocide “is the perfect issue with which to do so.”  

Freeman opined that the Chinese “seem to be doing many cruel and counterproductive things in Xinjiang.” However, he cautioned against taking the genocide accusation at face value: “In the current atmosphere, we should be especially skeptical about any and all assertions by people who have become part of the current anti-China campaign in the West. Before we condemn, we should be sure of our facts.”

The Jamestown Foundation did not respond to a request for comment on Zenz’s research.

China Is Not Committing Genocide in Xinjiang

History of Xinjiang Region — China Is Not Committing Genocide in Xinjiang

China Is Not Committing Genocide in Xinjiang

Article 6 of 10

The Geopolitics

By Iveta Cherneva

Originally published at https://thegeopolitics.com/china-is-not-committing-genocide-in-xinjiang/

Genocide committed by the Chinese government in the Chinese province of Xinjiang is a commonplace narrative that gained speed over the past year or so, and it deserves closer examination. Genocide is the highest crime in the international crimes category, which itself is the highest category of crimes. Genocide accusations should never be made lightly, yet the word genocide creeps in everywhere in relation to Xinjiang – in the mainstream media, in formal accusations at the highest level by various governments, in academic and Twitter debates, and in the American government propaganda machine.

On its border with Afghanistan, China faces Uighur jihadists who are affiliated with Al Qaeda. Hundreds of Uighur jihadists fight with ISIS in Syria and across the region. Uighur jihadists are a part of the global jihad movement. It’s the same people that the US government fought after 9/11. Yet, the US government is more than happy to stoke the radicalization forces in Xinjiang, so that the Chinese government cracks down on the population even more, and the US government can point the finger to a cruel, authoritarian regime committing genocide.

To answer the question whether China is committing genocide, it has to be acknowledged that many things are going on in Xinjiang: counter-terrorism against Uighur jihadists, fighting a separatist movement and sentiments, resettlement and deportations, fear-based and fear-inducing crackdown on the local population, detention in camps, political repression, cultural and religious pressure, unjust persecution of innocent people, and many other things that are in-between all that, and perhaps a lot more that we in the West might not be aware of.

What’s missing from the analysis of the genocide narrative is the element of the intent to destroy the group – the decisive element that makes genocide very difficult to prove, uniformly, time after time. You might remember that the genocide case at the International Court of Justice against Serbia showed that there was genocide committed in Srebrenica, and the state was guilty of not preventing and addressing it, and for not punishing the criminals. It could not be proven that the state itself committed genocide, even in that clear-cut example where it was proven that genocide took place. That’s as close as we ever got to seeing what a genocide case would look like in the court room, and the standard indeed is very high. This is not knit-picking or just semantics – this is the center of gravity in the international crime of genocide.

Hitler’s genocide against the Jews had the intent to end them as a group – full extermination, so that they no longer exist. That’s a clear-cut case of genocide in the legal sense, not just anecdotally to denote something very horrible. Turkey’s genocide against the Armenians during the First World War has also been recognized by the American government. Saddam gassing the Kurds is similar – he wanted to destroy and get rid of the Kurds as a group, so that they didn’t exist in Iraq.

What’s happening in Xinjiang can be compared to the Japanese internment camps after Pearl Harbor. It was not genocide directed to exterminate the Japanese population in the US because the US government hated Japanese people and wanted to end them as a group. Instead, it was over the top, heavy-handed suppression, repression and revenge on people from the same group as the military enemy. It was a way to make sure that people from the enemy ethnic group won’t pose a threat, as the US was fighting Japan externally. I think it’s safe to say that the Chinese regime does not intend to destroy the Uighurs as a group – it’s carrying out a number of systematic human rights violations against the population in order to suppress them, scatter them and diffuse the movement and the dissent, not to destroy them and exterminate them as a group.

States are always very careful when they utter the word genocide. You might remember that there was a lot of hesitation at the UN level to pronounce the genocide in Darfur as genocide. The reason was that once you make the determination that the highest of the highest international crimes is taking place, the UN and the international community have to step in. So, there are situations where the assessment errs on the lower side, failing to brand a genocide genocide. Other times, countries err on the opposite side – they exaggerate a human rights situation into genocide in order to tout the horn for political reasons. The Biden administration pronouncing the situation in Xinjiang genocide in 2021 is a clear example of that, and in time, history will also judge the US government’s assessment as an error. But that doesn’t matter because the US government needs the genocide narrative, now, in the context of hardening the Cold War rhetoric against China.

Jeffrey Sachs argued recently in Project Syndicate that the genocide accusations against China are unjustified, and I agree. That doesn’t mean that nothing is happening there. It simply means that the highest of the highest international crimes is not taking place.

You have to take a look at the US government’s treatment of the issue on the practical level. The US government hasn’t admitted any Uighur refugees over the past years.  Generally, Chinese refugees seeking asylum are not accepted into the US. Also, zero Uighurs were accepted in the United States, even though they were designated by Biden himself a priority refugee group in 2021, and the Biden administration claims genocide is taking place.

There is a reason for that, and it’s not a practical or logistical one in the sense that it must be close to impossible for Uighurs to apply for refugee status and escape the country – there are many Uighurs outside of China who would gladly try, and people from far worse and more difficult places apply and come to the US as refugees. It is also not the case that accepting Chinese refugees would be very rude to China. The US government has already accused China of genocide – I don’t think it can get ruder than that. Rather, the US government knows that there are hundreds of Uighurs fighting with ISIS in Syria and across the region, and they will be the first to apply, if the US government started taking in Uighurs. The US government knows that really well. That’s why it’s not opening up the refugee program to Uighurs, even if formally, the Uighurs are a priority refugee group for Biden.

The zero number simply shows that the US government is itself not convinced. It knows very well that hundreds from the group are engaged in jihad and it will be difficult to determine who is who. The US government itself fears this Chinese minority group and it doesn’t want to open its doors even to a small number for the worst, clear-cut cases of persecution.  In the same time, the US government scooped up and accepted indiscriminately thousands of Afghan refugees in 2021, without any vetting. So there is something much bigger behind the zero number of refugees fleeing genocide. The US government itself is not buying its own narrative, aware of the reality on the ground.

In terms of what can be done to help the situation of the Uighurs in China, you can’t make terrorists not want to be terrorists, you can’t make people who want to separate from China not want that, and you can’t make a government not crackdown on a group of people. What can be done, however, is to not support Uighur terrorist groups in and outside China, and to prevent a military escalation of the situation, which is something that the US government could be entertaining as an option, behind the scenes. There is nothing worse for innocent people from the same ethnic group than a government facing an actual terrorist or military threat.

With jihadist groups in the region, and around and inside Xinjiang, the most important priority for the international community right now is that the situation doesn’t grow into actual military hostilities, or worse, a civil war that draws in all kinds of forces. After Syria, the global jihadist movement could be eyeing Xinjiang to be next.

Iveta Cherneva is an author and commentator in the fields of international relations, security and human rights. Her most recent book is “America in free fall: the 2022 and 2024 elections and Trump’s return”. She writes on US-China-EU relations, among other geopolitical topics. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

The National Endowment for Democracy in US Hegemonism and Imperialism

History of Xinjiang Region — The National Endowment for Democracy in US Hegemonism and Imperialism

The National Endowment for Democracy in US Hegemonism and Imperialism

Article 7 of 10

Dr. Radhika Desai

By Radhika Desai

Originally published at https://radicaldesai.substack.com/p/the-national-endowment-for-democracy

This is the original text of my article published by CGTN today.

The NED in US Hegemonism and Imperialism

Radhika Desai

When the annals of US and Western imperialism and hegemonism are written, the National Endowment for Democracy will feature as one of their principal instruments. The publication of its Annual Report for 2025 is a good time to consider how it will be remembered.

2025 was a tumultuous year for the NED, leading it to reorder its priorities. It has never neglected China – portraying it as an ‘authoritarian’ country, as ensnaring other countries in ‘debt traps’ and as bullying its partners, for instance, along the Belt and Road and funding and aiding actors within China whether allegedly fighting for democracy in Hong Kong or against ‘genocide’ in Xinjiang, or against Covid restrictions at the end of 2022. However, 2026 will see China topping the list of countries targeted for most funding. How should we understand this?

The NED claims it is ‘an independent, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world’. This is wrong in three key ways.

First, it is not ‘independent’, it is not Non-Governmental Organization. Rather it is what is ironically known as a GONGO, a government-organised Non-Governmental Organization. Its budget comes form the State Department and is subject to Congressional approval. It is a creature of the US government.

Secondly, it was established to deal with rising criticism, within the US and abroad, of the covert operations of the US Central Intelligence Agency CIA, which manipulated politics in foreign countries, including through plots against progressive, left-wing political leaders like Lumumba, Allende and Castro and by interfering in elections and political parties, not only in the Third World but also in allegedly ‘allied’ Western Europe. Already in the mid-1960s, President Johnson had urged the creation of a ‘public-private’ organization to undertake these activities. With criticism culminating in the Church Committee to investigate the activities of the CIA, FBI and other US agencies against people and political leaders within and outside the US, the NED was launched in late 1983. As its first president declared publicly in 1991: ‘A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA’.

Even this is only partly true. The NED did not replace the CIA, whose covert operations continue down to the present day. The NED has, therefore, only added a new arm to the US’s destabilising activities around the world, now violating the sovereignty of countries openly, interfering in the public spheres of many societies, undermining their very purpose as arenas of national discussion in the national interest. Finally, not only do the NED’s activities involve introducing discourses not committed to the national interest of the country targeted, it also results in undermining the credibility of all public discourses, leaving public spheres almost irredeemably damaged.

The final problem lies with taking the NED’s claims to be promoting democracy at face value. In the name of promoting democracy, it promotes neoliberal capitalism. This involves the violating countries’ sovereignty in ways that matter most: the right of each country to organise its economy in its own national interests, based on its resources, its capacities and the needs and desires of its people.

This violation is central to the operation of hegemonism and imperialism: they demand that other countries organise their economies in ways that suit US and Western big corporations, give them access to markets for their excess production, investment and lending opportunities that make exorbitant profits and interest, and primary commodities, low technology manufactures and labour at low prices. Neoliberalism prevents societies from developing, since that would require, first of all, controlling and regulating, if not prohibiting, US and Western corporations and working to improve the prices and wages its working people receive. And it could even successful developers to contest the technological leadership of the imperialist and hegemonist countries, as China has done so well.

One might think that a US President elected on an ‘America First’ platform might not favour the NED and, indeed, 2025 was a hard year for the GONGO, with Elon Musk ensconced as ‘head’ of the infamous Department of Government Efficiency charged with slashing government spending, the NED was labelled ‘evil’ and had its funding cut. However, as with so much else in the Trump administration, its America First rhetoric has not matched its actions in government, which have reverted to imperialism and hegemonism. So, the NED was able to regain its funding after going to court, and then busied itself aligning with the Trump administration’s priorities. One key outcome was that whereas in 2024, Russia was the top target with $16m spent on it with China coming second with nearly $10m, in 2025, China topped the target list with $13m spent against it.

Arab League's visit to Xinjiang rejects Western accusations of ethnic genocide, religious persecution

History of Xinjiang Region — Arab League's visit to Xinjiang rejects Western accusations of ethnic genocide, religious persecution

Arab League's visit to Xinjiang rejects Western accusations of ethnic genocide, religious persecution

Article 8 of 10

People's Daily

By Global Times

Originally published at https://peoplesdaily.pdnews.cn/china/er/30001378149

Arab League's visit to Xinjiang rejects Western accusations of ethnic genocide, religious persecution

The delegation from the Arab League, after wrapping up a visit to Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, said that allegations of "ethnic genocide" and "religious persecution" are completely false, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated on Monday. Arab countries appreciate China's efforts in caring for minority groups, including Muslims in Xinjiang, and they will continue to support China's endeavors in maintaining the development and stability of Xinjiang.

A delegation of diplomats and officials from the Arab League and its Secretariat visit the old town of Kashgar in northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, May 31, 2023. (Photo:Xinhua)

After attending the 18th senior diplomats and officials' meeting and the 7th senior official-level strategic political dialogue of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, the 34-member group from 16 Arab countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria visited Xinjiang between May 30 to June 2.

The group visited a number of locations in Xinjiang and said that the reality on the ground does not match what is portrayed by Western media. The region boasts harmony and stability, a rapidly growing economy and a colorful and prosperous culture, with residents living and working in peace and contentment.

Mohammed Haj Ibrahim, director-general of the Department of Asian and African Affairs under the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that China has made constructive contributions to the fight against terrorism and extremism. International cooperation on counter-terrorism should be strengthened, including the exchange of information and experience.

The delegation visited the Id Kah Mosque and the old town of Kashgar, some 1,500 kilometers southwest of Urumqi. Mohamed Moustafa Kamal Mohamed, permanent representative of Egypt to the Arab League, said he was very glad to see that the historic mosques in Kashgar are well preserved and equipped with modern facilities.

The group praised China's 7-billion-yuan ($987 million) renovation of the old town of Kashgar, an ancient Silk Road city with a history stretching back more than 2,000 years.

Mohanad Alaklouk, permanent representative of Palestine to the Arab League, said he was very happy to see the ancient buildings and experience the long-standing culture of the old town of Kashgar on his first trip to Xinjiang.

The Chinese government has made huge efforts to renovate the old town and preserve its wonderful cultural heritage, and all these efforts and achievements are impressive, he said.

Arab countries have consistently held a controversial position on the Xinjiang issue, stated Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, adding that the genuine impressions of the Arab League delegation during their visit to Xinjiang once again fully demonstrate that the sinister plot of manipulating the Xinjiang issue to smear China is destined to fail.

Slanders about China's treatment of Uyghurs are aimed at bolstering the military-industrial complex

History of Xinjiang Region — Slanders about China's treatment of Uyghurs are aimed at bolstering the military-industrial complex

Slanders about China's treatment of Uyghurs are aimed at bolstering the military-industrial complex

Article 9 of 10

Friends of Socialist China

Originally published at https://socialistchina.org/2021/12/21/slanders-about-chinas-treatment-of-uyghurs-are-aimed-at-bolstering-the-military-industrial-complex/

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Friends of Socialist China

A platform based on supporting the People's Republic of China and spreading understanding of Chinese socialism

Interviewed by Jacquie Luqman for Sputnik’s By Any Means Necessary radio show, Friends of Socialist China co-editor Carlos Martinez discusses the US’s new Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Washington Post’s ‘smoking gun’ report linking Huawei to surveillance technology in Xinjiang. The full radio show can be found here.

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Is China Committing Genocide? Behind the US Government's Propaganda Campaign

History of Xinjiang Region — Is China Committing Genocide? Behind the US Government's Propaganda Campaign

Is China Committing Genocide? Behind the US Government's Propaganda Campaign

Article 10 of 10

Mint Press News

By Dan Cohen

Originally published at https://www.mintpressnews.com/china-uighur-genocide-behind-us-government-propaganda/276085/

XINJIANG PROVINCE, CHINA — Up is down. War is peace. And the U.S., Canada and the Netherlands have accused China of genocide.

“This is forced labor, this is forced sterilization, this is forced abortions, …the kind of thing we haven’t seen in an awfully long time in this world,” declared then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

To be fair, the accusers are experts in genocide: the U.S. and its junior imperial partner, Canada, wiped out their indigenous populations. Today the U.S. is responsible for the three biggest human rights catastrophes in the world in Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen. And the Netherlands is just coming to terms with its massacres in Indonesia.

Mike Pompeo’s successor at the State Department, Antony Blinken, is sticking with the genocide claim. That’s despite the State Department’s top lawyers stating that whatever might be happening in Xinjiang, it’s not genocide. That’s right. Chinese Communist Party genocide denialists have infiltrated the U.S. State Department to impurify our precious bodily fluids.

Pure Zenz

So what did Pompeo and Blinken base their accusations of genocide on? There must have been a pretty strong body of on-the-ground reporting and research. Or not. It turns out that one guy is pretty much responsible for the whole narrative. His name is Adrian Zenz.

“Adrian’s research, as many of you know, has been key in establishing the existence of the camps in the first place, and in documenting the buildup of the PRC police state,” explained Hudson Institute fellow Eric Brown.

Zenz appeared almost overnight as a go-to expert on Xinjiang and Uighurs. Now he’s a regular on mainstream outlets and even on supposedly progressive news show Democracy Now. In fact, in Mike Pompeo’s official statement accusing China of genocide, he directly credited Zenz.

But most of his so-called research has been discredited, and he’s been revealed to be a straight-up fabulist. A Grayzone News investigation showed that Zenz’s claims of 1 million Uighur detained in camps were based “on a single report by Istiqlal TV, a Uyghur exile media organization based in Turkey, which was republished by Newsweek Japan.” In other words, no evidence, and not even an attempt.

Meanwhile, Zenz’s study accusing China of forced sterilizations didn’t contain any proof of coercion. The Grayzone showed how “Zenz consistently framed the expansion of public healthcare services in Xinjiang as evidence of a genocide in the making.”

Characterizing expanded access to birth control as genocide is what the Christian Right does. So it makes perfect sense that Zenz – an evangelical fundamentalist himself – holds this view.

Zenz’s first book is a psychedelic trip through the mind of a Rapture-ready Christer. Entitled “Worthy to Escape: Why All Believers Will Not Be Raptured Before the Tribulation,” the book claims that in the end times, “God’s refining process will wipe out all unbelieving Jews who refuse to come to Christ.” So Zenz writes racist fantasies about Jews, like me. Who knows what he thinks will happen to Uighur Muslims!

He also says that Satan is using postmodernism to attack gender-authority structures and undermine what he believes are God’s unique but different role assignments for men and women. Clearly, he is against women’s rights. So does he support criminalizing birth control in his native Germany and here in the U.S. where he now resides?

Even more deranged, Zenz’s big genocide study claimed that women in Xinjiang receive 800 to 1600 IUD insertions per capita. That means every Uighur woman is surgically implanted with 4 to 8 IUDs every single day of the year.

Evidently, none of the outlets that feverishly published his claims bothered to give even a cursory examination to the evidence, or lack thereof, that he presents.

Other reasons (besides genocide) for having fewer kids

In reality, the decrease in birth rate is a normal, predictable outcome of economic development. When people are more financially secure, they choose to have fewer kids and do it later in life.

In fact, China is pouring money into Xinjiang to develop its economy.

According to a 2015 U.S. government study, “To decrease ethnic instability in Xinjiang, the Chinese government’s plan is to economically develop the region.”

That’s right. Chinese Communist Party agents have also time-traveled to 2015 to infiltrate the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and write a study trying to justifying genocide. Damn you Xi!!!

As a result of this economic development, China’s birth rate is falling at rapid rates in all regions, which comes with its own set of problems, like an aging population – similar to what the U.S. is dealing with. So Chinese lawmakers are now pushing for the universal two-child policy to be changed to three.

But this rapture-ready fanatic Adrian Zenz isn’t the only source for these claims of genocide, right?

Well, Newsweek cites Adrian Zenz.

How about CNN: the self-described most trusted name in news? CNN says its reporting found that some Uyghur women were being forced to use birth control and undergo sterilization… There it is. Can’t argue with that.

…The article was “based on a report by Adrian Zenz.”

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum accuses China of crimes against humanity and genocide against Uighurs. They reference “leaked government documents” and “researchers,” presumably referring to Zenz.

Zenz and the Genocide Choir

With Zenz at the center, a cast of shady characters have promoted this disinformation to support the phony genocide claim:

Rushan Abbas — former Pentagon contractor who worked for Radio Free Asia, a U.S. propaganda mouthpiece started by the CIA.

Darren Byler — a fellow at the Wilson Center, which is funded by the U.S. government and a host of other NATO governments, big banks and corporations. His resume shows he has also been funded to the tune of 100,000 dollars through the U.S. Department of Education.

He does panels with Louise Greve — the former vice president of the CIA cutout National Endowment for Democracy, who now runs the NED-funded Uyghur Human Rights Project.

There’s Human Rights Watch China Director Sophie Richardson — this cold-warrior wrote an op-ed in the liberal interventionist Foreign Affairs magazine calling for Biden to confront China over human rights. What the hell are the people at Human Rights Watch smoking to believe the guy who just bombed Syria and sponsors Israel’s project of apartheid has a shred of crediblity on human rights?

Then there’s the Australian Strategic Policy Institute – the self-declared independent, non-partisan think tank, which is totally dependent on funding from the Australian and American departments of defense, NATO, weapons makers, the Embassy of Japan, and the Embassy of Israel, among others.

2018 and the sudden “genocide” drumbeat

The Uighur genocide claim was virtually unheard of before 2018. Up until that point, Western media coverage of the issue was dramatically different.

Take The New York Times. In the 1980s, it published a series of articles about how Uighur Muslims were actually prospering and Islam was flourishing under Chinese rule.

By the 1980s, this separatist movement was becoming violent. In one 1997 incident, the Times reported on, about a thousand Muslim separatists of the Uighur ethnic minority rampaged through the town Yining on Wednesday, smashing cars, burning shops and beating up ethnic Chinese to protest Beijing’s rule.

In 1994, the Times reported that Uighur extremists were returning from Afghanistan, where the CIA spent a billion dollars arming what it called a “University of Jihad.” The Times noted that “Afghan veterans have fought in two western provinces, Uighur and Xinjiang, where they have armed and trained Chinese Muslim rebels.”

In the wake of the U.S. destruction of Yugoslavia, the Times noted the separatists fantasized about a NATO bombing campaign

This Uighur separatist movement, its violent anti-Han rampages, or the militants returning from Afghanistan are barely mentioned in any of the contemporary Times reports claiming genocide.

In 1981, The Washington Post wrote about growing ethnic tensions in Xinjiang, noting that “Peking has taken pains to ensure ethnic rights and elevate minority group members to leadership positions. In Xinjiang, a kind of affirmative action program has been started at the provincial university to guarantee that 60 percent of new students are from ethnic backgrounds.” Today, none of this gets mentioned in the Post’s coverage.

How about Newsweek? Back in 2000, it reported that Xinjiang was a weak point that threatened to fragment China along ethnic lines, that Uighur separatists threatened the security of Beijing, and some might even join forces with Islamic “holy warriors.” Now it’s all genocide, all the time.

With these misleading or outright false claims based on manipulated statistics, the only evidence for a Uighur genocide is anecdotal, which is hard to prove or disprove. But the testimony in Western media is often full of contradictions.

Take the case of Sayragul Sauytbay. In 2019, she told the UK tabloid The Daily Mail that she witnessed concentration camp “inmates being flayed, raped by guards in front of other prisoners, given injections that made them infertile and force-fed pork.” Keep in mind this is the same tabloid that has spent years peddling Islamophobic hysteria and once warned about Muslim fanatics hijacking the royal wedding. Sauytbay has told similar stories in more respectable newspapers like Foreign Policy, Haaretz and Deutsche Welle.

But back in 2018, Sauytbay told the Globe and Mail that “She did not personally see violence.” For some reason, she completely changed her story. Maybe she was fearful and traumatized, or maybe she falsified it. Apparently, none of the outlets that published her testimony bothered to check into that discrepancy.

Then there’s Tursunay Ziyawundun. She’s the central character in the forced-sterilization narrative cooked up by Adrian Zenz. She’s delivered teary testimonies for the BBC, CNN and Democracy Now. A few months before those reports, however, she told Buzzfeed News, “I wasn’t beaten or abused.” Again, why did she change her story? And why did all of these media outlets fail to do a basic check into her past statements?

Older rumblings

In my research, the first mention of Uighur genocide took place back in 1997, when several so-called “Chinese dissidents” testified to Congress. One woman named Rizvangul Uighur claimed that China’s birth control policy involved murdering babies as soon as they were born. She said the one-child policy was so strictly enforced that “babies are being killed in [the] delivery room without seeing the mother’s face and world.”

Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) – a homophobic bigot from the Christian right – claimed that Uighur women “are often taken physically to the abortion mill. Forced abortions can be performed very late in pregnancy, even in the ninth month. Sometimes the baby’s skull is crushed with forceps as it emerges from the birth canal. Either the woman or her husband may then be forcibly sterilized.”

That’s the same Chris Smith who several months before was railing against abortion rights at the so-called March For Life rally and accusing Bill Clinton of murdering unborn children:

You are and your legacy will be abortion president. You know, mister president, that the scriptures admonish us to pray for those in authority. And we will be faithful to that. As believers we will pray and fast, and sincerely hope, that you reject the culture of death.”

Neither Rizvangul Uighur nor Smith bothered to mention that in 1997 Uighurs and other ethnic minorities were not subject to the one-child policy. So the birthrate in Xinjiang province was 19.66 – meaning there were nearly 20 births per 1,000 people. Meanwhile, in Beijing, the birthrate was 7.91.

Of course, there was a clear political goal in the bogus testimony delivered in Congress. It was coordinated to be released on the day that Bill Clinton met with President of China Jiang Zemin.

Members of Congress were demanding Clinton take a hardline approach to China, some even using racist epithets to warn of a Chinese invasion. “The White House will not wise up until there’s a full blown rice paddy on the east lawn,” warned Democratic Ohio Congressman James Traficant, whose career ultimately ended in a bribery conviction and expulsion from Congress.

After that, save for a couple of Voice of America articles, there was no mention in Western media about the Uighur genocide — until 2018.

The contemporary hypocritical propaganda barrage

It’s worth pointing out that the vast majority of American politicians taking up the supposed Uighur genocide cause are totally supportive of U.S.-sponsored genocides around the world. Like Chris Smith (yup, he’s still there).

The same Chris Smith who welcomed Benjamin Netanyahu with a statement of “unequivocal support for Israel” just a few months after it killed 551 Palestinian children in Gaza.

Or Florida Senator Rick Scott – also a bestie of the butcher of Gaza, Benjamin Netanyahu.

The neocon Michael Pillsbury – the same Michael Pillsbury who in the 1980s, as a state department official, oversaw the CIA’s arming of the Afghanistan mujahideen with Stinger missiles, the same mujahideen who would train Uighur jihadists.

The Uighur genocide is almost perfectly tailored for right-wing agitators who want to portray socialism as a totalitarian system akin to Nazism. “When people say ‘never again’ they were (sic) full of crap. They’re just full of crap. This is one area where the United States should be taking a leading role… shaving people’s heads, shipping them on trains and to concentration camps where you force them into labor and/or sterilize them,” declared Ben Shapiro.

“Many of them women who, of their own volition, had the Chinese government paramilitary forcefully end those pregnancies. Forcefully sterilize,” said Tim Pool. “They’re trying to sterilize the Uighur population but force the Han population genetic code into other Uighur women,” his fellow podcaster claimed.

Should I mention here that the U.S. government forcibly sterilized 1,400 Black women in a California prison? Haven’t seen any U.S. government officials or news media talk about that!

This propaganda deluge is having a powerful impact on U.S. public opinion. In 2017, just before the Uighur genocide narrative kicked into high gear, 53% of Americans had a favorable view of China – the highest in three decades. Now, a new poll shows it’s down to 20% – a historic low. That was accompanied by a 150% increase in anti-Asian hate crimes in U.S. cities.

Trillions of dollars worth of “caring”

So what is this all about? Why did corporate media and militaristic right wing politicians, along with a surprising number of progressive dupes, suddenly start freaking out about a supposed genocide in China?

Xinjiang is the heart of China’s Belt and Road initiative, the economic plan that connects Asia to Europe and the Middle East. It’s an alternative model to the dictatorship of the U.S. dollar, where the World Bank and International Monetary Fund turn countries into neo-colonies for American corporations – a system backed up with the constant threat of military invasion.

The U.S. can’t deal with legitimate competition, so it’s resorting to smears in an attempt to isolate China diplomatically and slow its economic growth.

It’s either that, or the government and military that forcibly sterilized minority women in prisons, tortured in Abu Ghraib, relies on prison labor, and is waging genocidal wars against multiple Muslim-majority countries, just simply cares a whole lot about the Uighurs.

Feature photo | Graphic by Antonio Cabrera

Dan Cohen is the Washington DC correspondent for Behind The Headlines. He has produced widely distributed video reports and print dispatches from across Israel-Palestine. He tweets at @DanCohen3000.

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Citations

Citations

The Idea of the 'Uyghur Genocide' and the Realities of Xinjiang

Notes

Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State,” China Brief 17, no. 4 (March 14, 2017).

Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief 17, no. 12 (September 21, 2017). A lesser-read piece by Zenz is “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude’: China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey 38, no. 1 (2019): 102–28.

Gerry Shih, “China’s Mass Indoctrination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution,” Associated Press, May 17, 2018.

U.S. Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Chairs Urge Ambassador Branstad to Prioritize Mass Detention of Uyghurs, Including Family Members of Radio Free Asia Employees,” press release, April 4, 2018.

For a forceful takedown of this work, see Gareth Porter and Max Blumenthal, “US State Department Accusation of China ‘Genocide’ Relied on Data Abuse and Baseless Claims by Far-Right Ideologue,” The Grayzone, February 18, 2021.

Lily Kuo, “China ‘Legalises’ Internment Camps for Million Uighurs,” Guardian, October 11, 2018; and Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018.

Marije Vlaskamp, “Beijings grote geheim stond op haar laptop,” deVolkskrant, December 7, 2019.

The China Cables are available at the website of the International Consortium of International Journalism, based in Washington DC, which was funded by the U.S. State Department from its founding in 1997 to 2025. During the period of the China Cables, the Consortium received U.S. government funds. The Karakax List is written about in Adrian Zenz, “The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk 8, no. 2 (February 2020).

Fergus Shiel, “Uighur Woman Tells Dutch Newspaper She Shared Leaked Chinese Government Documents,” International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, December 7, 2019.

Adrian Zenz, “Sterilisations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation, 2020.

Zenz, “Sterilisations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control,” 3.

Michael R. Pompeo, “Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang,” press statement, January 19, 2021.

Government of Canada, “Parliamentary Committee Notes: Use of the Term ‘Genocide’ and the Situation in Xinjiang,” January 27, 2023.

UN Human Rights Council, Forty-First Session, Agenda Item 3, “Letter Dated 12 July 2019 from the Representatives of Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, the Congo, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the State of Palestine to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council,” A/HRC/41/G/17, July 12, 2019.

Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, “Joint Statement of 69 Countries at the Interactive Dialogue on High Commissioner’s Annual Report at the 47th Session of the Human Rights Council,” June 22, 2021.

Organization of Islamic Countries, Resolutions on Muslim Communities and Muslim Minorities in the Non-OIC Member States, adopted by the Forty-Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Abu Dhabi, March 1–2, 2019, 5.

A State Council July 2019 report titled Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang rehearses some of this history, although with its own priorities. See State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2019).

Xue Zhang, “Imperial Maps of Xinjiang and Their Readers in Qing China, 1660–1860,” Journal of Chinese History 4, no. 1 (2020); Jianxiong Ge, Zhongguo Lidai Jiangyu de Bianqian [The Evolution of China’s Territorial Boundaries through the Dynasties] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1997).

James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 2nd edition, 2021).  “Turkistan” is a much older Persian ethnographic term for Turkic-speaking people.

The literature on Uyghur history is beginning to be well-documented in both English and Chinese. For the better academic work in English, see David Brophy, Uyghur Nation: Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016); and Millward, Eurasian Crossroads. For Chinese texts, see Zhiping Pan, “Eguo Datasta Si’tan ‘Zhajide’ Yundong yu Jindai Weiwuer Qimeng Yundong—Xinjiang ‘Dongtu’ersitan’ Yundong de Yuanqi,” Xibei Minzu Yanjiu, no. 3 (2014); and Ke Wang, Dongtu’ersitan Duli Yundong: 1930 Niandai zhi 1940 Niandai (Hong Kong: Xianggang Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe, 2013).

Ablet Kamalov, “Uyghur Historiography,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History, October 29, 2021, oxfordre.com.

Sean Roberts, “The Narrative of Uyghur Terrorism and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Uyghur Militancy,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); and Maria Soloshcheva, “The Uyghur Terrorism: Phenomenon and Genesis,” Iran and the Caucasus 21, no. 4 (2017). For the official Chinese government white paper, see State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “Xinjiang de Fan Kong, Qu Jiduanhua Douzheng yu Renquan Baozhang” [“The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang”], white paper, March 2019.

Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed Books, 1994).

Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

State Council Information Office, Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang.

Notably, this was registered in the Western academic literature. See, for instance, Andrew Mumford, “Theory-Testing Uyghur Terrorism in China,” Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no. 5 (2018); Millward, Eurasian Crossroads.

Alyson J. K. Bailes, Pal Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail Troitskiy, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” SIPRI Policy Paper no. 17, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007.

United Nations Security Council, “Reason for Listing: Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement,” April 7, 2011; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Press Statement on the UN Designation of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement,” press release, September 12, 2002.

One of the authors, Vijay Prashad, met many of these fighters in northern Syria in late 2014. They had been fighting alongside Jund al-Aqsa, a wing of the Islamic State. Most of the other fighters saw them as the most ideologically committed to the al-Qaeda tradition and as very brave and dangerous on the battlefield.

The numbers of dead are disputed, but the fact of the violence is uncontested.

Wang Hui, “The ‘Tibetan Question’ East and West: Orientalism, Regional Ethnic Autonomy, and the Politics of Dignity,” in The Politics of Imagining Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). For the Chinese original, see 汪晖,「东方主义、民族区域自治与尊严政治——关于”西藏问题”的一点思考」,《天涯》2008年第4期.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “CPC Guidelines for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era: Practice and Achievements,” September 20, 2025. The numbers in this report are close to what demographers find, such as Jianxin Li and Liya Qiu, “Demographic Transition and Population Dynamics in Xinjiang, China,” China Population and Development Studies 8 (2024). There is a body of literature on health disparities that mostly negatively impacted minorities, but this literature is out-of-date, with the trend lines now showing overall improvement. Brenda Schuster, “Gaps in the Silk Road: An Analysis of Population Health Disparities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” China Quarterly, no. 198 (2009). For a response to some of the Western scholarship, see Jianxin Li and Liya Qiu, “Xinjiang renkou zhuanbian yu fazhan—Huíying xifang youguan Xinjiang renkou ‘zhongzu miezhong’ miu lun,” Xibei Renkou 44, no. 5 (2023).

Zhang Donggang, The Belt and Road. A New Route to a Shared Future (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2023).

Ürümqi is seen as a key “pivot city” in the entire Belt and Road complex and is now one of the five gateway airports into China. See: The Belt and Road Research Team, Pivot Cities on the Belt and Road (Beijing: Chongyang Institute for Financial Services of Renmin University/New World Press, 2016), 216–22.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “Poverty Alleviation: China’s Experience and Contribution,” white paper, April 6, 2021.

For a broad assessment of poverty eradication, see Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, “Serve the People: The Eradication of Extreme Poverty in China,” Studies in Socialist Construction, no. 1 (July 23, 2021).

 A more recent article on southern Xinjiang and mechanization is Xie Dawei, “Shendu pinkun diqu yidi fupin banqian chanye fazhan moshi ji zhiyue yinsu fenxi—yi Xinjiang nanjiang san di zhou wei li,” Ganhanqu Dili, January 2021; Xiaoyun Li and Yang Chengxue, “The Battle Against Poverty: An Alternative Revolutionary Practice in China’s Post-Revolutionary Era,” Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought, no. 3 (June 2020), in Chinese. An English translation of the same article was published by Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research in Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought 1, no. 2 (June 2023).

“Human Costs,” Costs of War Project, Brown University, costsofwar.watson.brown.edu; David Michael Smith, Endless Holocausts (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2023).

Zenz, “The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang.”

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data,” white paper, September 26, 2021.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, “2021 Census Shows Changes in Australia’s Religious Diversity,” press release, June 28, 2022, abs.gov.

Nathan Ruser, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Tilla Hoja, “Cultural Erasure: Tracing the Destruction of Uyghur and Islamic Spaces in Xinjiang,” Policy Brief no. 38, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 24, 2020.

Wang Hui, “The ‘Tibetan Question’ East and West.”